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This dissertation is intended primarily as a contribution to postcolonial criticism and theory 
and the rhetorical analysis of epidemic writing as they undergo various crises and sublimations in the 
geopolitical landscape that has come into focus since the multilateral undertaking of the War on 
Terror in 2001. I begin with a set of questions about representation: when, how, and why are extra-
legal, insurgent, anti-colonial, and terrorist forms of violence figured as epidemics in literature and 
connected discursive forms? What events in colonial history and scientific practice make such 
representations possible? And how do these representational patterns and their corollary modes of 
interpretation both reflect and transform discourse and policy?  
Although the figure is ubiquitous, it is far from simple. I argue that the discourse of the late 
colonial era is crucial to an understanding of how epidemiological science arises and converges with 
colonial management technologies, binding the British response to the 1857 mutiny and a growing 
Indian nationalism to the development of surveillance and quarantine programs to eradicate the 
threat of the great nineteenth century epidemic, the so-called Indian or Asiatic cholera. Through a 
constellation of readings of key texts in the British and French colonial and postcolonial traditions, 
including selected works of Bram Stoker (Dracula, “The Invisible Giant”), Albert Camus (La Peste, 
Chronique Algérienne) and Salman Rushdie (The Satanic Verses, Shalimar the Clown, Joseph Anton), I 
demonstrate how epidemics have played a complex representational role in relationship to violence, 
enabling us to imagine specific kinds of actors as absolute, powerful enemies of biological and social 
life, while also recoding violent political action as an organic affliction in order to efface or suppress 
the possibility of agency.  
 
There are two crucial aspects of this story that run throughout the histories and texts I 
engage with in this project. The first is that the figure of insurgent violence as epidemic has two 
opposing, yet interrelated faces. One looks to the promise of scientism, data collection and rational 
study as a means of eradicating the threat of irregular warfare. This is the function of the figure 
embedded in the practices and progress of epidemiology. On the other hand, the mythopoetics of 
infectious disease also point toward the occult and the unknowable, and code natural forces of 
destruction as sublime and inevitable. This is the function of the figure embedded the literary and 
political history of the term terror, which encompasses both natural and political events and the 
structures of feeling to which they give rise. The result of this duality is the persistent epistemic 
collapse of data-driven rational scientism and irrational sublimity in texts where epidemic and terror 
are at issue.  
The second crucial aspect of this story is that the dissolution of a colonial world system 
changes the shape of thinking about both epidemics and violence by displacing a binary architecture 
of antinomy in both public health and politics. The broadened view of epidemic since the end of the 
nineteenth century, in other words, has moved us away from metaphors of bellicosity to a more 
multi-factorial view of bacteriology and virology in temporal, geographic, and demographic space. 
One of the main goals of this project is to examine the relationship between these shifting 
epistemologies, narrative form, and imperial strategy. A connected through-line in the dissertation 
attempts to map what becomes of the biologistic and organicist conception of the state—which are 
already a matter of representation and imagination—as the very notions of biotoic life and the 
purview of the organism undergo no less radical redefinitions than the concept of the nation itself, 
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The whole earth is our hospital 
  Endowed by the ruined millionaire, 
  Wherein, if we do well, we shall 
  Die of the absolute paternal care 
  That will not leave us, but prevents us everywhere.  




In July of 2011, about two months after “Operation Neptune Spear,” the raid on a large 
residential compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, ended with the killing of Osama Bin Laden, it was 
widely reported that a key United States asset in targeting the Al-Qaeda leader had been a Pakistani 
physician by the name of Shakil Afridi.1 A state surgeon in the Khyber Agency of the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas, Afridi allegedly supervised a Central Intelligence Agency-backed 
hepatitis B vaccination program as a cover for the collection of crucial information, including blood 
samples, in the area where Bin Laden was thought to be hiding. The campaign began in one of 
Abbottabad’s impoverished districts, Nawa Sher, where health workers from the region, including 
Afridi himself, who had formerly conducted polio vaccination campaigns and advocacy, stopped 
people on the street and knocked on doors to determine the immunization status of needy residents, 
offering free tests and injections when necessary. Matthieu Aikins, an Afghanistan-based journalist, 
reported in January 2013 that Dr. Afridi’s roughly 20-person vaccination team was instructed to 
perform rapid hepatitis tests on each patient who agreed to the vaccination. This test required the 
                                                
1 The Guardian was the first major news outlet to cover the incident. Saeed Shah, “CIA organized 
fake vaccination drive to get Osama bin Laden’s family DNA,” Guardian, July 11, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/11/cia-fake-vaccinations-osama-bin-ladens-dna. 
2 
drawing of a small amount of blood. If the test came back negative, the patient was to be 
immunized; nurses would administer one of a series of three injections, the second and third would 
follow at intervals of one month and six months later. Afridi would then collect the used tests along 
with the identifying information attached to them, and turn them over to his American handlers. As 
with many public health campaigns in the area, the team targeted unimmunized children. One of the 
nurses Aikins interviewed, a woman who goes by the name of Bakhto, claimed to have given oral 
polio vaccines to seven children at the suspected residence of the Bin Laden family the year before. 
It was among these children, U.S. intelligence operatives hoped, that they would find some genetic 
confirmation of the presence of the Bin Laden family in Abbottabad before carrying out an 
unauthorized military operation on Pakistani soil.2 DNA from Bin Laden’s sister, who died at 
Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston in 2010, was to be used as the basis for a match. It is 
unclear whether such evidence was collected, but the timing of Afridi’s team’s visit to Bin Laden’s 
home between April 21 and April 27, 2011, and the authorization two days later, on April 29, of the 
raid that would kill him, has suggested to some that actionable information collected through the 
fake vaccination program was likely operative in the decision to strike.3  
News of Afridi’s cooperation with the CIA seems to have emerged only when he was 
arrested by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) and held on treason charges soon 
after the Bin Laden operation. Speaking to the logic of the arrest, an unnamed Pakistani official 
remarked, “he was working for a spy agency of a third country, irrespective of the fact that that 
                                                
2 Mark Mazzetti, “Vaccination Ruse Used in Pursuit of Bin Laden,” New York Times, July 11, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/world/asia/12dna.html?_r=0. 




country is an ally.” 4 Through the vicissitudes of what a number of news outlets have pointedly 
described as “colonial-era tribal laws” that are still in place in some areas of the North West Frontier 
Province, Afridi was tried without a defense attorney or jury not for treasonous cooperation with the 
United States, as the remarks of the official above would seem to suggest, but rather for conspiring 
with and supplying medical treatment to the militant Islamist group Lashkar-e-Islam. He was 
sentenced to 33 years in prison, which he is currently serving in Peshawar. Although Afridi now 
claims to have had no contact with CIA handlers, officials in the U.S. government confirmed in July 
of 2011 that the doctor had indeed been acting on behalf of the United States, and that the CIA had 
planned the hepatitis B scheme in Abbottabad.5 Former Defense Secretary and CIA director Leon 
Panetta, in an appearance on 60 Minutes, said that Afridi had “helped provide intelligence that was 
very helpful with regards to this operation,” and called his imprisonment “unfortunate,” arguing that 
Afridi had not in any way acted against Pakistan, but had provided crucial assistance to an operation 
that would benefit both nations.6 A small group of United States congress members have tried to 
encourage the U.S. government to organize protection for Afridi, but it has not been a popular 
cause; instead the Senate Appropriations Committee voted to cut Pakistani aid by 33 million dollars 
in the year 2013, a number that reflects the duration of Afridi’s sentence, and serves as a reminder to 
Pakistan of the economic necessity of its full cooperation in the War on Terror.7  
                                                
4 Jon Boone, “Doctor who helped US in search for Osama Bin Laden jailed for 33 years,” Guardian, 
May 23, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/23/doctor-bin-laden-cia-jail.   
5 Jason Ukman, “CIA defends running vaccine program to find bin Laden,” Washington Post, July 13, 
2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-defends-running-vaccine-
program-to-find-bin-laden/2011/07/13/gIQAbLcFDI_story.html. 
6 Leon Panetta, interview, CBS News, June 10, 2012. 
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7396619n. 
7 Chris McGreal “US cuts Pakistan’s aid in protest at jail for doctor who helped find Bin Laden,” 
Guardian, May 24, 2012 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/24/us-pakistan-aid-doctor-
bin-laden. 
4 
Responding to the revelation of the CIA plot, World Health Organization spokeswoman 
Hayatee Hasan remarked, “health interventions are by nature apolitical….[w]e hope that this story 
does not prevent children in Pakistan being vaccinated against polio, measles and other vaccine-
preventable diseases.”8 Hasan’s claim reveals an interesting paradox that carries with it a complicated 
history. If we assume, as she suggests, that health interventions have a “natural” relationship to 
politics, then her claim is best understood as an effort to establish the relationship she describes as a 
norm—in other words, health interventions must strive to be apolitical if they are to engender and 
retain the trust of the people who most need them. In this sense, Hasan’s claim is hopeful, but it 
also serves as an unintentional reminder of how often health interventions have served as a cover 
for political action. Indeed, the hepatitis B vaccination campaign continues a centuries-long 
collusion of epidemic medicine and imperial and pseudo-imperial power. From the prohibitions on 
religious pilgrimage in 19th century India to the eugenic and scientific alibis of genocide in Europe, 
to forced sterilization in Israel, the withholding of syphilis treatment in Alabama, Nestlé’s world-
wide promotion of infant formula, and the continued assault on reproductive rights in the United 
States, public health interventions bear neither a simple nor a consistent relationship to politics, 
even—perhaps especially—at the level of international humanitarian intervention. Hasan’s statement 
is undeniably pragmatic in that it advances the mandate of the organization she represents, which 
works on the premise that health is an inalienable human right that ought not be jeopardized by 
political aims and actions. Still, her claim that “health interventions are by nature apolitical” 
                                                
8 Quoted in Sebastian Abbot, “Reported CIA Vaccine Ruse sparks fear in Pakistan” Associated Press, 




expresses a logic that has been put to harmful use in the interest of surveying and controlling social 
behavior, especially in colonial and neo-imperial contexts.  
Hasan’s insistence that programs to promote public health transcend the political is not only 
historically incomplete, it also articulates a logic that subtends a long-standing representational 
practice, which we can locate in a number of key works of colonial and postcolonial literature. This 
representational practice collapses an image of epidemic space with that of political intransigence, 
projecting specific kinds of enemies, especially those not associated with a recognized sovereign 
state, as coterminous with plagues, cancers, viruses, or infections. This kind of figuring or encoding 
has the effect of naturalizing forms of opposition that arise in these spaces as epidemics, such that 
their eradication becomes a matter of global health, which stands as an unquestioned good, rather 
than a matter of politics. The effect of this figuration is a depoliticization of conflict. If we think 
about systematic violence outside the framework of war as epidemic, it becomes easier to justify all 
measures against it in defense of the bodily well-being of humanity, the world, or the globe. It is 
here that we can begin to see the significance of the recent hepatitis B scheme in Abbottabad as a 
culmination of a complex discursive and epistemic history encompassing the dismantling of a 
colonial system, the development of a discipline devoted to the study and prevention of global 
epidemics, and narrative practices that bring the two phenomena into mutually constitutive figural 
relationship with one another by way of the insistent, ubiquitous depiction of extralegal violence as a 
kind of epidemic.  
By most accounts, the vaccination program, which initially followed medical protocol in 
administering real beneficial drugs, was abandoned once the operation was brought to a successful 
conclusion and Afridi was arrested, leaving patients who had been treated only one-third of the way 
through a full vaccination course. The international public health community has unequivocally 
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condemned the operation on these grounds, and has cited the already formidable challenges in 
bringing what are seen to be Western medical interventions to regions and people that are deeply 
suspicious of North American and European soldiers, aid workers, doctors, and peacekeepers.9 
Rumors of sterilization, biological surveillance, intentional crippling, even murder have been stoked 
by anti-Western rhetoric for far longer than the War on Terror has been underway. These rumors 
have been re-ignited in recent years thanks to the enormously damaging presence of the U.S. 
Military and its apparent disregard for international laws of war, sovereignty, and civilian life, 
exemplified by the massive increase in unmanned drone strikes, the revelation of a so-called “Kill 
List” for singling out targets of counter-terrorism operations, and the classification of all military-
aged men in “strike zones” as combatants.10 Now there is evidence substantiating at least one of 
these rumors about the uses of medical aid in the waging of war. The outcomes have already proven 
grim: in June of 2013, two health workers involved in polio vaccination campaigns near Peshawar 
were shot and killed by men described as Islamic militants, bringing the total number of polio 
workers killed in Pakistan over last year to almost twenty. The killings have been widely interpreted 
as retaliation for the covert vaccination operation that helped to locate Bin Laden. U.K. based 
international aid organization, Save the Children, has been effectively ejected from Pakistan on the 
suspicion that they provided the forum for initial contact between Afridi and the CIA. The 
international medical organization Médicins Sans Frontières published a statement in the months 
following Afridi’s arrest suggesting the potential harm that may come from the short-sighted use of 
health workers and facilities in the waging of overt and covert warfare, not just to aid workers and 
                                                
9 Les F. Roberts and Michael Van Rooyen, “Ensuring Public Health Neutrality,” New England Journal 
of Medicine 368 (March, 2013), 1073–1075.  
10 Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,” New 
York Times, May 29, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-
on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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the people they will have more difficulty accessing and helping, but also to global health and world-
wide epidemic eradication programs.11 Supporting these warnings, epidemic prevention records over 
the last decade appear to be worst in places where drawn-out conflict has further jeopardized the 
lives of people already in precarious economic and health situations. Pakistan, Afghanistan, and 
Nigeria, for example, are the only three nations in the world where polio remains endemic; after an 
historical low in 2001, suspicion about vaccination as an arm of Western imperialism has lead to an 
increased number of polio cases in recent years in all three countries, threatening to undermine an 
expensive, multi-decade global program to wipe out polio and set the stage for the end of other 
preventable communicable diseases.12 Two out of three of these countries, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, are also listed as top terrorist havens in the U.S. Department of State’s 2012 “Country 
Reports on Terrorism,” while Nigeria is described as an area of concern after a spate of suicide 
attacks in 2011 and 2012, thus layering a contemporary geography of epidemic over a geography of 
failed postcolonial states. 13 The prominence of these putatively “failed” postcolonial states decenters 
an outdated geography of terror, which posits the Middle Eastern origin of Al-Qaeda-style jihad in 
the specific religious identities and practices of the oil-rich Arab peninsula and its immediate 
environs. This new geography sheds light on the correlation between degraded social, economic, and 
political conditions and militant violence, as well as the collusion of counter-terrorism and 
epidemiological intervention. Contrary to director Hasan’s assertion that disease and health 
                                                
11 Médecins Sans Frontières, “Alleged Fake CIA vaccination campaign undermines medical care,” 
July 14, 2011. http://www.msf.org/article/alleged-fake-cia-vaccination-campaign-undermines-
medical-care-0. The statement was widely referred to in the popular press.  
12 The WHO has led the charge to eradicate polio, in cooperation with national governments and 
other health organizations. World Health Organization, “Poliomyelitis fact sheet,” April, 2013. 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs114/en/ 
13 United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2012,” May 30, 2013. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210204.pdf 
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interventions are apolitical, these patterns and juxtapositions reveal not only the impact of politics, 
economy, and social relations on the global distribution of disease, but also the persistence of the 
relationship between health security and counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, both in the 
present moment and, I want to suggest, during its evolution from the colonial period.  
If the story of Shakil Afridi and the fake vaccination campaign sounds stranger than fiction, I 
think it is in part because we have thus far failed to consider the ways in which imaginative writing 
and the cultural metanarratives these fictions uphold have reflected and put forth a picture of 
irregular warfare and insurgent violence itself as a kind of epidemic, and how, in turn, literary tropes, 
habits, and narrative forms that attempt to make sense of global phenomena such as epidemics have 
influenced extra-literary thinking, narrative making, and policy. The contemporary spy games and 
contests over sovereignty that we see unfolding in the Northern reaches of the subcontinent, for 
example, are prefigured in the most widely-read colonial novel of the early twentieth century, 
Rudyard Kipling’s Kim. Published in 1901, Kim tells the story of British and Russian imperial 
machinations, the “Great Game,” as Kipling calls it, in the same Central Asian and Northern Indian 
regions in which Bin Laden was captured, during the decades following the Crimean War and the 
1857 Indian Mutiny. Kipling’s version of this moment in colonial history is told through the itinerary 
of a young boy’s adventures with a Tibetan lama and conscription into the service of imperial 
intelligence and espionage. As an agent of the imperial project of mapping and military surveyorship, 
Kim stands as a proxy for the sciences underwriting imperial power. Kipling’s fiction serves as a 
striking demonstration of how the cross-pollination of science, rebellion, war, and the function of 
different forms of healing—whether spiritual or bodily—mark narratives of turn of the century 
colonial conflict as much as they do contemporary counter-terrorism. 
9 
Just as Kim’s alibis, disguises, motives, intentions, and outcomes disrupt easy distinctions 
between power and the powerless, oppression and progress, East and West, friend and enemy in the 
space between the plains and the mountains of the Indian subcontinent at the turn of the twentieth 
century, the legacies of a colonial and later Cold War militarization have rendered such distinctions 
equally difficult to parse in reports, statements, fictions, films and adjacent narrative forms in the 
very same regions where an ostensibly post-national War on Terror has been underway for more 
than a decade. In place of the spiritual journey undertaken by Kim and the lama in their search for 
the River of the Arrow, the sham vaccination episode offers us humanitarian health work, anti-
epidemic care, and vaccination tours as a soft covers for hard spy games. In place of maps, 
topographical surveys, rumors, certificates declaring horse pedigrees, Masonic credentials and letters 
of introduction—the currency of a late nineteenth century colonial espionage—we have syringes, 
DNA, viral envelope proteins, and remote control warfare.  
Confluences between a conception of communicable disease and the representation of 
rebellion are already at play in Kipling’s novel. Early in the journey of the lama and his chela, Kim, 
the two travelers encounter an old man who had served as a native officer on the side of the British 
during the Rebellion of 1857. The man tells them stories of his service during the Mutiny and the 
evils of the time when “the land from Delhi south [was] awash with blood.”14 The lama remembers 
hearing rumors of this “Black Year,” when violence overtook reason, and asks the old man “what 
madness was that, then?” He replies, “[t]he Gods, who sent it for a plague, alone know. A madness 
ate into all the army, and they turned against their officers. That was the first evil, but not past 
remedy if they had then held their hands” (100). The old man’s words identify the Mutiny as a 
plague and a madness, a kind of parasite that “ate into” the army and might have been “remedied” if 
                                                
14 Rudyard Kipling, Kim, ed. Edward Said (New York: Penguin, 1989), 100. Hereafter cited in text.  
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the rebels had stayed their hands. Rather than being remedied, he explains, “they chose to kill the 
Sahibs’ wives and children. Then came the Sahibs from over the sea and called them to most strict 
account” (100). Here, Kipling importantly figures the “mutiny,” a series of violent episodes and 
sieges that began in Meerut and spread throughout Northern India, as a plague and a madness—
something natural, like the trembling of the earth, another figure he uses to describe the uprising—
but it is also deliberate and human, the rebels “chose” to kill, and the Sahibs “called them to most 
strict account.” As if to embody the social unrest of his surroundings and the conflicted loyalties in 
which he is participating, Kim falls ill, along with the lama, and it is only upon his healing that he can 
return to the service of the British. For Edward Said, whose reading of the novel stands as one of 
key studies in Culture and Imperialism, it is Kim’s experience of illness, even his near death, that serves 
to underscore the cultural liminality of his character. Kim is “like the epic hero…descended into a 
sort of underworld from which, if he is to emerge, he will arise stronger and more in command than 
before. The breach between Kim and ‘this world,’” Said writes, “must now be healed.”15 Kim’s 
healing does, indeed, allow him to re-enter the world, but to re-enter it as a survivor, immunized, as 
it were, against the plague of rebellion, the madness of Mutiny that makes the old man shudder to 
remember. The reward for his close relationship with the land and its people, his vulnerability and 
openness to it, is a heightened immunity to its plagues and its politics. With this immunity also 
comes impunity—though his loyalties are divided, Kim has positioned himself to be neither 
chastised nor punished in struggle between the British against the natives. Such impunity is achieved 
partly through Kim’s alliance with the lama, whose search for transcendence takes him out of the 
material world, but it is also partly due to his disavowal of armed conflict, and his participation in the 
ostensibly neutral project of gathering information, and bringing the uncharted regions of the 
                                                
15 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage, 1993), 141. Hereafter cited in text.  
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Subcontinent into the ambit of imperial knowledge. As Said notes, “Kipling was one of the first 
novelists to portray [the] logical alliance between Western science and political power at work in the 
colonies” (153).  
In the end of the nineteenth century, India was already coded in the European imagination 
as a space of rampant infection, illness, and unreason; a land that by some accounts threatened death 
at every turn, if not by mutinous sepoy, then by vengeful ice cube, which might be carrying the 
various distempers of the East. British troops in India were the first to carry the waterborne Asiatic 
or Indian cholera—a disease that was endemic to the Ganges River delta, where Kim and his lama 
are traveling, precisely to be “healed”—to Europe and later around the globe, where its deadly 
waves of infection would greatly impact the experience of living in nineteenth century from China to 
the Middle East to North America and beyond. Kipling’s novel directly registers the enormity of 
cholera’s impact on this period in colonial history by identifying Kim’s mother as a victim of the 
disease on the very first page. While the father died working on the Railway, “the wife died of 
cholera in Ferozepore,” leaving Kim an orphan (49). These two seemingly dissimilar causes of death 
in Kim’s prehistory in fact reflect the overlapping anxieties about travel and the circulation of both 
people and disease in the industrialized networks of colonial space.   
In spite of these anxieties, Kipling’s fictionalization paints a soft-focus portrait of the British 
Raj in India, full of what Said calls “the pleasures of imperialism.” Kim’s story, serialized in the 
American magazine McClure’s is popular, light, and fun: Kipling does not seem particularly interested 
in recording the hard facts of the insurgency, or the violent side of the imperial spy games between 
Russia and Britain, and cholera serves merely as a backdrop for plot, which only re-emerges in the 
old soldier’s off-hand comment that the Mutiny was a “plague, a madness.” Instead, the novel is 
interested in the narrative and poetic possibilities these events afford when woven together to 
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produce a picture of colonial space that is alluring and picturesque, but also insalubrious—an India 
poised on the verge of some great violence. Likewise, the fantasy of what Faisal Devji has described 
as the “dismembered” landscapes of global jihad function between attraction and repulsion, at once 
repositories of unreconstructed Orientalist desire peopled with powerful and inscrutable Barbarians, 
and at the same time terrifyingly contemporary nodes in a network of diverse political and cultural 
agendas and actors, who seem to be just as canny at deploying the rhetoric of global 
humanitarianism, and better at navigating virtual post-national space than those who claim the 
exclusive right to surveying and policing it.16  
What facts do emerge about Dr. Afridi’s role and the efficacy of the vaccination campaign in 
locating the Bin Laden family prior to the raid in Abbottabad, and whatever the diverse sets of facts 
may describe with regard to the movements, motives, architectures, and religious and cultural 
underpinnings of contemporary terrorism and counter-terrorism, the cultural discourse around 
terror that has ballooned over the last twelve years in North America and Europe serves as a 
constant reminder of the unfinished business of postcolonialism as both a politics and as a critical 
reading practice. A recent bit of manufacturing news illuminates a particularly distasteful visitation of 
colonial history in the present. In June of this year, an Idaho munitions company rolled out a 
specialized line of products called Jihawg Ammo, which they claim on their website is “peaceful” and 
“natural deterrent to the ever growing threat of radical Islam and Sharia Law.”17 The line includes 
bullets with “Porcine Coating,” which, if used to shoot Muslims, will purportedly “prevent their 
attaining entrance into heaven.”  
                                                
16 See Faisal Devji, Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2005), 112.  
17 Jihawg Ammo, press materials. http://jihawg.com/about-us, accessed 23 June, 2013.  
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As Said notes in his reading of Kim, an important piece of the story of the 1857 Mutiny, and 
one that has proven durable in the broader historiography and narrative of the end of British 
colonialism, tells us that the sepoy uprising began because Hindu and Muslim troops serving in 
Meerut were outraged to find that the use of their new regulation firearm, the storied Pattern 1853 
Enfield musket rifle, necessitated biting a gunpowder cartridge greased with animal fat, possibly pig 
or cow fat, forbidden animals for consumption by Muslims and Hindus respectively. When they 
refused, they would be shamed and relieved of duty. As rumor of the unclean cartridges and the 
poor treatment of those who refused to use them spread, so too did outrage among the native 
troops, who found reason to believe that, irrespective of their religious beliefs and attendant 
cleanliness, hygiene, and food practices, they were being deliberately derided and abused by the very 
colonialists for whom they risked their lives.18 This history is not lost on the makers of Jihawg Ammo. 
Situating their own idea in a colonial lineage, they cite “History of dealings with radical Islam, from 
the days of Jefferson…to actions [sic] of Gen. John J. “Black Jack” Pershing in the early 1900s in the 
Philippines gave clarity to a modern day market solution-Jihawg Ammo [sic].”  
Alistair Horne begins his canonical history of the Algerian War of Independence, the war 
that crystallized the relationship between Islam, political struggle, and terrorism in the global 
imaginary, with an epigraph from Kipling—not from Kim, but from the poem “The White Man’s 
Burden: The United States and the Philippines.” The imperial conflict to which the poem’s subtitle 
refers is the same as the one the Idaho munitions company alludes to by way of General John 
                                                
18 Metcalf and Metcalf call the Enfield rifle incident the “proximate cause,” of the Mutiny to 
distinguish it from more general, longer term sources of unrest, such as the 1856 General Services 
Enlistment Act, which required sepoys to serve wherever posted, rather than in their own regions or 
regions of choice. Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, A Concise History of India (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 100. See also Thomas R. Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt: India 
1857–1870 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).  
14 
Pershing. The epigraph to Horne’s book, A Savage War of Peace, which takes its title from the second 
line below, reads,  
Take up the White Man’s Burden 
      The Savage wars of peace— 
  Fill full the mouth of famine  
      And bid the sickness cease.19 
 
 
Many historians and literary critics in the last three decades have turned their attention to the 
massive, systematic influence of cultures of knowledge, narrative, and representation on the 
everyday practices of imperialism, but few have tracked the tenacity with which certain imperial 
encounters are organized around the seemingly apolitical burden of “bidding the sickness cease.” 
Where can we locate this sickness of colonialism? In the very condition of political 
disenfranchisement and marginalization imposed on colonial space by its rulers? Or in the unruly, 
contagious behaviors of a population gripped by a desire for self-determination? Is the 
contemplation of war and violence in a secular age bound to take on scientistic metaphors, or do the 
categories of plague, healing, and purification bring us back to the most basic mechanics of sacred 
exegesis? What are the consequences of the figural analogy between sickness and colonial violence 
for the business of imperialism, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism? These questions, once you 
look for them, teem just below the surface of a great many works of colonial, anti-colonial, 
postcolonial, and neo-imperial history and literature. In this dissertation, I hope to begin answering 
some of them.   
                                                
19 Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden,” quoted in Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: 








He falls, and does not know in the daze of his folly. 
Such in the dark of man is the mist of infection 
that hovers, and moaning rumor tells how his house lies  
under fog that glooms above. 




An old physician told me in confidence with a mixture of surliness and solemnity, that the 
‘colonized do not know how to breathe.’ 





This dissertation is intended primarily as a contribution to the practices of postcolonial 
criticism and theory and the rhetorical analysis of epidemic writing as they undergo various crises 
and sublimations in the geopolitical landscape that has come into focus in the twelve years since 
September 11, 2001, a period in American and Imperial history that has consistently stretched and 
redefined the meaning of war, anmity, sovereignty, and security. I begin with a set of questions 
about representation: when, how, and why are extra-legal, insurgent, anti-colonial, and terrorist 
forms of violence figured as epidemics in literature and connected discursive forms? What events in 
colonial history and scientific practice make such representations possible? And how do these 
representational patterns and their corollary modes of interpretation both reflect and transform 
discourse and policy? We can observe this habit of thought in its most immediate form in the 
expeditious and shallow use of metaphor by public intellectuals and lawmakers on all sides of the 
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conversation; bellicose politicians insist that terrorism is a “cancer on the human condition,”20 while 
security experts argue that “beyond its metaphorical appeal, there are a number of more practical 
attractions to an epidemiological [or] public health conception of terrorism.”21 Novelists and 
philosophers have called Islamism a “pathological cult”22 and terror “a pathological copy of the 
organism it attacks.”23 The editor of Critical Inquiry, one of the most well-regarded humanities 
journals in the world, wrote in 2002 that  
the invisible figure of terror spreads like a virus through the collective consciousness of the 
American people as surely as the powdered toxin of anthrax circulates through the U.S. 
postal system. The visual images circulate with equal virulence…24  
 
Philip Bobbitt, director of the Center for National Security Law, framed his book Terror and Consent, 
with an introduction titled “Plagues in the Time of Feast,” and a conclusion titled, “A Plague 
Treatise for the Twenty-first Century.”25 The New York Times called Bobbitt’s book “the most 
profound book to have been written on the subject of American foreign policy since the attacks of 
9/11—indeed, since the end of the cold war,” while Tony Blair suggested that it should be “required 
reading for political leaders.”26 From American generals to French philosophers, Egyptian 
                                                
20 Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Rumsfeld and Myers Briefing on Enduring 
Freedom,” United States Department of Defense: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
News Transcript, October 7, 2001, 
<http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2011>. 
21 Paul Stares and Mona Yacubian, “Rethinking the War on Terror,” United States Institute of Peace 
Briefing, September, 2005, http://www.usip.org/publications/rethinking-war-terror. 
22 Martin Amis, “The Age of Horrorism, part two,” The Observer, September 9, 2006, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/sep/10/september11.politicsphilosophyandsociety1 
23 Hans Magnus Enzensberger, “The Resurgence of Human Sacrifice,” Society 39.3 (March/April 
2002), 75. 
24 W.J.T. Mitchell, “9/11 Criticism and Crisis,” Critical Inquiry 28.2 (Winter 2002), 568. 
25 Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Knopf, 2008).  
26 Niall Ferguson, “War Plans,” review of Terror and Consent by Philip Bobbitt, New York Times, April 
13, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/13/books/review/Ferguson-
t.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. Cole Moreton, “Philip Bobbitt: The presidents’ brain,” Independent, July 
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statisticians to Algerian poets, German journalists to Pakistani presidents, some of the most 
influential voices in the creation of a contemporary discourse of terror have leaned on the ready 
homology between the threat and spread of terrorism and the specter of cancer, virus, infection, 
epidemic, or plague.  
Although the figure is ubiquitous, it is far from simple. Epidemics have played a complex 
representational role in relationship to violence, enabling us to imagine specific kinds of actors as 
absolute, powerful enemies of biological and social life, while also recoding violent political action as 
an organic affliction in order to efface or suppress the possibility of agency. The aim of this 
dissertation is not to shine a light on the banal ubiquity of this particular figure, nor to point the 
finger at epidemiologists or public health specialists as handmaidens of neo-Imperialism. Rather, I 
aim to track and assess the logics, hermeneutics, histories, and commitments that subtend this family 
of metaphors, metonyms, and allegories, as well as to parse the epidemiological reading practices and 
forms of surveillance and security to which it gives rise.  
I begin by arguing, in the first chapter, that the discourse of the late colonial era is crucial to 
an understanding of how epidemiological science arises and converges with colonial management 
technologies, binding the British response to the 1857 mutiny and a growing Indian nationalism to 
the development of surveillance and quarantine programs to eradicate the threat of the great 
nineteenth century epidemic, the so-called Indian or Asiatic cholera. What follows is a constellation 
of readings of key texts in the British and French colonial and postcolonial traditions, including 
medical and policy writing, essays, short stories, novels, memoirs, and journalism, that facilitates a 
consideration of this figure’s evolution from that late colonial moment, and the ways in which it 




both expresses and supports a seismic shift in the conception of antipathy, antinomy, and war over 
the course of the last century and a half. This broad-ranging discursive analysis is anchored by 
readings of selected works of Bram Stoker (Dracula, “The Invisible Giant”), Albert Camus (La Peste, 
Chronique Algérienne) and Salman Rushdie (The Satanic Verses, Shalimar the Clown, Joseph Anton), each of 
which projects a complex picture of social vulnerability, while both reinforcing and resisting 
contemporaneous projections of political terror as an epidemic raging through the disarticulated 
anatomy of colonial and postcolonial space. A literary genealogy of the terms terror and terrorism 
cannot be fully represented in a project of this scope; I have restricted my purview to texts in which 
disease and irregular or non-state forms of organized violence appear as conjoined threats to existing 
social order. Doing so highlights the evolution and significance of a specific contemporary 
conceptualization of terrorism, which is in turn coded as a blight on humanity. 
To reconstruct this fragmentary history in a detailed way, I concentrate on three exemplary 
scenes in the development of postcolonial literature and politics. Chapter One situates Bram 
Stoker’s work in the context of late nineteenth-century Anglo-Irish epidemiological science and 
Orientalism. Chapter Two shifts to post-war Algeria and the concrescence of German and Algerian 
terror in Camus’s writings. Chapter Three examines the changing relationship between disease and 
Islamist violence in post-partition South Asia and the South Asian diaspora as it appears in Salman 
Rushdie’s oeuvre. These historical disjunctures, which rupture a linear progressive conception of 
history, reflect the behavior of epidemic disease. The movement is neither constant nor random, but 
rather emergent and multi-planar; it both takes place in and constitutes sites of political and narrative 
intensity. The foundational historiographical framework for this practice derives from Walter 
Benjamin’s comments on historical materialism in “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 
particularly as they are inflected by Michael Löwy’s characterization as a Gothic historiography 
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marked by the haunting interplay of linear, fragmentary, and lost time. Drawing on this historical 
form, as well on related epidemiological methods of investigation, collation, and interpretation, I 
show how social relations are coded in narratives of disease that emerge in key moments of colonial 
and postcolonial struggle.  
There are two crucial aspects of this story that run throughout the histories and texts I 
engage with in this project. The first is that the figure of insurgent violence as epidemic has two 
opposing, yet interrelated faces. One looks to the promise of data collection and rational study 
comprising the microbe or virus, the individual, and the population, as a means of eradicating the 
threat of irregular warfare, just as infectious diseases have been defeated by the tools of demography, 
cartography, hygiene, and the study of immunization. This is the function of the figure embedded in 
the practices and progress of epidemiology. On the other hand, the mythopoetics of infectious 
disease from the Abrahamic scriptures to the present also point toward the divine, the occult, the 
unknowable, gaps in data and textual lacunae, and the inevitability of natural forces of destruction 
and sublime phenomena, even when they are cast in explicitly non-religious terms. This is the 
function of the figure embedded the literary and political history of the term terror, which 
encompasses both natural and political events and the structures of feeling to which they give rise. 
Horror, I argue, is an important formal and generic expression of such events, from Apocalypse to 
the Gothic to postcolonialism’s violent narratives of personal and political dismemberment. The 
result of this duality is the persistent epistemic collapse of data-driven rational scientism and Gothic 
sublimity in texts where disease and terror are at issue.  
The second crucial aspect of the story I tell is that the dissolution of a colonial world system 
changes the shape of thinking about both epidemics and violence. The end of colonialism, in other 
words, is both effect and cause of the displacement of a binary architecture of antinomy in both 
20 
public health and politics. Where war and subjugation once stood to describe oppositional 
encounters of sovereign states, or the suppression and incorporation of other kinds of polities under 
the mantle of imperial nationalisms, what we can see by looking at various narratives of anticolonial 
violence, and later, non-state-sponsored acts of terrorism, is that the idea of warfare as frontal 
conflict has already become an anachronism in late colonialism. Similarly, the broadened view of 
infectious and viral disease since the end of the nineteenth century in Western Europe and North 
America have moved us away from metaphors of bellicosity, through which disease was imagined to 
be pressing up against the fortifications of civilization, to a more multi-factorial view of bacteriology 
and virology in temporal, geographic, and demographic space. One of the main goals of this project 
is to look at the relationship between these shifting epistemologies, narrative form, and imperial 
strategy. A connected through-line in the dissertation attempts to map what becomes of the 
biologistic or organicist conception of the state—which is already a matter of representation and 
imagination—as the very notions of biotoic life and the purview of the organism undergo no less 
radical redefinitions than the concept of the nation itself, providing the conceptual underpinnings 
for a subsequent biomorphic conception of the globe.  
The objects of such an analysis are still very much in motion. During any given week in the 
research and writing of this project, new events, new data, new theories and approaches, national 
and international security tactics, uprisings, bombings, drone strikes, humanitarian interventions, 
enhanced interrogations, extra-judicial murders, renditions, terrorist attacks, arrests, detentions, 
trials, cyber and biological aggressions, legislative measures, and hate crimes came to light, and in 
coming to light, necessitated the reframing of international conversations about terror and the 
redefining of the set of tools most appropriate for parsing and evaluating the ever-more obviously 
fragmented phenomenon of contemporary terrorism. At the same time, well after the Declaration of 
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Alma Ata in 1978 committed global actors to victory over communicable disease and the 
establishment of primary health for all by the year 2000,27 we have seen in the last decade large-scale 
outbreaks of new diseases like Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome beginning in Hong Kong and 
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome in Saudi Arabia; rapidly evolving strains of highly infectious and 
fatal influenzas, such as swine, avian, and most recently bat flu originating in Mexico, Indonesia, and 
China; the emergence of multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis in Eastern Europe, India, and South 
America; and the massive resurgence of older communicable diseases like cholera in Haiti following 
the earthquake of 2010.  
In addition to these water and airborne viruses and infections, the continuing impact of HIV 
and AIDS, especially in sub-Saharan Africa where diagnoses of new cases still far outstrip treatment 
of existing infections, has thrown into ever-sharper focus the enormous bodily risks associated with 
the increasingly untrammeled movement of people and animals across borders. The awareness of 
this threat has partly to do with the development of better and faster mechanisms for both collecting 
and disseminating information about epidemics. The panic expressed in North American and 
Western European public discourse is particularly acute, however, when the people who are vectors 
of these diseases are from Asia, Africa, and Central and South America. In keeping with a colonially-
inflected version of Hegelian progressivist history, these infectious spaces—hot, dirty, and teeming 
with illiterate and unhygienic bodies—have been represented by many health experts, policy makers, 
and popular science writers as out of sync with the supposed hypersmooth, sanitary space of the 
Western metropolis. In these ways and more, the beginning of the twenty-first century has been 
inscribed in a variety of discourses with an increasingly acute sense of the failures of rational 
                                                
27 World Health Organization “Declaration of Alma Ata,” September 12, 1978, 
http://www.who.int/publications/almaata_declaration_en.pdf. See also Laurie Garrett, The Coming 
Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of Balance (New York: Penguin, 1995).  
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modernity to protect citizens of sovereign nations in the developed world from barbarous and 
illogical forms of harm: zoonotic diseases from far-off lands swirl in the airspace above major transit 
hubs, while the rule of law is flouted again and again by both legitimate and illegitimate actors. As 
Bruce Holsinger queries in his 2008 analysis of the pervasive invocation of medievalism in 
contemporary public culture, “[w]hy did the aftermath of the September 11th attacks inspire an 
immediate, deliberate, and truly ecumenical discursive recruitment of the medieval among the 
world’s political classes and within the journalistic organs serving the various public spheres that 
transmit and mediate their languages?”28 If the distant zones of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq 
weren’t already existing in a past out of joint with Western notions of development, the U.S. would 
remind them that they could, at any moment, “bomb them back to the stone age.”29 
In tandem with these real events has been the growth of the terrorism plot in literature, 
television, and film, which now feels less like a flash-in-the-pan moment of cultural production, and 
more like an abiding, epoch-defining mytheme. From Jürgen Habermas to Steven Soderbergh, 
philosophers, critics, authors, directors and show-runners with a “global” audience found 
themselves compelled—for mercenary reasons as much as intellectual ones—to produce a text 
about terrorism. A tonal shift can be observed in the nature of these stories in parallel with the 
political moments they reflect. What began, under the Bush administration, as an emotional, 
nationalist incarnation of the master narrative of East-West incommensurablity and conflict, an 
                                                
28 Bruce Holsinger, “Empire, Apocalypse, and the 9/11 Premodern,” Critical Inquiry 34 (Spring 
2008), 470.  
29 According to Pervez Musharraf, then President of Pakistan, this is the threat Richard Armitage, 
then deputy Secretary of State, delivered to a Pakistani intelligence chief in the days following the 
September 11 attacks. Armitage denies it, but the phrase, seemingly a citation of Curtis LeMay’s 
1967 remarks on Vietnam, entered into the collective memory following an interview Musharraf 
gave on 60 Minutes in 2006. See “US ‘threatened to bomb’ Pakistan,” BBC online, September 22, 
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5369198.stm. 
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oppositional structure based on classical assumptions of inscrutable evil and insuperable enmity, has 
given way in recent years to a more rhetorically-tempered approach to preventing terrorism and 
eradicating its means through intelligence, surveillance, and surgical strikes, the last of which implies 
the existence of the enemy within the body of humanity.  
A particularly striking series of events since the start of 2013 has seen Barack Obama 
announce the end of the United States’ War on Terror in the foreseeable future, and, less than a 
month later, seen a former CIA and NSA employee expose an as yet unfathomably vast domestic 
surveillance program. Under the aegis of counter-terrorism intelligence, the PRISM program and 
related undertakings have been harvesting phone and internet metadata from the largest American 
telecommunications and computer companies since 2006, enduring over both terms of Obama’s 
presidency. The program of metadata surveillance began under Bush, but its perseverance and 
expansion since 2008 attests to an important transition from the nomenclature and strategies of the 
War on Terror to the institution of a seemingly infinite, warrantless surveillance of human behavior, 
irrespective of citizenship or country of origin, in the name of counter-terrorism security.  
 
—1. Terror and Horror— 
Investigating the literary antecedents of a contemporary figuring of terror as epidemic leads 
quickly into the literature of colonial and postcolonial horror, where imaginative fiction has long 
attempted to work out the relationship between the terrors of the body and the horrors of the body 
politic. As Ken Gelder points out in the introduction to a 2000 special issue of Postcolonial Studies, 
postcolonial narratives of history and nation are as often dysfunctional, disarticulate, and 
monstrously hybrid as they are subject-affirming and national-myth building. In his view, 
postcolonial critics had, at that time, “barely noticed the lowbrow, sensational end of the popular 
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cultural spectrum, where so much horror happily proliferates.”30 Since September 2001, I would 
suggest, we can see horror in more than just “low-brow” global or postcolonial writing. The 
“dominant horror tropes…of infection…inhabitation…and circulation,” that Gelder mentions, and 
the evident “clash between the new and the archaic” (35), are also at work in any number of high-
culture artifacts of globalization, revealing not only the interpenetration of horror and 
postcoloniality, but also the new centrality of Gothic forms in narratives of globalization. This is 
both a contemporary phenomenon, and one that reveals itself retroactively when we look through 
the lens of epidemic at colonial and postcolonial writing. Even more than in the year 2000, the 
public discourse on terrorism and failed states—many of which are postcolonial—over the last 
twelve years have substantiated Gelder’s prescient claim that “the nation itself suddenly became 
vulnerable to what Jean Baudrillard has described as ‘even the mildest of viral attacks’ and Lawrence 
Buell has termed, not dissimilarly, ‘toxic discourse’” (35).  
Prior to the twentieth century, terror and horror frequently appear in tandem or as loose 
synonyms in descriptions of the Gothic imaginary, a powerful overwhelming of the senses that 
incites bodily pleasure and pain, exceeds communicability, and refracts understanding to an 
unknowable horizon. Terror, a nominative transitive that requires both a subject and an object, has 
always been associated with affect in English, while horror is embodied. In addition to being 
chiastically defined as “a shuddering with terror,” the history of the word horror and its usage is 
includes a now-archaic definition as a “nauseousness of taste, such as to cause a shudder or thrill; 
…as a symptom of a disease.”35 This sense of disease and ill health, as we have seen, inflects a 
                                                
30 Ken Gelder, “Global/postcolonial horror: Introduction,” Postcolonial Studies 3.1 (2000) 35.  
35 “Horror,” Oxford English Dictionary online, 3rd edition. 
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contemporary understanding of terror, and here interlaces the meaning of terror with a 
symptomatology of horror.  
In English literature, the best-known attempt to set horror and terror in contradistinction to 
one another appears in the eminent Gothicist Ann Radcliffe’s 1826 essay “On the Supernatural in 
Poetry,” where she suggests that “terror and horror are so far opposite, that the first expands the 
soul and awakens the faculties to a high degree of life; the other contracts, freezes, and nearly 
annihilates them.” 36 Terror, in other words, can be redemptive and spiritual, while horror reduces us 
to a trembling body. Radcliffe associates terror with the Burkean sublime, while a discussion of 
horror engenders a moralizing critique of the prurient appetite not just to feel dread, but also to 
make contact with it, indulge in it, be contaminated by it. As she continues, however, it becomes 
clear that the thin membrane of corporeality that separates horror from terror has already sprung a 
leak. She admiringly states that Hamlet “dispose[s] us to welcome, with trembling curiosity, the awful 
being that draws near; and to indulge in that strange mixture of horror, pity, and indignation” (149) 
and points out the force of Milton’s engagement with what is, for her, the lesser of the two terms in 
his line “On his brow sat horror plumed” (151).  
The specter of the Terror in the violent half-decade that followed the French Revolution 
serves, in most Western European accounts of political modernity, as the first political use of the 
term. While in Germany the revolution produced its own ripples in the forms of philosophical 
idealism and critiques thereof, the post-revolutionary period in England saw the ascendancy and 
explosive popularity of the Gothic novel, also called the “terror novel” or the “terror romance,”37 
evincing a relationship between not-so-distant political violence characterized as both “terror” and 
                                                
36 Ann Radcliffe, “On the Supernatural in Poetry,” New Monthly Magazine 16.1 (1826), 145-152.  
37 “Terror,” “Terror-novel,” and “Terror-romance.” Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd edition.  
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“the Terror,” and forms of literary horror in the last years of the eighteenth century.38 The slippage 
in this period between the definite, indefinite, and adjectival uses of the term terror is reflected in the 
generic incoherence of the Gothic novel as well. As scholarly attempts to wrestle with this deluge of 
literary horror and its insatiable taste for the irrational, the terrifying, the Oriental, and the weird 
avow, “Gothic…seems to work by intuitive suggestion rather than by any agreed precision of 
reference.”39 
The promiscuous interchangeability between the aesthetic, the corporeal, and the political in 
the terms terror and horror creates a classificatory confusion that makes it difficult to unfold 
meaningfully distinct definitions, particularly, as I will argue, in colonial and postcolonial texts. In 
canonical works of colonial and postcolonial literature written during periods of political upheaval 
we see how these two terms continually fall into one another. The consequence of this tumbling is 
that the stories we tell about terror and terrorism—stories at the center of a far-reaching web of 
international politics and American military engagements—are scarred and stratified by ways of 
thinking and knowing native to low-genre, ostensibly non-philosophical and non-empirical narrative 
forms from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—also the height of European imperialism and 
Orientalism. This continuing slippage suggests that, even as the “Clash of Civilizations” discourse 
inaugurated by Bernard Lewis has increasingly emphasized the rightful and exclusive inheritance of 
rationalism, modernity, rights, democracy, and the rule of law in Western culture, it remains the case 
that a brand of horror associated with the barbarous past and its repositories in the East has held a 
peculiar, even embarrassingly large place in contemporary Anglo-American culture since at least the 
                                                
38 Fred Botting, Gothic: The New Critical Idiom. London: Routledge, 1996 (5), among others.  
39 Chris Baldick, ed. Oxford Book of Gothic Tales, “Introduction,” London: Oxford University Press, 
2009, xi.  
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1980s.40 Edward Said, in his response to Lewis’s paradigmatic Atlantic essay, “The Roots of Muslim 
Rage,” published just a month after the attacks of September 11th, deftly deconstructs what he sees 
as Lewis’s facile opposition between modernity and tradition. Said speaks of the “people who are 
stranded in the middle of the ford, between the deep waters of tradition and modernity. We are all 
swimming in those waters,” he suggests, “Westerners and Muslims alike. And since the waters are 
part of the ocean of history, trying to plow or divide them with barriers is futile.”41 Indeed, the ocean 
of history has often flowed in these consanguineous currents of terror and horror, anachronism and 
progress.  
Contemporary legal definitions of terrorism are likewise freighted with a great degree of 
indeterminacy and reliance on the permeable boundaries of the term terror. According to the 
Dictionary of International and Comparative Law, terrorism is “the use of arbitrary violence against a 
defenseless population; [it is] often difficult to draw the line between terrorism and legitimate 
struggle.’”42 A 2004 United Nations Security Council Resolution includes the “purpose to provoke a 
state of terror in the general public,” in its general definition and condemnation of terrorist acts.43 
Evidently, these terms—terror, horror, and terrorism—suffer from a classificatory instability 
resulting in a largesse that is at once nosologically capacious and extremely challenging to parse. 
                                                
40 Gina Wisker links this revivification to the ontological tremulousness of contemporary subjectivity 
in mobile, multi-ethnic, cosmopolitan populations. In her 2005 book Horror Fiction, she argues, “the 
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necessary to sanity, but fictive and artificial in themselves. Horror grows from this destablisation.” 
Gina Wisker, Horror Fiction (New York & London: Continuum, 2005), 214.  
41 Edward Said. “The Clash of Ignorance,” The Nation (October 22, 2001), 13, 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011022/said.  
42 Dictionary of International and Comparative Law 3rd Edition (New York: Oceana Publications, 2003). 
43 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 (S/RES/1566 (2004)), 8 October 2004.   
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While terrorism has become a compulsory topic in the contemporary American and global political 
spheres over the decade or so, what terror and terrorism mean culturally, legally, taxonomically, 
phenomenologically is a definitional problem that long predates the post-September 11th moment.  
Eqbal Ahmad’s is one of the most important voices in the effort to elucidate the definitional 
complexity and political bi-directionality of the term. In his 1998 talk, “Terrorism: Theirs and Ours,” 
he illustrates the semiotic sterility of the term in the post-Vietnam era by citing former Secretary of 
State George Schultz’s tautology on the subject from a speech given in 1984: “terrorism is a modern 
barbarism that we call terrorism.”44 This utterance does not serve to incite any outright military 
action, but it does signify a persistent reliance on traditional Orientalist projections of violence 
undertaken by non-state actors as barbaric, and tightly delimits this barbarism as an immutable 
identity by way of an interpretive tangle that folds back on itself to define terrorism, uselessly yet 
broadly, as terrorism. Reaching back to this Cold War moment, we can observe the long-standing 
definitional instability of what has now become a vague enemy in an unending war. Tautology is 
only the most obvious demonstration of the evasive ways in which policy experts and military 
strategists have defined terrorism. As Charles Townshend notes in his 2002 book on the subject, 
working definitions of terrorism are overly reliant on the oftentimes opaque intentions of actors to 
harm and instill fear rather than on the actions they commit or to what ends they commit them.45  
In line with this thinking, the Italian philosopher Adriana Cavarero has proposed dispensing 
with the term altogether and replacing it with “horrorism,” which she sees as a more adequate 
vocabulary for highlighting the de-individuating effects of such violence on victims and perpetrators 
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alike, who are linked, in her understanding, on a continuum of vulnerability.46 Martin Amis used the 
same term in the title of a three-part essay, “The Age of Horrorsim,” written on the occasion of the 
fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. Amis uses the neologism to indicate the “philosophical crisis” 
introduced by liberalism’s drive to interpret suicide terrorism within the rubric of reason and politics, 
rather than what Amis believes it actually is, a “pathological cult,” and “a poison that might take—
might mutate, like bird flu.”47 “Suicide-mass murder is more than terrorism,” he writes, “it is 
horrorism. It is a maximum malevolence.” He goes on to express his admiration for Eric 
Hobsbawm’s characterization of terrorism in the mid-nineties as “part of the atmospheric pollution 
of Western cities.” Definitions of terror and terrorism, despite their common obscurity and 
incoherence, frequently betray a unifying, if enigmatic feature, namely the equation of terrorism with 
epidemic. We can see this clearly in Amis’s invocation of the “pathological cult,” “the atmospheric 
pollution of Western cities” and the “poison…like bird flu” that render Muslim, third-world and 
non-developed space as breeding grounds of toxicity and pathogenicity.  
 
—2. Reading Epidemiologically— 
The World Health Organization currently defines epidemiology as follows:  
Epidemiology is the study of the distribution and determinants of health-related states or 
events (including disease), and the application of this study to the control of diseases and 
other health problems. Various methods can be used to carry out epidemiological 
investigations: surveillance and descriptive studies can be used to study distribution; 
analytical studies are used to study determinants.48 
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There are a number of important details to note here, but first a word on why I want to begin with 
the WHO definition of epidemiology, rather than more academic presentations. The WHO is the 
world’s largest international health system, with stated goal of “providing leadership on global health 
matters, shaping the health research agenda, setting norms and standards, articulating evidence-
based policy options, providing technical support to countries and monitoring and assessing health 
trends.”49 As such, the organization serves as a site of gathering and compromise for an incredibly 
wide range of public and private health rhetorics, practices, and theories, which often reflect 
competing interests and ideas about what is urgent, what constitutes “best practice,” and how these 
practices should be implemented. From among these different viewpoints, the organization sets 
priorities and standards of global health surveillance and care, as well as putatively enforcing these 
standards in the context of governmental internationality. In this crucial way, the WHO differs from 
non-governmental and other research organizations both in its powers of enforcement (although 
they are limited), and in its function as an extension of international governmentality, rather than a 
replacement or adjacent structure.  
In Michel Foucault’s late lectures, he defines governmentality as the result of the 
“unblocking” of a limited form of sovereignty—which took the family as its model—toward a new 
focus on the problem and sciences of the population, in this case an international population. For 
Foucault, this focus included a growing understanding and study of population’s normal ebbs and 
flows: “its death rates, its incidence of disease, its regularities of accidents….major epidemics,” and 
so forth, in the interest of “improv[ing] the condition of the population…increas[ing] its wealth, its 
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longevity, and its health.”50 Likewise for the WHO, whose inter-governmental goals include “quietly 
protecting the health of every person on this planet, every day.”51  
Although Foucault pointedly does not limit the function of governmentality to governments 
or organizations that collaborate with states—in fact it is partly the ways in which biopower exceeds 
the state that interest him in these lectures—the WHO is a useful place from which to start building 
a working definition of contemporary epidemiology in the context of global geopolitics for two 
reasons. First, because epidemiological thinking not only implies but is explicitly framed as a) 
comparative and b) international, if not governmental. While epidemiological approaches to health 
can certainly be pursued and applied in narrower frameworks, it is a science that developed in 
response to, and is therefore particularly suited to, the study of the emergence and potential 
transmissibility of harmful global phenomena. The second reason is that, again, although 
epidemiology can be and very often is practiced outside the framework of governmentality, it is my 
goal here to excavate the particular relationship between a conception of epidemic and a conception 
of terrorism, a specifically non-state and increasingly international phenomenon that is being fought 
by both state and international governmental means. The study, protection, and improvement of 
world health have been at the heart of twentieth century structures of internationalism from their 
inception. In joining the legacy of the International Sanitary Conferences that began during the Paris 
cholera of 1851 to the establishment of a post-war international order in the League of Nations, the 
WHO is the best example of the institutionalization of an ambiguous form of information that 
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inheres power and resistance in the periods of overlap and transition between colonialism, the world 
wars, and globalization.  
The WHO definition of epidemiology shows us certain features that will appear again and 
again, inflected in different ways by different political and historical contexts. Chief among these is 
the distinction between health-related states or events and the subcategory of disease. While the 
word epidemic often immediately suggests illness, communicability, contagion, and transmission, 
this idea is incomplete. Equally robust subfields of epidemiology are engaged in the study of 
presumably non-communicable health problems and causes of mortality, the most obvious being 
chronic illnesses like asthma, cancers, diabetes, and heart disease. Less obvious, but equally valid 
epidemiological studies investigate patterned events detrimental to health and life, including war, 
substance abuse, gun violence, traffic accidents, and psychiatric events. This is an important 
development in the uses of the tools of “surveillance,” “descriptive studies,” and “analysis,” for 
public health outside of infectious and viral disease, the ground on which the discipline was founded 
in the late nineteenth century, because they bring a massive number of facts of lived existence under 
the aegis of what we can read through the lens of epidemic.  
A small number of investigators have specifically pursued the epidemiology of terrorism; 
these studies are strictly-defined assessments of the risks of injury and death by acts of terrorism, 
however, and do not equate terrorist ideology with the epidemic imaginary, apart from bringing 
mortality by terrorist acts within the orbit of epidemiological investigation.52 The breadth of adverse 
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health and mortality events that can be studied in this way will prove important in setting norms for 
the concurrent breadth of surveillance and intervention that can be undertaken in the interest of 
“health.” In this vein, the WHO’s emphasis on studying “distribution and determinants of health-
related states and events” articulates a wide mandate with reference to both geography, in the sense 
that distribution tracks location and movement that may well be world-wide or cross geopolitical 
boundaries, as well as causality, in that “determinants” encompass a vast range of factors from 
socio-economic status to natural disasters to meteorological conditions to gender, age, nutrition, and 
political climate. In the practice of epidemiology, a useful distinction is drawn between proximate 
and distal determinants, with the former indicating something closer to what we think of as 
immediate causality (for example, drinking unclean water can “cause” cholera to infect a person), 
while the latter establishes conditional factors (for example, the 2004 Earthquake in Haiti eliminated 
many people’s access to clean water, and combined with mass relocation to refugee camps “caused” 
an epidemic of cholera).  
We can see, even in this brief outline, that the epidemiological approach to health is social, 
transverse in both time and space, and multi-factorial. Some of these characteristics are true in 
clinical medicine as well, but in contrast to the clinical scene, which is limited to the physician and 
the patient, and takes as its object of analysis the individual body and the symptoms expressed on or 
in it, epidemiology investigates scenes of behavior, labor, migration, and social intercourse, and takes 
as its object the nodes, patterns, and convergences that constitute the social. In the WHO definition 
above, “descriptive studies” play a particular role in tracking and understanding the distribution of 
epidemic events; this is where epidemiology comes into most obvious contact with literature. 
Epidemiologists’ descriptive studies do not look like what we would call narrative, strictly speaking, 
but they do function as the beginning of a systematization of anecdotal events, which can be 
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brought together in order to highlight shared characteristics of particular adverse health events that 
may have occurred at some distance from one another in time and space. Narrative, in this context, 
serves both a deepening and a broadening function. These descriptive studies thus stand as a form 
of comparative life writing, in which the circumstances and behaviors of disparate individuals 
combine to produce a new narrative form that serves as evidence in the analysis of epidemic 
phenomena.  
Before turning to a brief discussion of some of the ways in which literary scholars have taken 
on narratives and figures of epidemic and illness, it is illuminating to bring this contemporary 
definition of the discipline into contact with its very first articulations in the proceedings of the 
Epidemiological Society of London, the first professional association of epidemiologists established 
in 1850. In the Transactions of the Epidemiological Society of London, which began recording the society’s 
activities in 1859, president Benjamin Guy Babington presents the following aims for 
epidemiological science:   
To institute a rigid examination into the causes and conditions which influence the origin, 
propagation, mitigation, prevention, and treatment of Epidemic diseases—to collect and 
promulgate, with relation to these subjects, such facts as appear to be established on a sound 
and sufficient evidence—and to point out those methods of investigation by which the 
misleading influence of false or deficient evidence may be best avoided.53   
 
Babington’s definition is somewhat narrower than the WHO’s here, limiting the subject of inquiry to 
epidemic disease. In keeping with the prevailing concerns of the day and the vast industries that sold 
bogus preventions, treatments, and cures, the society also prioritized controlling the dissemination 
of inaccurate information in much the same way that the WHO stresses the “application” of 
epidemiological research.  
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Even at this early date, the society also makes a useful distinction between causes and 
effects, naming each as an important line of inquiry:  
In the investigation of Epidemic diseases the aim will be to trace them up to their causes, to 
examine each cause thoroughly, and to ascertain whether they admit of prevention, and if so, 
by what means.  
 
The spread of Epidemics will form another subject of inquiry; and under this head, the 
influence of isolation and of unrestrained intercourse will be particularly investigated (7).  
 
These two paragraphs demonstrate in clear terms the dual reading practice embedded in an 
epidemiological mode of inquiry: it is an interpretive paradigm that operates equally and 
simultaneously in the thorough and rigorous detection of origins, and the interrogation of social 
effects, evident in the emphasis on isolation and unrestrained social intercourse as factors in the 
behavior of epidemics.  
 
Robert Seaman, Illustration of the London Board of Health, 1832 
 
There is a rich and rewarding history recounting the evolution of this scientific paradigm over the 
course of the next century and a half, particularly as it expresses anxieties about the increasing 
globalization of social intercourse under the conditions of colonialism and its afterlives, and I will 
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speak to some of the most salient moments of epidemiological rhetoric and discourse production in 
the chapters to come.  
Taking this approach more broadly, epidemiology’s dual reading practice can offer a useful 
set of tools for reading comparatively, interdisciplinarily, and postcolonially. In attending to the 
interplay of near and far, genesis and transmission, depth and surface, we can also see how such a bi-
focal mode of reading preserves an important space for the undecidability of representation, which, 
in the case of epidemiology, persistently strives, and inevitably fails, to project a complete, composite 
picture of the infinite intersecting lines of origin and transmission in broad-distribution health 
events. The challenges of epidemic representation and interpretation carry over into the figuring of 
terrorism as epidemic, compounding one incomplete form of mediation with another. Rarely does 
an epidemic projection of violence posit an analogy or equivalence between its two terms, even 
when it takes the form of metaphor or allegory. The figuring of terrorism as epidemic has most 
explanatory force when it works through metonymy to open up epistemic convergences between 
health security and pervasive, seemingly organic forms of violence that escape other existing 
hermeneutic frameworks. In this way, the epidemic figure begins to loosen the tight arithmetic of 
metaphor and allegory, and disrupts these figures’ customary logic of the relationship between the 
sign and the referent, surface and depth.  
 
—3. Epidemic, Figure, and the Literary— 
One of the most influential works of criticism to address representations of disease in the 
last few decades is Susan Sontag’s pair of essays, Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and its Metaphors. In the 
first of the two, Sontag argues that the experience of illness is poorly served, even perverted, by 
metaphors that both seek to describe it in other terms—a primary example for her is the “fight” 
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“battle” or “war” against cancer—as well as those that seek to describe other forms of antipathy 
through figures of particular illnesses—war can as easily become a “plague” a “cancer” or an 
“epidemic” in her account. Writing in 1977 on the occasion of her own diagnosis and reckoning 
with myelodysplastic syndrome and later acute myelogenous leukemia, she suggests that these 
metaphors are “a vehicle for the large insufficiencies of this culture: for our shallow attitude toward 
death, for our anxieties about feeling,” and, most notably for my investigation, “for our justified 
fears of the increasingly violent course of history.”54 Although Sontag situates her thinking in 
reference to other diseases, most prominently tuberculosis, she is writing, in this long essay, about 
the mythopoetics of cancer, whose symbolic life span she predicts, at the close of her essay, is 
coming to an end. “The cancer metaphor,” she writes, “will be made obsolete…long before the 
problems it has reflected so vividly will be resolved” (87). Throughout, she insists on the 
interruptive, damaging effects of a rhetoric that metaphorizes, and in so doing, runs the risk of both 
romanticizing and making monstrous what is an ordinary, ruthlessly literal, biotic experience.  
By the time she writes the second essay, AIDS and Its Metaphors, in 1990, Sontag has built a 
more flexible operating definition of metaphor, and sees in the figurative deployments and 
projections of disease a number of capacities in addition to risks and harms. She identifies in the 
previous essay a limited Aristotelian concept of metaphor, along with its suspicion of the peregrine 
transformations of language, and clarifies at the outset of the second a somewhat softer position on 
the “seductiveness of metaphorical thinking” (93), suggesting the impossibility of thinking and 
interpreting any shared state without metaphor. Because she deals in this second essay with shared 
states and social illness—the viral epidemics of HIV and AIDS—there is more consideration of how 
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epidemic metaphoricity intersects with figures of the social and the state, as well as how it configures 
those who are excluded or banished from it. She considers, for example, both military metaphors of 
the body, which figure health states as protected by a kind of corporeal fortress, and civic metaphors 
of the body, which help us to imagine health as a social system in which parts of the body cooperate 
in both resistance and vulnerability. She usefully identifies in the latter family of figures a tendency, 
in comparing society to a human body, to “make[] an authoritarian ordering of society seem 
inevitable, immutable” (94). Sontag’s focus is mostly on how military, pollution, and plague 
metaphors obscure and negatively impact the human experience of disease, rather than the other 
way around, and she argues that all of these metaphors distance, dehumanize, and even kill the sick. 
My exploration of epidemic figure differs from Sontag’s in a number of significant ways. Most 
notably, my interest is to track how metaphors and other figures of epidemic remake conceptions of 
violence, and particularly of terror.   
Although for Sontag it is a minor point, the claim she makes about the inevitability and 
immutability of an ordering of society based on an analogy to the human body is a crucial feature of 
how I understand the process and outcomes of epidemic figuration: if certain forms of violence are 
metaphorized as epidemic, these metaphors render such forms of violence “inevitable” and 
“immutable,” just as they justify responses to those forms of violence as compulsory and 
unassailable. The effect, when we draw this claim through a century of colonial and postcolonial 
literature, is that a way of thinking about epidemic organizes a way of thinking about terrorism such 
that the possibility of agency, and with it a certain conception of politics, is obscured, irrespective of 
what we might think about the content of that politics. This happens both in the projection of 
adversity, and in the response to it, which is consequently made to look like an obligation beyond 
good and evil, above politics, namely to protect the health of the imagined social body. In this 
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scheme, terrorists become subhuman—microbial, or viral—while their enemies retain status as a 
collective human body, projecting a baseline image of health and integrity. In other words, my 
approach to epidemic begins from the observation that epidemic is always more than metaphor, it is 
also a method of knowledge production and political action.  
In this vein, it is helpful to look at how Patricia Clough and Jasbir Puar, whose previous 
work has been on terrorism, have characterized the “viral,” in their recent co-edited volume of 
Women’s Studies Quarterly, as a form of relation whose “effect on subjectivity, memory, desire, and 
history…suggests a move away from identity” as well as “a move away from those sorts of 
representational forms or strategies that privilege interiority, depth, and integrity.”55 This conception 
of virality gives us new purchase on the paradox of the post-subject as both free of naïve 
assumptions about fixed or essential identity, but also frequently relieved of certain meaningful 
characteristics of subjectivity, such as desire and history, and, I would suggest by extension, the 
ability to assert political agency. I raise this issue because the question of motivation and desire has 
been key for certain patterns of representation in terrorist-themed literature over the last twelve 
years: John Updike, Don DeLillo, Mohsin Hamid, Martin Amis, Richard Flanagan, Pearl Abraham, 
Amitava Kumar, and Lorraine Adams, to name only the most prominent of writers who have 
tackled this topic, have turned to prose fiction as a space for working out the “psychology” of 
terrorists, both foreign-born and American.  
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Amitava Kumar, “Delhi: Wears Pant and Shirt I,” 2011 
 
Most recently, the Boston Marathon bombings, carried out by two young brothers of Chechen 
descent living in Cambridge, have revitalized the mainstream media’s “psychology of terrorists” 
think pieces, a genre of writing that combines pseudo-psychological extrapolations from scraps of 
biographical information with essentialist analysis of national character, religious commitment, and 
ethnic history.  
Clough and Puar identify how the concept of virality interrupts the sense of “interiority, 
depth, and integrity,” on which Sontag’s understanding of the representation of illness relies. If we 
carry Clough and Puar’s insights into the realm of literature, a new question arises: how do we 
approach a metaphor of contamination and transmissibility whose terms undo the very logic of 
depth by which it comes to have meaning? What larger representational and literary modes does 
such a figure intersect with or give rise to? Priscilla Wald and Cristobal Silva are perhaps the best-
known theorists of the point of contact between an idea of disease and narrative form in 
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contemporary literary scholarship. For Wald, epidemiology is first and foremost a discipline of 
representation:  
epidemiology turns an outbreak of communicable disease into a narrative, it makes the 
routes of transmission visible….[i]n that transformational capacity, the epidemiological 
narrative is, like the microscope, a technology, and it is among the epistemological 
technologies that delineate the membership and scale of a population.”56  
 
She argues that “outbreak narratives” or epidemic plots “project[] a narrative logic onto epidemics, 
and the role of epidemiology [i]s at once to read and to write the epidemic as a story of detection 
with predictive value” (23). Wald further posits that the outbreak narrative “is like the 
epidemiological map and the electron microscope, a tool for making the invisible appear” (39). The 
structure she suggests is more complicated than it seems, for even once the “outbreak narrative” has 
made the invisible visible, this information—“points on the epidemiologist’s map…the organism 
under the researcher’s microscope”—requires “the story that is told about transmission” in order to 
make sense (39). In other words, the reading and writing practices of epidemiology constitute their 
object through narrative at the same time as they comprise the interpretive framework by which 
these narratives can be understood and made useful as predictive and preventative evidence. In this 
way, epidemiology can be understood as a paraliterary genre that aspires to both social history and 
scientific prediction. Similarly, in his book Miraculous Plagues, which looks at narratives of illness in 
colonial New England, Silva approaches the discipline of epidemiology, or rather its forbears, since 
his period is well before the establishment of the field as such, “as a literary critic would a narrative 
genre,” and characterizes its practices, such as disease mapping, as “representations of disease that 
encode bodies, health, illness, social habits, geographic spaces, communities, and borders into 
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coherent narratives that reveal the progress of epidemics over time in provisionally bounded 
spaces.”57  
Though they appear in slightly different forms, Silva and Wald’s suggestions that 
epidemiology may be read as a “narrative genre” or a form of emplotting and rendering visible the 
bodily effects of the social is useful in a number of ways: first, the diversity of their objects, both 
within and between their books, demonstrates the broad applicability and critical insights made 
available by a form of storytelling that, as Heather Schell has put it, makes it “an extremely powerful 
tool for creating master narratives about the world.”58 Following Schell, I want to further suggest 
that epidemiology can be approached as both a genre and as a reading practice that describes the 
relationship between the local and the global. Second, their examinations of the plots, narratives, and 
genres of epidemic writing suggest a coherent set of conventions in the literature of epidemic. 
Building on their formidable work and the research I’ve undertaken for this project, I argue that 
these conventions include messy, contaminant, or transmissible figuration as a structural element; 
the pointed and prismatic use of corporate protagonists and multiple points of view; documentary, 
pseudo-documentary, or archival forms that determine and perform the pace of revelation and 
interpretation; an explicit consideration and assessment of the status of data; a close attention to the 
geography of antipathy; and a layered history marked by both memory and repetition.  
 
—4. Epidemiological Historiography— 
This dissertation takes large leaps between times and places, and in so doing disturbs an idea 
of progressive literary and historical continuity. In reading the epidemic fictions of Stoker, Camus, 
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and Rushdie, each of the chapters that follows traces the embedded histories that are smuggled into 
these works’ imaginative present by way of epidemic and its multivalent figuration. In Stoker’s 
Dracula and “The Invisible Giant,” we find evidence of a layered conception of pathogenicity that 
draws on the vague and general terrors of Eastern Europe and its legacy of Ottoman conquest and 
miscegenation; the enormous cultural impact of the cholera epidemics originating in India, which 
were associated with an imaginary of the Mutiny and the contagion of anti-Imperialism; and the 
memory of the Irish potato famine, which was caused by the plant pathogen phytophthora infestans, 
and became a galvanizing event in the movement for Home Rule. The next chapter shifts from 
Stoker’s native Ireland and adopted London to colonial Algeria to look at Camus’s The Plague and 
journalistic writings on Algeria. In these works, and most pointedly in the novel, the present of the 
1940s is interrupted by the arrival of a medieval pestilence, which carries with it an enormous 
cultural history of ruin and stagnation in Europe. Camus juxtaposes this distant past against Algeria’s 
more proximate colonial history, including the cholera outbreak of 1849 in Oran, the town where 
The Plague is set, as well as his own recent experiences in France under Nazi occupation. Finally, in 
Rushdie’s two novels Shalimar the Clown and The Satanic Verses, pestilence imprints the recent history 
of London, Bombay, Los Angeles, and Kashmir with the wounds of the same bubonic medievalism 
that Camus visits on his fictional Algeria, as well as other, more diffuse, epidemics. These plagues 
also serve as access points to the horrific memory, once again, of the Second World War, the 
legacies of British Imperialism in post-independence South Asia, the Iranian revolution, a pre-
Islamic Arabian peninsula, and the political movements of Thatcher-era immigrants to Britain.  
As we can see, the deployment of epidemic in these narratives almost always serves as a 
portal to a variety of histories on a range of different scales. Each of these texts, to some extent, 
interrogates a pathogenic line that tracks the history of a microbe or figural pathogen, as well as a 
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social history, which tracks its movement and transmission, and finally draws into its fictional orbit 
the cultural and social memories of outbreaks and crises of the past. It is not my aim to simply 
reproduce the historical layering of epidemic narratives, but rather to follow and interrogate the 
temporal logic of epidemic expressed by these complex histories. This formation of time moves in 
broken lines, through nascency and dispersed resurgence. Such an optic allows us to see particular 
discursive connections between three scenes of colonial and postcolonial intensity that are distant 
from each other in time and place—late colonial Britain, post-war Algeria, and post-partition South 
Asia. The grounds on which I bring them together are both comparative and historiographic.  
To the first point, the global project of European colonization brought non-contiguous 
polities, cultures, and histories into contact with one another in ways that would radically impact 
later political and narrative formations in addition to disrupting the building of national literary 
canons. It would be unwise and inaccurate to posit a homogenous experience of colonialism, and 
even more of anti- and postcolonialism; depending on the time, place, practices, and from whose 
point of view we look at this history, conditions and outcomes differ dramatically. Nevertheless, 
networks of military, political, and biopolitical management, as well as the broad rhetoric of 
justification, including the intentional spreading—a term that shares a kind of viral logic with 
depictions of other, more putatively toxic ideologies like insurgency—of certain philosophical, 
educational, and political forms in conjunction with the spread of empire itself, bring disparate 
scenes into relationship with one another in a way that impacts both political and cultural forms. In 
the hands of its most capable practitioners, a comparative postcolonial approach resists the 
homogenizing impulse of both Euro-centric comparative literature and the center–periphery model 
of imperial power and the vehicular languages of empire. This critical practice is wed from its 
inception with the possibilities and promises of a global resistance to economic and political 
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exploitation, crystallized in early and mid twentieth century international efforts to repudiate 
colonialism.59  
The comparative postcolonial dimensions of this project are subtended by a way of thinking 
about the emergent and resurgent aspects of epidemicity as a structural paradigm for a literary 
historiography that draws on Walter Benjamin’s writing on historical materialism and Michel Serres’s 
topological conception of time. Notwithstanding Benjamin’s critique of Marxist progressivist 
orthodoxy, and the suspicion with which he looks on the purported scientific objectivity of 
materialist history, Benjamin affirms in the “Theses on the Philosophy of History” the revolutionary 
imaginary enabled by the dialectical “leap” into history, or the “blast” of history into the present, 
each of which promises to shatter the phantasm of history’s progressive linearity.60 As such, the 
object of this history is not an empirically discernable past, but the iterative relationship between the 
past as it is constituted in the present, and the future. In this way, Benjamin’s understanding of 
historical materialism, incorporating but also critiquing the purported objectivity of Marx’s view of 
history, shares some features with Wald’s understanding of epidemiology as a narrativization of the 
past that is undertaken explicitly in the service of a predictive understanding of the future. 
Perpendicular to this scientistic appropriation of Benjamin, Michael Löwy, in his book Fire Alarm, 
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characterizes Benjamin’s historical materialism as a Gothic form of history, marked by suppression, 
haunting, doubling, and enchantment, and expressive of a “kind of ‘revolutionary melancholia,’ 
which betrays a sense of a recurrence of disaster, the fear of an eternal return of defeats.”61 In the 
space between the scientism of Marxist materialism and the Gothic haunting of a juxtapositional 
history that seems to instantiate “profane illumination” (Löwy, 11), we can begin to see how 
epidemic might function within a Benjaminian paradigm as a different kind of disaster, and a 
different point of access to the thinking and writing of history. Here, epidemic may be understood 
as equally constitutive of lived life and of a view of history as the “material things” on which 
Benjamin’s essay comments; but it is perhaps even further afield from a notion of progressivism, in 
the sense that epidemic appears to befall and undo social relations, rather than being constituted by 
and in turn constituting them.  
Likewise, in his conversations with Bruno Latour, Michel Serres, the philosopher of science, 
has argued that the classical linear conception of time is infelicitous for the study of both literature 
and epistemology. Drawing on his own early work on Leibniz, he elaborates a theory of time and of 
history that “flow[s]…according to an extraordinarily complex mixture, as though it reflected 
stopping points, ruptures, deep wells, chimneys of thunderous acceleration, rendings, gaps…”62 
Serres unfolds this theory of time in terms of topology, an answer to metrical geometry, the latter of 
which presumes fixed distances between points. He illustrates the dynamism of topology by 
comparing it to a flexible surface, which is subject to the fold, the twist, the pleat, and—even more 
in keeping with the contaminant imaginary—a turbulent flow, a percolation of liquidity. “If you take 
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a handkerchief and stretch it out in order to iron it,” he explains, “you can see in it certain fixed 
distances and proximities…then take the same handkerchief and crumple it, by putting it in your 
pocket. Two distant points suddenly are close, even superimposed. If, further, you tear it in certain 
places, two points that were close can become very distant” (60). Speaking about his own approach 
to literature, Serres suggests a way of reading that assumes that “all authors are our contemporaries,” 
or can become so by way of the “resurrection of dead texts,” which functions to overcome what he 
perceives as the bifurcation of the sciences and literary scholarship that intercepts the “messages 
destined for both parties” (56). I want to suggest that this way of thinking about time and history is 
particularly useful in postcolonial criticism, because its objects are so often hybrid and multi-planar, 
and difficult to locate in fixed linguistic, national, and chronological frameworks. A crumpled, rift-
filled form of history is also adept at accounting for phenomena dispersed in time and space in the 
way that epidemic is. By way of the ubiquitous figure of epidemic that describes it, a history of 
terrorism has likewise come to be constructed as both barbarously ancient and hyper-modern, both 
culturally local and technologically global; consequently, non-contiguous histories touch and impinge 
on one another like so many folded nodes in a topology of terror.  
As Serres describes it, “sickness is a noise…sickness, of whatever variety, intercepts a 
function; it is a noise that mixes up messages in the circuits of the organism, parasiting their ordinary 
circulation.”63 By extension, we can understand epidemic as interruptive of both a conception of 
linear time and the normal mechanics of life, and of the story of linear progressive history: it surges 
out of the past as a symbol of barbarism, darkness, and a time before civilization, and suggests the 
immediate and inalterable cessation of history as apocalypse. In this way, the imaginary of epidemic 
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compounds the pervasive sense of apocalypse that has hovered over narratives of very recent global 
history, which as a consequence, seems to unfold in a series of ever-escalating crises. An epidemic 
historiography illuminates not a continuity between times and places, but rather a nodal temporal 
map of a shared precariousness of progress and order—the constant threat of something nascent or 
endemic exploding with new force out of the local and into the global. We can see this kind of 
leaping movement at work in the record of anti-colonialism, which is also a record of uneven, 
dispersed revolution that operates, according to many of its chroniclers, as a contagious form of 
politics. Viewed in this way, epidemic operates as both a carrier and substrate of history, a low-
voiced constant that, given the right conditions, can grow enormous and lay waste not just to the 
accoutrements of progress, but also to the very idea of it.   
In the chapters that follow, I offer readings of work by three of the most widely-read writers 
of the Anglophone and Francophone traditions in the twentieth century, founders of discourse, in 
Roland Barthes’s terms, whose impact on literary fiction and the public imaginary has far exceeded 
their historical and geographic origins, and situate these readings within a multivalent epidemic 
history. In the space between these texts’ allegories and figures of disease, and the resurgent, 
topological histories that bring them into contact with one another, we can begin to see how 
epidemic becomes more than a metaphor, becomes, in effect, a method. This method structures not 
only the writing of history, but also the representation, interpretation, and remediation of irregular, 
insurgent, and terrorist forms of violence. The bureaucratization and banalization of the War on 
Terror, over the last five years, as simply an exercise in data-gathering, surveillance, and remote-
control surgical strikes shows us the real-world stakes of such a method as it eclipses older models 
of bellicosity and frontal conflict. In literary terms, what this gathering of readings allows us to see is 
that even as a story of the slow redistribution of power and progress to the former colonies of the 
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Global South takes hold in the second half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, and 
even as postcolonial literature participates, even if only partially, in the telling of this story, a dark 
undercurrent of Gothicism, sickness, dismemberment, and failed states still haunts the story of 
national liberation. Like Camus’s plague bacillus, which “can lie dormant for years and years in 
furniture and linen-chests,” until “the day would come when, for the bane and the enlightening of 
men, it would rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city,”64 this form of 
epidemic thinking renders the globe a single corporeal entity, perpetually vulnerable to natural or 
organic forms of affliction, and infinitely poised on the brink of epidemic emergence, if not total 
emergency. The presumed totality of this epidemic condition, its potential to turn apocalyptic, makes 
all measures in its prevention possible, makes all counter-epidemic violence an unquestioned 
remedy.  
                                                








…what is so dismal as the idea of some invisible agent pervading the atmosphere, and 
spreading over the world? If the writer’s opinions be correct, cholera might be checked and 
kept at bay by simple measures that would not interfere with social or commercial 
intercourse; and the enemy would be shorn of his chief terrors. 
    —John Snow, On the Mode of Communication of Cholera   
 
 
The doctor who said there were no diseases but only patients would probably agree that 
there are no ghosts, but only tellers of ghost stories. 





The relationship between representations of terrorism and monstrosity in American popular 
culture and political discourse has been the subject of a great many scholarly studies and popular 
think pieces during what we might call the millennial vampire surge. The long-standing American 
fascination with the vampire, inaugurated by the 1931 release of Tod Browning’s Dracula and 
revivified in the late 1990s with the enormous success of Joss Whedon’s television series, Buffy the 
Vampire Slayer, crested in a wave of popular horror in the early 2000s, corresponding with the 
millennial apocalypse imaginary. This trend was in turn fed by the horrific and spectacular attacks on 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001, and with them, the sense that something 
massively and terrifyingly other was lurking just beyond American shores.65 The millennial vampire 
surge peaked in 2008 with the record-setting release of the first film in the Twilight franchise, setting 
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in motion what looked to be a period of unremitting popularity of vampire literature, especially of 
the romance subgenre, in multiple novel series, “practical” guides and taxonomies of vampire 
mythology, a massive number of vampire and blood-themed films and television series, art, cultural 
criticism, music, and fashion. Although there were certainly earlier vampire stories from Eastern and 
Western Europe, and other connected haematophagic and immortality myths from all over the 
world, one vampire story in particular crystallized a set of influential tendencies within the genre, 
namely the famously decadent, decidedly sexual, hyper-Orientalized version that comes to us from 
the wilds of Bram Stoker’s Anglo-Irish imagination in Dracula.  
As I will show in this chapter, the cultural fascination with the vampire, particularly Stoker’s 
version of it, overlaps in important ways with contemporary descriptions of the shape, scope, 
behavior, and motivations of a global network of Islamist terrorism. Simply put, the fact that 
terrorists—especially in cases of suicide terror—are depicted as behaving in subhuman, inhuman, 
irrational, unimaginable, or unthinkable ways makes the opaque, proximal enmity embodied in the 
vampire a useful tool for representing the particular terrors of a culturally illegible enemy that acts 
not only outside of the framework of war, but also seems to act outside of a framework of reason. 
We have seen, in the introduction, how a definition and a phenomenology of terror remain as 
muddy today as they did in the immediate aftermath of the 2001 attacks. Efforts to understand the 
concept or phenomenon of terrorism through the tools of philosophy and cultural criticism have 
often taken recourse to the language, plots, and moods of horror. A particularly ubiquitous 
representational strategy relies on organicist figures that depict the threat of terrorism and its 
corollary ideologies as epidemics, or through metaphors of pathogenicity or metastasization. Such 
forms of dehumanizing representation are distinct from the dehumanization of monstrosity, but 
they intersect with it in crucial ways, especially with regard to agency and motive, both of which are 
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obscured or rendered putatively illegible through the formal and characterological conventions of 
monstrous and pathological or epidemic narrative. Myths of abnormality or monstrosity have long 
emerged and re-emerged in cycles to index and explain socio-political anxieties. The vampire myth 
in particular, while it has remained a relatively consistent part of the horror repertoire throughout 
the twentieth century, has crossed over into mainstream popular culture and critical culture in cycles 
of intensity to express fears about miscegenation and the ability of foreigners to infiltrate, naturalize, 
infect, and convert local publics. In the preponderance of millennial vampire stories, we can see how 
a sudden, erotic intimacy with the radically other expresses itself through narratives that deal in both 
disgust and seduction, and how a national experience of spectacular violence turns the collective 
imaginary toward the substances of life and mortality—blood, food, sexual fluids—even as it 
participates in fantasies of immortality.  
My questions in this chapter are in some ways this simple: why this monster at this time? 
What history—particularly Orientalist and imperial history—is embedded in its resurgence? What 
conflicts and moments in politics and culture does Stoker’s text inhere? Is the vampire as terrorist 
phenomenon just an example of ideologically expedient mystification, in which vague monstrosity is 
assigned to that which can’t be known, or does it suggest specific ways of knowing and specific 
forms of thinking about pathogenic monstrosity? Understanding the historical significance of the 
return to interest in vampirism since September 11, 2001, requires us to go back to Stoker’s 
paradigmatic text. I want to turn briefly first to a small constellation of moments in postcolonial 
thinking that illuminates the way in which a historically and epistemologically oriented reading of 
Stoker’s text points toward the problem of contemporary representation with which I began: the 
popular discursive confluence of pathogenic monstrosity and terrorism.  
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One of the foremost scholars working at the intersection of popular discourses of terrorism 
and monstrosity is Jasbir Puar, who, in her co-authored article with Amit Rai, “Monster, Terrorist, 
Fag” and her own field-defining book Terrorist Assemblages, posits the relationship between terrorism 
studies, the disciplining of sexuality, and their appearance together in a form of knowledge that 
draws on myths and representations of monsters and other abnormals, a category she adapts from 
Foucault. In identifying the genealogy of the monster as an important source informing 
contemporary representations of terrorism, Puar and Rai ask whether “such figures and such 
representational strategies have a history,” and suggest that “this language of terrorist-monsters 
should be read by considering how the monster has been used throughout history in Western 
discourses of normality.”66 Specifically, their approach calls for an interrogation of the “history that 
ties the image of the modern terrorist to a much older figure, the racial and sexual monsters of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” (117). For numerous disciplinary and rhetorical reasons, Puar 
and Rai do not name these monsters, the two most prominent and enduring of which are arguably 
the Frankenstein monster and Dracula. They also eschew a literary approach to key texts in these 
discursive histories, including the Orientalist fantasies and Gothic novels that inform contemporary 
horror. By posing the question, however, and building the evidentiary foundation for an analysis of 
pathogenic monstrosity as a representational strategy in depictions and hermeneutics of terrorism, 
Puar and Rai facilitate a pointed reading of these monsters’ textual origins and strengthen the 
framework for considering how these colonial-era monsters represent not just racial and sexual 
threats, but also specific political threats to empire.  
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In Terrorist Assemblages, Puar’s approach foregrounds the sexual pathologization of terrorists, 
querying not just “what is terrorist about the queer,” but also “what is queer about the terrorist.” 67 
She associates the imaginary of terrorists’ perverse or failed masculinity with disease, such that  
the unfurling, viruslike, explosive mass of the terrorist network, tentacles ever regenerating 
despite efforts to truncate them, [depicts] the terrorist [as] concurrently an unfathomable, 
unknowable, and hysterical monstrosity, and yet one that only the exceptional capacities of 
U.S. intelligence and security systems can quell (xxiii).  
 
The combination Puar describes of the unknowable, unfathomable sublimity of monstrous 
inhumanity on the one hand, and the conviction of militarized scientific rationalism to defeat it on 
the other is a tension we can see clearly in the coinciding of the post-September 11th vampire surge, 
and the vast security and intelligence undertakings that have formed an enormous part of the war on 
terror. Indeed, these efficacious figures of Orientalist monstrosity remain central to a discourse not 
only of terrorism, but even more specifically, of the legacies of militarism left behind by colonialism 
and revivified by neo-colonial occupation and the neo-Imperial soft annexation of sovereign states 
by debt structures and contingent aid. In the recently-leaked Pakistani “Abbottabad Commission 
Report” on the so-called “national tragedy” of the 2011 U.S. raid on the Bin Laden compound in 
Abbottabad, the Chief Minister of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa described the political situation in the 
Northern tribal areas as follows,  
[A]fter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the military government at the time had created a 
Frankenstein’s Monster in the shape of militant organizations posing as national liberators. It 
may have been in the national interest at the time to get so deeply involved in Afghan affairs. 
But the fact was that the country had paid a massive price for its many unwise decisions and 
it would take a generation or more to deal with the consequences.68 
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The Chief Minister’s passing reference to the unholy creation of Dr. Frankenstein points to the 
continuing (and no longer strictly Western) uses of the kinds of monsters and monster mythologies 
that Puar and Rai identify as historical sources for a depiction of terrorist monstrosity. The question 
of Shelley’s own critique of Imperialism remains an ambiguous one—certainly the failure of the 
monster, stitched together from sundry parts, to become integral and integrated leaves open the 
possibility of a reading in which the monster’s wounds correspond to the terrible sutures of empire. 
More importantly, however, we can see that in the prismatic afterlives of Shelley’s novel, the figure 
of the Frankenstein monster has been a productive touchstone for representing the tension between 
political disintegration and national geography projected as a body, or the body politic, which cannot 
cohere or thrive.69 In this way, the Chief Minister’s analogy between Shelley’s tragic monster and the 
problematic growth of the militant organizations in northern Pakistan in the wake of the arming of 
the Afghan rebels and the disastrous military coups unconsciously resuscitates and relocates what is 
already a monster myth that can be productively read as a pessimistic allegory of empire. If, 
however, we wish to understand a specifically pathogenic or viral monstrosity like the one Puar 
describes above, we must turn not to Frankenstein, and the singular loneliness of its antagonist, the 
Romantic wilds in which he roams, but rather to Dracula, and its terrible figure of incontinence, 
contact, and infectiousness, who Stoker constructs in his earliest notes for the novel in relationship 
to “plague.”70 
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Puar and Rai’s is not the first argument to make the connection between terrorism and the 
pathogenic monsters of the Gothic and post Gothic imaginary—the vampire in particular has long 
served this function. In his 1959 essay on the complex signification of the veil during the Algerian 
liberation movement, “Algeria Unveiled,” Frantz Fanon considers the way in which women’s bodies 
become the ideological battleground of colonialists’ liberal cultural agenda. Much as the hysterical 
reaction to sati, or widow immolation, in nineteenth-century India served a broad colonial reform 
program, especially among bourgeois women at home in metropolitan Britain, so too did the 
criminalization and pathologization of Arab men’s treatment of women serve the French colonial 
project, marking the veil as a backwards, irrational fetish, a mnemonic for the entombing of women 
within life. In this way, according to Fanon, the behavior of the Algerian was firmly denounced and 
described as “medieval and barbaric.”71 Fanon marks the Orientalist habit of placing Eastern, 
especially Muslim, cultural practice and history firmly within the past beyond history; a culture of 
barbarity and medievalism that, by contrast, claims modernity only for the ostensibly secular West. 
Fanon argues that the European in Algeria continues to be “haunted” by “the dream of a total 
domestication of Algerian society by means of ‘unveiled women aiding and sheltering the occupier’” 
(39). Quite to the contrary, as Fanon points out, the Algerian National Liberation Front, or FLN, 
used this symbol and the assumptions of feminine passivity it carried with it to their advantage, 
sheltering not the occupier, but rather the explosives that would eventually lead to his removal, 
beneath its folds.  
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Already we can see the ways in which the veil functions as both a membrane of difference 
and, in Eve Sedgwick’s words, an extension of the surface, both of whose attributes, she argues, are 
“contagious metonymically, by touch” while “depict[ing] veils, like flesh, as suffused or marked with 
blood.”72 More pointedly, then, Fanon also notes how colonial discourse differentiated itself from its 
object by counterposing its own rationality against the monstrosity of the colonial subject, writing, 
“[w]ith infinite science, a blanket indictment against the ‘sadistic and vampirish’ Algerian attitude 
toward women was prepared and drawn up” (38) [avec une science infinie, la mise en place d’un réquisitoire-
type contre l’Algérien sadique et vampire dans son attitude avec les femmes, est enterprise et menée à bien].73 
Thinking with Puar and Rai, we can see how certain figures in colonialist representations of its 
subjects, namely the abnormal, the pervert, or the queer—in this case, the sadist, as well as the 
vampire—retain traction in the present. But what of the “infinite science” Fanon invokes? How 
does the simultaneous affirmation and infinite deferral of scientific mastery captured in Fanon’s 
paradoxical phrase appear in the narratives of nineteenth century monsters? I want to suggest that 
Dracula serves a unique function in colonial literature, even as it has long stood outside of this canon, 
in offering both an allegory of pathogenic monstrosity that draws on the Gothic fear of the irrational 
and unknowable, which set science on its infinite course, and simultaneously advancing a reading 
practice that sustains a belief in the tools of rational investigation and modern social medicine, tools 
that were developed and refined as a result of colonial epidemics.   
This is not a traditional way into the novel, which has most often been read in terms of class, 
sexuality, and psychoanalysis. But the history of Dracula’s reception throughout the twentieth century 
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shows clearly that it has endured in part because it works as an efficient allegory for a variety of 
social ills and political maladies. Extant scholarship accordingly identifies Stoker’s vampirism as a 
successful projection of a range of Victorian anxieties: the poverty of the rural masses arriving in 
London; moral degeneracy and untamed sexual desire; a generalized, diffuse “decadence” as well as 
the aesthete who performs it; miscegenation in the colonial periphery and the metropolitan heart; 
the Jew as usurer and occult capital-maker; the exhaustibility of natural resources and foreign 
markets—mineral, vegetable, human—in Britain and abroad; rebellion and nascent nationalism in 
India; homosexuality (whether Stoker’s or that of his associates Wilde and Whitman); and the 
inevitable dissolution of the British Empire presaged by Ottoman decline in Eastern Europe.74 
These are just a few of the more compelling and frequently-invoked historicist keys to Stoker’s 
promiscuously interpretable text. Indeed, the symbolic breadth of Dracula has led critics to note a 
propensity to read the novel as “an all-purpose allegory.”75  
As a consequence of this allegorical selectivity, readings of Dracula have often held apart the 
novel’s various symbolic vocabularies by favoring one figural or rhetorical mode and suppressing 
others. The novel’s representation of media of semantic transmission, for example, in its hybrid 
epistolary-documentary approach—the writing, typing, voice recording, mapping, charting, 
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counting, telegraph, and telepathy reports that constitute the text—has remained critically isolated 
from the representation of the materials of social and bodily circulation: air, water, food, and blood. 
Indeed, both of these systems have been read as the primary symbolic material of the novel—in the 
case of the former, the novel is really about information and detection, while the latter approach 
suggests that it is about the horrors of the body and its vulnerability to the strange. The key to the 
novel’s allegorical elasticity is located precisely in the circulatory logic that links its investigation of 
mediation and contagion, both of which hyperbolize the fluidity and untrammeled circulation of 
goods, bodies, and ideas throughout the former Ottoman and current British empires. If we read 
form and surface, rather than symptom, we can see how these two seemingly distinct figural groups 
interact as complementary systems, connected through peripheral or capillary transfer, something 
like the organ systems of the body. Such a reading must begin with confluence itself, as it is 
represented by both the systems of mediation and contagion, which preoccupy the novel and its 
characters throughout, erupting in the various scenes of blood transfusion, zoophagy, maritime 
travel and other water-borne translations, such as hypnotic mind-reading. This preoccupation also 
takes the more subtle form of letters and textual traces that describe the terror of Dracula’s capacity 
not just for violence, but for self-reproducing infectiousness, which exacerbates the horror of being 
victimized by also transforming the victim into a vampire herself, a disease-vector of an incurable, 
deathless haemophilia with side-effects that include a disruptive ontological confluence with the 
enemy. Dracula’s fervent consumption and vigorous afterlife as a touchstone for social anxiety 
further consecrates what might at first appear to be an accidental meeting of horror, disease, and 
empire, upholding a disavowed persistence of the Gothic within rational empiricism over an 
enormous span of time.  
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While the novel may lend itself to a collection of allegorical interpretations, reading it in this 
way runs the risk of rendering the text inert and monovalent, as well as misrepresenting its 
theoretical implications. By and large, these kinds of readings are “symptomatic,” ascribing to the 
writer little more than the ability to serve as a conduit for general social anxieties, and treating the 
text as a symptom of a generalized cultural disorder. Such approaches also rely on a depth-based 
model of reading, in which allegoresis plunges into the text, autopsy-like, in search of a vertical 
relationship between the horror at the surface and its referent secreted inside. Though often 
suggestive in their results, such readings’ hermeneutic parameters are ill-suited to their object in this 
case; they miss the formal logic of the surface that is Stoker’s primary resource, and the most crucial 
point of difference between Dracula and its Gothic predecessors, and thus fail to bring the novel into 
focus. The novel’s characters employ an investigative practice that includes symptomatology, 
pathology, narrative detection, and statistical cartography, reflecting developments in the study of 
infectious disease then newly known as epidemiology—a discipline at the center of the vociferous 
public health debates of Stoker’s time. In addition to the thematic treatment of communicable 
disease, and the changes of state it visits on its victims, the form of the novel also indexes 
epidemiological strategies of data collection, reading, and interpretation derived from practices of 
colonial population management and health governance.  
  This approach is established by the elliptical prefatory instructions to its readers regarding its 
form as a composite or documentary collection: “how these papers have been placed in sequence 
will be made clear in the reading of them.”76 Here, Stoker explicitly calls for an investigation of the 
novel’s formal characteristics, promising a lesson embedded within the text as to how it should be 
read and understood; we are invited to consider, before even beginning, the novel’s shape and 
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ordering, generic hybridity, the materiality of its figures, as well as its governing logic of circulation. 
The textual assemblage that makes up Dracula performs the juxtaposition of different forms of 
evidence and communication dispersed throughout a social space—we see various violent events, 
for example, occurring from multiple perspectives. At the same time, and partly through this 
evidentiary dispersal, the novel interrogates communicability as it is understood in the late Victorian 
period through the then-nascent methods of studying infectious disease and other epidemics.  
The resulting discipline of epidemiology emerged as a hybrid science of population and 
pathology—necessitating the collection and analysis of variant data from the British and French 
empires—to respond to the fatal outbreaks of Asiatic cholera that tore across Asia, North Africa, 
and Europe in waves throughout the century. In highlighting the importance of Dracula’s encounter 
with the epistemologies of epidemic and empire in this way, I do not wish to marginalize its other 
historical and allegorical dimensions, but rather to explain how the figural potential that has defined 
these historicist readings as well as the novel’s historical impact—the inexhaustible logic of the 
vampire as—reflects epistemological and literary developments that subtend, but remain irreducible 
to, an abundance of rich single-issue symptomatic analyses. If we return to Fanon’s brief invocation 
of the Arab as a sadist and a vampire whom the colonialists hope to defeat with their “infinite 
science” we might ask, what kind of science does the novel propose as a remedy to the monstrous 
infection of vampirism?  
 
—1. Choleric Pretexts: Charlotte Stoker’s Letter and “The Invisible Giant”— 
Dracula, Stoker’s second novel, was published on the cusp of the twentieth century in May of 
1897, but his preparatory work for the novel takes us back to the 1870s, just as London was 
recovering and rebuilding from the devastating, nearly decade-long cholera epidemic of 1852-1860. 
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The novel owes its suspense in part to the challenges of reading pathogenicity in both individual 
bodies and through social relations and geographic movements, each of which become highly 
fraught and contested kinds of texts at this historical juncture in the development of population 
management, epidemic medicine, and public health. Owing to the way in which Dracula figures 
infection through its shapeshifting villain, these bodies’ anatomic dimensions range from the 
miniscule to the enormous—the speck of dust to the very atmosphere itself—and their legibility 
ranges from the visible symptom—the bite mark or wound—to psychic and social disorder. The 
novel begins with a transcript of the haphazard journal of a young Englishman, Jonathan Harker, 
who narrates his captivity in the Transylvanian castle of Count Dracula. Dracula, a sinister host, has 
called him there to arrange a purchase of a London property. Harker is far from home—beyond the 
boundaries of the Europe he knows. Strange inhuman behavior, the Gothic twists of the castle, a 
chance encounter with three vampiric women, and a desperate failed attempt to flee put him in a 
state of hysterical aphasia. Harker’s terror overtakes him, and as he breaks off, and falls into a 
month-long swoon, his narrative is taken over by his fiancée, Mina Murray. Mina, a school mistress 
who is learning the secretarial arts, is joined in her taking over of the narrative by a group of friends 
and colleagues in London who, in their concern for Harker’s suffering and “brain fever,” begin 
compiling data to see if they can figure out what has happened to him, and why he is so terrified. 
This group includes Mina’s companion Lucy Westenra; her future betrothed, Arthur; the young 
psychiatrist who loves her, Dr. Jack Seward; his mentor Dr. Abraham Van Helsing; and their “mad” 
patient, Renfield, who has taken to shouting about blood and eating live animals in his cell. This 
narrative shift is the first in a series of shifts: the novel comes to us in pseudo-epistolary form 
though these characters’ journals, letters, notes, musings, and the clippings, maps, timetables, and 
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other evidence they collect to figure out if Dracula has landed in England, as he planned, and what 
kind of violence he is preparing.  
The methods by which the text and its characters seek to understand the nature of this new 
terror in their midst—a terror that actively seeks to evade their comprehension—include 
physiological and psychiatric diagnosis, accounting, navigation, necromancy, hypnosis, mapmaking, 
inoculation, autopsy, interview, divination, and more. While critics have long noted that Stoker’s 
inflection of vampirism—an existing mythology on which he did a great deal of research in 
preparation for the novel—resembles a contagious sickness more than a singular visitation of 
violence, the novel’s foregrounding of the investigation of this sickness has gone relatively 
unnoticed. Particularly important are the ways in which the group’s detective science links the 
pathogenic imaginary of the imperial encounter to the depiction of antipathy and monstrosity in a 
key text of colonial-era horror fiction written by a native of Ireland at a time when the memory of 
the Great Famine and the contest over independence ensured Ireland’s reputation as a land not just 
of quaint Celtic fantasy, but also of starvation, rebellion, poverty, and ill-health.  
Two important texts stand at the base of Stoker’s fictional engagements with communicable 
disease, the first a letter from his mother, Charlotte Stoker, and the second a short story Stoker 
published in 1882 called “The Invisible Giant.” Stoker biographer Barbara Belford has argued that 
living through the Sligo cholera outbreak of 1832 was formative for Charlotte Stoker’s commitments 
to social reform and charitable works. In her biography of Stoker, Belford recounts how as a boy 
with a mysterious disease that rendered him bed-ridden, the young Bram would spend his days 
listening to his mother’s stories about the horrors of an earlier time. Belford imagines an exchange 
between mother and son in which he begs her to “tell [him] about the sickness.” Paraphrasing an 
1873 letter from Charlotte Stoker to Bram, Belford writes “‘it was said to have come from the 
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East…rising out of the Yellow Sea, growing nearer and nearer until it was in Ireland…By twos and 
threes our dead neighbors were carried away.” 77  
Maurice Hindle’s 2003 edition of Dracula for Penguin Classics includes Charlotte Stoker’s 
letter in its entirety as an appendix alongside the brief, breathless correspondence between Stoker 
and Walt Whitman. The letter is believed to have been composed in response to a request from 
Bram to his mother. This inclusion constitutes a kind of argument—prior to Hindle’s edition, the 
letter, which is mentioned frequently in Stoker biographies as an antecedent to the dark, Gothic 
sensibility that gives rise to Dracula, was only extensively cited (and not reproduced in full) in W. 
Foulsham’s 1962 biography of the author. In the colorful account, Charlotte Stoker describes her 
family’s flight from Sligo during the epidemic that raged until it had carried off every member of the 
surrounding households while a miraculously surviving local coffin-maker knocked every morning, 
sure his services would finally be needed. Sligo, she writes, was “a provincial town in the West of 
Ireland…it was long before the time of the railroads and (I think) of steamboats...”78 Provincial, 
however, did not mean isolated, and while those emblems of modern industrial mobility—the train 
and the steamboat—had not yet transformed every corner of the Irish landscape, roadways, 
carriages, and mail allowed enough intercourse with the world outside Sligo that town officials 
guessed correctly that the so-called “terror,” whose progress they charted from Germany to France 
to England, would not pass them by. The spectre of the arriving terror soon burgeons into a fatal 
period in Irish history, which Charlotte calls the “horror.” “In very few days,” she explains,  
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the town became a place of the dead…Many people fled, and many of these were overtaken 
by the plague and died by the way…most of the clergy of all denominations fled, and few 
indeed were the instances in which the funeral service was read over the dead (413). 
 
With so many souls improperly dispatched, the suffering of the living is echoed in their lingering 
ghostly counterparts. The family stays put for a time amidst the panic and flight, but when 
Charlotte’s mother finds her chickens “dead and dying” in the backyard one morning, she decides its 
time to leave, and the family packs up to seek shelter with relatives in Ballyshannon. They embark 
on a stormy, miserable journey that serves in Charlotte Stoker’s words as a “forewarning of what lay 
before,” in much the same vein of Gothic pathetic fallacy as Jonathan Harker’s approach to Castle 
Dracula through the Transylvanian forest, which serves as an overture to the terrors he’s about to 
endure. When the family arrives, they encounter a “half-mad doctor,” prefiguring the “Mad Doctor” 
and “Mad Patient” pair of Stoker’s early notes toward the novel. The doctor in Charlotte Stoker’s 
letter keeps vigil along the town’s sanitary border, and leads a pitchfork-wielding charge against the 
family, threatening their lives if they dared to get down from the carriage in defiance of quarantine.79 
Tuned away at the edge of town, they continue on to Donegal, where the family is assaulted in their 
carriage, their luggage scattered on the ground to a welcoming cry of a riotous mob, screaming “Fire 
to burn the cholera people!” (417).  
Charlotte’s family is saved from the flames as regiment troops come to their aid and call off 
the mob. Charlotte, her parents, and her sisters are ordered to leave, but they secretly re-enter 
Ballyshannon and are barricaded in the home of their relations against the violent protests of the 
townspeople who learn they have been deceived, and in fact the cholera people are there in their 
midst. After the family is examined and declared free of cholera, they are quarantined. When they 
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finally return to Sligo, Charlotte Stoker writes, they “found the streets grass-grown and five-eighths 
of the population dead” (418). Such a drastic transformation of the space of home following the 
violent visitation of a deadly invader describes and indeed forecasts Dracula’s multiple narratives of 
spatial and affective exile, manifested first by Harker’s imprisonment, and second by the way in 
which Count Dracula’s arrival in England makes those infected foreign to themselves in both body 
and mind.  
Charlotte Stoker describes two cases of live burial that crystallize the horror of cholera’s 
rapid fatality as one that newly confounds the line between life and death. In the first instance, she 
tells of a woman thrown from hospital into a mass grave, whose husband finds her there by 
accident, “still life in her,” and quickly takes her home where she recovers into a long life. In the 
second, a very tall Sergeant thought to be dead of cholera would not submit to the diminutive 
stature of his coffin, so his gravediggers tried to break his legs. “The first blow roused the Sergeant 
from his stupor,” writes Stoker’s mother, “and he started up and recovered. I often saw the man 
afterwards” (414). Such drastic and startling awakenings from states of death and pseudo-death, as 
well as the living on of gentlemen who found themselves inside a coffin, will not be unfamiliar to 
readers of Dracula, whose play across the threshold that separates life from death is indexed by the 
strange double erasure of the term “Un-dead.” Shot through Charlotte Stoker’s account of exile, 
violence, abuse, and states of pseudo death during the 1832 cholera at Sligo are details that turn up 
transformed in her son’s novel and other fictions. 
The most crucial of these fictions is the short story “The Invisible Giant,” collected in a 
children’s book Stoker published in 1882 called Under the Sunset. Responding to William Hughes’s 
charge, that “modern criticism’s preoccupation with sexuality dominates and indeed inhibits the 
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development of the debate on vampirism,”80 Martin Willis offers a reading of the story through a 
detailed account of the deeply political, oftentimes vituperative and slanderous debate between 
Britain’s miasmatists and contagionists—the two main theoretical camps of infectious disease 
communication in the 1860s and 70s. He traces the development in Stoker’s thought from the 
miasmatic underpinnings of “The Invisible Giant” to a contagionist imaginary in Dracula.81 Where in 
the former the antagonist is a formless poison who arrives by air, is taken in by the lungs, and 
perverts breath and voice, precisely as miasma does in the writings of its major theorists, the latter’s 
villain works through the skin and the blood, the organs of touch, flow, and, in the medical 
imaginary of the time, contagion.  
Leading miasmatists of the time included the most powerful medical voices in England; they 
argued that disease was bred in and escaped from foul airs. Florence Nightingale, who oversaw the 
cholera-ridden British ranks during the Crimean war, was one the most prominent voices in 
miasmatic theory, promoting open-air facilities, ventilation and air circulation as the most effective 
means of controlling the spread of cholera. Nightingale was joined by a great many Victorian social 
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reformers who sought to call attention to the dangers of living conditions among the poor, causes 
with which miasmatic theory, with its attention to the sanitation and air quality in densely populated 
urban areas, dovetailed nicely. Contagionists, on the other hand, believed that the contamination of 
touch was at fault, and that cholera was passed through contaminated garments and objects, which 
moved by means of specific social intercourse. Willis reads the mist-enveloped, gauzy Giant as an 
anthropomorphicization of miasma theory’s claim that illness came from the bad air that swaddled 
great stretches of poor residential London, particularly in the East End, where the airborne 
industrial waste of the City and the West End blew.  
Willis further suggests that “The Invisible Giant” is “as central to Dracula as are those texts 
from the ‘Dracula Notebooks’…Stoker’s creation of an invading spectre with the potential to infect a 
population with an unforeseen and unnamed disease finds its first expression” (303).82 I would add 
to this observation that between the story and the novel, we can see an evolution from allegory to a 
more multi-dimensional figuration, marking a development from a one-to-one symbolic economy in 
“The Invisible Giant,” in which threat is associated unilaterally with disease, to a more complex and 
signifying process in the lengthier, more layered novel. The two monsters work by degrees of 
subtlety that correspond to the complexity of the texts’ representations of antipathy; in the story, the 
Giant arrives in the form of a pervasive mist and kills indiscriminately, while Dracula strikes 
systematically, not to kill but to survive, and with a precision that confounds, rather than clarifies the 
logic of infection. In a number of ways connected to early epidemiological discoveries that borrowed 
from both contagionist and miasmatic approaches, Stoker’s story does more than Willis credits in 
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forging detailed links to diverse contemporary theories of infectious disease, as well as its sources 
and treatments. 
 
Illustration of “The Invisible Giant,” 1882 
Stoker published “The Invisible Giant” three years after his first and only child was born—a 
son named Thornley Noel Irving Stoker, after Stoker’s brother and his close friend and famous 
actor Henry Irving. The story provides a much more straightforward allegory for disease and 
infection as a consequence of moral degradation than Dracula does, as it recounts the misadventures 
of a girl called Zaya, an orphan taken in by her neighbors. Their charity runs out when she begins an 
alarming campaign to describe a monster she has seen, “the form of a Giant, hanging dimly in the 
air.” 83 The Giant, enshrouded in mist, approaches the unnamed city, but she is the only one who is 
able to see the danger, the others “did not fear [the Giants] because they did not see them” (46). She 
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flees her native city where not only poverty and degeneracy, but now mockery and threats too have 
set in.  
Supplicating the Giant aloud to spare the inhabitants of the city, Zaya attracts the attention 
of a solitary old man of “great wisdom” named Knoal. Knoal’s “curious instruments and many 
common herbs and simples” (55) as well as his knowledge of medicine make him an ally and 
companion for the little prophetess. His name and profession also connect him to two other figures, 
first through the homonym of Stoker’s only child Noel, and second, as a preliminary sketch of the 
“great specialist” of Dracula, Abraham Van Helsing, with his “many instruments and drugs…the 
ghastly paraphernalia of [his] beneficial trade.”84 Van Helsing, of course, bears Stoker’s own first 
name, Abraham, and serves as Jack Seward’s father figure and mentor, a detail that links the stories 
more closely still. Zaya explains to Knoal the gravity of what she has seen, and the pair make their 
way back to the city where they witness countless of its inhabitants fall prey to what the story now 
refers to as the “Giant-Plague.” The symptoms of the plague are relatively generic, and although the 
children’s tale does not lend itself to the precise and graphic representation of medical symptoms, 
those who fall prey to the Giant-Plague sicken in specific ways associated with cholera including the 
sudden darkening of the body: the first victim “cried out in great pain, and screamed horribly…his 
face grew blacker and blacker, and he fell down before them, and writhed awhile in pain, and then 
died” (61-62). Soon the streets are filled with the dead, and the living flee to the countryside where 
they find little protection. Even Knoal eventually succumbs to the Giant-Plague, its last victim. The 
grieving Zaya looks up to pray but instead is met with the “blind eyes” of the Giant, “look[ing] at 
her as though he were trying to see, [he] raised the great shadowy arms, draped still in his shroud of 
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mist, as though blessing her” (71). In the moaning of the wind, Zaya hears a moral: “innocence and 
devotion save the land” (71).  
“The Invisible Giant” highlights two major features of the discoveries associated with 
physician John Snow’s epidemiological investigations during the second and third cholera outbreaks 
in London, namely transmission through food and drink, and the importance of the city’s central 
fountain. Snow’s work has been identified as the foundation of modern epidemiology for the last 
century of scholarship in public health, beginning with his 1849 treatise On the Mode of Communication 
of Cholera. Although Snow’s attribution of choleric dissemination was challenged and disputed by 
powerful detractors in the Royal College of Surgeons through the third (and worst) of the major 
London outbreaks, later challenges to both miasma and contagion theory—including the discovery 
of the bacterium vibrio cholerae by Robert Koch in Calcutta in 1884—would prove him right: cholera 
spread through contaminated drinking water.85  
Regarding the first of the two features, Stoker’s story includes a subplot about Zaya’s “little 
bird friends,” who appear and disappear from her attendance in oscillating movement with the giant. 
The birds sense its presence more than she does, and in the tradition of children’s literature about 
orphans, provide her company and legitimate her gloomy prophecy. The birds are thus in secret 
alignment with the reader, who gains a privileged knowledge above Zaya’s human compatriots. The 
birds return to help Zaya after a protracted absence and, finding the city infected, take it on 
themselves to “tell her when there was danger, just as well as though they could talk.” When she 
moves toward a place where the plague has struck, they “flutter before her and try to impede her, 
and scream out in their own tongue, ‘Go back! go back!’” (64). The little assistants’ interventions 
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intensify as they begin tasting her food and drink. Sacrificing themselves to test for plague before 
she consumes anything that comes her way, “they pecked of her bread and drank of her cup before 
she touched them…Often it happened that, even whilst it pecked at the bread or drank of the cup, a 
poor little bird would fall down and flutter its wings and die” (65).  
The poison-testing birds underscore Stoker’s awareness of the possibility that the Giant-
Plague cholera was spread through food and drink. This concern with the alimentary—a concern 
with both the safety and availability of the most basic necessity of life—is central for Dracula as well, 
and appears as a feature not only of the Count, whose tastes are uniquely difficult to satisfy, but also 
for Dr. Seward’s zoophagous patient Renfield and the lusty Lucy Westenra, whose hunger for 
numerous men leaves her exposed to vampiric infection. More interestingly, the birds as test-
subjects also rehearse a practice of experimentation, by gathering and submitting themselves as data 
that can be used by Zaya to avoid falling ill. While Zaya remains ignorant as to the causes of the 
plague, the story thus stages an epidemiological approach to infection in that it traces effects in a 
population, and constructs a preventative praxis in response.  
The first English use of the term epidemiology is traced to 1873, the last year of the fourth 
cholera pandemic in London. Though Stoker would not permanently take up residence in London 
until 1878, his visits as the theater critic for the Dublin Evening Mail were frequent, and the alarmist 
press about the outbreak in the East End that killed early 6,000 people would have been unlikely to 
escape his notice.86 Moreover, Stoker’s older brother Thornley, with whom he was in frequent 
correspondence, was serving as Chair of Anatomy at the Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland, as 
well as surgeon to the Swift Hospital in Dublin, and publishing frequently in the Dublin Journal of 
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Medical Science, all of which made him to some extent responsible for and keenly aware of the major 
public health threats of the day, of which cholera was doubtless the most pressing.   
By 1880, John Parkin, whose use of the term epidemiology is identified as the first in 
English,87 had published his tract Epidemiology; or the Remote Cause of Epidemic Diseases in the Animal and 
in the Vegetable Creation. With the Cause of the Hurricaines, and Abnormal Atmospheric Vicissitudes.88 In his 
title alone we see the tension between a new science, epidemiology, and the lingering traction of 
miasmatists’ focus on “abnormal atmospheric vicissitudes” that give substance to Stoker’s monster 
in “The Invisible Giant.” The famines and blights Parkin writes of bear features of Stoker’s Giant; 
he cites the Daily Telegraph from Boxing Day 1879 describing the famine in Ireland as “a doom upon 
the poor people…We read of parents all but naked in wretched, empty rooms, forlorn of fire, the 
corpses of their children, victims of typhus (hunger typhus) lying uncovered on the floor” (393). To 
explain this affliction, Parkin makes analogies to early 19th century famines in India, China, Persia, 
and Asia Minor, and ascribes all of them to “the vicissitudes of the seasons, or to drought, rather 
than to actual diseases in the crops.” The atmospheric aberrations Parkin seeks to explain are 
identified as  “commenc[ing] with, or rather preced[ing] the rise of the epidemic cholera in India.” 
He continues to summarize James Bryden’s famous communiqué known as the Bengal Report on 
Epidemic Cholera, printed in Calcutta in 1869, a key text in the development of prevention practices in 
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England during the fourth outbreak.89 That the famine is thus associated—even erroneously—with 
the “atmospheric conditions” friendly to Asiatic cholera makes clear the deep imbrication of 
consumption, disease, and miasma that Stoker is beginning to unfold in his short story.  
The second feature of Stoker’s story that connects it even more precisely to a diverse set of 
theories about cholera’s mechanisms of transmission is the central fountain in the unnamed city. 
The fountain is the focus of an elliptical figural landscape that quotes heavily from what will later 
split into descriptions of Transylvania and London in Dracula. The tale is organized around the 
contrast between two settings: the vertical stack of poverty in the overcrowded city center and the 
horizontal stretch of the countryside, in which Zaya finds a home in stark contrast to the uppermost 
garret of a multi-storied house in which she used to reside, where “people were so poor that when 
the morning came they did not know whether they should have anything to eat the whole day long” 
(47). Away from the crowds and dirt of the city, Zaya finds Knoal in his tomb-like house, and enters 
“into the dwelling built of great stones…The inside was a Tomb. The old man felt her 
shudder…and he said ‘Weep not, little one, and fear not. This place reminds all who enter it, that to 
the tomb we must all come at the last. Fear it not, for it has grown to be a cheerful home to me’” 
(54). Knoal’s welcome bears comparison with Count Dracula’s reverie on his new home at Carfax 
delivered before the frightened Harker, who has helped him to secure it. “I am glad that it is old and 
big,” Dracula says.  
I myself am of an old family, and to live in a new house would kill me. A house cannot be 
made habitable in a day; and, after all, how few days go to make up a century. I rejoice that 
there is a chapel of old times. We Transylvanian nobles love not to think that our bones may 
be amongst the common dead. I seek not gaiety nor mirth, not the bright voluptuousness of 
much sunshine and sparkling waters which please the young and gay. I am no longer young. 
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And my heart, through weary years of mourning over the dead, is not attuned to mirth. 
Moreover, the walls of my castle are broken; the shadows are many, and the wind breathes 
cold through the broken battlements and casements. I love the shade and the shadow, and 
would be alone with my thoughts when I may (26).    
  
While one is a savior and the other a villain, both prefer old, tomb-like homes, and furthermore 
sleep in boxes for the dead—Knoal’s “tomb” of giant, rough-hewn stone turns, in the later text, into 
Dracula’s crumbling castle and coffins filled with native earth. Just as the Count confesses that “to 
live in a new house would kill me,” so too does Knoal preserve the relationship between “living” 
and that which would “kill” him by inhabiting a sepulchral structure whose foundations are “old and 
big” much like the “broken” walls of the Count’s castle. Both structures allow the “wind [to] breathe 
cold through the broken battlements and casements.” For Knoal, this indicates the permeability of 
his abode to both the clean air of the country, and to the giant mist—life and death dwell with him. 
Like Zaya and the birds, he’s a socially marginal character with a heightened vision and 
understanding that is replicated in the inside-outside and dead-undead character of his home. These 
resonances link the old man to Dracula, both suspended between life and death, sleep and sickness, 
ancient wisdom and modern method.   
Harker’s journal of his time in Transylvania redoubles the relationship between the two 
texts’ treatment of landscape. The space he sketches out in the journal—owing to his fright and 
amnesic “brain fever” remains hypothetical, figural. The suppressed episodes of the novel’s Gothic 
overture take place in the unmapped East—a metaphorical landscape whose limited description 
reveals that it is unknown, iconic rather than literal. Contrasting the dream-like, hectic Transylvanian 
vista Harker observes from his lofted window—an atmospheric predecessor to the misty gauze in 
which the novel’s Whitby events unfold—is the street level realism of London, whose well-mapped 
roads, institutions, and estates constitute the surveyable landscape in which Dracula will be defeated.  
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In both texts, it is water that serves to connect two contrasting landscapes: the vertical, 
programmatic space of the city and the wood-swaddled tomb of the wilds. In Dracula, waterways 
serve an important function in both transportation and telepathy, doubling and literalizing the risks 
of circulation and contamination that vampirism makes spectacular and corporeal. In “The Invisible 
Giant,” this function is served by the great fountain in the market-place center. On her arrival back 
into the city, Zaya accompanies Knoal onto “the lowest step of the great fountain,” which provides 
a kind of humble podium from which they might deliver their warning. The fountain also functions 
as an indeterminate focus for the rage of the plague, its steps providing a theatrical slope on which 
stricken bodies drape themselves.  
 
Illustration of Zaya and Knoal in “The Invisible Giant,” 1882 
 
When they “move from the fountain,” Zaya “look[s] up and start[s] with joyous surprise, for the 
Great shadowy Giant was nowhere to be seen” (61), further linking the public water feature to the 
presence of the Giant. Convinced that Zaya is lying, the residents lead her back and propose 
“ducking” the little girl and her companion in the fountain as punishment for their alarmism. The 
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first death Zaya and Knoal witness also takes place there; in keeping with the clear moral message of 
the tale, the “ringleader” of their persecution falls victim to the Giant, his face growing “blacker and 
blacker” before he “writhed awhile in pain and then died.” Compounding the first death, many more 
“fell dead, and their corpses lay” before they “could leave the marketplace, in the centre of which 
was the fountain.” Finally, after days of attempting to heal the dying, Knoal picks up his staff and, 
“with Zaya helping to support him, got as far as the fountain in the midst of the market place; and 
there, on the lowest step he sank down as though exhausted…gr[e]w cold as ice, and…knew that 
the chilly hand of the Giant had been laid upon him.” Then, without knowing why, Zaya “looked up 
to where she had last seen the Giant as Knoal and she stood beside the fountain” and the “shadowy 
form of the terrible Giant who had been so long invisible gr[e]w more and more clearly out of the 
clouds” (67-68). The Giant’s appearance to Zaya is thus firmly associated with her proximity to the 
fountain.  
The importance of the fountain in “The Invisible Giant” indicates that when Stoker wrote 
his allegory of the epidemic spread of cholera, he combined a standard miasmatic approach, which 
by the 1880s had been largely dismissed, with something that looks a good deal more like the new 
multi-factorial approaches of epidemiology. The fountain functions as a social node, both as a stage 
for the theatre of moral justice, and as a site of infection. It is also Knoal and Zaya’s home away 
from home, standing as a site of confluence between dirty crowded city life and the mystic 
crumbling outside. Like the Broad Street pump, whose handle was famously removed at Dr. Snow’s 
insistence to stop the spread of the cholera infection in London’s Soho neighborhood in 1854, the 
fountain is the site at which the disease is most forceful and apparent, a nexus or scene of intensity 
and distribution, but it is not its cause. This distinction between the correlation of site and symptom 
on the one hand and causality on the other is important—Stoker plays with narrative possibilities 
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afforded by this uncertainty in the story, and exploits them more deftly in Dracula. In this way, “The 
Invisible Giant,” evinces more than a passing interest in miasma theory, and in fact comes closer to 
articulating a theory of disease detection that was more multivalent and scientifically sound than the 
miasmatists’ or the contagionists’ were. Even as the story hits the traditional moral messages of 
children’s literature by punishing the cruel and ungenerous city dwellers with a plague, it also begins 
to consolidate the uses of mapping (where people sicken and die, and how their movements 
determine their health), narrative (character, action, and consequence), chronology (when, and how 
densely sickness manifests), and morbidity statistics (how many birds and people fall prey to the 
plague), as well environmental factors (urban density, heat, cloud cover) and pathology (the 
convulsions and blackening of the skin). In so doing, the story stands as an early experiment in 
Stoker’s oeuvre in the narrative of social health, and lays the groundwork for the deeper 
experimentation we will see in the novel. Reading this story in this way also deepens our 
understanding of the tenure and seriousness of Stoker’s engagement with contagion and infection, as 
well as the impact the cholera had on his literary project.  
 
—2. “Like Indian Ink”— 
Belford, Hindle, and Willis have begun to account for the ways in which Dracula draws on 
the facts and myths of cholera, but have not contextualized the way in which cholera discourse and 
investigative science grows out of the imperial moment. According to the geographic movements of 
Dracula, vampirism, like the storied plague of Stoker’s childhood, “come[s] from the East,” rises out 
of the sea, both in the ghost-ship Demeter, which wrecks at Whitby, and in Dracula’s body, which is 
shipped from Transylvania in a dirt-filled coffin and arrives by waterways, “growing nearer and 
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nearer” until it arrives in London.90 Cholera, which eventually arrived in Europe from India, where it 
had long been endemic, was imagined in visual and literary discourse as the revenge of the Sub-
contintent—a translation of the 1857 mutiny in digestive terms—and as such, exemplified by the 
bodily risks of overseas governance as they pertained not only to military personnel and others living 
overseas, but also to the public at home, a group represented in the novel by Harker and his 
companions. Dracula does not hail from the crown jewel of the British Empire, but rather from the 
historically and culturally layered region of Eastern Europe, where the legacy of Ottoman conquest 
lay buried deep in Transylvanian soil. Early in the group’s efforts to eradicate the vampire from 
England, doctor Van Helsing meditates on Dracula’s origins in terms of autochthonous confluence, 
establishing a classically ethnographic correspondence between the polymorphous Count and the 
tumultuous flow of his Transylvanian landscape by overlaying a psychological portrait of the villain 
with a description of the eruptive geological features of his home. Van Helsing tells the still healthy 
Mina Harker 
[t]he very place where he have [sic] been alive, Un-Dead for all these centuries, is full of 
strangeness of the geologic and chemical world. There are deep caverns and fissures…. 
There have been volcanoes, some of whose openings still send out waters of strange 
properties, and gases that kill or make to [sic] vivify (355).91  
 
In Van Helsing’s account, the liquid and gaseous emissions from the earth assist in constructing a 
specific geological nativity for a mysterious villain whose primary characteristic is that he is eternally 
bleeding out, much like the belching, bubbling fissures and caverns of the Carpathians. In the 
novel’s first part, Dracula himself uses the language of imperial confluence in his autobiographical 
monologue to his prisoner Jonathan Harker: “…[i]n our veins flows the blood of many brave races 
                                                
90 W. Fitzgerald and W.B. Cockburn, illustration from Bram Stoker, Under the Sunset (London: 
Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington, 1882), 49.   
91 The grammatical errors in the text are Stoker’s indication of Van Helsing’s peculiar English.  
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who fought as the lion fights…[h]ere in the whirlpool of European races” (31-32). Following the 
metaphor of the whirlpool, the Count invokes the Hungarian “flood” that sweeps eastward: first 
their capitulation to the Turks, then their vigilance at the frontier, where Turkish soldiers have 
imparted a martial proverb to their foes: “water sleeps, and enemy is sleepless” (32).  
This phrase, gnostic and aphoristic, stands alone on a typewritten page of Stoker’s research 
notes for the novel, articulating exactly the false wisdom that the novel deconstructs as it deflects 
various historical real-world echoes of the difficult to define enemy manifested in the figure of 
Dracula. Dracula does sleep, and it is this literal, basic corporeal necessity that is his undoing: the 
mapping and “sterilizing” of his sleeping-boxes by the band of protagonists leads to his demise. But 
as the text shows us, waters, bloods, histories, networks do not sleep—they are transmitted, they live 
on, they replicate, according to the dispersed logic of circulation. To meet the challenge posed by an 
enemy constituted in this way, Dracula’s protagonists remake themselves in the image of their 
assailant; each member dispersing him or herself into a collectivity, thus becoming both differently 
vulnerable and differently resistant to the pathogenic other.  
According to a version of the story dominant in the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
cholera morbus (as opposed to the domestic discomfort cholera nostras) was always an Indian villain 
exacting revenge on the British occupiers of its homeland, and by extension, the world. Multiple 
epidemics of the virulent and then-fatal disease, which kills by dehydration, swept Westward from 
India into Europe in ruthless cycles nearly once per decade in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
The rapid amplification of cholera’s threat from outbreak to pandemic to epidemic occasioned the 
spilling of a great deal of ink from colonial administrators’ pens; some of the more comprehensive 
works included, The Bengal Reports, The Madras Reports (1848), Report on the Epidemic Cholera (1849), A 
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History of Asiatic Cholera (1876).92 From its first aggressive appearance among British troops stationed 
near Calcutta in 1817 to popular comics depicting fez and turban-sporting avatars of the disease, to 
the nickname “the Blue Death,” which invoked the popular fascination with images of Hinduism’s 
blue god Krishna, the public embraced the anthropomorphicization of an affliction they did not 
understand, but which they knew spread across Asia and into Europe from the delta of the River 
Ganges. Regional Hinduisms even incorporated goddesses on whom cholera’s fatal vengeance could 
be projected. 
 
       
“The Kind of Assisted Emigrant We Cannot Afford To Admit,” Puck Magazine, 1883  
                                                
92 See Samuel Rogers, Reports on Asiatic Cholera in regiments of the Madras Army from 1828–1844 
(London: Richardson, 1848), James Bryden, Epidemic cholera in the Bengal Presidency: a report on the cholera 
of 1866-1868, and its relation to the cholera of previous epidemics  (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendant of 
Government Printing, 1869) and Cholera epidemics of recent years viewed in relation to former epidemics; a 
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Government Printing, 1874), William Scott, Report on the Epidemic Cholera as it has appeared in the 
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Unknown cholera cartoon (Visages du Choléra, 1987) 
 
After a dormant period in cholera scholarship, a number of medical and cultural historians 
over the last ten years have reacquainted readers with the defining role played by cholera morbus, also 
called Asiatic and Indian cholera, in the late colonial imaginary and the development of modern 
institutions of health and urban management during the Victorian period.93 It is difficult, these 
historians argue, to overstate the grip of Asiatic cholera on the public imagination during a time of 
rapid global expansion. At one point during the 1832 outbreak, London, Paris, and New York all 
circulated periodicals devoted exclusively to news about the disease: The Cholera Gazette at Fleet 
                                                
93 The most comprehensive accounts of the relationship between political upheaval, colonial 
instability and epidemic cholera can be found in the two books mentioned above: Erin O’Connor, 
Raw Material: Producing Pathology in Victorian Culture (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 
2000) and Christopher Hamlin, Cholera: The Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).  
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Street found its counterpoint in The Cholera Bulletin stateside. Cholera’s apparent origins in the 
Ganges delta and progression toward Europe by trade and military routes contributed to its 
characterization as a terror arrived from the East that, beginning in the capillaries of the colonial 
periphery, rapidly infiltrated the heart of the Empire.  
In a recent history of cholera, Christopher Hamlin reconstructs the terms in which the 
“signal disease of the nineteenth century,” was understood by its two most prominent “Asianizing” 
theorists: as “an unfortunate byproduct of bringing India into the world.”94 According to this 
account, the risks of systematically extending the global economy and circulation of goods into India 
was the insalubrious confluence of immunities and pathogens, health histories embedded in the 
European and Indian body respectively. Although Hamlin does not discuss Stoker’s novel, he 
describes the discursive formation of cholera during the same late-Victorian site of epistemic 
confluence that also gave rise to Dracula, arguing that cholera as an idea, as much as an empirically 
observable phenomenon, “grew up in conjunction with Enlightenment liberalism, nationalism, 
imperialism, and the rise of global biomedical science, [and that] it was most problematic…in 
precisely the places where these darlings thrived” (4).  
The link Hamlin underscores between cholera and epistemology is causal; the disease spread 
in other words, because of the trade and discourse networks created by liberalism, imperialism, and 
globalization. As Hamlin describes it, the zones of contact in which epidemic cholera became “most 
problematic” were not necessarily those in which it took the most lives; its greatest mortality was 
confined to Asia and the Near East. Rather, cholera made itself known as a “problem” for Europe 
in the cities and ports that facilitated the expansion of these networks. These spaces amplified the 
spectacular horror of cholera’s rapid onset and high death rates because the large, mobile, and 
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economically diverse populations that comprised them posed the greatest challenges to containment, 
existing medical facilities, and disposal of the dead. Scenes of suffering, death, and decay thus played 
themselves out in terrifyingly public theaters across Europe, deeply influencing social reform and 
hygiene movements, as well as scientific practice and cultural production. Although such scenes 
were equally devastating in waves from Persia to Japan, epidemic cholera struck a myopic European 
populace with the force of something cruelly new. In discourse, cholera seemed to bring with it a 
robust lexicon to describe the horrors of contagion, layered over long-since stabilized fantasies 
about the horrors of the East.  
While the microbe was probably endemic to the Ganges Delta for centuries, cholera’s 
epidemic character—a trait that would be appended to its very name—was defined by its transgressive 
mobility in the era of high imperialism. Its leveling capacity to both kill and dedifferentiate multiple 
“peoples,” not just the predictable demos of local proportions, seemed to carry with it the threat that 
cholera would remain afoot as long as global trade and urbanization continued. Because of the way 
its victims seemed to liquidate spontaneously, as from a suddenly unplugged drain, cholera would 
also become culpable for the very conditions that facilitated its spread through the contamination of 
drains, sewers, rivers, reservoirs, and eventually drinking and washing water. This liquidity—a kind 
of pure mediation without substance—links choleric symptomatology strongly to Van Helsing’s 
description of Dracula above, as a leaky monster from a gurgling, hydrous place. Erin O’Connor in 
her study of Victorian pathology has argued that in England,  
[c]holera […] became the operative term in an entire metaphorics of bodily contamination, a 
figure for the fluidity of boundaries in metropolitan space. If the choleriac body was an 
unsanitary city, the unsanitary city was dying of cholera.95  
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A third historian of the disease, Pamela K. Gilbert goes further in connecting liquidity to projections 
of race and gender in Victorian England, arguing by way of Herbert Sussman that  
British middle-class masculinity was predicated on the control of a ‘liquid, pulpy’ sense of 
the undisciplined body and on the rigid control of desire….If that liquidity and 
uncontrollable desire was projected onto the female and colonial male body, then cholera 
was the disease that most clearly symbolized that lack of control.96 
 
Gilbert’s identification of undisciplined liquidity as a threat to British masculine selfhood describes 
an anxiety that is shared by the protagonists of Stoker’s novel, who are compelled by their 
circumstances to pour out discomfiting streams of emotion and desire, as an emotional complement 
and reflection of the way their bodies unwillingly pouring out streams of their own blood.  
The language of biological flow and architectural drainage is embedded etymologically in the 
Greek choler, which indicates both “bile or gall” and “rain-pipe or gutter,” suggesting an originary 
intersection of biological and urban architectural bodies in the name of this disease.97 The morally 
inflected language of liquidity has permeated the discourse on cholera for more than a century, 
beginning with observations about the disease’s fatality in low-lying delta regions, which were 
consequently cast as topographically culpable, guilty, evil, and by extension, absolutely in need of 
colonial interventional remedy. William Farr was one of Britain’s early statisticians of cholera, 
beginning his investigations into mortality statistics in the late 1830s. His work contributed to the 
establishment of epidemiology as a science and provided the theoretical groundwork for John 
Snow’s discovery of cholera’s waterborne communication in 1849. In his essay “Influence of 
Elevation on Fatality of Cholera,” Farr writes, 
The poison of the [Nile] Delta, in every time of weakness and successful invasion, gradually 
gained the ascendancy; and as the cities declined, the canals and the embalments [sic] of the 
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dead were neglected,—the plague gained ground….Every race that settled in the Delta 
degenerated, and was only sustained by immigration….The history of the nations of the 
Mediterranean, on the plains of the Euphrates and the Tigris, the deltas of the Indus and the 
Ganges, and the rivers of China, exhibits this great fact….[:] degradation in successive 
generations under the influence of the unhealthy earth, and their final ruin, effacement, or 
subjugation by new races of conquerors.98  
 
More than a century later, preserving the tradition of a morally-inflected, politically expedient 
rhetorical connection between non-European landscapes and disease, Norman Longmate’s 1966 
study King Cholera: The Biography, lauds the investigator who “pinpointed the guilty spot […] precisely: 
a densely populated low-lying area 40 miles south-west of Calcutta at the confluence of three 
rivers.”99 This description of India’s “guilty spot,” written just a decade after Indian independence 
and published in the nostalgically monarchially titled book King Cholera, could apply equally well to 
Calcutta’s culture of intellectual intercourse: a driving force behind the national struggle, a densely 
populated “guilty spot” of religious and cultural confluence.  
Cholera’s ostensible preference for the poorest urban dwellers increased its negative politico-
cultural valences, which were further accentuated by the way in which it inscribed itself on the body: 
Asiatic cholera turned patients’ skin a deep blue or black, shriveled their limbs until they resembled 
“famine victims,” and thickened their blood and the fluids in their viscera to a pitchy substance that 
looked, in one physician’s words, like Indian ink. During the second and third outbreaks in the 
middle of the century, these symptoms, as if to pile insult upon its Victorian victims’ injuries, 
subtended what reformists and ideologues already understood as the racially and morally degraded 
character of cholera and its victims in Darwinian terms. David Arnold has suggested that, following 
the drastic increase in the ratio of colonial officials to “natives” after the so-called Great Mutiny of 
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1857, “colonial medicine enabled colonialism to use ‘the body as the site for the construction of its 
own authority, legitimacy and control.’”100 Establishing a humanist baseline of shared vulnerability of 
soldiers and villagers alike, cholera thus became another justification for the expansion of Imperial 
programs in sanitation, infrastructure, and containment. Corollarily,  
the British came to regard the cholera that decimated white troops as a form of Indian 
counterattack on the Empire, justifying not only contempt for Indians’ habits, but suspicion 
and hostility for the country and its population.101    
 
In the register of the body’s poetics, the massive dehydration that thickened the blood into a 
coagulated black “ink” suggested the waning fecundity of resources from abroad: the indigo, cotton, 
jute, tea and indentured labor harvested in India that were the lifeblood, so to speak, of the colonial 
economy.102 A familiar, uncanny mutiny was thus doubly staged in the evacuated choleric body, first 
as a corporeal take-over that turned white people dark, and second as an augurer’s pathological 
prediction in the form of the dried-up blood vessels and wasted alimentary canal that conjured the 
vulnerability of the Imperial vasculature and its mechanisms of nourishment.  
Between the 1830s and the 1880s, countless studies of patients and cadavers, weather 
systems and human excrement were undertaken to trace the causes of the disease to airborne 
particles, unsanitary living conditions, and moral decline. The focus on proximal causes of cholera, 
while in many cases not entirely incorrect, nevertheless failed time and time again to identify the 
source of cholera, and more importantly, failed to proffer viable prevention and therapies. The 
development of modern epidemiology spearheaded by Dr. John Snow during this time was a 
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response to the increasing difficulty of isolating what were believed to be proximal causal factors 
such as housing conditions, behavior, cleanliness, and susceptibility. Miasmatists—those who 
believed the disease spread through contaminated air—and urban reformers alike approached 
disease etiology at the intuitive scale of the particle and the person in order to heal the dying, but the 
speed of cholera necessitated containment as much as treatment. Epidemiology’s intervention 
consisted in a shift from clinical pathology, the study of an individual’s symptoms, body, tissues, and 
excretions, to the study of that which is upon, epi, the population, or demos. Suddenly the doctor’s 
charge was to understand not only the interconnected organ systems of a single body, but also the 
permeability and interconnectedness of the social body as a whole.  
While various methods of studying epidemics through morbidity and mortality pre-existed 
the last decades of the nineteenth century, the combination of professionalization, the production of 
a literature, and the pressing public health disasters in London, Paris, and New York contributed to 
the rapid expansion of a proper discursive field and a self-consciously new discipline called 
epidemiology. In addition to the diagnostic data of clinical medicine, again, largely focused around 
the individual patient, epidemiology’s hermeneutics involved tools like maps, interviews, statistics, 
and narrative in order to link data about individual bodies of the sick to the larger vascular system of 
the urban anatomy. William Farr and John Snow, among many others, investigated the health of the 
city by studying neighborhoods, commuting habits, and water circulation, the last of which turned 
out to be the common medium in which the vibrio cholerae replicated and spread. In the vocabulary of 
epidemiologists, these approaches are organized around “distal” or “upstream” determinants.103 
These determinants are called distal because the pathways of disease communication they study are 
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not necessarily causal, linear, or proximal, but rather ecological, in the sense that the compilation of 
these determinants projects a landscape of disease communication, thus allowing scientists to learn 
the particular behaviors of a specific contagion. 104  
The goals of the dispersed collective protagonist that emerges in Stoker’s novel are precisely 
the same as the goals of those early disease mappers: apprehension, prophylaxis, containment, and 
remedy, as opposed to a deep, local comprehension of Count Dracula’s intentions, motivations, or 
psychology. The way the novel moves these questions of depth and motive to the side mirrors the 
epistemic shift of epidemiologists away from monofocused symptomatic etiology, which they 
strategically overlooked in the interest of clarifying a landscape-level view of infection and the way it 
moves. This distal approach describes a hermeneutics adept at reading the kinds of systemic 
confluences outlined by both Hamlin and O’Connor, as well as those fictionalized by Stoker in 
Dracula and in his 1882 children’s story “The Invisible Giant.” In keeping with this important focal 
shift, we can understand assemblages of colonial geography, urban topography, and the vulnerable 
human body as comparable texts of different scales that can be submitted to a set of interconnected 
diagnostic tools that yield practical strategies of containment, prevention, and treatment. This focal 
shift requires a massive leap in perception: to imagine the city as an organ system in the body of 
empire such that disease can be mapped across its massive terrain is an anthropomorphizing 
operation. Unlike the horizon of visibility and proximity that define the clinical scene, of which there 
are abundant examples in Dracula, pinning this imaginative anatomy to a map of surface currents 
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requires an attention to places of unintentional confluence, where conditions, behaviors, figures, 
microbes cross over themselves or are carried across into new spaces, which they colonize and 
rename as sites of culpability and contagion. Dracula’s sciences of reading model real-world 
approaches to the terrors of disease through their careful attention to up-to-the-moment 
documentary verisimilitude, as much as modeling fictional behaviors in the face of the horrors of the 
imagination. Given the formal departures from its Gothic predecessors as well as its forbears in the 
detective genre, how does Dracula teach us to read it as an example of a nascent form of horror 
fiction that combines conventions and features of both of these genres with techniques of reading 
drawn from the study of epidemic disease? 
 
—3. Gothic Skin— 
According to Stoker’s preface, a compilation of “documents”—placed in an order, but 
without being narratively linear—comprise the text. Importantly, no synthetic or totalizing account 
of the events is given, which has the function of opening the allegory, and multiplying generic forms 
and possible interpretations without reducing them to one close or privileged observer’s position. 
The novel thus compounds the dissipation of the documentary form with a deterritorialized point of 
view to sketch out a resistant network of violent effects, which can be best understood not as one 
of, but rather as the irreducible panoply of Victorian social maladies enumerated above. Reading 
Stoker’s novel through these formal features and fissures and its mechanisms of transmission and 
mediation, enables us to better understand how the wild animism of myth and the fiction of terror 
comes together with positive science in the representation of pervasive and malevolent corporeal 
phenomena that circulate through the population; we see this combination not just in Stoker’s novel, 
91 
but also in the superstitious writings on cholera, which borrow from the conventions of the 
literature of terror to highlight the urgency and extravagance of the public health threat.  
What is written on the skin, what is legible and lends itself to classification, is ever at play 
with the twin movements of the occult and the real in the Gothic and its inheritors, including horror 
fiction. In reading these fictions, we can imagine their surface as a kind of skin that both covers and 
constitutes its object. Understood on a continuum of performance as flexible—a non-essential, 
disposable costume—the narrative function of this skin is fulfilled in part by genre. A careful 
understanding of the generic maneuvers of Dracula, then, will help us to understand how the novel 
produces meaning through the surface and its disruptions, rendings, and punctures rather than 
through depth. Although Dracula often stands for literary historians as an important end-point of 
Gothic literature, its self-consciousness with regard to information and knowledge also make it a 
useful text for locating the beginning of certain forms of modernism, namely those forms that 
intersect with the graphic, hyper-realist affective habits of horror. How, then, specifically, does 
horror differ from the Gothic? If we understand the generic heterodoxy of Dracula as an inaugural 
moment, we can see that horror, born in an age of Victorian rationalism and fascination with the 
occult, develops the increasingly exhausted and ineffectual authenticating mechanisms of 
enchantment from Gothic literature such as found manuscripts, translated histories, secret 
inheritances, and antique objects according to new technologies of disenchantment such as 
psychiatry, pathology, documentary, and forensics.105  
                                                
105 This particular configuration of Weberian disenchantment, scientific knowledge, and Orientalism 
as a nexus of tension and literary productivity in the late Victorian period is indebted to Gauri 
Viswanathan’s account of the professionalization and bureaucratization of occult knowledge in her 
article “The Ordinary Business of Occultism,” Critical Inquiry 27 (Autumn 2000), 7.  
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Stoker’s use of these technologies in Dracula draws on his both his own curiosity about 
advances in medical science evidenced in his library and his correspondence with his brother, Sir 
Thornley Stoker, who would become President of the Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland,106 as 
well as on familiar tropes from the colonial Gothic, as in Kipling’s “The Mark of the Beast” (1890), 
and popular investigative, mystery, detective, and sensation fictions emblematized in Wilkie Collins’s 
The Moonstone (1868) and Arthur Conan Doyle’s early Sherlock Holmes tales.107 It is the ineradicability 
of each paradigm in the face of the other—the paradigms of the real and the mysterious that 
Elizabeth Miller calls “the central dichotomy of the novel”108—that distinguishes horror from both 
Gothic fictions and various forms of scientific and pseudo-scientific realism, medical, detective, or 
otherwise. This ineradicability is staged in the novel as a formal correspondence between the priority 
and everlastingness of Count Dracula himself—he is born long before his enemies, and as Friedrich 
Kittler points out in “Dracula’s Legacy” does not undergo the definitive death-by-staking required to 
off him once and for all, and thus survives them as well109 —and the Gothic frame of the novel, the 
overture and coda that both take place in Transylvania. Once again we can see how the problem of 
infinite science that Fanon presents as an answer to the “sadist and vampiric” colonial subject 
repeats itself in the interpenetration of genre.    
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The smuggling of the proto-modern novel-of-investigation, set in London among the upper 
echelons of the professional classes, within this Gothic skin belies the interpenetration of the two, 
the way in which their capillary transfusion gives on to a new genre and a new hermeneutic, as well 
as a new way of thinking about terror. Drawing on and modifying the long-standing tradition of the 
mysterious and mystical found text, which in eighteenth and nineteenth century novels often hailed 
from the East, Dracula is the collection of documents and media, both found and produced by the 
Harkers and their compatriots, whose citation of the Gothic epistolary significantly advances those 
generic conventions in order to underscore an analogy between the revivified transhistorical—the 
manuscript brought back to life to haunt the present anew—and the novel’s eternally undead villain. 
This overture and its symmetrical embodiment in the immortal villain combines elements of the 
claustrophobic psychological topoi of the Gothic, the exotica of Orientalist fantasy, and the 
quotidian landscapes of realism. Such generic hybridity calls on and also undoes a variety of 
conventions and expectations.  
In Vital Signs, a study of nineteenth century medical realism, Lawrence Rothfield 
demonstrates the relationship between the interpretive tools of medicine as practiced by the clinical 
physician and realism’s panoply of tools for representing “the pathologically embodied person.”110 
Against the pathologically embodied person, Stoker offers a doctor-lawyer-businessman-occultist-
secretary amalgam—essentially the pathologically embodied collectivity—to contend with a shape-
shifting enemy from a mysterious and wild territory, swirling with the history of Oriental–Occidental 
conflict, who seeks to disrupt the free intercourse of affection and information that organizes their 
community. While Rothfield reads medical realism, both as a topic of writing and as a compositional 
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strategy, as an overture to “pararealisms” (190) such as naturalism and modernism, the novel Stoker 
constructs uses a corporate mode of inscription that describes a pathologically embodied collective, 
which is unrecognizable as a “person” because it is at once a vampire and victim, a collection of dirt 
boxes, a city, a waterworks, a system. In this way, “medical realism” can be seen to have another 
inheritor in the pararealism of horror—one that suggests a different literary genealogy for the 
professionalized mode of looking that made itself so strongly apparent in the nineteenth century 
realist novel.  
During the period in which he was preparing and writing Dracula, Stoker was experimenting 
with this hybrid form, marrying scientific realism with his more dominant mode of historically 
inflected myths of terror and monstrosity. As a result, Dracula presents us with a problem at once 
more and less modern than the kind of closely observed medical realism Rothfield describes. 
Stoker’s characters, for example, have little to no depth, resembling both Gothic archetypes and 
post-modern anti-subjects more than characters with interiority. Compounding this economy of the 
surface, efforts at deep knowledge and medical empiricism in the context of the studying vampire 
pathology and symptomatology come up short time and again as the characters attempt to piece 
together an understanding of Count Dracula’s movements, infectiousness, and haematophagy more 
broadly. The protagonists use a range of “cutting-edge” investigative technologies, to cite Mina 
Harker’s description, and heterogeneous lexicons that partake equally of rational scientific discourse 
on the one hand, and the unspeakable horror of the irrational on the other, as they attempt to 
understand the bite marks and exhaustion, the unaccountable deaths, the night-stalking, and the 
strange creatures in their presence. Over the course of the novel, they collect, produce, and trade a 
vast amount of data about the malevolent signs and symptoms of vampirism. It is an exemplary 
multi-media archive, containing wax-covered voice recording cylinders, newspaper clippings, 
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shipping bills, reports of hypnotic mediumship, diaries, letters, legal documents, folklore, and 
medical histories.  
The first four chapters of Dracula, however, are univocal, unfolding as a claustrophobic 
unilateral epistle, each episode pressed against the next in creased, confused layers of first-person 
narrative with no addressee. Jonathan Harker chronicles his arrival at Castle Dracula in a shorthand 
journal that, like the intercepted letters he writes home to his fiancée Mina, will be deliberately 
suppressed before reaching its destination: his future self, a survivor of his heterotopic experience. 
Once he has escaped the dread castle and made his way back to Buda-Pesth, and eventually home to 
London, where he convalesces from an aphasic brain fever, Harker instructs his future wife, Mina, 
to “share [his] ignorance[.] Here is the book,” he tells her as he vouchsafes the secret pages, “take it 
and keep it, read it if you will, but never let me know” (115). Even the journal’s most 
straightforwardly mnemonic functions—“I had for dinner, or rather supper, a chicken done up 
some way with red pepper, which was very good but thirsty: (Mem., get recipe for Mina),” (1)—fail 
in the face of the terror and subsequent amnesia Harker endures as he comes to understand the 
scope and possible consequences of the diabolical scheme he has facilitated by assisting the Count in 
his quest to own a piece of land in Harker’s “beautiful England” (53).   
The text treats Harker’s time in the “thunderous atmosphere,” among the “frowning 
rocks”(10, 13) of Transylvania as a Gothic text within a text—a limited horizon juxtaposed against 
the evidentiary omnibus that comprises the novel’s middle section. According to Stoker’s notes, the 
settings and descriptions, the local color details that shape this Gothic introductory portion of 
Dracula are largely adapted from three books, including a travel narrative published in the 1880s, 
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E.C. Johnson’s On the Track of the Crescent: Erratic Notes from the Piraeus to Pesth,111 which recounts the 
settings and occasions experienced by the author in the regions of Eastern Europe that had, for a 
time “fallen into the hands of the ‘unspeakable,’”112 a euphemism the author uses for the Turks. The 
crescent whose track Johnson follows casts its Islamic light over the territories that become not just 
a vague “East,” as previous scholarship on Dracula’s geographic imaginary suggests, but a specific 
locus of palimpsested belief, bloodshed, and mixed heritage. The Carpathian rocks Johnson 
describes echo with the cries of “Allah-Il-Allah!” an invocation that punctuates the “spirited” 
Roumanian victory poem Johnson includes in his volume (317-322). Stoker translates Johnson’s 
exoticizing depiction and historical musings into Dracula’s deeply accented English. Although the 
Count vociferously rejects the implied Islamic stain on his heritage, he notes that, for a time, “the 
flags of the Wallach and the Magyar went down beneath the Crescent” (32). The tangled bloodline 
Dracula claims thus remains knotted enough to imply a thread from that sleepless enemy the Turk, 
whose “water sleeps” proverb reflects the false wisdom overturned by Dracula’s impending 
maritime voyages and his blood-borne journeys into the breasts of the young ladies Lucy Westenra 
and Mina Harker. This particular Islamic dimension of Stoker’s research on and representation of 
vampirism has thus far remained unremarked in scholarship on the novel, but it illuminates a great 
deal about how the novel’s textual history intersects with both colonial-era fears of the Eastern other 
and those that mark our present moment.  
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Unlike Johnson in his travel narrative, one of three crucial source texts in Stoker’s research, 
Jonathan Harker does not ferry back to England his wanderer’s musings, collectibles, sketches, or 
picturesque renderings, nor the colorful descriptions of daily life, meals, dress, and charming habits 
that he might expect to gather in the course of an adventurous errand to the East. Although Harker 
does record his observations with pages and ink supplied by his captor, these musings turn out to be 
collateral damage in Harker’s self-preserving acts of forgetting and suppression—a forgetting that 
allows him to jump from one genre into another, out of the crumbling Gothic night and into the 
rational day-time hours counted out by London, its marriages and laws, its multiple technologies of 
writing, reading, and interpretation. The consequence of Harker’s aphasia is that he is reborn as a 
sort of untethered unconscious, available for professional study by his friends Dr. Seward and Van 
Helsing, who assume that his experience as a prisoner in Dracula’s castle will help them solve the 
violent mystery that is afoot if they can access it. By Mina and Lucy, he is viewed as a jumbled text 
yielding up clues ready for the reading. In the symmetrical terms favored by the Gothic, Harker’s 
amnesia—a suspended, timeless state followed by a rebirth—serves as a counterpoint to both 
Dracula’s perpetual undead state and the birth of his and Mina’s son, whose arrival secures the 
values and structure of the bourgeois family by demonstrating its mastery over the forces of evil. In 
these terms, Harker is both reborn and translated across his amnesic threshold. While he is never 
assaulted by the Count, and therefore never infected with the perverse and ancient appetite for 
blood, Harker nevertheless becomes a carrier—a vector of disease—of this history and its violence. 
He carries this unfamiliar pathogen in both body and in mind. The second medium for this 
uncanny transport is the journal he gives to Mina. The days tallied by his recollection fold back onto 
themselves in an unsettling repetition of pseudo-evidence. Locked doors, dusty passages, piles of 
ancient gold, nocturnal comings and goings, the larghissimo pounding of a band of Szgany workers 
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manufacturing some unannounced evil populate the pages of the short-hand journal. The elliptical, 
repetitious movement of the narrative is prefigured in the route by which Harker arrives at the 
castle, of which he writes “it seemed to me that we were simply going over and over the same 
ground again…I took note of some salient point and found that this was so…I waited with a sick 
feeling of suspense” (12). Compounding Harker’s frustration at his inability to synthesize and 
interpret these details is the way his memory and observational faculties seem to be off kilter in his 
new surroundings: “my brain seemed on fire,” he writes, as he tries to plan for his escape (57).  
Each night finds the young lawyer locked up in his bedroom, with scant equipment for a 
rational reckoning with the horrors of the day save for pen and paper. The prisoner tries, as best he 
can, to make sense of the insistent features of his prison—“doors, doors, doors everywhere, and all 
locked and bolted”—but learns only how well each clue refuses to be opened or yield any practical 
meaning. For Harker, writing holds promise as both a communicative and a cognitively organizing 
technology; he writes letters to Mina and carefully records his observations of the Count and his 
surroundings in order to stave off fear and madness, but numerous false starts lead to an 
increasingly hopeless isolation. More than a week into his stay, he futilely begins again by trying to 
find the beginning. “Let me begin with facts—bare, meager facts, verified by books and figures, and 
of which there can be no doubt. I must not confuse them with experiences which will have to rest 
on my own observation or my memory of them”(33). We know, however, that Harker’s self-
conscious rehearsal of the facts as opposed to experience is already a repetition, a fruitless effort to 
“be prosaic as far as fact can be” that he has undertaken before, writing that the facts “will help me 
to bear up, and imagination must not run riot with me. If it does, I am lost” (28).113 The implication 
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angry mob Charlotte Stoker describes in her letter to her son—the townspeople who chased her 
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of Harker’s earnest self-reassurances is that a studied empirical approach will serve as a remedy to 
the riotous incontinence of mind and body.  
In his reading of Dracula, Friedrich Kittler characterizes information in the novel as 
“diffuse,” and suggests that “the gathering of clues” instantiates “[a] new paradigm of science” 
instituted by “Edison and Freud, Sherlock Holmes and Van Helsing” (Kittler, 68). The novelty of 
this “paradigm of science” as the “gathering of clues” across broad swathes of measurable time and 
space is staged in Dracula by the transition from Harker’s claustrophobic point of view in the Gothic 
overture to Mina, Seward, and Van Helsing’s documentary narrative. It is important to note that in 
this opening section, Harker fails at both the gathering and the reading of clues, and his register of 
observations is overdetermined by what he confesses in a parenthetical note with the same formal 
characteristics as his reminder to get a recipe for Mina: “(Mem., this diary seems horribly like the 
beginning of the ‘Arabian Nights,’ for everything has to break off at cockcrow—or like the ghost of 
Hamlet’s father),” (33). This remark and its reference to an elusive, disappearing horizon of 
knowability in which the possibility of infinity, as in Sheherzad’s tales, defies interpretation like a 
Shakespearean ghost under the harsh illumination of daylight. The passing references to Hamlet and 
The Arabian Nights draws attention to Harker’s sense of the meta-narrative, and how his jottings 
strive and fail to piece together a reflection or narrative of the facts “of which there can be no 
doubt.” The Arabian Nights reference in particular reflects Stoker’s interest in the movements and 
spread of the “ghoul stories” of the Near East. His Dracula notes include a citation from Isabella 
Bird’s The Golden Chersonese, a travel narrative based in and around Malaysia about a local devils, 
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including a “storm fiend who rides the whirlwind, and spirits borrowed from Persia and Asia. It 
almost seems,” she writes, “as if the severe monotheism [of Islam] to which they have been 
converted compels them to create a giant demonology.”114 Stoker’s own demonology draws 
explicitly on these folkloric traditions, as we see in Harker’s comment, as well as those of Eastern 
Europe, and in so doing remains opaque to Harker, who suffers at the hands and teeth of its 
monsters.  
To emphasize this opacity, the novel offers an allegory-in-miniature by way of Harker’s 
abortive attempt to “see” what is happening to him by both lampooning his drive to know and 
destroying the tool with which he might do so. In the well-known shaving glass scene, Harker’s 
shaving glass becomes a figure for the “vain” enterprise of writing in his journal, in both the 
immodest and inefficacious senses. Dracula enters Harker’s room undetected, the young man’s gaze 
directed at his small mirror. With no approaching reflection to warn him of the Count’s arrival, 
Harker is surprised by a sudden touch on his shoulder and cuts himself shaving. He turns to greet 
the Count uneasily, and turns back to glass to observe, again, “[t]here was no reflection of him in the 
mirror! The whole room behind me was displayed; but there was no sign of a man in it, except 
myself” (28). Dracula warns Harker, as a drop of blood trails down his chin, “[t]ake care how you 
cut yourself. It is more dangerous than you think in this country,” then snatches the mirror and says 
in sudden anger,  
‘And this is the wretched thing that has done the mischief. It is a foul bauble of man’s vanity. 
Away with it!’ and opening the heavy window with one wrench of his terrible hand, he flung 
out the glass, which was shattered into a thousand pieces on the stones of the courtyard far 
below (28-29). 
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The mirror’s fall from the “terrible precipice” on which the castle stands illustrates the insuperable 
vertical distance separating Harker from the wide and wild territory below, whose narrow and 
infrequently traveled roads offer the only potential means of escape. He will come to know that his 
capacities fail him in ways the Count can best; in an episode cited by a number of critics at the 
novel’s time of publication, Harker witnesses his host descending the walls of the castle “face 
down…just as a lizard moves along a wall” (38).115 Building on the vocabulary he employs above, 
when he notes that “there was no sign of a man … except myself,” Harker here observes the 
outward sign of an inhuman morphology, and the vampire’s incomprehensibility as its extension.  
If the mirror’s fall portends his own, its shattered pieces reflect the sky, a “freedom in the 
vast expanse, inaccessible though it was to me compared with the narrow darkness of the courtyard” 
(37). The inaccessibility Harker bemoans here is as much a description of his physical captivity as it 
is of the unintelligible psychic and narrative horizons that plague his journal and thwart its 
transmission as evidence. The mirror’s inadequacy at reflecting what Harker knows to have been 
there also prefigures the thwarted reflection of self in his writing. Harker won’t see himself in the 
journal because he refuses to look at it. Consequently, he functions as an uncomprehending carrier 
in the import-export economy of violence to come. Instead, Mina, who undergoes a pseudo-
transformation into a vampire, does see his missing reflection in its pages, as she is also able to “see” 
the movements of an absent Dracula because his bite has given her hypnotic access to the alien 
formation of the vampire. Abysmally for Harker, the evidence he records—the architecture of the 
castle, the circuits of halls and doors and locked rooms and cellars, the dream-like encounter with 
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the three vampire women, the collection of English books with pages all cut, the sounds of 
construction echoing in the stone corridor—doesn’t add up to anything because it reflects only the 
immediate, controlled conditions of his surroundings. In this way, Stoker uses Harker as a foil for 
the way the novel presses against its Gothic constraints.   
The Count cannot be viewed or understood by way of the most fundamental tools of realist 
representation, namely immediate observation and detailed, fact-based description, because his 
actions exceed Harker’s understanding of human behavior and his landscape obeys its own physics.  
To draw a connection to mid-nineteenth-century medical realism as posited by Rothfield, the 
epistemological problem demonstrated here points up the limits of literary realism as a mirror when 
the scene in which it unfolds is as overwhelmingly unfamiliar as Transylvania, its subject as 
extravagantly unknowable as the Count. The romance, the fantasy, and the Gothic novel are better 
suited to such myths in that they bear different, less rigid, responsibilities to realism and 
pararealisms—psychological, medical, or otherwise. What’s remarkable about the novel’s Gothic 
overture, then, is the way in which it displaces paradigmatic subjects of each of these genres into the 
narrative space of the other: Dracula is a stranger in London as much as in medical horror, while 
Harker is foreign to Transylvania and the Gothic form. The dispersed reflections of sky captured by 
the pieces of Harker’s glass—in Kittler’s terms, the “diffuse” embodiment of information— forecast 
the challenges of naming and interpreting posed by the real, inasmuch as what has happened to 
Harker over the course of his captivity can only be rebuilt and projected through processes of 
narrative mediation, the generic conventions and abundant figurations of the Gothic, and the 
reader’s imagination, which always poses the threat, in Harker’s terms, of “running riot” with us.  
 Such evidentiary challenges are typical of Gothic forms whose details are obfuscatory and 
anaphorically sublime, owing to the fact that they participate in an impoverished symbolic 
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vocabulary that appears unable to communicate meaning apart from or deeper than a play of 
mirrored surfaces, which jibe at depth by refracting the illusion of it. A redoubled example of the 
novel’s motif of reflection and deflection comes to us by way of the ill-fated Lucy Westenra, who 
early on describes Dr. Seward in a letter to her confidante Mina as the kind of man who “look[s] one 
straight in the face, as if trying to read one’s thoughts…I flatter myself he has got a tough nut to 
crack,” she continues,  
I know that from my glass. Do you ever try to read your own face? I do, and I can tell you it 
is not a bad study, and gives you more trouble than you can well fancy if you have never 
tried it. He says that I afford him a curious psychological study, and I humbly think I do” 
(61, emphasis in the original) 
 
The trouble Lucy describes doesn’t apply to herself, at least insofar as legibility and vulnerability are 
conjoined: she is the easiest character to “read” in the novel’s flat depiction of her silly, superficial 
character, the first to succumb to the seductions of an outsized hunger for love and for contact, as 
well as the symptoms of vampirism, and the first to be killed for it. In her early work on the Gothic, 
this same “trouble” of reading the face, the surface, or the glass is what Eve Sedgwick describes as 
the “massive inaccessibility of those things that should normally be most accessible, the difficulty the 
story has in getting itself told.”116 Sedgwick’s use of the term “massive” here resonates not only with 
the riotous horrors of Jonathan Harker’s imagination, which recall the angry mobs of Charlotte 
Stoker’s letter, but also with the scalar organization of the Gothic, whose narrative hypertrophy is a 
dual descriptor of the enormity of both space and time (as opposed to the immediacy of 
foundational forms of empirical observation), neither of which adheres to a physics of realism in 
Gothic or post-Gothic writing. Instead, Gothic forms present and indeed specialize in portraying 
dizzyingly undifferentiated and transgressive space and time in ways that bear a comparison to 
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anxieties about the liquidity of the undisciplined body outlined by Pamela Gilbert in her account of 
Victorian cultural epidemiology and the medical anthropology of Asiatic cholera. These leaky and 
undisciplined systems of measurement as represented in the Gothic thus sketch out the contours of 
the unconscious—that fertile ground of terror as a feeling and horror as a literary effect—to which 
the uninterpretable is relegated. The suppression of Harker’s journal and its transfer into the hands 
of his future bride is an example of such a “massive inaccessibility.” Sedgwick’s definition continues,  
This difficulty occurs at every level of the novels. A fully legible manuscript or an 
uninterrupted narrative is rare; rarer still is the novel whose story is comprised by a single 
narrator, without the extensive irruption into the middle of the book of a new history with a 
new historian; rarest of all is the books presented by the author, in his own person, without a 
pseudonym and an elaborate account of the provenance and antiquity of the supposed 
original manuscript (15). 
 
Sedgwick’s early work on the Gothic attends equally to the conventional tropes and figures of the 
novels—including the centrality of doubling and mirroring in Gothic plots,117 which hold for Dracula 
most evidently in the first chapters in the ways I have described above—as to their formal and 
narratological features, which work to create an interpretive environment of anxiety and confusion 
by way of “extensive irruptions” in narrative that disrupt linearity, continuity, and other logics of 
development.118 The abrupt endings to Harker’s journal entries and his undelivered letters to Mina 
and Mr. Hawkins provide narrative irruptions-in-miniature that anticipate the much more elaborate   
polyvocality of the book’s middle section, where the passing off of voice—most notably from Lucy 
to Mina and from Seward to Van Helsing and back again—in addition to the collation of various 
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subjective accounts performs an authenticating function, disrupting the expectation of the 
authentication function of the single voice. Working toward the same authenticating end is what 
Sedgwick identifies as the Gothic novel’s compulsory “provenances” of which there must be an 
“elaborate account.” While provenance can refer to the place of origin of replicable objects such as 
comestibles or botanical strains, the word also indicates the singular origin of the work of art or the 
antique.119 This convention in particular, then, reveals the extent to which the Gothic novel is 
preoccupied with the causes and origins of fantastic, imaginary, mythic, and invisible forms of 
violence or terror. These forms of violence can be understood as a class of events—a type of attack 
of disease—but they are also singular in that they are enacted in ways that are specifically shaped to 
the memory, history, behavior, and psychology of their victims. The convention of the provenance 
thus reveals an aetiological orientation that links the project of textual authentication to the 
investigative practices of medicine as it was practiced by Stoker’s brother and his contemporaries. If 
provenance and aetiology represent a racinated mode of understanding modeled on depth and 
singularity, then collation, data sequencing, mapping, and by extension epidemiology represent an 
evolution of these interrogative technologies. Both are embodied in the generically and 
epistemologically hybrid form of Stoker’s novel right from the outset.   
I want to return once more to the novel’s prefatory note to the reader, which reads, “How 
these papers have been placed in sequence will be made clear in the reading of them. All needless 
matters have been eliminated, so that a history almost at variance with the possibility of latter-day 
belief may stand forth as simple fact” (frontmatter). Dracula offers suspense and drama not in the 
uncertainty of what will happen to the characters, but rather in how they will figure things out; the 
documents’ narrative force derives as much from their “simple” facticity as from their organization 
                                                
119 OED “provenance” first included in New English Dictionary, 1909.  
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and ordering. Put another way, the documents are manipulated in order to best project a narrative of 
causation, conflict, and resolution, while the elimination of “needless matters” confesses an editorial 
practice when it comes to Gothic convention. The preface continues in a rationalist vein: “There is 
throughout no statement of past events wherein memory may err, for all the records chosen are 
exactly contemporary, given from the standpoints and within the range of knowledge of those who 
made them” (frontmatter). The preface evinces a concern about both major categories of 
measurement—time and space—whose dysmorphia plagues the Gothic overture, as well as the body 
on which their perversions produce disorder, namely the memory, which, in Harker’s case, is 
unreliable, singular, and inaccessible.  
The power of the novel to terrify ostensibly rests on the assurance that the documents are 
both “exactly contemporary” and are articulated from the proper “standpoints,” and from within the 
“range of knowledge” of those who created them. In spite of the inclusion of this scientifically 
updated provenance, again, a Gothic convention Stoker is toying with, there remains central to the 
novel’s self-description an invocation of “belief,” hidden among a stream of qualifying terms, which 
represents a marked departure from the language of reason. The novel, according to its own 
parameters, offers a “history almost at variance with the possibility of latter day belief [that] may stand forth 
as simple fact.” The friction caused by the close proximity of the Gothic on the one hand and 
investigative realism on the other instantiates this new para-realism of horror, which hinges on the 
insistent return of the irrational that structures all attempts to organize and map the real and 
imaginary spaces of intercourse between people and thought.120 Finally, inasmuch as the book is 
                                                
120 Stephen D. Arata has called this “that ‘modernizing’ of Gothic which occurs at the close of the 
nineteenth century,” and suggests that “Stoker’s novel achieves its effects by bringing the terror of 
the Gothic home” (622). Stephen D. Arata, “The Occidental Tourist: Dracula and the Anxiety of 
Reverse Colonization,” Victorian Studies (Summer, 1990), 622-645.  
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concerned with susceptibility, infection, and symptomatology in a representative group, a sample, so 
to speak, of urban dwellers, its documentary form can be seen to draw on the assemblages of 
mortality data, maps, and the distal pathways of Asiatic cholera communication they traced that were 
studied and vociferously debated by epidemiologists and other medical personnel in the period 
during which Stoker was writing. Sedgwick argues that in spite of the narrative obstructions endemic 
to Gothic fictions,  
their whole point does not lie in the inability of the narrative to get from here to there.…The 
story does get through, but in a muffled form, with a distorted time sense, and accompanied 
by a kind of despair about any direct use of language (15).  
 
Just as the narrative manages to get through in a muffled form according to Sedgwick, so too does 
the generic materiality of the Gothic transgress the narrative irruption that moves us from 
Transylvania to London, where the novel is handed off to a “new historian.” Through Drs. Seward 
and Van Helsing, the reader discovers that the putative singularity of Dracula’s violence, which we 
understand by way of Harker’s Gothic overture, is a kind of trick, a slippery red herring ready to be 
let loose in the watery under-network of urban-imperial information circulation represented by the 
quick-traded typescripts, notes, memos, and news stories that make up the remainder of the novel. 
Taking a more distant view, we might ask through which porous membranes and barely-observable 
puncture wounds in the surface of the novel’s metropolitan modernity does the terror of Gothic 
monstrosity “get through”? How is Stoker’s representation of transmission indebted to theories of 
disease communication that are at once racially and geopolitically determined? 
 
—4. Organs of Knowledge— 
 
As we have seen, scholars have been circling around the question of infectious disease, and 
cholera in particular for some time now in reference to Dracula, and a survey of this material reveals 
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an amplification of interest in the specifics of disease nosology and aetiology over vague invocations 
of atavism and degeneracy as represented by infection, and epidemics more broadly. Kittler, whose 
primary concern is the representation of media and mediation, is one of these critics. In “Draculas 
Vermächntnis,” a 1982 essay written on the occasion of Jacques Lacan’s death, Kittler tells a cursory 
story about the specter of cholera. He mentions the disease once in passing: “[t]here was the cholera 
epidemic of 1832” (59), subordinating its role in Stoker’s medical sub-plot to the novel’s staging of 
the psychiatric investigations of the 1890s after Freud, Charcot and Ferrier; and then a second time 
in order to historicize the novel’s use of the word “sterilization” against the backdrop of the 
sanitation measures undertaken in England and France at the recommendation of Adrien Proust, 
father of Marcel, who established a “cordon sanitaire on the borders of the Occident.” Kittler suggests 
that “Proust’s wonderful neologism is reflected in the words and deeds of Stoker’s vampire 
hunters,” but his reading stops short of explicitly connecting the work of Mina’s secretarial labor and 
the “bureaucratization” (75) of information embodied in the typewritten manifold—whose media 
technological and gender implications he gives a capacious and rich reading—to the work of medical 
investigation.  
Kittler’s reading strongly intervenes in an unreferenced body of secondary literature that 
addresses the novel in an overly simplistic genre-based way. He writes, “Dracula is no vampire novel, 
but rather the written account of our bureaucratization.” (73). As an intervention this is a usefully 
forceful reversal, but its holding apart of horror on the one hand and bureaucratization on the other 
sets in motion an itinerary for research that is bifurcated along these lines, implying that horror 
cannot be understood as a part of bureaucracy, and vice versa. Although he adds a conjunctive 
phrase as a follow-up “anyone is free to call this a horror novel as well” (73), he leaves open the 
question of how to further specify in critical practice the “as well” of this nomenclature. Rather than 
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simply calling Dracula a horror novel as well as a written account of bureaucratization, we might ask 
to what extend the two are mutually constitutive, by connecting the two halves of Kittler’s cleverly 
autopsied Dracula through of the sciences of morbidity, the counting and mapping of dead bodies 
that played such a key role in the development of epidemic medicine.  
In extending Martin Willis’s claim that Stoker’s fiction evinces an interest in disease theory in 
the form of the miasma that gives shape to “The Invisible Giant,” we can see that there are 
biographical, as well as historical reasons to think that the writer was interested in the relationship 
between health and the social. While Willis carefully avoids making the claim that “Stoker’s scientific 
knowledge of disease theories was particularly acute” (303), he does recognize an aspect of Stoker’s 
text that brings it closest to the contemporary study of disease when he concludes that Dracula’s 
exploration of infection “fruitfully reveals that [disease] is not only a clinical or pathological category, 
nor can it be associated with any single political ideology, but that it powerfully and contradictorily 
acts upon, and within, an already multivalent and conflicted social and cultural world” (322). Stoker’s 
approach to disease does not simply reflect a social view of disease, but also reflects the specific 
wisdom of epidemiology, whose expanded field of inquiry, in which disease is defined both socially 
and pathologically, is described by its practitioners as “an integrative, eclectic discipline deriving 
concepts and methods from other disciplines, such as statistics, sociology, and biology, for the study 
of disease in a population.”121 If Kittler’s Proustian neologism—the ‘sanitary border’ devised to 
protect Europe from the invasion of Asiatic cholera—is manifest, then, in the “words and deeds of 
Stoker’s vampire hunters” their investigations reveal a two-fold precedent in the nineteenth century 
effort to come to terms with Asiatic cholera as both an epistemological problem representative of 
                                                
121 David E. Lillienfeld and Paul D. Stolley, Foundations of Epidemiology 3rd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 4. 
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infectious disease in a global economy and as a set of specific bodily and social symptoms.122 These 
symptoms came to be understood in ways that were crucially different from the practices that helped 
doctors to understand local, non-contagious afflictions. The novel highlights the differences in these 
two medical epistemologies by persistently showing the limits of the knowledge of its two clinicians, 
Drs. Seward and Van Helsing, both of whom are psychiatrists, in comparison to the more socially 
and bureaucratically-minded Mina, and by further differentiating the suffering of the brain or the 
head, body parts associated with individuality and the self that are exemplified in the figure of the 
“mad” patient Renfield, from the pathogenicity of the circulatory system that strikes Lucy and Mina.  
Returning to Charlotte Stoker’s letter, we can see further evidence of the way in which 
Stoker experiments with both of these forms of medical knowledge, indeed, how he exploits their 
intersection in the interest of developing a horror that is not just about bodily suffering, but is also 
about systems of knowing and the management of public health crises. Charlotte Stoker’s tale 
describes the cholera hospital, overflowing with corpses and the sick, as a site of particular horror 
where “such scenes were perpetrated …as would make the flesh creep to hear of” (Charlotte Stoker, 
414). One by one the nurses die, and are replaced by women of ill-repute and constant drunkenness, 
who, according to Charlotte Stoker, saved themselves time waiting for cholera victims to die by 
“dragging the patients down the stairs by the legs with their heads dashing on the stone steps, before 
they were dead” (414). In one of the most horrific and critically neglected episodes in Dracula, Bram 
Stoker layers this scene of medical misconduct during the cholera epidemic with a neuro-
physiological note on head trauma that he receives in a memo from his elder bother, Thornley, 
                                                
122 This shift can also be usefully understood as describing or following a pattern similar to that of 
political power when juxtaposed with Michel Foucault’s argument in The Birth of the Clinic about the 
kinds of power embodied in the clinical, pathological medicine of the early and middle 19th century. 
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sometime in the early 1890s.123 This layering takes place just as the violent activities of the desperate 
and suddenly careless Count Dracula are coming to a climax. We find Dr. Seward aghast in the 
doorway of the ever more disorganized and agitated Renfield’s room in the lunatic hospital, the 
locked doors and windows of which admit no unauthorized entrant who could have inflicted such 
violence. Seward writes in his diary:  
I found him lying on the floor on his left side in a glittering pool of blood. When I went to 
move him, it became at once apparent that he had received some terrible injuries…As the 
face was exposed I could see that it was horribly bruised, as though it had been beaten 
against the floor – indeed it was from the face wounds that the pool of blood originated 
(305).  
 
In addition to the face wounds, Renfield has broken his back. The young doctor and a ward 
attendant try to piece together how the isolated patient could have both fallen from a great enough 
height to break his back and subsequently beat his face repeatedly against the floor. Whatever 
impossible violence has laid its hands on Renfield, Seward decides initially that the pool of blood is 
issuing from his battered face. But the visible symptoms, as it turns out, are misleading, and Seward 
quickly retracts his diagnosis once Dr. Van Helsing has arrived, concluding instead that “the wounds 
of the face were superficial; the real injury was a depressed fracture of the skull, extending right up 
through the motor area” (306-307). First, Renfield’s pseudo-incarceration in the asylum recalls the 
quarantining of the half-dead patients at the Fever Hospital in Sligo. Second, the plurality of the 
“terrible injuries” and “face wounds,” as a consequence of the repetitive action of having been 
“beaten” suggest a citation of the perverse seriality not only of the endless and indeterminate 
passageways and stone staircases of Dracula’s castle—the Gothic architectonics of Jonathan 
Harker’s ordeal in Transylvania—but also of the stone steps down which Charlotte Stoker observed 
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the half-dead patients being dragged feet first. Here we see the violence inflicted by the vampire 
converging with that inflicted, however indirectly, by cholera.  
What follows in the novel is an odd eruption of technical medical jargon and surgical 
theatrics employed by Stoker to attenuate the lead-up to the novel’s most spectacular scene: the 
forced feeding of Mina at Dracula’s breast. In the lunatic asylum, Renfield is bleeding on the floor; 
his cell is suddenly transformed into an operating theatre whose finale is the trephining operation 
performed on Renfield’s cranium by Van Helsing in order to “reduce the pressure and get back to 
normal conditions.” These terms and the description surrounding it are taken directly from a note 
written by Stoker’s brother Thornley as an answer to Bram’s query about the symptoms and 
treatment of depression fractures. Thornley’s memo states “if a depressed fracture the symptoms 
would probably be immediate […] trephining to remove the depressed bone, or to give the surgeon 
opportunity to remove the blood clot might give instant relief.”124 The practice of trephining—
which involves drilling or scraping a small burr-hole in the skull to reduce intracranial pressure 
caused by bleeding—is not only the oldest surgical procedure in evidence, but has also remained 
medically relevant for the treatment of brain bleeds and other traumas. Trephination also has an 
independent history in the field of mental health: for psychiatric patients suffering seizures, madness, 
and other disturbances, trephination has long been thought to relieve cranial pressure and allow for 
the removal of, as it is called in the title of the Hieronymus Bosch painting, “the stone of 
madness.”125  
                                                
124 Sir William Thornley Stoker, “Memo,” (Page 81, Rosenbach #45a) in Robert Eighteen-Bisang 
and Elizabeth Miller, ed. Bram Stoker’s Notes for Dracula: A Facsimile Edition (Jefferson, NC and 
London: McFarland & Co., 2008), 179-185.  




Hieronymous Bosch, “Cutting the Stone,” c. 1494 
 
Van Helsing and Seward’s heroic efforts to rescue the delusional madman Renfield from his 
head wounds are significant because they have just realized the necessity of his remaining alive and 
lucid in order to tell them what he’s seen of Count Dracula. The trephination performs a few 
functions in the novel, especially in the way it stages the tension between the visual basis of 
empiricism and other forms of medical knowing. The trephining is theatrical: a visible attempt to 
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address an internal brain bleed by way of surgical intervention. In this way, the operation represents 
the externalizing response to the disordered internal rupture of blood—in other words, a repetition 
of the internal condition of perpetual hemorrhage from which the Count and his victims suffer. It is 
also an attempt to extract the “stone of madness” in the form of Renfield’s key piece of information 
about the Count, whose extrication could help reverse the spread of vampirism. As a figure for 
psychic disturbance, the stone represents a way of thinking about pathology in which a cause can be 
physical, visible, singular, hard, clearly defined, and thus found and removed from the one place 
where it resides. Such a specific and singular source of malaise both reflects and challenges ways of 
imagining contagious afflictions. On the one hand it suggests the possibility of isolating and 
eradicating an agent like a microbe or a virus, a role played by microbiology in epidemiological 
studies. On the other hand, it represents a depth-based approach to the investigation and remedying 
of disease, rather than a social one. 
In keeping with the limited efficacy of the stone-extraction or radical surgical approach, the 
rewards of the trephining the doctors perform exactly according to Thornley Stoker’s instructions 
are not only medically incomplete, but also interpretively inconclusive. Before dying, having 
recovered from the “stertorous breathing” he shares with others who have been bitten, Renfield lets 
loose a stream of disappointing information that the reader and the inquiring doctors already know. 
While some new details of his relationship to Dracula do come out, any data helpful in locating or 
containing him rapidly are limited to the discovery that the vampire can atomize himself into a dust, 
and that he is most likely already attacking Mina Harker at the very moment Renfield is speaking his 
words.  
This scene with its elaborate failed operation illustrates the tension between models of 
medical understanding staged in Dracula—those inherited from a clinical tradition, what we might 
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call pathological understanding, and those whose interpretive field casts beyond the body of the 
patient and into the network of movement and communication. In The Birth of the Clinic, Michel 
Foucault describes the developments of nineteenth century medicine according to the explosive 
availability and self-conscious theorization of pathology—the study of tissue, masses within the 
body, and anatomical surfaces, which was not a new science but was only just developing as a 
discipline in the early 1800s—as the cornerstone of a modern medicine organized by way of the 
sightlines that grid the clinical encounter. In the preface to the book, Foucault offers an account of 
the primal scene of this invention: the dissection of the human brain.  
The fruit is then opened up. From under the meticulously parted shell, a soft, grayish 
mass appears, wrapped in viscous, veined skins: a delicate, dingy-looking pulp within 
which—freed at last and exposed at last to the light of day—shines the seat of knowledge. 
The antisanal [sic] skill of the brain-breaker has replaced the scientific precision of the scales, 
and yet our science since Bichat identifies with the former the precise, but immeasurable 
gesture that opens up the plenitude of concrete things, combined with the delicate network 
of their properties to the gaze, has produced a more scientific objectivity for us than 
instrumental arbitrations of quantity. Medical rationality plunges into the marvelous density 
of perception, offering the grain of things as the first face of truth, with their colours, their 
spots, their hardness, their adherence. The breadth of the experiment seems to be identified 
with the domain of the careful gaze, and of an empirical vigilance receptive only to the 
evidence of visible contents. The eye becomes the depositary and source of clarity; it has the 
power to bring a truth to light that it receives only to the extent that it has brought it to light; 
as it opens, the eye first opens the truth: a flexion that marks the transition from the world 
of classical clarity—from the ‘enlightenment’—to the nineteenth century.126 
 
This passage begins with the time-honored and forceful contradictory image of the brain as the 
“fruit” of humanity, the “shining seat of knowledge,” and the decidedly “grayish mass…[the] dingy-
looking pulp” that houses it. When Foucault speaks of the “grain of things,” found like a secret 
Braille in the buried trove of the skull, their “colour, their spots, their hardness, their adherence,” he 
is speaking of a period in medical history in which medical “things”—disturbances, sicknesses, 
                                                
126 Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, trans. A.M. Sheridan 
Smith (New York: Vintage, 1994), xiii. [L’agilité artisinale du casse-crâne a remplacé la précision scientifique de 
la balance…], M. Foucault, Naissance de la clinique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997) ix.]  
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tumors—bore a scalar correspondence to the body, and of the way in which pathological knowledge 
under such a system is received by the eye, that very organ that has “brought it to light.” In other 
words, in moving beyond an “enlightenment” model of the quantitative writing of medicine as a 
scientific rather than a barbarous profession, a “classical clarity” represented by the scales, 
pathological medicine during the nascency and maturation of the clinic in Western Europe fell back 
on its own perceptual apparatuses in a kind of sensory tautology very much like the interpretive 
cloister of the Gothic described by Sedgwick. Under these conditions of what Foucault names a 
“flexion,” signaling the transition from the enlightenment to the nineteenth century, truth is 
coterminous with sight—“as it opens, the eye first opens the truth”—and coterminous as well with 
presence, and with the singularity of the sick body. 
In Dracula, composed in the very last years of the nineteenth century, the medical as a way of 
reading organic violence can be understood as a bridge, representing a twentieth-century empirical 
field of knowledge that moves beyond pathology, as well as the clinical gaze of the of the nineteenth 
century that is oriented toward the patient. This moving beyond is exemplified in the failure of the 
trephining operation above; the stone of madness is an incomplete piece of evidence that represents 
the limitations of searching inside the body for clues about contagion. Even as it looks forward, this 
new way organizing knowledge about sickness and health remains layered upon, indebted to, and 
commingling with the horrific masks of death that populate a Gothic past, including the contested 
stability of the pathological subject in its narrative system. How a heterogeneous population of the 
dead, the living, the sick, and the fantastic is represented through and made legible by the 
topography and demography of modern urban life—and how this legibility is indebted to the 
epistemology of epidemiology—is the subject of the next section.  
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—5. Occult Blood—  
 
“May I cut off the head of dead Miss Lucy?” Van Helsing asks Lucy’s fiancée, Arthur 
Holmwood (228). “Heavens and earth no!” he cries in response. This conversation begins the 
negotiations for the treatment of Lucy’s veinous cadaver, through whose ravenous vessels has 
flowed the blood not just of her secret assailant Count Dracula, but also her betrothed, and Jack 
Seward, and Van Helsing, and finally Quincy Morris in the form of blood transfusions during the 
decline in her health and her conversion to vampirism (133-135, 141, 148, 164). The first scene of 
transfusion offers rich material for a psycho-sexual reading. Ever the expert on remedies both 
ancient and modern, Van Helsing explains his plan: “[y]oung miss is bad, very bad. She wants blood, 
and blood she must have or die. My friend John and I have consulted; and we are about to perform 
a transfusion of blood—to transfer from full veins of one to the empty veins which pine for him” 
(134). With three men tending to Lucy, Stoker exploits the double meaning of her “want,” as both 
lack and desire, to bring all three into relationship with her in a manner that Arthur will later 
describe as having made them “truly married,” though she dies too soon to become his wife.  
The vitality of the substance itself, blood’s materiality as opposed to its metaphorical or 
spiritual value, is celebrated in the novel by the enthusiastic enunciations of the mad patient 
Renfield, who declaims in crescendoing tones after weeks of accumulating animal matter in the form 
of a few kittens who eat a number of birds who eat many spiders, who eat still more flies, “the blood 
is the life! The blood is the life!” (156). The question of whose life the blood is remains an open one, 
and such celebrations do not render the process of transfusion ontologically uncomplicated, 
quotidian, or without fascination. Van Helsing performs the operation “with swiftness…with 
absolute method,” and Lucy’s “pining” veins receive a “blood so pure that we need not defibrinate 
it” (135). The fibrin Van Helsing refers to here is a fibrous protein that scientists were just beginning 
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to understand in the 1870s and 80s as a clotting agent that would inhibit a salubrious transfusion.127 
This detail once again indicates Stoker’s interest in then-recent developments in medicine, as well as 
reflecting a pervasive understanding—in the wake of decades of journalistic and professional 
speculation about choleric contagion—of solid debris or fibrous material found in water as distinctly 
insalubrious in the wake of three disastrous outbreaks of cholera in London. By the end of the 19th 
century, human whole blood transfusion was fairly well understood, to the extent that blood was 
known to have different “types” and was therefore mixed prior to transfusion, but it was not 
practiced widely with much success until the Austrian Karl Landsteiner made a breakthrough in 
codifying blood groups in 1901, four years after the publication of Dracula.128 Stoker’s allusion to the 
“swiftness” and the “method” of Lucy’s transfusions, and his use of technical medical vocabulary 
like “defibrinate” to describe what was then a relatively rare operation reveals again a studious 
interest in contemporary medical advances, terminology, and praxis. The prevalence of this language 
increases in the second half of the novel as the narrative unfolds more and more in the voices, notes, 
and conversations between Dr. Seward and Van Helsing, the men of science who jointly endeavor 
to diagnose the ills befalling themselves and their compatriots. The self-consciously rational and 
imperturbable tone of the diagnostician is not without a trace of the uncanny return of the 
monstrous; the way the novel lingers over, and returns time and again to scenes of transfusion as 
spectacular performances of the invisible process of infection reveals the lurid strangeness of 
opening one’s veins to another, and watching the life pass from body to body. 
                                                
127 Most scholars agree that the key data on fibrin and coagulation inhibitors was published by 
Alexander Schmidt, a Baltic physiologist, in 1872. See JA Marcum, “Defending the priority of 
‘remarkable researches’: the discovery of fibrin ferment,” History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 20.1 
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128 See Catherine Waldby and Robert Mitchell, Tissue Economies: Blood, Organs, and Cell Lines in Late 
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119 
At the time of Stoker’s writing, transfusion was heavily overwritten by an anxiety about 
sharing blood as tantamount to sharing something essentially personal between giver and receiver.129 
Van Helsing mobilizes this imagined corporeal parasympathy to his advantage, in order to convince 
Arthur of his good intentions: “For her—I am ashamed to say so much, but I say it in kindness—I 
gave what you gave: the blood of my veins; I gave it, I, who was not, like you, her lover, but only her 
physician and her friend” (229). Through this blood union, he stakes a claim in her death: “…before 
death, after death; and if my death can do her good even now, when she is the dead Un-Dead, she 
shall have it freely” (229). Van Helsing argues convincingly for their joint possession of and 
responsibility for the young lady, and Arthur concedes that it will be necessary to behead his dead 
fiancée and drive a stake into her chest himself. The language Van Helsing uses to persuade 
Holmwood is instructive not only in its reliance on the trope of the investments that come of 
confluence, which are underscored by the market and trade valences of the term “freely,” but also in 
its insistence on the undecidability of life and death, whose liminality in this fiction is represented by 
combinations and recombinations of the terms: Un-Dead death (Dracula’s annihilation) dead Un-
Death (Lucy’s intermediate pseudo-death), Death Un-dead (Renfield’s temporary revival). The 
porous membrane between life and death, these two absolute states, reflects two major tropes in the 
                                                
129 The force of these connections, at least according to affective reports, does not wane nearly as 
much as we might imagine, in spite of the widespread use of blood and blood products for 
transfusion in the twentieth century, at least until the early 1980s. What’s more, its opposite, a terror 
about being “inhabited” by the blood giver was so entrenched that blood banks remained segregated 
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a continued round of donation, a continuing replenishment of both the population’s vitality and its 
generosity” (16).  
120 
discourse around cholera: first, the terror of live burial, whose force in the young Stoker’s 
imagination can be sourced to his mother’s tales of the cholera horror, and second, the horror of 
permeability and confluence that haunts every register of choleric literature, and plays itself out on 
objects large and small: from national boundaries and riverways to the absorptive capacities of bed 
linens and lung capillaries.130  
Somewhere between these two levels is the anxiety manifested in the novel about 
increasingly elastic interpersonal relationships, especially ones in which bodily fluids are exchanged, 
whether by choice or by force. Van Helsing’s insistence on consanguinity—the many bloods 
inhabiting Lucy’s body—and the intimacy and ownership this condition confers on the donors, 
points up what many critics have identified as the conservative sexual politics of Stoker’s book, 
which would punish Lucy, the first to be made vampiric and the only to die for it, for her barefoot, 
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On the Mode of Communication of Cholera (London: Wilson and Ogilvy, August 1849). Snow writes of 
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communication are reasoned upon in the opinion that cholera, if conveyed by human intercourse, 
must be contagious…by emanations from the sick person into the surrounding air, which enter the 
system of others by being inhaled, and absorbed by the blood passing through the lungs” (6). He 
corrects this theory, remarking that he doesn’t assume that choleraic patients’ blood is poisoned 
“until it become so by the retention of matters which ought to pass off through the kidneys, the 
functions of which are, however, suspended by the thickened state of the blood, which will scarcely 
allow it to pass through the capillaries” (8).  
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free-roaming ways, and for her wish to “marry three men, or as many as want her!” (65).131 Lucy’s 
letters to Mina, whose breathless enthusiasms and deep triviality and equivocation provide notable 
relief after Harker’s diary of despair and terror, are rich with metaphors of liquidity and its risks, 
from her “sympath[y] with Desdemona when she had such a dangerous stream poured in her ear, 
even by a black man” (63), to Seward’s “pouring out a perfect torrent of love-making” (64), to 
“burst[ing] into tears” at the end of her “very sloppy letter” (65). The language carries over into 
Seward’s account of his own suffering following Lucy’s refusal; he begins his phonographic journal 
with surgical efficiency: “ebb tide in appetite today” (67).   
Lucy’s promiscuous circulatory system doubles, in miniature, the fertile soil of Dracula’s 
Transylvanian earth on which so many bloods were spilled through acts of both aggression and self-
sacrifice over centuries of conflict between Cross and Crescent that rendered the dirt earth itself 
“holy” (331). Both substances—blood and dirt—in their materiality also reveal the textured, soiling, 
staining nature of the metaphor and the medium insofar as they both become visible means of 
conveyance for Dracula and his disease in their journey from East to West. The count sleeps in this 
dirt, as Harker discovers one day in an effort to escape the castle: “[t]here in one of the great boxes, 
of which there were fifty in all, on a pile of newly dug earth, lay the Count!” (53).132 The “coffins,” or 
                                                
131 See Talia Schaffer “ ‘A Wilde Desire Took Me’: The Homoerotic History of Dracula,” English 
Language History 61 (1994), 381-425, and Kathleen L. Spencer “Purity and Danger: Dracula, the Urban 
Gothic, and the Late Victorian Degeneracy Crisis,” English Language History 59 (1992), 197-225. 
132 There is a secondary curiosity about this scene: the lid of the box is also “pierced with holes, here 
and there” (53), as if the vessel were a crude planter, and its inhabitant an occult seed. There are the 
sexual and reproductive meanings that could be attached to this reading, and partially underscored 
by the name of the ship—Demeter—on which the earth-filled boxes are carried to England. But 
another imaginary is invoked here by the white, necrotic thing planted in imported earth, and that is 
the Great Famine. It is widely understood that the fungus that caused the potato blight was likely 
brought onto European shores in one of the innumerable shipments of guano harvested in South 
America, which served as fertilizer for Northern Europe’s increasingly exhausted wheat and potato 
crops. The “mould” in the Demeter’s uncanny cargo of coffins invokes this imported fungus and the 
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“boxes” built by Gypsy laborers in the weeks leading up to Dracula’s emigration to England become 
the weird cargo for the ghost ship wrecked at Whitby, creating a stir during Lucy and Mina’s visit 
there. The novel shows a cutting from the Dailygraph pasted into Mina’s journal that reads,  
[t]he sequel to the strange arrival of the derelict in the storm last night is almost more 
startling than the thing itself. It turns out that the schooner is a Russian from Varna, and is 
called the Demeter. She is almost entirely in ballast of silver sand, with only a small amount of 
cargo – a number of great wooden boxes filled with mould (89). 
 
What is so startling about this news? Between the silver sand ballast and the boxes of “mould,” the 
schooner is almost entirely freighted with earth. Apart from providing further details in the story of 
a sensational shipwreck in a sleepy English seaside town, this item shows the disarming strangeness 
of encountering earth itself—an entrenched symbol of the singularity of place, home, and nation—
                                                
devastations it carries with it. Though his Anglo-Irish, professional class family was mostly shielded 
from the effects of the famine, Stoker was born in November of 1847—the year known as “Black 
’47” for its high famine-related mortality—in a house “overlooking Dublin Bay.” “In the distance,” 
adds biographer Barbara Belford, “was the North Wall docking slip, from which thousands sailed, 
fleeing the Irish famine of the 1840s” (Bram Stoker: A Biography of the Author of Dracula (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), 13. The famine and the violence it occasioned (riots, looting, beatings, 
theft) so impacted the family that they moved from Dublin to the coastal town of Clontarf, and, 
according to Stoker’s biographers (Lisa Hopkins, Harry Ludlum, Daniel Farson) stories of the 
famine’s great horrors were as plentiful in the Stoker household as were those of the cholera horror 
at Sligo. Famine and epidemic (and sometimes class upheaval) were often linked in the press, as in 
an account from the London Times in 1845 that called for the need to “prevent, as much as possible, 
the horrors, the high prices, and extortion of a famine.” Later in 1846, the Times again warned of 
“the certain and immediate perils of famine, plague, and pestilence” (cited in Cormac Ó Gráda, Black 
’47 and Beyond: The Great Irish Famine in History, Economy, and Memory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), 38). At the unstable allegorical level of Dracula, the villain’s monstrous 
hunger that ends inevitably in a form of cannibalism does double duty as an extension of famine-
terror and a vulgar literalization of Protestant derisions of the Catholic belief in transubstantiation 
and the “cannibalism” of eating the body and drinking the blood of Christ (Cf. Chapter 3: 
“Consuming bodies: transubstantiation, incarnation and the politics of cannibalism in Jonathan 
Swift” in Jarlath Killeen, Gothic Ireland: Horror and the Irish Anglican Imagination in the Long Eighteenth 
Century (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2005). For more on the famine, see Cormac Ó Gráda, above; 
The Meaning of the Famine, ed. Patrick O’Sullivan (London: Leicester University Press, 1997); Jarlath 
Killeen, above. For the poetics and cultural significance of the potato, see Catherine Gallagher “The 
Potato in the Materialist Imagination,” in Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt, Practicing New 
Historicism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).  
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as a deterritorialized substance that forces a recognition of the earth’s potential, and potentially 
monstrous, flow. The potential of the very earth of foreign lands to arrive on the shores of England 
functions as a hypotyposis of a reverse colonialism in which, even more worryingly than the people, 
the very land of conquest—plundered for its raw materials—returns to wreak its revenge. Stoker’s 
cartography of fear in Dracula is not so direct: the land does not come from contemporary British 
colonies, but rather from a more ancient zone of East–West conflict, a decision which serves to 
Gothicize the then-present colonial relations in an oblique way. The Demeter’s sand and dirt cargo 
draws attention not only to the way earth is made fluid, but also to the terrestrial interruptions of a 
water-based economy’s levity and speed, to the persistent necessity of weight and materiality, the 
ballast of the lightly cargoed ship, in an increasingly weightless and symbolic global trade scheme 
facilitated by globalization of markets as an extension of colonial expansion.  
As Franco Moretti has suggested in his reading of the novel, this economy and the shifting 
class structure inherent in it is represented by the evolution of Dracula’s landed stone-and-gold-
bound fortune—whose epistemological extension is “local knowledge,” as opposed to the “book 
knowledge” with which he prepares himself to emigrate—to a paper one, as he organizes, by way of 
Harker, the paper-pushing solicitor, to obtain the deed for the house at Carfax, and eventually others 
scattered throughout London.133 Here we see another way in which Stoker links liquidity and 
                                                
133 Franco Moretti, “Dialectics of Fear,” Signs Taken for Wonders: Essays in the Sociology of Literary Forms 
(London: Verso, 1983), 83-108. Moretti suggests that in spite of his aristocratic blood, Dracula 
“lacks the aristocrat’s conspicuous consumption: he does not eat, he does not drink, he does not 
make love, he does not like showy clothes, he does not go to the theatre and he does not go hunting. 
He does not hold receptions and he does not build stately homes. Not even his violence has 
pleasure as its goal. Dracula…does not like spilling blood. He sucks just as much as is necessary and 
never wastes a drop….Dracula, in other words, is a saver, an ascetic, an upholder of the Protestant 
ethic. And in fact he has no body, or rather, he has no shadow. His body admittedly exists, but it is 
‘incorporeal’—‘sensibly supersensible’ as Marx wrote of the commodity, ‘impossible as a physical fact,’ 
as Mary Shelley defines the monster in the first lines of her preface” (Moretti, 90-91, emphasis 
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monstrosity. The making liquid of Dracula’s fortune also allows for his mobility, and therefore 
allows his blood-sucking condition to spread beyond the scope of endemic violence, of which the 
local populations in both Transylvania and later London are only too aware, into the realm of the 
epidemic, characterized by speed, spread, and English mortality. Dracula’s boxes of dirt—an 
uncannily transported feature of his life at home in the East—prefigure the weird cargo of the 
twentieth century immigrant’s arrival novel: those fruits, spices, leaves, unrecognizable roots, seeds, 
and nuts that made the terror of retaliation in the form of the colonies coming to England visible as 
a cornucopia of alimentary and ecological eccentricity. Thinking in terms of immigration, we might 
imagine that blood-drinking is an ailment akin to a kind of imperial homesickness; we never directly 
see Dracula drinking blood in Transylvania, for example. At one point late in their researches to find 
and eradicate him, Mina writes in her journal “I suppose one ought to pity anything so hunted as is 
the Count. That is just it: this Thing is not human—not even beast. To read Dr. Seward’s account of 
poor Lucy’s death, and what followed, is enough to dry up the springs of pity in one’s heart” (253-
254). 
It is crucial, too that the dirt in the ship is not fresh and fertile, but rather old and sickly; the 
putrefaction indicated by the use of the newspaper’s term “mould” over Harker’s “earth” prefigures 
and indeed prejustifies a strategy of “sterilization” undertaken later in the novel by the medical men 
whose vocabulary this plan draws on. The term sterilization functions in this instance to indicate 
both a cleansing and a prevention of reproduction. Seward and Van Helsing lead the charge to 
                                                
mine). While I agree with the portion of this analysis that identifies ‘incorporeal supersensibility’ as a 
collapse of the monster and the commodity in Dracula, I am less convinced by the first part of the 
claim. What Moretti describes as Dracula’s lack of ostentation can alternatively be understood in the 
fin-de-siècle context as a performance of moral superiority derived from noble roots, a nobility that 
importantly contrasts itself with the more demonstrative wearing of wealth characteristic of the 
merchant, professional, colonial classes and the industrial bourgeoisie.  
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“sterilize [the] lairs…of his earthly envelope.” “[W]e have this day,” they insist “to hunt out all his 
lairs and sterilize them” (324). A concrescence of eugenic and epidemiological language of pollution, 
cleanliness, and sanitary policy pervade the following pages until the scene culminates in the 
pharmaco-theological “sterilization” or “treatment” of the coffins of dirt with communion wafers. 
Harker, resuming the therapeutic mantle of narrator to keep from “going mad” (321) after a long 
absence in the archive’s pages, writes “[o]ne by one we treated in the same way each of the great 
boxes, and left them as we had found them to all appearance; but in each was a portion of the host” 
(331). Here we can see the relationship between a Christological understanding of spirit, which can 
be housed in the material substrate of the wafer, and disease, whose invisible operations between 
people can only begin to be understood by way of the material that flows between them.  
We might also note here that Stoker was committed to the novel’s questions of hospitality in 
these terms; in 1914, two years after Stoker’s death, the short story “Dracula’s Guest,” which is 
widely held to be a revision of the deleted first chapter of Dracula, was published as the title text in a 
new story collection. Apart from the double-entendre that triangulates the quotidian meaning of the 
word “host” as one who provides for the guest, whether he is welcome or not, and a biological host 
whose body becomes the site of thriving and proliferation of a parasite or disease, the “treatment” 
also invokes the practice of inoculation—whose use in the prevention of smallpox also arrived by 
way of a diplomatic errand the East—relying as it does on the use of the material of disease, in this 
case the scabs of the dermic sore, as a prevention against it. 134  In other words the “holy”-ness of 
Dracula’s imported and blood-soaked earth, a metonym for the struggle and eventual fall of the 
Crescent in the Carpathians, is “sterilized” against him by use of that other material metonym of the 
                                                
134 See Lady Mary Wortley Montague, Selected Letters, ed. Isobel Grundy (London & New York: 
Penguin Books, 1997), 58.  
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holy spirit, namely the communion wafer, a stand-in for the body that cannot help but evoke its 
liturgical companion, the blood of Christ, a drink bound for the veins as much as for the stomach 
and the soul.  
 
—6. Bittersweet Waters— 
The ways and passages, the capillaries and the tides, the routes of arrival and the narrative 
shape they take in Dracula offer perhaps the strongest thematic link to the concerns of epidemiology 
as it responded to Indian cholera, and was practiced and theorized from the time of its first use as a 
term in English in 1850135 through the 1890s. At the tenth meeting of the Epidemiological Society of 
London, and on the occasion of the first free-standing publication of the society’s transactions, Dr. 
Benjamin Guy Babington addressed the attendants and recapitulated the goals of the still-new 
science as he had stated them at the inaugural meeting of the body: 
We endeavor, by the light of modern science, to review all those causes which result in the 
manifestation and spread of epidemic diseases—to discover causes at present unknown, and 
investigate those which are ill understood—to collect together facts on which scientific 
researches may be securely based—to remove errors which impede their progress.136 
 
In these lines, we can observe a shift from the post-enlightenment rhetoric of science described by 
Foucault and exemplified in Babington’s opening invocation of “light” and the search for causes—
those “at present unknown” and those “which are ill understood”—to the assemblage of data that 
                                                
135 The Epidemiological Society of London held its first meeting in 1850, and instantiated at that 
time the publication of The Transactions of the Epidemiological Society of London, though for the first ten 
years it was published under the auspices of The Sanitary Review. While “epidemic” had been in use 
since at least the earliest years of the 17th century if not before, epidemiology as a science, theory, 
and study of epidemics was not born until much later. The OED lists an 1873 use of 
“epidemiology” as the first in the title of J. P. Parkin’s Epidemiology or the Remoter Causes of Epidemic 
Diseases.  
136 Epidemiological Society of London, Transactions of the Epidemiological Society of London v. 1 1859-
1862, (London, 1859-1907), 1. Hereafter cited in text as Transactions. 
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will form the basis of research, and the removal of errors from that body of data. The mandate “to 
collect together facts” and to “remove errors” should recall the short preface of Dracula as well, the 
“papers…placed in sequence,” and the way in which “all needless matters have been eliminated” 
(frontmatter). Babington continues in a martial register that draws on the prevalent metaphor of 
disease-as-enemy, an extension of which is the equally prevalent discourse of enemy-as-disease:   
thus having, as far as we are able, made ourselves thoroughly acquainted with the 
strongholds of our enemies, and their modes of attack, to suggest those means by which 
their invasion may be either prevented, or, if in spite of our exertions they may have broken 
in upon us, to seek how they may be most effectually combated and expelled (Transactions, 2-
3). 
 
Babington’s language of reconnaissance, invasion, and combat reveals further the overlap between 
imperial management strategies and the techniques of surveyorship employed by so-called shoe 
leather physicians like William Farr and John Snow, who examined not only the bodies of their 
patients, but also their statistical significance as a way of understanding not the nature of cholera 
morbus as pathologists and biologists had done to no avail, but its “strongholds,” “modes of attack,” 
“invasions” and “break ins.”137 Further revealing the reliance of imperial administration on 
epidemiology’s broad-view data interpretation is William Farr’s early work on ‘hygology,’138 as he 
called it in the early 1830s, which would later make an appearance in economist John Ramsay 
McCulloch’s two-volume Descriptive and Statistical Account of the British Empire, first published in 
                                                
137 I distinguish the practices and epistemologies of imperialism from colonialism following Edward 
Said’s definition in the opening chapter of Culture and Imperialism, where imperialism inheres the 
structures of thought and technologies of administration of the whole empire—a kind of broad view 
epistemic strategy—as opposed to the “implanting of settlements on distant territory,” which is the 
concern of colonialism proper, and which Said calls a “consequence” of imperialism. In the way that 
this distinction both acknowledges the “intertwining” of and also differentiates between global 
causes and local effects, I would like to suggest a loose taxonomy in which pathology and 
colonialism reside on the side of deep, local understanding, and epidemiology and imperialism with 
the rhizomatic, the network, and the surface, including the shared metadata of Empire and 
Epidemiology (see fn. 42). Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage, 1994), 9.  
138 Patricia T. Aalseth, Medical Coding (Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett, 2006), 4. 
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1837.139 The study functioned as something of a handbook, and its range of topics—from climate to 
topography to language, religion, governance, trade, and “vital statistics”—reveals the centrality of 
the production of quantitative knowledge as a nineteenth century epistemology and a tool of 
Empire.140  
Babington’s 1860 address on the state of epidemiology turns from the society’s earliest goals, 
cited above, to its current discoveries, which included a detailed account of how the cholera has 
continued to impact the British in the colonies, the French in theirs, and the Spanish in Morocco. 
The passage evinces a capacious historical view as well as a deft personification of the disease as an 
enemy visitor unaware of the niceties of class-distinction and military rank:  
Since the great outbreak of cholera at Jessore, in 1817, no disease of modern times has 
committed such ravages in those quarters of the globe, where, in the course of its epidemic 
progress, it has for a while settled. Cholera has been so long regarded as an established 
endemic of India, that we now hear of its appearance in different localities in that country 
without surprise, and with comparatively little interest. It is otherwise when this terrible 
invader approaches nearer home. We then begin to consult maps, and to compare dates and 
seasons, in order to ascertain how far the disorder, in respect to its period of invasion, its 
march, and its mortality, coincides in character with that which it exhibited during its former 
visits to Europe. Cholera broke out among the troops and seamen after the capture of 
Canton, but it never advanced to the epidemic form…the same disease appeared in July last 
at Bombay and Poona and almost simultaneously on the continent of Europe; selecting on 
                                                
139 John Ramsay McCulloch, A descriptive and statistical account of the British Empire, exhibiting its extent, 
physical capacities, population, industry, and civil and religious institutions, 3rd edition (London: Longman, 
Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1847), 413-423. This was a corporately authored undertaking, and an 
independent, and much fleshed-out version of Farr’s contribution was also reprinted in a memorial 
volume of his works in 1885: Vital Statistics: A Memorial Volume of Selections From the Reports and 
Writings of William Farr, ed. Noel A. Humphreys (London: Sanitary Institute, 1885).  
140 See Alain Desrosières, The Politics of Large Numbers: A History of Statistical Reasoning, trans. Camille 
Naish (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). Desrosières’s account of the history of 
statistics as a science begins, in fact, with politics and health: he cites Englishman John Graunt’s 
work on Mortality Bills in the 1660s as the first use of statistics in his description of “English Political 
Arithmetic.” He writes, “[f]rom the standpoint of our inquiry into the birth of the material 
procedures of objectification, they involve three important stages: keeping written records, 
scrutinizing and assembling them according to a predetermined grid; and interpreting them in terms 
of ‘numbers, weights, and measures’” (23). At least the first two of these procedures are readily 
visible in the strategy used by Dracula’s protagonists.  
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this, as on former occasions, the city of Hamburgh as the scene of its development. It broke 
out there in the middle of June last, at once attacking, according to Dr. Helbert, ‘young and 
old, rich and poor, in all parts of the town; showing no preference to the waterside over any 
other locality.’ […] Cholera has been prevailing among the French at Algiers, and it has also 
invaded the Spanish army in Morocco. Already several superior officers, besides numbers of 
the soldiers, have fallen victim to this scourge (Transactions, 9-12).  
 
In this vivid telling, Babington invokes much of what is central to the ecology of fear in Stoker’s 
text, namely that the marshalling of information technologies, however modern, empirical, and 
militarized they may be, provide a leaky defense against a disease that seems according to Babington 
to have purpose: it visits again and again, uninvited and under a vague and ever-shifting 
countenance, but exhibits no faculty of discrimination—“no preference of waterside” over inland 
areas, age over youth, wealth over poverty, officers over soldiers. This last characterization of a 
disease without “preference” will prove at least partly untrue in ways that will lead investigators to a 
better understanding of the disease—cholera will, when it is looked at differently, exhibit something 
resembling preference, a combination of density and mortality, for populous sites, especially those in 
which the public relies on the shared resources of infrastructure, most importantly public waterways, 
sewer systems, and foundation architecture.  
The choleric imaginary in Europe—an extension and further specification, in light of 
colonial geopolitics, of the historical representation of infectious disease, was one of the largest and 
most energetically contested discursive fields since the middle ages in which the mystery of organic 
harm was rendered legible through language, narrative, and literary figures, and thus made ready for 
scientific inquiry. As we can see in Babington’s language of martial metaphors, the tension between 
sublime unknowability and a faith in the rational tools of military science reflects the a similar 
tension to the one Puar describes in her diagnosis of terrorism rhetoric, the 
“concurrently…unfathomable, unknowable, and hysterical monstrosity, and yet one that only the 
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exceptional capacities of U.S. intelligence and security systems can quell” (xxiii). Here, we can see 
clearly how, from the mid-nineteenth century crisis in colonial health management to contemporary 
terrorism studies, epidemic figures complicate a notion of enmity by conflating it with organic crises 
like communicable disease. Where in the present moment, we are more likely to see terrorist 
violence and ideology figured as epidemics—terrible networks operating under their own, inhuman, 
self-preserving and expansionist logic—Babington’s remarks describe the inverse, that is, how the 
Asiatic cholera emerges as a “terrible invader,” an embattled and powerful enemy in colonialism’s 
hot zones: Jessore, Poona, Bombay, Algiers, Morocco. At the same time as Babington and his 
colleagues were writing an early history of cholera in these martial terms, the British army in India 
became increasingly invested in controlling human movements in the interest of curbing not only 
the spread of disease, but also the spread of insurgency and nationalism.  
If we recall for a moment Jonathan Harker’s insistence on using the technology of writing to 
prevent his mind from “running riot” with him and turning his experience into an Arabian fantasy 
of infinite duration, we can see how the novel links monstrosity to the idea of the innumerable 
hoard in scenes of disarray and protest as much as it does to the singular aristocratic figure of 
Dracula. In addition to the kinds of local cholera riots like the ones in Paris that Delaporte recounts 
in Disease and Civilization, or those described by Charlotte Stoker in her letter to her son, this 
language forms a crucial link between geographically distant parts of Empire—the Fenian Raids and 
Rising in Stoker’s native Ireland in the latter part of the 1860s point a mirror toward rebellion in the 
Subcontinent. This observation allows us to see even more clearly how the Count serves in the 
novel as both a specific monster and a medium of monstrosity—the spectacular, powerful, and 
visible embodiment of an evil embedded in the miscenginated soil of his homeland, where the blood 
of Muslim warriors runs deep in the earth, and stands as a constant reminder of the possibility of a 
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Europe under reverse colonial rule. It is no accident that Babington’s language bears a similar 
imprint of a panic about an uprising from the East, and notes specifically the losses wrought by 
cholera on military officers; his 1860 speech above, on the first anniversary of the Epidemiological 
Society of London, follows the 1857 Mutiny by only three years. The shift in India from Company 
Rule to the Crown in 1858, usually considered a direct response to the events of 1857, only further 
reflects the governmental consolidation of power in response to both of these crises, cholera and 
insurgency, and helps us to better understand what kinds of tools of surveillance were being enlisted 
in the prevention of each, as well as in whose interest this surveillance was being undertaken, and 
under what rubrics of alliance and enmity. The Epidemiological Society’s motto: venienti occurrite 
morbo, to meet the misfortune as it comes, resonates doubly, then, with both public health 
undertakings in colonial space, and with the fictional activities of Dracula’s protagonists, who in 
many ways reflect the motto’s wisdom.  
Looking back at the first of Babington’s characterizations of cholera, the invader’s lack of 
discrimination or judgment, we can consider how his anthropomorphizing rhetoric of disease 
further reflects common ideas about non-Europeans’ (a category which often included Stoker’s 
fellow Irishmen) lack of rational faculties and indulgence in basic drives and lusts. Van Helsing gives 
voice to the same ideas about an Eastern nascency of mind in his disquisition on the Count’s 
underdeveloped psychology. As the novel climaxes to the Count’s capture, Van Helsing explains, “in 
faculties of mind, he…is only a child…for us, it is, as yet, a child-brain” (336). Being child-like in 
mind, Dracula is also understood to have the capacity to learn, and the audacity to do so by 
nominally scientific means, “[t]his monster has been creeping into knowledge experimentally!” the 
doctor continues, describing the Count’s clever modes of gaining entry into Seward’s house where 
his next victim, Mina, is being kept for safety. His child-brain also appears less and less child-like as 
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the description unfolds. Van Helsing remarks on the patience with which he pursues his plot: “he 
means to succeed, and a man who has centuries before him can afford to wait and go slow” (336).  
The monster’s long-term resoluteness, and the question of his adaptability to changing forces of 
history, geography, and custom over centuries reflects a fervent post-Darwinian debate about 
evolution that followed the 1859 publication of On the Origin of Species and the subsequent 1871 
appearance of the still more widely read Descent of Man, which gave rise to as many scientific and 
pseudo-scientific theories about genealogy and the evolution of race as it did about degeneracy, 
criminality, monstrosity, and susceptibility to disease.141 That cholera was personified as an ancient 
Eastern ailment with the audacity to break through the edifice of the modern metropolis is 
exemplified in Babington’s remarks above, as well as William Farr’s comments on degeneracy, 
culpability, and illness in the delta regions cited above.  
The vibrio cholerae’s longevity and evolutionary patience remains an equally strong feature of 
contemporary cholera writing, revealing the ongoing legacy of Orientalism’s alignment of the ancient 
and the infantile in characterizations of the Orient. Sandra Hempel opens her popular book on John 
Snow with an introduction titled “The Long Journey,” which begins:    
Cholera first stepped onto the world stage in 1817. No one knows exactly when or how the 
tiny bacterium responsible for the disease evolved, but its ancestry goes back to the origins 
of life itself. We do know that it emerged from the Sunderbund swamps of the Ganges Delta 
in north-east India, where in all probability, it had been mutating for millennia…Only in the 
early 1800s, however, did accounts begin to crop up regularly in medical records, and then 
only after cholera had had the temerity to threaten Europeans in what were to become three 
great nineteenth century pandemics, each of which originated in India.142 
 
                                                
141 See Kathleen Spencer, “Purity and Danger: Dracula, The Urban Gothic, and the Late Victorian 
Degeneracy Crisis,” English Language History 59 (1992) 197-225.  
142 Sandra Hempel, The Strange Case of the Broad Street Pump: John Snow and the Mystery of Cholera 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007), 1-2.  
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Like Dracula, cholera, too, can “afford to go slow,” developing its child-brain, which we can 
understand as a combination of survivalism and a will to replicate and spread over the course of 
centuries until it reaches a level of virulence that can carry it beyond the borders of the endemic, and 
into the rapid, world-wide colonization of bodies of all varieties.143  
In considering Babington’s second characterization of cholera as potentially mutable, a 
danger of shifting countenance, “how far its character coincides with that which it exhibited in its 
former visits,” we see in Dracula that the invader takes many forms, and in so doing presents a 
difficult task for those who wish to survey his movements and track him down. The novel gives us 
the familiar shape of the pale, otherworldly Count, “a tall, thin man, with a beaky nose and black 
moustache and pointed beard,” (190) but the vampire is also represented as “quaint little specks of 
dust floating in the rays of the moonlight,” which hypnotize Harker and “gradually materialize from 
the moonbeams” as the “three ghostly women, to whom [he] was doomed” (49); then later a “dog, 
which landed when the ship struck” (89); an escaped zoo-wolf named “Berserker” (150-151); the 
beautiful “Bloofer Lady…known to the writers of various headlines as ‘The Kensington Horror,’ 
‘The Stabbing Woman,’ or the ‘Woman in Black’” (196); a bat, “perhaps some wild specimen from 
the South” (216); a fog “like smoke, or with the white energy of boiling water….concentrated into a 
sort of pillar of cloud” (287); “thousands of rats with their eyes blazing red” (310); and finally, 
strangely, as a celestial light “[h]e slid into the room through the sash, though it was only open an 
inch wide – just as the moon herself has often come in through the tiniest crack, and has stood 
before me in all her size and splendour” (311). As Van Helsing has it: “[i]t is no common enemy that 
                                                
143 An evolutionary biological account of the virulence of cholera is given as the opening example in 
Paul Ewald’s essay, “The Evolution of Virulence” (Scientific American, April 1993, 86-93). See also 
Ewald, Evolution of Infectious Disease (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) and Plague Time: A 
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134 
we deal with!” (312). Reading Babington’s speech alongside the monstrous transformations of 
Stoker’s imagined form of villainy, it becomes clearer how Dracula capitalizes on and hyperbolizes a 
way of understanding cholera and communicability more broadly in terms of fluidity, diffuseness, 
obscurity, circulation, and mediation, and in so doing, consecrates and preserves in the public 
imagination the relationship between horror and epidemiological modes of understanding.   
In an earlier moment in the novel that marks the shift from collective victimhood to the 
ensuing investigation-and-sterilization plot, Arthur Holmwood, Lucy’s betrothed, bequeaths Lucy’s 
papers and personal effects to Dr. Van Helsing. Knowing that this transfer and making public of her 
papers is an overture to the subsequent group autopsy and violent staking of Lucy’s body, Van 
Helsing treats Arthur gently, reminding him that in the coming pages, “[w]e and you too—you most 
of all, my dear boy—will have to pass through the bitter waters before we reach the sweet” (189). 
This phrase is repeated twice more by Van Helsing, once privately in a letter to Dr. Seward, again in 
reference to Holmwood: “he must pass through the bitter waters to reach the sweet,” and once 
more to Arthur himself just before the beheading ordeal, when he reminds the “dear boy” that 
“[y]ou are now in the bitter waters….By this time tomorrow you will, please God, have passed them, 
and have drunk the sweet waters…till then I shall not ask you to forgive me” (236).  
The Sweet Waters of Europe, mentioned in Stoker’s notes toward the novel, was the name 
given to a famed stream in Constantinople, that consummate site of Eurasian mixing. The Sweet 
Waters began in the hills just outside the city and emptied into the Bosphorus by way of the Golden 
Horn inlet where it met another such stream from the East, the Sweet Waters of Asia. In an account 
given by General Sherman in Harper’s in 1873, the banks of stream that flowed from the Asian hills 
framed a picturesque scene of cultural intermingling, with ladies of the harems taking their picnics 
alongside groups of Western tourists and restful Sabbath takers: an idyll of the pleasures of East–
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West intercourse.144 What, then, of the bitter waters? Thus far, we have tracked some of the broad 
epistemic antecedents, attitudes, and assumptions of epidemiology’s early narrative approaches to 
the great public health threat that instigated its establishment as a new science. The most field-
changing investigations of cholera, however, play out at a much more local level as well, and here 
too we can find many correspondences between cholera’s particular dangers, and the terrors of 
confluence that flow throughout Dracula, those bitter waters that mingle with the sweet.  
The investigations of John Snow, perhaps the most lionized figure in the science of modern 
public health, turn to the private plumbing, the neighborhood wells, their attendant networks of 
drainage and waste containment, and finally the corporate water works of London that were 
responsible for the delivery of safe, uncontaminated water to Londoners during the Asiatic cholera 
outbreaks—the most aggressive attacks on the body politic that had yet been experienced in 
industrial modernity. In his seminal pamphlet of 1849, “On the Mode of Communication of 
Cholera,” the circumspect doctor begins by signaling that “[I]t is not the intention of the writer to 
go over the much debated question of the contagion of cholera…it is propagated by human 
intercourse. Its progress along the great channels of that intercourse…seem[s] to leave no room for 
doubting its communicability.”145 In the paragraphs that follow, Snow gives a brief account of the 
major differences between his own views, and those of the proponents of other theories of cholera’s 
communication including the miasma theory, based on the movements of the “eruptive fevers,” of 
cholera as an airborne poison “absorbed by the blood passing through the lungs” (6); and the blood-
poison theory, which, rests on the notable change in “thickened state of the blood,” in cholera 
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patients “which will scarcely allow it to pass through the capillaries” (7). Snow dismisses this 
explanation owing to cholera’s progression of symptoms from local to general, rather than vice 
versa, where the blood state follows massive systemic dehydration from a “single surface” (8), 
namely the small bowel, instead of beginning with general symptoms attributable to blood disorders.  
Instead, he will “open up to consideration a most important way in which the cholera may be widely 
disseminated; by the emptying of sewers into the drinking water of the community” (11).  
Snow “walks” through a number of cases, as it were, giving the sense that he is moving from 
place to place, connecting outbreaks spatially as he names the rivers and streams that supply water to 
the regions where the disease has been particularly vicious in England (the Clyde, the Nith, the 
Thames, the Lea), their tidal patterns, and their filtration and distribution practices. In London, 
Snow examines wells, interviews residents about their laundry washing habits, excavates half-rotten 
cesspits, observes the gutters that connect houses and diagrams the results against the number and 
chronology of cholera deaths. In this way, he shows that, counter to the prevailing idea that open 
sewers may be responsible for the spread of cholera by way of their noxious fumes, which would 
emanate out from a central point of infection, lines of transmission instead followed water lines, 
skipping over houses that maintained a private water supply, or whose inhabitants eschewed 
drinking and cooking with local water altogether. Later, during the epidemic at Broad Street, Snow 
would go on to codify this approach to infectious disease research in the so-called “ghost” maps and 
Voronoi diagrams of local mortality, which he began in 1854 on the basis of Edmund Cooper’s 
maps for the Metropolitan Commission of Sewers.146  
                                                
146 Steven Johnson gives a detailed account of the documents and data that led up and contributed to 
Snow’s powerful map in his 2006 book The Ghost Map: The Story of London’s Most Terrifying Epidemic—
and How it Changes Science, Cities, and the Modern World (New York: Riverhead Books, 2006), 192-194.  
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Eventually, these approaches would prove not only the truth of his claim—that cholera was 
communicated by way of drinking water contaminated with choleric evacuations—but also the 
strength of his method, which sought to address the epidemic by situating infection in a field 
gridded by the time and space of a public intercourse, rather than in the symptomatic convulsions of 
a singular demise. Snow’s work, like his prose, is simple and commonsensical. Snow’s reorganization 
of medical knowledge required a massive departure from the clinical orientation of the day, 
including the allopathic assumption that a malady’s cause and its behavior were coupled in a static 
and straightforward fashion, that this relationship could be observed in and through the ailing body, 
and that any wisdom thus gained, if it was extrapolated at all, would move from the singular to the 
general. His focus on “communication,” and rigorous examination of the material substance—the 
waters of urban intercourse that run both bitter and sweet—exemplifies the success of an 
epistemological restructuring of medicine that revealed clinical pathology’s limited optic—its 
assumptions about the integrity of the body and the boundaries of the self that prevailed in medicine 
prior to the great global epidemics of the nineteenth century.  
The moving of Transylvanian earth over the waterways connecting the rivers and seas of 
Europe is one of the first signs in Dracula of an interest in the material of circulation, pathogenicity, 
and communication. The distribution of Dracula’s coffins of dirt in London, and the location and 
sterilization of each of them, ultimately leads to his retreat from English shores. Following the logic 
of the ghost map, we can understand these boxes as sites of contagion, disease vectors or host 
bodies that sustain the sickness he carries with him. For the protagonists, ostensibly co-captained by 
Doctor Van Helsing, the professor of esoteric medicine and John Seward, the young and modern 
psychiatrist, but importantly organized by Mina Harker and her secretarial skills, the process of 
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containing the threat Dracula poses is one of mapping and of counting these boxes, eliminating, as it 
were, the contaminated sites from which he might launch his attacks.  
The investigators know from the shipping bill of Dracula’s wrecked ship, the Demeter, that 
there are exactly fifty of these “foul lairs” distributed throughout the city on both sides of the 
Thames. The dispersed shape of this network of information is signified in miniature by a collection 
of papers the investigators discover in one of the Count’s properties, including the news story of the 
shipwreck, the shipping bill itself, the arrangements for the purchase of the house at Carfax, 
Dracula’s personal notes: laying in a “sort of orderly disorder,” “there were the title deeds of the 
Picadilly house in a great bundle; deeds of the purchase of the house at Mile End and Bermondsey; 
notepaper, envelopes, and pens and ink” (334). These objects suggest not only two more definitive 
sites of unholy infection at Mile End and Bermondsey, but also, in the unused paper and envelopes, 
the potential of further spread, still more sites, an increasingly fragmented and difficult to contain 
disease map. The Count’s ownership of these properties, and the signed deeds that stand for it 
highlights the paradoxical liquidity of his fortune which evolves from a castle filled with gold to city 
homes commandeered with paper. Next to these papers, completing the lurid still life, the men find 
“a jug and basin—the latter containing dirty water which was reddened as if with blood” (334). In 
their juxtaposition, the accessories of communication: paper, pens, ink, reveal their salubrious 
relationship with the substance of infectious transfer—the water that carried the bloody earth, the 
blood dispersed back into the water, the ink that stands at its side—these media all index an anxiety 
about the circulation of media even as they become essential to the tracking and annihilation of the 
vampire.  
The communicative capacities of fluid are abundantly evident in Dracula, and as we have 
seen, it is the women whose health degenerates, who become the “guilty spots” the “delta regions” 
139 
of pathologic confluence, the mediums of vampiric incubation who nurse at the breast of the 
monster. Through these figures of miscarried reproduction and monstrous transmission, the novel 
invokes an uncanny hybrid of menstruation and lactation. The fluid infectiousness, the 
communicability of communication itself is also at issue in the novel, and Mina becomes medium in 
ways more numerous than it might at first appear. Jonathan Harker’s transmission of his journal to 
his wife tries and fails to transform memory, by way of writing, into a symptomatic appendage 
whose amputation can expropriate the diseased memory by passing it along. But Mina’s mind 
becomes the site of another, far riskier confluence following her forced imbibement (Van Helsing 
calls it her ‘baptism’) of Dracula’s multifarious blood, which includes drops of her own, along with 
Lucy’s. As the blood flows from an opened vein in his chest, Dracula “forces her face down on his 
bosom” like “a child forcing a kitten’s nose into a saucer of milk to compel it to drink” (313). In 
contrast to the infantile imagery of the child and the kitten, this scene refers to Mina exclusively as 
“Mrs. Harker” instead of “Mina” or the still more virginal “Miss Mina,” which calls attention to the 
parallel between Mina’s double-sown body and Lucy’s, with its many transfused bloods. In 
swallowing this terrible draught, Dracula tells her “you are now to me…blood of my blood…my 
bountiful wine-press for a while…now you shall come to my call. When my brain says ‘Come!’ to 
you, you shall cross land or sea to do my bidding” (320). Mina’s mind is opened to the Count at the 
moment of their bodily confluence. In the end of the novel, it is in fact, by sea that she will come to 
him, although not in the way he imagines, and rather to kill him than to do his bidding.  
In case there was any doubt as to the transmissibility of Dracula’s condition, Stoker 
furnishes the reader with a diagnostic experiment in the form of the inoculating wafer, which, when 
applied to Mina’s forehead, “seared…burned into the flesh as though it had been a piece of white-
hot metal” (329). Thus certifiably contaminated (“Unclean! Unclean!” she exclaims after the ordeal) 
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she requests to be hypnotized in the hopes that some kind of stethescopic knowledge of the vampire 
blood in her veins will give onto another level of hearing, one in which her ears will amplify not her 
own heartbeat, but the swooshing, swirling sounds of Dracula’s movement. This is where the 
materiality of circulation, both blood and genetic material, and communication as a bodily 
transmission of information come most closely in sync: attended by the group of men who love her 
“each in his own way” arrayed around the foot of her bed, her own diminished consciousness is 
overtaken by the Count’s “child-brain.”  
Mina follows the “the current of her thoughts” (347) to describe “the lapping of water. It is 
gurgling by, and little waves leap…I am still…It is like death!” (347). They glean through further 
questioning that she is, which is to say the Count is, on a ship, and that it is weighing anchor as they 
speak. After this somnolent visitation, her mind crossed with dreadful currents and her infected 
body crossed with the glances exchanged by the band of men, Mina rests “like a sleeping child for a 
few moments” and then awakes “in wonder to see [them] all around her” (348). Like Lucy, Mina is 
spent by the labors of mediumship, both psychical and physical, that she has performed by bearing 
this information to the encouraging murmurs of so many male spectators.  
Splashing for a few moments in a “puddle” of information (348), the doctors and their 
companions come to the conclusion that Dracula has been chased off of English shores, that he has 
collected his last great box filled with holy dirt, and secured his passage home by way of the Black 
Sea, and onwards to Transylvania. This reasoning transpires rapidly, taking just a moment for all the 
pieces to fall into logical place after weeks and weeks of amassing evidence, beginning with Harker’s 
secret diary, his convalescence on the journey home, the shipwrecked Demeter at Whitby, Lucy’s 
illness and death in London, the newspapers’ sensational Bloofer Lady attack stories, the 
exhumation and staking of Lucy’s corpse, the escape of the wolf from the zoo, the mad, heroic 
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murmurings of Renfield, the charting and tracking of Dracula’s earth-filled coffins, the mapping of 
his real estate acquisitions, all in this moment with the force of something freshly seen. The novel, in 
some senses, ends here, as the map of information comes together and throws the ordinariness of 
Dracula’s occult operations into high relief.147 Relieved that his science has saved the day, Van 
Helsing exclaims, “he take [sic] hundreds of years to get so far as London; and yet in one day, when 
we know of the disposal of him, we drive him out” (350). They double check their conclusions 
against the collated typed-up transcript of events prepared by Mina, and know that they are right: the 
count has “decided to get back to his castle by water, as the most safe and secret way” (392). The 
logjam of circular logic, suffering, and confusion is released as the novel flows, unobstructed, to its 
triumphant end.   
Mina Harker, half-vampire, endures a few more hypnotic episodes. As she develops the tell-
tale longer tooth and harder eye, as she pleads for the men to pity the creature she might one day 
become, her access to Dracula’s water-borne travels grows stronger and stronger, such that she 
finally begs her companions to keep their plans a secret from her lest she unconsciously 
communicate some strategic intelligence to the fugitive Count. She discloses a set of aural clues that 
mark the Count’s progress from sea to river, the pulse of his retreat, first “the waves lapping against 
the ship, and the water rushing by” (371), then “water swirling level with my ears and the creaking of 
wood…on a river in an open boat…the banks are near, and it is working against stream” (393). The 
group corroborates her reports with a battery of train and boat schedules—“I am a train fiend” 
(376), Mina confesses—interrogations of the Slovak dock workers in charge of the “box,” and 
rounds and rounds of map consultations—“I shall get the maps and look over them!” (390), and 
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later, “I have examined the map, and find that the river most suitable for the Slovaks to have 
ascended is either the Pruth or the Sereth,” (393). In split crews on land and sea, they beat the 
enemy back into the place of his perennial retreat. When the group descends upon the villain in a 
field that spans the riverbank and the castle’s ramparts, Dracula’s end is fast, “almost in the drawing 
of a breath, the whole body crumbled into dust and passed from our sight” (419). No blood is 
spilled back into the holy earth. There is no splash or flow, no ink or effluvium, and no speech, only 
the breath before it. For all the heroic striving and well-coordinated research marshaled in service of 
understanding this foreign enemy, the final scene, in putting every mark and sign of Dracula’s 
violence under erasure, dramatizes the limits of an ideology of information. As Kittler points out in 
“Dracula’s Legacy” the crumbling of Dracula’s body into dust renders impossible the definitive 
death-by-staking required to off him once and for all (80), reminding us that he may well, like 
Stoker’s atomized, atmospheric Invisible Giant before him, remain dormant and unseen until 
favorable conditions for his self-perpetuation through an exogenous set of host bodies again arise.  
In the preface to the 1765 edition of The Castle of Otranto, Horace Walpole complained that 
“the great resources of fancy have been dammed up by a strict adherence to common life.”148 
Eddying through Stoker’s undammed gothic distortions, his dramatist’s preference for melodrama 
over psychological realism, the arcana of the decadent, there is an evident, purposive insistence of 
common life. It takes the form of the demystifying domesticating practice of naming, mapping, and 
charting things, the compiling of data, the typewriter, the phonograph, the telegram, the deed. In the 
case of Dracula, a strict adherence to common life, to scientific practice, lends a new and terrifying 
force to the vampire myth. Returning to Puar and Rai’s claim with which we began, that the 
                                                
148 Horace Walpole, The Castle of Otranto: A Gothic Story, ed. Frederick S. Frank, (Peterborough, 
Ontario: Broadview Press, 2003), 65.  
143 
pathologization of the terrorist draws on the historical and narrative traditions of eighteenth and 
nineteenth century monster, we can see that not only does the fantastic morphology of the monster 
or Bogeyman serve as a projection screen for social anxiety, but that the terror of the colonial other 
was already embedded during this time with the terrors of infectious disease and the monsters that 
represented them.  
Stoker reinvents the vampire, and invents his undoing, however provisional or temporary, 
through systems of knowledge necessitated and upheld by the colonial encounter and global trade. 
With “infinite science”—the paradoxical term Fanon uses to describe the white man’s rhetorical and 
epistemological arsenal for dehumanizing his colonial subjects, the text lays traps for the vampire’s 
defeat, and marshals surveillance technologies at the cutting edge of late nineteenth century 
biopower to save the soul, body, and blood, of the population under threat. Perhaps questions about 
the relationship between an epidemiological colonial medicine and the projection of monstrosity 
have been ignored in studies of Gothic and horror because they must overlook the most thrilling 
moments of terror, suspense, and violence that these texts offer to their readers. The drama of 
learning how to read, synthesize, and interpret this violence is far more ordinary, but it retains the 
fantastic moves of the imagination whereby the urban infrastructural vasculature, itself a microcosm 








War, to sane men at the present day, begins to look like an epidemic  
insanity, breaking out here and there, like the cholera or influenza,  
infecting men’s brains instead of their bowels. 
            —Ralph Waldo Emerson, Miscellanies  
 
 
In 1828, when our great-grandfathers crossed the Mediterranean  
for the operation that was to end in the conquest of Algeria,  
Algeria was an archaic country. So was France. 




In his notebooks of 1942, during the time when Albert Camus was drafting his second major 
work of fiction, The Plague, which would be published to great acclaim by Gallimard in 1947, he 
wrote “science explains what happens, not what is” [la science explique ce qui fonctionne et non ce qui 
est.]149 Camus’s aphoristic tone is characteristic of the Carnets, where one finds many of the big ideas 
that will appear dispersed in the journalism, novels, plays, stories, and philosophical essays as 
rewards at the end of difficult expository passages or as interpretive crystals following a series of 
narrative evasions. For all the grand assertions from the notebooks that do appear in the published 
texts—often with only minor transformations—many more do not. For the contemporary reader of 
Camus’s work, an energetic body of texts suffused with moral perplexity and political ambiguity, 
these abandoned philosophies entombed in the pages of the writer’s private thought represent so 
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translates fonctionne as “happens” which is a somewhat reductive rendering, excluding the other 
senses of the word: functions, operates, works, or moves along. I use the published translation here 
and throughout for ease of reference, with the understanding that “happens” does not index the 
same complexity.  
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many potential keys to the oeuvre, each one a lens through which a mass of intriguing, often 
infuriating, inconsistencies might suddenly come into coherent focus. This is one such statement: la 
science explique ce qui fonctionne et non ce qui est. The point of this assertion is almost certainly to 
distinguish the flat-footed pedantries of scientific observation from the deeper, more permanent 
truths to which fiction, theater, or lyric essay, Camus’s own means of thinking and knowing, 
presumably give us access. Literature shows us that which is, eternally, essentially, while science 
simply records observed events—what happens, works, or unfolds as a function of time, in mere 
sequence. Indeed, Camus has been celebrated for generations as the paradigmatic philosophical 
novelist of the twentieth century: a reliable purveyor of deep, universal human truths, if not always 
of progressive politics.  
A different way of understanding this maxim, however, is to look at how Camus’s writing, 
marked by a striving for balance and objectivity, presented from journalistic, medical, lawyerly, and 
testimonial points of view, represents the dynamics of what unfolds in life-before-our-eyes, and in 
so doing, complicates a notion of what is, what is true, or what ought to be. In relationship to the 
circulatory logic and epistemology of the surface that we observed in Stoker’s writing about the 
dangers of an uninhibited communicability in the late imperial moment, Camus’s statement may 
suggest that his work contains not just a meditation on the metaphysics of epidemic, but also an as 
yet uninterrogated interest in a scientific or phenomenological depiction of post-war upheaval, 
including the circulation of people, goods, and ideas, and the threat of a nationalist ideology that 
looks increasingly dangerous, virulent, and contagious. Reading the statement in this way doesn’t tell 
us much if the goal is to establish a more consistent reading of Camus’s practice of representation, 
and even less so what he thought about science, a topic that very little of his work engaged explicitly. 
What it may do, however, is illuminate how and why La Peste, the most explicitly scientific and 
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prismatically historical of Camus’s fictions, allegorizes political violence through a chronicle of 
plague. From this perspective, the chronicle is less a coherent tale of an existential crisis, told from 
the perspective of a distant omniscient interpreter, teaching its witnesses and readers about what is, 
and more a social and scientific text which unfolds from multiple perspectives the difficulty of 
understanding what functions or happens as it happens, oftentimes in the absence of reliable 
knowledge of what it, in fact, is. The plague itself, for example, remains unnamed until well after its 
arrival in the Algerian city of Oran, and is only identified because an elderly doctor recognizes it 
from his days in China. Even then, it seems impossible; the doctor deems his own diagnosis “hardly 
credible” [c’est à peine croyable], placing the preposterous, anachronistic identity of the illness—in other 
words what is—under the sign of uncertainty.150  
Instead of investigating the plague’s identity and origins, much of the story revolves around 
the workaday efforts of a group of men to understand and cope with this enormous and 
incomprehensible scourge, a “reign of terror” [la terreur] (199; 181) that has landed in their town to 
test their commitments, energy, ethics, and humanity. This narrative focus on the topography and 
social behavior of disease in a relatively populous colonial city, rather than its microbial or viral 
identity reflects the epistemic shift from pathology and aetiology to an epidemiological approach to 
medicine, which came about, as we saw in the first chapter, during the cholera epidemics of the late 
nineteenth century, and opened up a relationship between the colonial sciences and public health. 
Camus, in the voice of his narrator, Dr. Bernard Rieux, writes that the group of men regrettably 
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perform no “heroic feat or memorable deed like those that thrill us in the chronicles of the past” 
[quelque action éclatante, pareils à ceux qu’on trouve dans les vieux récits.] (179; 165). Instead, “the grim days 
of plague do not stand out like vivid flames, ravenous and inextinguishable, beaconing a troubled 
sky, but rather like the slow, deliberate progress of some monstrous thing crushing out all upon its 
path” [les journées terribles de la peste n’apparaissaient pas comme de grandes flammes somptueuses et cruelles, mais 
plutôt comme un interminable piétinement qui écrasait tout sur son passage] (179; 166). In spite of the horrific 
imagery associated with plague, not the least of which is the swollen purple buboes on the body, the 
novel favors a depiction of the slow, deliberate progress of the disease, its transmissibility between 
people and places, its geometric growth, and its steady calculus of mortality, in order to suggest that 
“nothing is less sensational than pestilence…by reason of their very duration, great misfortunes are 
monotonous” [rien n’est moins spectaculaire qu’un fléau…par leur durée même, les grands malheurs sont 
monotones] (179; 166). We can hear, in these words, an echo not only of Hannah Arendt’s memorable 
characterization of the banality of evil in the Eichmann trial, but also a reflection of the 
bureaucratization of violence, the colonial institutionalization of power under the aegis of education, 
military and intelligence service, population management, quarantine, sanitation, and public health, 
each of which, in its own way, sought to bring colonial subjects into the statistical and administrative 
orbit of global humanity.  
To meet this threat as it comes, the work of the protagonists narrated from the perspective 
of a physician is equally slow, statistical, observational, and bureaucratic. In this way, the novel’s 
scientific angle, which embeds an explanation of what occurs, happens, or functions over the long 
course of a monotonous misfortune within an exploration of what is in a more complete, stable 
sense, expresses a perplexity about the specificity and transposability of experience and of history. In 
other words, the recourse to science as a literary perspective calls into question a distinction between 
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the sequential events of the surface and the deeper, more persistent is of analysis. In particular, The 
Plague displaces a description or an explanation of the effects of a German nationalism gone awry—
the novel’s title draws on a term of abuse for the Nazi occupiers, who were called la peste brune in 
France, after the brown color of their uniforms151—to the more ambiguous space of Algeria, a 
colony populated by a different kind of brown body, teetering on the edge of drastic political change 
that Camus was documenting elsewhere in his journalism. In displacing the allegory of Occupation 
and Resistance from Europe to Africa, the novel hypothesizes the contagious nature of ideology, 
and links the past events of the Second World War to the threat of a mimetic future in Algeria.  
Like Stoker, Camus suffered from poor health as a young man. His tuberculosis diagnosis at 
the age of seventeen crystallized an awareness of the behaviors and dynamics of the punishing but 
non-fatal disease, which he wrote “comes quickly, but leaves slowly.”152 In keeping with tuberculosis 
treatments of the day, Camus was subject to periodic medical exile from his home in Algiers to the 
putatively cleaner and healthier air of France, journeys that compounded the war-time exile he 
experienced with so many others following the allied landing North Africa in 1942. One biographer 
describes Camus’s life with tuberculosis as “subject[ing] his body to a kind of foreign occupation,” 
which involved both resistance and accommodation. We may imagine, by extension, that the 
experience of disease served as a model for Camus’s inscription of both the German Occupation as 
plague and the violent colonial dynamics through the puzzling, parasitic guest–host relationship 
depicted in the short story “The Guest,” [L’hôte].153 Unlike Stoker, however, Camus doesn’t appear 
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to have prioritized medical or historical research in the drafting of The Plague. In place of the 
combination of old-world occult wisdom and cutting edge surgical and hematological technologies, 
Camus’s narrative emphasizes the moral and social impact of the plague on the citizens of the 
unnamed Algerian town. While practical science and medical technique remains somewhat less 
legible than in Stoker’s writing, La Peste’s incorporation of scientific perspectives and methods, and 
specifically epidemiological methods, to narrativize, study, read, and thereby domesticate illegible 
bodily threats and acts of aggression is a key example in colonial literature of a durable practice that 
has carried us into the twentieth century, as we saw with Stoker’s turn of the century novel of 
monstrosity, and also out of it, as we will see in the next chapter.  
Like Dracula, Camus’s novels have also enjoyed long lives not just in their original literary 
canon of French and Francophone writing, but also in British, American, North African, and World 
Literatures. The Plague in particular continues to serve as a touchstone for readers thinking through 
questions of political violence and war. The most relevant example for considering epidemic 
depictions of terrorism is Tony Judt’s November 2001 essay on the timely appearance of Robin 
Buss’s new translation of The Plague in light of the September 11th attacks. Judt frames a reprint of 
his previously published introduction to the then-new translation in relationship to the events of 
September 11, just seven weeks before, suggesting, “today, The Plague takes on fresh significance and 
a moving immediacy,” and that Camus’s “depiction of instant ex cathedra judgments—‘My 
brethren, you have deserved it’—will be grimly familiar to us all.”154 By invoking an apocalyptic 
interpretation of the attacks, while also comparing the present situation to that depicted in The 
Plague, Judt gives voice to a common dual concept of terror in which events are understood 
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simultaneously as a monstrosity beyond comprehension—an inhuman, organic, and natural event 
befalling the people, like a plague—while also participating in a Judeo-Christian framework of divine 
justice, which renders them comprehensible, even remediable, in a global moral calculus that 
presumes decisive and intentional action. This juxtaposition recalls how, as we considered in the 
previous chapter, Jasbir Puar characterizes depictions of terrorism as “concurrently an 
unfathomable, unknowable, and hysterical monstrosity, and yet one that only the exceptional 
capacities of U.S. intelligence and security systems can quell.”155 In the post September 11th moment, 
Judt is not alone in finding Camus’s writings, particularly those on Algeria, both nostalgically familiar 
and newly instructive.  
For the first two decades after his death in 1960, Camus scholarship in North America 
oscillated dramatically between condemnation on political grounds, as we see, for example, in Conor 
Cruise O’Brien’s forceful Albert Camus Of Europe and Africa (1970); hagiographic recovery on 
biographical and humanist grounds, a key instance of which is Herbert Lottman’s Albert Camus: A 
Biography (1979); and finally trauma theory and historicist grounds, exemplified by the witness-
oriented reading of La Peste by Shoshana Felman in 1989.156 In the mid-1990s, following Edward 
Said’s invitation to study Camus’s body of work in light of French colonial cultural production in 
Culture and Imperialism (1993) and the publication of the unfinished manuscript of Le premier homme in 
1994, both devotees and critics sought to resituate Camus’s novels and stories in the broader context 
of his life and political and journalistic writings, as well as in interpretive frameworks beyond that of 
post-war existentialism, including postcolonialism, surrealism, and the aesthetics of violence. The 
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intensity of this project has only grown in the years since 2001, a decade marked by a seemingly 
insatiable interest in the historical roots of the intersection of global Islam and terrorism, a nexus 
that many associate with the Algerian war of independence. Accordingly, a number of new scholarly 
and popular works on Camus’s writing have appeared in the last years. The most recent and 
significant of these, in the context of a North American Camus, is the publication this year of the 
long-awaited English translation of the Algerian Chronicles by Arthur Goldhammer.157 Goldhammer’s 
translation, compiled and introduced by Alice Kaplan, joins David Carroll and Robert Zaretsky’s 
new books, Albert Camus the Algerian (2007) and Albert Camus: Elements of a Life (2010), in signaling a 
return to Camus scholarship, specifically a critical reappraisal of Camus’s writings and politics in 
light of the global War on Terror. In his review of the Algerian Chronicles, Zaretsky further suggests 
that the upcoming centenary of Camus’s birth in November 2013 has led to a flurry of events and 
publications in France as well as abroad, an excitement compounded by the sense that Camus’s 
“spirit has hovered over the Arab Spring.”158  
In these ways, readers have begun to recognize that to claim Camus exclusively in the 
French literary tradition, or to refuse him as a European Algerian writing during the period of 
decolonization, is to miss a great deal about what makes his writing consequential for those 
interested not only in the so-called human condition, but also in the shifting parameters of the very 
category of the human in the middle of the twentieth century. To claim Camus as a French writer, 
indeed as a “European writer…a Frenchman”159 as even sympathetic critics have done, is also, I 
think, to agree too easily to an identitarian, racially-constituted understanding of national belonging 
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over place-belonging, affinity, and other modes of association. In some ways, this new moment 
echoes and builds upon the Algerian recovery of Camus during the “décennie noire” or black decade 
of the 1990s, which Alice Kaplan and Emily Apter have both noted as an important counterpoint to 
the rejection of a serious postcolonial legacy in Camus’s oeuvre.160 Kaplan and Apter both describe 
the ways in which Algerian intellectuals, under threat of a repressive Islamic regime’s censorship, 
exile, and even execution, reclaimed Camus as a North African secular humanist, and recast him as a 
prescient observer of the threat of Islamo-fascism or fascislamisme that soured the dream of national 
independence about which Camus expressed such skepticism. In the contemporary American 
context, Camus has begun to be similarly recovered from his reputation as an unwavering 
colonialist, myopic to the point of hypocrisy, blind to the very existence of non-European Algerians, 
and refashioned as an important early observer of the painful realities of decolonization in North 
Africa, and the cyclical, ineradicable plagues of political violence and totalitarianism.  
In these critical movements, we can begin to see how Camus’s work has become available as 
an important resource in a global conversation about the history of terror and the aesthetics of 
violence. La Peste in particular—a novel that explicitly tracks social relations and population and 
municipal sciences in North Africa—stands as an important moment in the colonial literary practice 
of incorporating scientific perspectives and methods, specifically epidemiological methods, in the 
narration, interpretation, and consequent domestication of illegible bodily threats and acts of 
aggression. The plague emerges in colonial Algeria in a year, 194–, that exists in an impossible future 
anterior wedged between the end of the War and the beginning of the end of French possession 
marked by the massacre of Algerians at Sétif and elsewhere that began on May 8th, 1945, a date 
                                                
160 See Alice Kaplan “New Perspectives on Camus’s Algerian Chronicles,” in Camus, Algerian 
Chronicles, 1–18 and Emily Apter, “Out of Character: Camus’s French Algerian Subjects,” Modern 
Language Notes 112.4 (September 1997), 499–516.  
153 
celebrated throughout the world as Victory in Europe day. In this way, the novel refracts not just its 
own historical moment, or moments, but also resonates with the late-Imperial circulatory 
movements of Stoker’s writing, as well as with our own. Camus’s engagement with the sciences of 
medicine and epidemic in the service of describing political terror and its social effects can be thus 
understood as a persuasive and crucial moment in the development of the figure of terror as 
infectious disease in colonial writing. The novel’s self-conscious and extensive use of the discourse 
and imaginary of a cosmopolitan public health returns us to the problem anticipated by Camus’s 
description of science, namely whether the text stands as a description of what happened in Vichy 
France—a terror that Camus witnessed first-hand—or whether it also suggests a more transposable 
dystopian fantasy of what is, and in this way also registers a fear of what may come in Algeria.  
 
—1. The Unthinkable— 
One of the most evident ways in which The Plague borrows from what Camus names as the 
scientific practice of explaining what happens, works, or occurs [ce qui fonctionne] rather than what is,  
is that it is narrated from a physician’s point of view, whose stated “business is only to say ‘this is 
what happened,’ when he knows that it actually did happen” [Sa tâche est seulement de dire ‘Ceci est 
arrivé,’ lorsqu’il sait que ceci est, en effet, arrivé] (23; 28). Though the verb is different from that in the 
notebooks [fonctionner], the overlap in perspective, and the concern with accuracy and simplicity in 
the depiction of a sequence of extraordinary events marries Dr. Rieux’s chronicle, which, like 
Dracula’s documentary form, draws on both his own documentation of the period of illness and that 
of his small group of friends, to Camus’s understanding of a scientific approach. The reader does 
not find out that the organizing point of view is the doctor’s until the final pages of the novel, when 
he confesses that “the tale he had to tell…could only be the record of what had to be done, and 
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what assuredly would have to be done in the never ending fight against terror” [cette chronique…ne 
pouvait être que le témoignage de ce qu’il avait fallu accomplir et que, sans doute, devraient accomplir encore, contre la 
terreur et son arme inlassable] (308; 279). When Rieux appears from out of the text in this final moment 
to reiterate his goal of simply recounting what happened, he also refers to the plague not as la peste, 
but as an even more historically multivalent entity: la terreur. As the near-final word of the novel, 
Rieux’s utterance confirms the text’s orientation toward documenting and preserving an account of 
a city-in-crisis—the effects of an epidemic—over and above a detailed or medically sound 
investigation of the particular adversary, which, in this gesture, dissolves into the much broader 
category of “terror,” recalling the aftermath of the Revolution as much as it does the terror of Nazi 
Germany.   
Far before we get to this final revelation of the chronicler’s identity and the extrapolation of 
the plague into the “terror,” however, the novel highlights a descriptive and narrative approach to 
the epidemic’s progress, rather than a nosological or ontological one, by delaying naming it until it is 
so advanced that it has nearly become what Rieux calls “an abstraction” [l’abstraction] (91; 88). Prior 
to its naming, what the reader sees in the first phase of the sickness, along with Rieux, Rambert, 
Grand, Cottard, and Tarrou, are the “bewildering portents” [signes déconcertants] (23; 28), or outward 
signs, first of dying rats in the streets and exceptionally sticky weather, and later of swollen ganglia 
and black patches of skin on a few patients suffering from a vicious fever. Soon the epidemic 
advances, and the ganglia grow bigger. “One of them,” recounts the doctor, “was beginning to 
suppurate, and presently split open like an overripe fruit” [L’un d’eux commençait à suppurer et, bientôt, il 
s’ouvrit comme un mauvais fruit] (35; 39), a reflection of how the city’s hushed tones and anxious 
conversations are reaching a breaking point. The extrusion of the pus and blood from the inside of 
the body to the outside marks a new phase in the social existence and mediation of the disease: now, 
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there is little opportunity to avoid or ignore the graphic realities of what has arrived, and little doubt 
as to what is causing the buboes, which are soon joined “by dark patches…on their legs and 
stomachs,” [des taches…au ventre et aux jambes…] and sudden death “in a stench of corruption” [dans 
une odeur épouvantable] (35; 39). Still the text is marked by silence and uncertainty; when Rieux rings up 
his local district’s medical supply depot after visiting the ill, all he writes in his journal is “Negative 
reply” [Réponse négative] (35; 39), as if the disease itself were the representative of unadulterated 
negativity, an absence on the other end of the line. The press too, “so lavish of news about the rats, 
now had nothing to say” [si bavarde dans l’affaire des rats, ne parlait plus de rien] (35; 39). When the town’s 
doctors begin adding up the cases to startling results, Rieux’s friend Castel, an older physician, drops 
in to see him.  
“Naturally,” he said to Rieux, “you know what it is.”  
“I’m waiting for the result of the post-mortems.” 
“Well, I know. And I don’t need any post-mortems. I was in China for a good part of my 
career, and I saw some cases in Paris twenty years ago. Only no one dared to call them by 
their name on that occasion. The usual taboo, of course; the public mustn’t be alarmed, that 
wouldn’t do at all. And then, as one of my colleagues said, ‘It’s unthinkable. Everyone knows 
it’s ceased to appear in western Europe.’ Yes, everyone knows that, except for the dead men. 
Come now, Rieux, you know as well as I do what it is” (35–36).  
—Naturellement, lui dit-il, vous savez ce que c’est, Rieux?  
—J’attends le résultat des analyses.  
—Moi, je le sais. Et je n’ai pas besoin d’analyses. J’ai fait une partie de ma carrière en Chine, et j’ai vu 
quelques cas à Paris, il y a une vigntaine d’années. Seulement, on n’a pas osé leur donner un nom, sur le 
moment. L’opinion publique, c’est sacré: pas d’affolement, surtout pas d’affolement. Et puis comme disait un 
confrère: «C’est impossible, tout le monde sait qu’elle a disparu de l’Occident.» Oui, tout le monde le savait, 
sauf que les morts. Allons, Rieux, vous savez aussi bien que moi ce que c’est (39–40).    
 
Castel’s circuitous inquiry, in which he continues to refuse to name “what it is,” reveals the extent to 
which the epidemic’s history and behaviors are embedded in, and even stand in for, its identity. In 
particular, Castel dramatizes the plague’s unthinkability by describing it in a series of oblique terms: 
as something one sees in China, that, in Paris, one wouldn’t dare to call by its actual name, a taboo, 
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and an unthinkable anachronism that has “disappeared from the Occident.” The only people who 
can attest to its unseasonable return, he seems to suggest, are the dead.   
 Rieux receives Castel’s intimations with an air of defeat: “[h]e was looking out the window of 
his surgery, at the tall cliff that closed the half-circle of the bay on the far horizon” [par la fenêtre de son 
bureau, il regardait l’épaule de la falaise pierreuse qui se refermait au loin sur la baie] (36; 40), as if in search for 
the source of infection.  
“Yes, Castel,” he replied. “It’s hardly credible. But everything points toward its being 
plague.” 
     Castel got up and began walking toward the door.  
“You know,” the old doctor said, “what they’re going to tell us? That it vanished from 
temperate countries long ago.” 
    ‘“Vanished”? What does that word really mean?” Rieux shrugged his shoulders.  
    “Yes. And don’t forget. Just under twenty years ago, in Paris, too.” 
“Right. Let’s hope it won’t prove any worse this time that it did then. But really it’s 
incredible” (36).  
—Oui, Castel, dit-il, c’est à peine croyable. Mais il semble bien que ce soit la peste.  
Castel se leva et se dirigea vers la porte.  
—Vous savez ce qu’on nous répondra, dit le vieux docteur. «Elle a disparu des pays tempérés depuis des 
années.» 
—Qu’est-ce que ça veut dire, disparaître? répondit Rieux en haussant les épaules.  
—Oui, et n’oubliez pas : à Paris encore, il y a presque vingt ans.  
—Bon. Espérons nous que ce ne sera pas plus grave aujourd’hui qu’alors. Mais c’est vraiment incroyable 
(40).   
 
Even as their discussion seems to confirm that the unbelievable is afoot, Rieux continues to speak of 
the epidemic’s character in uncertain, hypothetical terms, “everything points to its being the plague” 
[il semble bien que ce soit la peste], “really its incredible” [c’est vraiment incroyable], and Castel provides good 
reasons as to why, explaining that the triumphalism of modernity and the imagined “temperateness” 
of the Occident will not allow those in power to admit that a hideous and ancient disease may not 
have “disappeared” from the West at all. Notwithstanding the strangeness of referring to Oran as 
“temperate” and “the Occident,” even if he is mimicking the voice of those in authority, this 
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conversation highlights the ways in which the imaginary of disease—not just what happens, but 
where, and to whom—is far from neutral, culturally, historically, and discursively.  
 As the paradigmatic embodiment of the evils of disease, this taxonomic revelation is 
something of a feint; as a poetic device, plague is both specific and metonymic, suggesting the 
possibility of realism—a depiction of something that happens, or could happen, as a particular set of 
symptoms and historical impacts—while simultaneously undercutting this specificity with heavy 
cultural and moral iconography of disease broadly construed—plague stands in for all disease, 
malediction, catastrophe. From the perspective of the narrative, “[t]he word ‘plague’ had just been 
uttered for the first time” [Le mot de «peste» venait d’être prononcé pour la première fois] (36; 40), but almost 
immediately, it skitters into the realm of abstraction by being equated with war. Rieux justifies his 
disbelief by reaching for an analogy, “there have been as many plagues as wars in history; yet plagues 
and wars always take people by surprise” [Il y a eut dans le monde autant de pestes que de guerres. Et pourtant 
pestes et guerres trouvent les gens toujours aussi dépourvu] (41). This is not the end of Rieux’s nosological 
paroxysms; later, when Castel, suggests that “those rats died of plague…or of something extremely 
like it,” Rieux, cleaving to his uncertainty as though it were a principle, “sa[ys] nothing” (61) [—Les 
rats sont morts de la peste, ou quelque chose qui lui resemble beaucoup…Rieux se taisait] (62). Such denuded 
language and rampant silence is evident throughout the chronicle, and it gives an accurate if subtle 
clue about not only the identity of the narrator, but the kind of scientific viewpoint he embodies, 
namely a point of view associated with phenomenological reading. In these vacillating exchanges, 
unspoken names, and persistent uncertainties, we can observe how, even once it is invoked, the 
looming identity of the plague is fragmented through its rapid evolution from a zoonotic disease, to 
a bubonic form of plague in humans, and finally a pneumonic form, while being simultaneously 
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suppressed by both the astonishment of the medical community and the desire of city officials to 
prevent panic and chaos.  
In light of the novel’s belated identification of the epidemic, it is useful to contextualize the 
struggle over naming within the parallel developments in epidemiology, which was moving more and 
more toward a multilateral approach to research and data collection in which topographical and 
narrative information played an equally central role in the study of epidemics as did the investigation 
of specific agents of contagion.161 A concern with what is namable as a stable, or even provisional 
scientific truth—say the detection and discovery of a virus or bacterium, or the location of a point of 
origin or index case for an outbreak—was, by the 1940s, only one part of the study and management 
of communicable disease as it evolved from the period of the great epidemics of the late nineteenth 
century. By the end of the First World War and the subsequent ravages of the 1919 influenza 
pandemic, an understanding of epidemic disease as socially, geographically, and behaviorally 
contingent had largely replaced numerous older models of epidemic epistemology, and instantiated a 
new era of international public health—a key element of international governance from the very 
outset—that was equally concerned with what happened in disease events as it was with what was, in 
terms of pathology and microbiology.  
In The Plague, the emergence and death of the sick rats from beneath the city seems 
unconnected to the mysterious but subtle uptick in fatal human fevers, but as the disparate evidence 
begins to consolidate a picture of some terrible thing that has arrived, it becomes more and more 
urgent that the inhabitants of Oran come to terms with what is in their midst. Like Dr. Rieux, the 
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townsfolk have trouble recognizing the vastness of what has come upon them because “they were 
humanists: they disbelieved in pestilences” [ils étaient humanistes: ils ne croyaient pas aux fléau] (37; 41). 
What’s more, they thought, “[a] pestilence isn’t a thing made to man’s measure; therefore [they] will 
tell [them]selves that pestilence is a mere bogy of the mind, a bad dream that will pass away” [Le fléau 
n’est pas à la mesure de l’homme, on se dit donc que le fléau est irréel, c’est un mauvais rêve qui va passer] (37; 41). 
Even in the context of their doubt, we can begin to see that the novel has begun to render the 
plague both physical and metaphysical, literal and metonymic, as well as strongly allegorical and 
fable-like, a dimension further brought out in the combination of the two words the narrator uses 
most often uses to describe it in, peste and fléau, the latter of which joins these two registers in its 
range of meanings: a blade or knife for cutting wheat, a punishment at the hand of God, a calamity, 
a whip, a flagellum—as in the hand of an abuser, or the tail of a cell—a paroxysm, a flail.  
It is this thin significatory atmosphere, soaked in panic and confusion, into which the 
Doctor’s foil, he who ministers to the soul and not the body, steps to offer an interpretation, 
precisely not of what happens, or is happening, but what is, in the metaphysical terms of theological 
history. With a captive and terrified audience of men and women whose city has been overtaken by 
the disease, the priest, Père Paneloux bellows,  
The first time this scourge appears in history, it was wielded to strike down the enemies of 
God….from the dawn of recorded history the scourge of God has humbled the proud of 
heart and laid low those who hardened themselves against Him…If today the plague is in 
your midst, that is because the hour has struck for taking thought…plague is the flail of God 
and the world His threshing-floor, and implacably He will thresh out his harvest until the 
wheat is separated from the chaff (95).  
«La première fois que ce fléau apparait dans l’histoire, c’est pour frapper les ennemis de Dieu…Depuis le 
début de toute l’histoire, le fléau de Dieu met à ses pieds les orgueilleux et les aveugles…Si, aujourd’hui la 
peste vous regarde, c’est que le moment de reflechir est venu…Dans l’immense grange de l’univers, le fléau 
implacable battra le blé humain jusqu’à ce que la paille soit séparée du grain» (92).  
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Paneloux’s impassioned deployment of both of these words, peste and fléau, in tandem punctuates the 
already apocalyptic event with the customary moral decisiveness of scripture-driven oratory, as well 
as the etymological association of apocalypse with corporeal disintegration, indecency, or the 
unveiling of the flesh.162 His description of the plague replicates almost exactly the terms Van 
Helsing uses to describe Dracula’s seductions, patience, and talents for ingress, “comely as Lucifer,” 
“hovering above your very roofs” [beau comme Lucifer…dressé au-dessus de vos toits]. “Maybe at this very 
moment,” he continues, “the plague is settling down in your bedroom to await your return. Patient 
and watchful, ineluctable as the order of the scheme of things, it bides its time” [A l’instant, peut-
être…[elle] s’assied dans votre chambre et attend votre retour. Elle est là, patiente et attentive, assurée comme l’ordre 
même du monde] (96; 93). According to Paneloux, knowledge, study, logic will be no match for this 
curse, “No earthly power, nay, not even—mark me well—the vaunted might of human science can 
avail you to avert that hand” [Cette main qu’elle vous tendra, nulle puissance terrestre et pas même, sachez-le 
bien, la vaine science humaine, ne peut faire que vous l’évitiez] (96–97; 93).   
Paneloux’s sure ascription of peste and fléau as punishment for sin (fléau is also literally 
“punition de Dieu”163) is a ruse; Camus smirks at the priest’s overblown rhetoric, comparing the 
Father’s opening gestures to a “fisticuff” or blow [donn[é] comme on assène un coup] (91), and 
punctuating the sermon with a theatrical rain storm, an uncharacteristic moment of pathetic fallacy 
in the story of a “monotonous” city in the grips of a slow enemy. Père Paneloux rides the rain and 
the humid wind to a symbolic climax by allowing it to substantiate, in the realm of the sensory, his 
invitation to the congregation to “picture a huge wooden bar whirling above the town, striking at 
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random, swinging up again in a shower of drops of blood, and spreading carnage and suffering on 
earth” [Il évoqua l’immense pièce de bois tournoyant au-dessus de la ville, frappant au hasard et se relevant 
ensanglantée, éparpillant enfin le sang et la douleur humaine] (97; 93). The sound of rain falling heavily on 
the chancel windows and the stone court outside enables the congregation to not only picture but to 
hear the fléau battering the people, raining down the blood of the dead upon the survivors and the 
land. The image is so indelible that the novel’s skeptic, the man of science, Dr. Bernard Rieux, later 
hears an unidentified “low soughing” [un sifflement sourd] as he walks through the town that brings to 
mind “that unseen flail threshing incessantly the languid air of which Paneloux had spoken” [rappela 
l’invisible fléau qui brassait inlassablement l’air chaud] (101; 97). The satisfactions of Father Paneloux’s 
sermon, his ordinary, Christian narrativization and interpretation of plague, are evident and 
overwhelmingly ubiquitous in the broader mythology and historiography of epidemic, and especially 
of bubonic plague.164 From the mouth of the bumbling, slightly sweaty but well-intentioned priest, 
Camus gives us the habitual answer to the question of what the plague is, but places it under the sign 
of the absurd.  
Before moving into an exploration of the historical referents and refractions of The Plague, I 
want to unfold one further layer in the complex operations of nomenclature around the epidemic 
because they give us access to a particularly colonially-inflected history of epidemic that has, in 
readings of the novel, largely gone unnoticed. Long after Castel and Rieux have come to a mutual 
agreement that the unbelievable is true, and that they’re under occupation by the dreaded black 
                                                
164 Later readers of the novel, especially those reading Camus’s work in the context of Algeria, may 
notice that word, fléau, which Paneloux favors in his sermons, is also the same word used to describe 
the increasingly violent and repressive French occupation in Algiers in Gillo Pontecorvo’s 1965 film, 
The Battle of Algiers. Like Camus’s own writings on Algeria, along with his body of fiction, this film 
experienced an important second life during the early years of the United States’ War on Terror 
owing to a 2003 screening at the Pentagon and subsequent theatrical release.  
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plague, a curious asthma patient comes to see Rieux to seek out his professional opinion. Rieux, 
hesitant to unduly alarm the man, and more generally the public, refuses to say. The patient asks,  
“Well, Doctor, it’s cholera, isn’t it?”  
“Where on earth did you get that idea from?”  
“It’s in the paper, and the radio said it, too.”  
“No, it’s not cholera….Don’t you believe a word of it” (60).   
—Alors, docteur, c’est le choléra?  
—Où avez vous pris ça?  
—Dans le journal, et la radio l’a dit aussi. 
—Non, ce n’est pas le choléra…n’en croyez rien (61).   
 
By the time we come to this anxious exchange, of course, we know that it’s not at all cholera, 
but rather a more ancient and symbolically vivid scourge. With its undertones of medievalism, its 
invocation not just of sickness but of the painful buboe, the wound, the lash, the curse, the bite of 
the pest or vermin; its habitually inseparable connotation of blackness; its genesis in the East, and its 
slow march on the backs of rats and men along the Silk Road toward Europe, plague serves up a 
different set of Orientalist myths and presuppositions than cholera, which, as I have discussed in the 
first chapter, also traveled by way of trade and military routes from Asia to Europe during the 
golden age of imperialism, a connection made all the more forceful by the discovery that cholera 
originated in the swampy environs of the Ganges river. Although Camus’s doctor dismisses this 
possibility immediately, “ce n’est pas le choléra…n’en croyez rien,” his patient’s query should give us 
pause, since it acts as a crucial portal or point of contamination through which nineteenth century 
colonial history and discourse leak out into the flat temporality and homogenous population of the 
novel’s indeterminate “194–” cosmopolitan Algeria. In other words, through this misprision, Camus 
has given us evidence early in the novel that the plague refracts multiple social and epidemic 
histories.  
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By invoking the memory of the Asiatic cholera pandemics, which stand in metonymically for 
a range of exotic ailments by now familiar to Western European and pied-noir populations, the 
speaker reveals the doubled character of the colonial city that seems to linger between times and 
places. Populated by two peoples engaged in the making of increasingly divergent histories, Oran is 
at once located in the pestilent, unruly East, and also separate from the vastness of the Algerian 
landscape and its manifold threats by fortress walls that will soon shut the city off entirely from its 
environs. Stuart Gilbert’s translation bears the mark of voice far more than Camus’s prose: in the 
brief lines above, Gilbert’s tiny flourishes “on earth,” “idea” and “a word of it,” feel absolutely 
massive in sentences as tonally weightless as “Où avez vous pris ça? N’en croyez rien.” This second line of 
the dialogue, “où avez vous pris ça,” spoken by the doctor, further suggests the novel’s paranoia about 
the location of the sources of both information and disease, each of which spreads as if by 
contagion. The doctor’s clinical brusqueness suggests this double meaning by way of its brevity; he 
might ask, equally nonchalantly, “where did you get this rash” or “where did you pick up this bug”? 
The question of information mapping is thus layered here with the mapping of contagion, both of 
which are hyperbolized through the scalar differences between the geography of greater France, 
including the Algerian colony and the occupied territories, and the novel’s claustrophobic setting in a 
single town isolated from hope and protection of the state. The third line, spoken again by the 
patient, invokes the variegated media, including the newspaper and the radio, that produce and 
manage the discourse around infection, informing the public of their duties and advisable courses of 
action. As we will see particularly through the figure of M. Othon, the long-suffering magistrate, 
information management and assessment will be as crucial for the preservation of plague victims as 
it will be for maintaining the health of the social body and ensuring the stability of its future. Finally, 
the doctor’s reply in the fourth line seeks to dismiss the alarmist concerns of the old man, but 
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nevertheless juxtaposes a negative certitude (“Non, ce n’est pas le choléra,”) with an invocation of belief, 
(“n’en croyez rien”), as though it were possible to believe or believe away the social, historical, and 
narrative character of the pestilence. This juxtaposition encapsulates the novel’s insistent negotiation 
between the spiritual and the empirical, which brings the chronicler, in his own view, into the post-
theistic realm of simple observation.  
Perhaps because of this moment in the text, which is the only place cholera is mentioned, or 
perhaps simply because of the real-world epidemic’s historical significance, many critics believe that 
The Plague drew on the legendary cholera outbreak not of 194–, but of 1849, which decimated Oran 
nearly twenty years after the French conquest.165  
                                                
165 Everywhere I’ve come across it, this claim is made without a direct attribution and in the passive. 
Thus far, I haven’t seen strong evidence in Camus’s notebooks or essays that would suggest he was 
specifically interested in the Oran cholera (neither have I found mention of cholera at all in his 
notes, but only here, in the novel). Interestingly, though, this claim about the 1849 cholera in Oran 
as a partial inspiration or historical backdrop for La Peste has made it out of Camus criticism and 
into the reflective writing and common wisdom around postcolonial reading practices, of which the 
best piece of evidence is Moustapha Marrouchi’s, “Counternarratives, Recoveries, Refusals,” in 
Edward Said and the Work of the Critic: Speaking Truth to Power, ed. Paul A. Bové (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2000), 187–228. Marrouchi writes “The severe cholera epidemic of 1849, which 
caused widespread loss and ruin in Oran, set the stage for [the novel’s] destructive history” (219). 
This gap in historical causality and interpretive documentation speaks to the distance between 
Camus’s own priorities in researching and sketching out the novel in terms of its philosophy, and 
the priorities of a particularly historicist strain of postcolonial criticism. The claim that the 1849 
Oran cholera served as inspiration for the novel, rather than serving as a useful intertext, tells us a 
good deal about how—and to what end—we read La Peste now in the context of colonialism.  
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The Geographical Diffusion of Epidemic Cholera in Eastern Africa, 1872 
 
 
This moment joins the period of the holocaust and the Occupation as the most frequently-invoked 
referents for a historicist situating of the novel, but such positions have thus far failed to develop 
readings of the novel through this lens, and to consider how the discursive history of cholera 
smuggles a deeply problematic set of ideas about hygiene, geography, ethnicity, and colonial relations 
into the text’s depiction of epidemic. In order to be able to engage the question of La Peste’s explicit 
treatment of history through Roland Barthes’s quarrel with Camus about the novel’s “ahistorical 
ethic,” it is crucial to look at some of the implicit history that appears under the auspices of the 




—2. It’s Not Cholera—  
In the same way that the identity of the epidemic serves as a point of interpretive 
controversy within the novel, the historical referent of The Plague, and what real-world evil its 
contours approximate, remains contested and multivalent. The question of the real or intended 
historical and political events behind Camus’s famously broad allegory is one that I want to bracket 
for the moment, however, in order to consider this singular moment of mistaken epidemic identity 
because it reveals a good deal more about the tangle of Camus’s geopolitical commitments in the 
late 1940s—as well as how they emerge in his figural lexicon—than the quest for a clear single 
allegorical referent can. Alighting on this moment of contact with nineteenth century colonial 
history, in which cholera played an enormous role, also allows us to see a number of new features 
and behaviors of the novel, notably how The Plague participates in a longer and more varied literary 
and historical archive than the limited post-war moment in which it is most commonly situated, and 
imports the complex cultural signification of colonial epidemics into a new time and space. Situating 
the novel in this expanded history of colonialism and epidemic also serves to better connect 
Camus’s journalistic writings, comments, and speeches about Algeria with the imaginary of a 
different kind of violent transformation that in this novel takes the form of plague, but elsewhere 
travels under the broad aegis of the scourges of injustice, famine, revolutionary violence, oppression, 
and terror.  
When we think about the role of disease and infectiousness in the dehumanization of 
people, and look specifically at how the morphology of that dehumanization intersected with ideas 
about geography, history, climate, race, personhood, and morbidity, it becomes possible to see how 
the choleric figures of the nineteenth century might appear as an answer to the nosological problem 
the doctor and his patient face in 194– Oran. In keeping with the abstracted spatio-temporality 
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registered by the unmarked date, Camus’s description of the plague draws on a century-old history 
of disease-reading, an effect most visible in the invocation of the paradigmatic contagion of 
nineteenth-century globalization, namely cholera, which, in learning of a recent lethal outbreak of 
disease, the speaker assumes must be on the rise once again. Why, in the 1940s, does this patient 
think Oran is under threat of cholera, the great nineteenth-century epidemic of Empire? What does 
this moment of connection to a notorious imperial ailment tell us about Camus’s contested novel? 
In approaching this question, it is crucial to note that cholera and other infectious diseases played an 
important role in the early establishment of colonial dynamics between Algeria and France, as well as 
in the foundation of the modern state’s relationship to public hygiene and health systems in the 
metropole and the territories. With reference to the impact of cholera on the burgeoning fields of 
public health and sanitation in nineteenth century France, François Delaporte, a historian of 
medicine and student of Foucault, documents the massive 1832 cholera outbreak that ravaged Paris 
just two years after the French seizure of Algiers. In describing the significance of the cholera 
epidemics in the creation of new forms of state population management and revisions of the post-
revolutionary social state, Delaporte writes,  
The cholera that swept across Europe demonstrated the vulnerability of an ancient system of 
defense…the epidemic of 1832 surely marks a historical watershed: the moment when the 
need to import into the civilized class a health apparatus forged by and for the bourgeoisie 
became evident…166  
 
The ancient system of defense he refers to here includes army-based measures such as the 
troop-based cordons sanitaires, and economic measures, both to curb trade from abroad to limit the 
possibility of new contamination, as well as the sequestration of cities and towns, which slowed 
                                                
166 François Delaporte, Disease and Civilization: The Cholera in Paris, 1832, trans. Arthur Goldhammer 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1986), 189, 199–200. Emphasis in the original. Hereafter cited in 
text. 
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internal commerce to a near halt. The new health apparatus he describes would replace the primacy 
of state interests as well as the focus on prevention by way of quarantine and closure with a focus on 
the lived health of the bourgeoisie. In this sense, Delaporte notes the tendency over time of 
nineteenth century sanitation and hygiene sciences to turn away from general social reform and 
toward a different, less service-oriented preservation of biological privilege to match economic 
privilege. To this summative conclusion, he adds, this “apparatus…remained the instrument of the 
bourgeoisie’s hegemony” (200). Here, Delaporte emphasizes the collusion of power and biological 
epistemes that was the hallmark of his teacher’s work, and of that of Foucault’s own teacher, 
Canguilhem.  
As far as the impact of cholera and typhus on colonial dynamics is concerned, French 
hygiene and sanitation experts, like their British counterparts, assigned blame for the devastating 
epidemics first to their impoverished cohabitants in the cities of France and elsewhere in Europe, 
who were understood in some respects to be a distinct race of persons less possessed of the moral 
fortitude that would dissuade the epidemic from dispatching themselves and their loved ones. Later, 
with increasingly sophisticated means of mapping epidemic spread, these same observers would 
point the finger at their darker-skinned compatriots to the South and East. In his history, Delaporte 
draws attention to the slippery analogy enabled by this shift, whereby the economically 
disenfranchised and the foreign become commensurable, and even in some instances 
indistinguishable, by highlighting at the very beginning of his introduction the nineteenth-century 
economist and statesman Michel Chevalier’s plaintive observation that “the admirable people of 
Paris, who are so heroically confronting the cholera of poverty…were not made to serve as fodder 
for the cholera of Asia and to die like slaves in pain and terror” (2).  
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Delaporte returns to Chevalier’s comments periodically throughout the book to point up 
various rhetorical features and epistemological presuppositions that contributed to the cultural 
scaffolding around cholera specifically, and sanitation more broadly. What he doesn’t address 
explicitly, however, in any of these moments, is the way in which Chevalier’s impassioned comment 
clusters a variety of histories that are essential to the development of the social state in post-
Revolutionary France. In so doing, Chevalier’s recollection of the 1832 cholera also clusters a 
number of importantly overlapping discursive fields. We can see evidence of this clustering in the 
comment above. First, the pseudo-metaphorical use of the word cholera, as in “cholera of poverty,” 
identifies the ailment as one that afflicts the poor. In other words, the cholera belonging to, or 
proper to, the impoverished. But it also, in its figural dimension, elides the specificity of the disease, 
suggesting that poverty is, itself, a kind of fever or rage, la colère as much as le choléra, or “the cholera 
of Asia.” This construction unlinks the figural “cholera” as a general distemper from the material 
conditions of life, labor, and infrastructure that enabled its spread, while also suggesting that 
poverty, like epidemic, is in some sense a natural, and potentially blameless, occurrence—not the 
outcome of violent and exploitative economic policies, but rather of some sort of invasive outside 
force, “preceded by cries of terror from two continents” (3).  
Chevalier undercuts this possible interpretation to some extent in the paragraphs that follow, 
insisting that “the finger of accusation should point at those who see civilization merely as a more 
sophisticated servant of their luxury and pleasure” (3), but it’s unclear who exactly “those” are, and 
who should be allowed to serve their luxury and pleasure, if not the urban poor. To this point, 
Chevalier’s insistence that the people of Paris “were not made to…die like slaves in pain and terror,” 
layers the discourse of cholera with the brutal history of plantation slave labor in Saint Domingue, 
while yoking the anathema condition, the “terror” of pain and suffering to the terrors of both post-
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Revolutionary France and the subsequent slave uprising in the colony. Implicit in such a statement, 
of course, is the sense that there may be some who are more deserving than the people of Paris to 
suffer in this way. For other commentators of the period, those people certainly included the 
Algerians, who were, in France, the most proximate figure for denizens of uncivilized places, 
burdened with insalubrious climates, and teeming with autochthonous diseases.   
Indeed, by the height of the new imperial enterprises in the 1890s, both cholera and typhus 
were posing an enormous threat to the health of the citizenry and even state sovereignties of 
Europe. Andrew Aisenberg, in his work on health management in 19th century France, cites a 
particularly striking example of what is evident in dozens of colonial-era writings about sanitation 
and epidemic, namely the association of epidemic disease with the barbarous races, a connection 
that was used as a justification for the necessity of colonial surveillance in order to keep the 
movements of the natives in check, and quarantines strictly enforced. According to Aisenberg, 
Achille Kelsch, a theorist of latent germ behavior following Pasteur, “blamed the 1893 [typhus] 
epidemic on Algerian immigrants who had in his view had served as carriers of the germ.” 167 
Drawing on the popular ethno-mythology around the Arab-Berber people’s hospitality (in this case 
to the germ, which they harbored and unleashed on others who were not immune) Kelsch “used the 
example of these immigrant carriers to illuminate the mechanism of latency [by] identif[ying] 
microbe carrying Algerian ‘nomads’ as posing a permanent danger to French society that could be 
addressed only by placing them under constant surveillance” (104). Aisenberg explains how the 
hypothesis of latency, which would become so much a part of the cultural mythology around the 
spread of typhoid fever in the early twentieth century, “dissociated…etiology from a politics of 
                                                
167 Andrew Aisenberg, Contagion: Disease, Government, and The “Social Question” in Nineteenth-Century 
France (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 104. Hereafter cited in text .  
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social regulation centered on the home,” and instead reached out beyond the insular cartography of 
determinants and into the geographical and temporal space beyond the home.168 As I have argued in 
the first chapter, this interpretive reorientation toward distal determinants of disease etiology was 
complicated by the contemporary advances in microbiology pioneered in Robert Koch’s discovery 
of the cholera vibrio, which, combined with statistical and mapping approaches, produced the new 
epidemiology in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Kelsch’s own words demonstrate how 
this shift in approach to determining the origins of infectious disease reconstituted the colonial 
subject in terms of public health:  
I am inclined to believe that these nomadic groups, which are so dangerous for the 
population but not for themselves, do not have typhus but carry the cause within them. The 
vigilance of public hygiene is needed not only in regard to those vagabonds suffering from 
typhus, but also those who are not (quoted in Aisenberg, 104-105).  
 
Here, we can see an example of how professionals in the sciences of life and morbidity in 
metropolitan France sought to bring the life-practices of the Algerian people under the control of 
the state, simultaneously criminalizing their migrancy within Algeria as a racial characteristic, as well 
as their emigration to France, which was often undertaken in pursuit of some small measure of 
economic stability. The suggestion that “themselves” are distinct from “the population” only further 
underscores this point. As healthy, or asymptomatic, carriers of the disease, these “nomads” also 
represent the threat of undetectable assimilation and invisible intercourse between races in the form 
of contagion, as well as the specter of a reverse colonization of the beloved homeland. Such 
                                                
168 Typhoid fever is distinct from typhus, which is caused by a different microbe, though both derive 
their name from the Greek root indicating smoke, burning, and also deafness, to describe symptoms 
of mental “cloudiness,” or “stupor” (“Typhus,” Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, ed. C.T. Onions 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 953). For a complete account of the social and cultural 
history of asymptomatic carriers, exemplified by New York’s “Typhoid Mary,” see Priscilla Wald, 
Contagious: Cultures, Carriers, and the Outbreak Narrative (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 
Chapter 2: “The Healthy Carrier: ‘Typhoid Mary’ and Social Being.” 
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anxieties, made especially potent and spectacular during times of aggressive epidemics, would 
contribute to the consolidation of fear around the various assimilation proposals after the Second 
World War that would bring many Algerians into full French citizenship, and thus tip “the 
population” balance such that the “French” would be outnumbered ten to one.   
In addition to pointing beyond the boundaries of the metropole and its people, the new 
discourse of disease occasioned by the modern epidemics also pointed outside of the immediacy of 
the present. Even in the middle of the nineteenth century, when it was still a novel and little 
understood disease, commentators in France understood cholera as somehow out of sync with the 
march of civilizational and scientific progress, like the plague in Camus’s novel, an anachronism in 
the post-Enlightenment age, and an unaccountable blemish on the sanguine nationalist projection of 
a sanitary and healthful body politic. In this, the rhetoric of sanitation and its relationship to morality 
in mid-century France is even more emphatic and certainly more florid than in Victorian England, 
where reformist tracts, particularly with reference to the urban poor, were increasingly characterized 
by a tone of self-conscious restraint, objectivity, and scientism, even as they drew on the rhetorical 
efficacy of a measure of sentimentalism. Delaporte recounts the way in which the public reacted to 
this affront of the past upon the present: 
what was surprising was that an affliction like cholera, which reminded people of the great 
medieval epidemics, should have appeared in an age of progress. Hence, the devastation 
caused by the disease came as a shock, especially to members of the bourgeoisie, who with 
all the resources of civilization at their disposal never dreamed that they would have to 
contend with such a frightful calamity…Ancient obsessions seemed to well up from the 
depths of the Middle Ages (49).  
 
In this framework, it becomes even more possible to see how the epidemics of the nineteenth 
century were marshaled in service of a medievalization of the colonies, continuous with that period’s 
Manichean view of the existential threat posed by Islam. An awareness of the memories summoned 
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by history, then, would seem indispensible to the understanding and management of colonial 
relations and dynamics, especially where the health and mortality of the citizenry was at issue as a 
direct consequence of colonially-determined social relations. Alongside Chevalier, Delaporte sets 
another chronicler of the 1832 outbreak, Émile Littré, who was not only a philologist and student of 
Sanskrit, but also translator of Hippocrates and student of medicine, as one of his key historical 
observers. Of the anachronism of cholera, Littré writes, “Paris, to which heaven had long been so 
kind, had forgotten those sad times when plague sowed devastation within its walls. Proud of our 
civilization, we Parisians gave little thought to the ferocious attacks that nature occasionally 
unleashes on the races of mankind” (quoted in Delaporte, 49). For Delaporte, this reaction must be 
situated in terms of contemporary class antagonism if it is to be fully understood, and he gathers 
compelling evidence to suggest that it was not only a traditionalist elite who saw the cholera wafting 
as a deadly threat from the poorer and more fragrant quarters of Paris, but also the poor, who 
looked with escalating suspicion on their overlords as potential poisoners and exterminators.  
We can see just in this small constellation of texts how contemporary reflections on the 1832 
cholera in France as it impacted daily life, particularly in Paris, where population density and an 
already taxed infrastructure aided in its spread, ranged from the sober and reformist, generally 
focusing on the suffering of the poor, to the sensational and dramatic, whose players were more 
often the urbane and leisurely. One of the more literary moments in Delaporte’s comprehensive 
history highlights Heinrich Heine’s recollections of the colorful scenes of suffering in the homes, 
courts, ballrooms, and avenues where subjects of the brand new July Monarchy entertained 
themselves. In De la France, an account of his early years in France, Heine tells an arresting story 
about the high-spirited Parisians who scoffed and postured to overcome their fear of the disease by 
mimicking it, “Parisians danced with even more gaiety than usual on the boulevard, where one saw 
174 
masks whose sickly pallor and deformed features mocked the fear of cholera and the disease itself 
[les Parisiens se trémoussèrent avec d’autant plus de jovialité sur les boulevarts, où l’on aperçut même des masques qui, 
parodiant la couleur maladive et la figure défaite, raillaient la crainte du choléra et la maladie elle-même]” (47).169 As 
the dance halls fill up on a temperate spring evening, Heine’s companion revelers dance and drink to 
banish their well-founded fears, when “suddenly, the sprightliest of the harlequins felt cold in his 
legs, ripped off his mask, and to everyone’s astonishment revealed a face that had turned bluish-
purple in color” (48) [tout à coup, le plus sémillant des arlequins sentit trop de fraîcheur dans ses jambes, ôta son 
masque et découvrit à l’étonnement de tout ce monde un visage d’un bleu violet (134)]. The harlequin’s 
spectacular death is made all the more lurid by the joyous playful outward appearance of the 
victim—a special horror, it seems, is reserved for a mimetic death that reveals a real one beneath the 
actor’s mask.  
 
“Death as Fiend,” Alfred Rethel, 1851. Based on Heine’s account of the 1832 cholera 
                                                




Idries Shah, in his canonical book, The Sufis, has made a case for the Sufi origins of the figure of the 
harlequin in the Italian Commedia dell’Arte, citing the Arabic word aghlaq, for the silent performer-in-
gesture as a likely root for the French arlequin.170 Heine is unlikely to have been aware of such a 
resonance, but there is in any case something peregrine about the harlequin—the colorful player 
who joins gesture to meaning, archetype to body, and silence to sense. Although Camus doesn’t cite 
Heine’s writings on cholera specifically, we know he was reading the Ideas and possibly the memoirs, 
because he cites Heine a number of times in Carnets IV and V, which run from January 1942–April 
1948.171  
Within the imaginative landscape of the novel, Camus also stages a scene very much like the 
one Heine describes above, in which the lead player in a production of Gluck’s Orpheus, a 
mythological figure who is already an ambassador to the strange and horrible land of the dead, 
succumbs to plague onstage during his climactic duet with Eurydice. The plague, by this time in the 
chronicle, the beginning of part four in a classical five-act tragedy, has advanced far enough that the 
town is in the elastic phase of experiencing its state of emergency as more or less ordinary. At least, 
they devote themselves to behaving as if it is so, even as their days are punctuated by gruesome 
scenes of illness and social breakdown. Cottard and Tarrou, two of the novel’s “ordinary men,” have 
decided to attend the municipal opera, where a touring company has been “marooned” by the 
                                                
170 Idries Shah, The Sufis (New York: Anchor Books, 1971), 397.  
171 The passages he transcribes are typically difficult to manage at anything but the most abstract 
aphoristic level. In one instance, when he is just beginning to make notes toward La Peste, he copies 
Heine’s epitaph, which also appears in the Ideas: “He loved the roses of the Brenta,” and in another, 
what appears to be a reflection from 1848, the year Heine was confined to bed for what would later 
prove to be slow lead-poisoning, “What the world seeks and hopes for now has become utterly 
foreign to my heart” Albert Camus, Notebooks: 1942-1951, trans. Justin O’Brien (New York: Knopf, 
1966), 13, 174.  
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quarantining of the city. In an effort to maintain a measure of normalcy, as well as to collect some 
minimal payment under strained circumstances, the company gives one performance a week. Men 
and women, presumably of European extraction (they are described as “the cream of Oran society” 
[les plus élégants de nos citoyens] (200; 182)) don their evening dress, a “sure charm against plague” [l’habit 
chassait la peste] (200; 182), and greet one another as the orchestra tunes up. The first act goes off 
without incident, while only the most perceptive aficionados notice that in the second act Orpheus 
“introduced some tremolos not in the score and voiced an almost exaggerated emotion when 
begging the lord of the Underworld to be moved by his tears”[introduisait, dans son air du deuxième acte, 
des tremblements qui n’y figuraient pas, et demandait avec un léger excès de pathétique, au maître des Enfers, de se 
laisser toucher par ses pleurs] and that “some rather jerky movements he indulged in gave our 
connoisseurs of stagecraft an impression of clever, if slightly overdone, effects…” [Certains gestes 
saccades qui lui échappèrent apparurent aux plus avisés comme un effet de stylization qui ajoutait encore à 
l’interprétation du chanteur] (200–201; 182).  
Later, the plague itself will be anthropomorphized in similar terms, “progressing with its 
characteristically jerky but unfaltering stride” [ne cessa enfin d’avançer de son allure patiente et saccadée] (258; 
233)—exhibiting the same kind of bodily incontinence that it visits on its victims. Under the 
circumstances of the opera, however—the cast is trapped in an unfamiliar city far from their families 
as its inhabitants die around them—such an expressive outpouring is hardly noteworthy. In the third 
act, however, “at the precise moment when Eurydice was slipping from her lover,” [c’était le moment 
où Eurydice échappait à son amant] Orpheus is overcome. “He chose this moment to stagger grotesquely 
to the footlights, his arms and legs splayed out under his antique robe, and fall down in the middle 
of the property sheepfold, always out of place, but now, in the eyes of the spectators, significantly, 
appallingly so” [il choisit ce moment pour avancer vers la rampe d’une façon grotesque, bras et jambes écartés dans 
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son costume à l’antique, et pour s’écrouler au milieu des bergeries du décor qui n’avaient jamais cessé d’être 
anachronique mais qui, aux yeux des spectateurs, le devinrent pour la première fois, et de terrible façon] (201; 182–
183). If there is any doubt as to whether the young chanteur requires assistance or a coffin, it is 
dispelled immediately—no one rushes to his side. The orchestra stops playing, and the audience 
rises slowly to its feet, “like worshippers leaving church when the service ends, or a death-chamber 
after a farewell visit to the dead” [comme on sort d’une église, le service fini, ou d’une chambre mortuaire après 
une visite] (201; 183). Calm gives way to panic, and finally “the crowd stampeded toward the 
exits…pouring out into the street in a confused mass, with shrill cries of dismay” [la foule afflua vers les 
sorties et s’y pressa, pour finir par s’y bousculer en criant] (201; 183).  
The narrator, borrowing in this moment from the plague-era notebooks of his friend Tarrou, 
is unapologetically heavy-handed here. Along with the opera, Glück’s exceedingly Romantic take on 
the Orpheus myth, he allows the reader to indulge in what is quite literally an operatic experience of 
melancholy and tragedy, while simultaneously warning us of the folly of venturing into the mists of 
the underworld, of being lured by the seductions of drama, song, and sentimentalism. Inasmuch as 
the scene hearkens back to the site of the church and Paneloux’s sermon, with the opera-goers rising 
to their feet “like worshippers,” we are dangerously close to breaking Rieux’s carefully constructed 
frame of dispassionate observation. Apart from this scene, and one that follows, in which the 
Magistrate Othon’s young son dies extravagantly after being administered an experimental serum, 
the novel is rigorously and studiously unbeautiful, or at least, it keeps insisting that it is, telling us 
from its opening pages that it is a “chronicle” set in a town without passion—a document, or act of 
witness, more than a story or roman. The rare moments of sensory richness, like the heartbroken 
Orpheus dying of longing amid the strains of a now habituated orchestral tragedy, dissipate into flat 
actional language almost immediately. Another much-loved but rare moment of release in the text is 
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the scene in which Tarrou and Rieux, the doctor who we later learn is narrating the novel, escape the 
plague-locked city to go swimming in the sea, the “gentle, heaving expanse of deep piled-velvet, 
supple and sleek as a creature of the wild” [épaisses comme du velours, souple et lisse comme une bête] (256, 
231). The two swimmers encounter a chilly current, and after a final thrash of freedom, a 
competitive burst of speed, the scene ends quickly, and they prepare to “set their shoulders to the 
wheel again” [il fallait recommencer] (257; 232). The opera, too, is an abortive experiment with 
normalcy, where normalcy is defined as pleasure and the momentary suspension of obligation to the 
state of emergency itself. But this charade is short-lived. Once the ladies and gentlemen have 
escaped, Cottard and Tarrou, with whom the reader has remained in the Municipal Opera House,  
had merely risen from their seats [and] gazed down at what was a dramatic picture of their 
life in those days: plague on the stage in the guise of a disarticulated mummer, and in the 
auditorium the toys of luxury, so futile now, forgotten fans and lace shawls derelict on the 
red plush seats (201).  
Cottard et Tarrou, qui s’étaient seulement levés, restaient seuls en face d’une des images de ce qui étaient leur 
vie d’alors: la peste sur la scène sous l’aspect d’un histrion désarticulé et, dans la sale, tout un luxe devenu 
inutile sous la forme d’eventails oubliés et de dentelles traînant sur le rouge des fauteuils (183). 
 
Like Heine’s poor arlequin, the young man expires in the midst of a pageant in which he, 
seemingly in service to the whole community, visits death and attempts to defy it, and later comes to 
both embody and to suffer for it. The visual joke, as in Heine, is that the mummer, or mime 
[histrion], has become quite literally disarticulated [désarticulé] and inarticulate as a result of the fiction 
in which he plays collapsing into his circumstance. But the novel refuses to linger on this scene or 
give it much affective space in the way Camus seems to in his notebooks; in leading into the episode, 
the narrator explains dispassionately that he has found the account in Tarrou’s notes, and that it “re-
creates as nearly as may be the curiously feverish atmosphere of this period” [restitue à peu près 
l’atmosphère difficile de cette epoque] (199; 181). Here, Rieux seems to tell us, is a case study, rather than a 
moment of gravity of poetic significance in the in the work. Again and again, the novel’s restrained 
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descriptions of the monotony of life under extreme conditions encourages a kind of expunging of 
affect, detail, texture, and emotion in favor of clear-sighted, rational action—a sort of tempered, 
masculine optimism. And yet, at particular moments, we can see this tone in tension with a different, 
more baroque expressive habit rupturing the studied flatness of the novel’s surface. It is these 
moments that serve as points of contact with the more distant histories that the allegory seems to 
disavow, particularly those to do with an earlier discourse and imaginary of disease, as we see in 
Heine. The Orpheus scene is one such moment, and it gives us both the scientistic rejection of 
superstition—in the form of Tarrou and Cottard’s ironic detachment from their experience, which 
we can see in the condescending tone of a migratory close third person above—as well as a display 
of its attractions in language that approaches the horrific pleasures of Heine’s choleric jester, whose 
death is made comic as he is surrounded by eaters of ice cream dressed in their finery.  
For all of its symbolic and archetypal overdetermination, which pairs the approaching 
dénouement of the novel with an arresting compression of it in the opera, this scene offers some 
more subtle clues about how Camus seems to have been thinking about the spectacle of the diseased 
or suffering body in the context of political violence, specifically the German occupation, and in 
this, the fact that Camus attended a production of Corneille’s last play Suréna, in which a princess 
named Eurydice dies onstage, merits consideration.172 After seeing the play in Paris in November of 
1943, the culmination of a season of intense allied bombings across France, as a consequence of 
which the tide of the war had begun to turn, Camus writes in his notebook,  
                                                
172 Olivier Todd, in his biography Camus: A Life (New York: Knopf, 1997), sets up the story of this 
outing by mentioning the massive changes in Europe in the end of 1943—at the time, Lucien, 
Camus’s brother was fighting in an Algerian Brigade—writing, “He saw his first play in months, 
Corneille’s rarity Suréna, which had been exhumed by the Comédie Française. He was struck by 
Corneille’s verses and said he had not felt such powerful emotion for a long time” (170).  
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Suréna. In the fourth act, all the doors are guarded. And Eurydice, who up to now has struck 
such wonderful notes, begins to be silent, to search her heart without being able to express 
the word that would deliver her (83–84). 
Surena. Au 4e acte, toutes les portes sont gardées. Et Eurydice qui a trouvé jusqu’ici de si admirables accents 
commence à se taire, à presser son coeur sans pouvoir exprimer le mot qui la délivrerait  (109-110).  
 
This was also the month Camus had begun to work as an editor at Gallimard, and was living more 
comfortably than he had done in some time, entertaining friends and going out in the midst of what 
was very much a city under siege. This moment in Camus’s biography appears to have been an 
inspiration for the Orpheus scene, and while the tragedy Tarrou and Cottard witness is not 
Corneille’s, some of the details here are unfolded or displaced in their experience, namely the 
guarded doors of the stage, which point beyond the doors of the theater to the guarded doors of 
Oran, and the punctuation of muteness and death to end a song of suffering. A couple of pages later 
in the same entry in the notebook, Camus writes, “Plague. End up with a motionless woman in 
mourning announcing in sufferings what men have given in lives and blood” [Peste. Finir sur une 
femme immobile et en deuil qui annonce en souffrances ce que les hommes ont donné en vie et en sang] (85; 112), and 
still later in the same entry, “a theatrical company is still playing: a play about Orpheus and 
Eurydice” [Un troupe théâtrale continue à jouer: une pièce sur Orphée et Eurydice] (87; 115). What are the 
effects of the transposition of this scene, from 1943 Paris, still in the grip of the Occupation, to 
Oran in 194–, a city under a different kind of siege? In abandoning Europe for Africa, does Camus 
abandon his responsibility to a specific history? What becomes of the reflective woman figure who 
bears witness and mourns by “announcing in sufferings what men have given in lives and blood?” In 
the final version of the novel, there is no such woman. The scene in the opera house ends not with 
Eurydice—she has slipped away—but with the fallen Orpheus. The other women who the novel 
mentions have also conspicuously disappeared: Rieux’s wife has been sent to a sanatorium, where 
she will later die, Rambert’s lover, for whom he pines, is separated from him by quarantine, and 
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Jeanne has abandoned her husband Grand, a civil servant with literary aspirations. The looming 
feminine figure that remains in their place announces the sufferings of men in the form of chthonic 
“stigmata” (90)—pustules that mar and darken the skin of the city. For Roland Barthes, who 
challenged Camus to defend the “ahistorical ethic” of his novel, the absent presence of this feminine 
figure is an unforgiveable abstraction, she is la terreur, la peste, la déesse inconnue.  
 
—3. La Déesse inconnue— 
For half a century, readers have celebrated and puzzled over the singularly blank effect of 
Camus’s prose—its smoothness, its authority, its odd lack of detail. 173 The ubiquity of tragic forms 
and archetypes, like Orpheus and Eurydice above, contributes to this effect, which, in La Peste, is 
amplified by the characterlessness of the city and the lurking presence of silent and absent subjects, 
not just women, but also Arab Algerians. Francis Jeanson, the then-untested young critic whom 
Sartre would later allow to review L’Homme révolté for Les Temps modernes, much to Camus’s 
displeasure,174 described Camus’s tone as “noble and haughty” and characterized him as “against 
history” and “in favor of a metaphysical rebellion against the human condition.”175 Where Jeanson 
took issue with Camus’s self-seriousness and limited political vision, Camus’s most vocal critics in 
postcolonial philosophy, theory, and criticism, Albert Memmi, Edward Said, and Conor Cruise 
                                                
173 These characterizations are first and foremost Jean-Paul Sartre’s (Sartre identified and admired in 
Camus’s writing a style he called l’ecriture blanche in his 1942 review of L’Étranger for Les Temps 
Modernes), Jean Pouillon’s (“L’Optimisme de Camus,” Les Temps Modernes 3.26 (November 1947), 
921-929), and Roland Barthes’s, though many more contemporary critics have borrowed these 
formulations or versions thereof. Of the three, the most lasting has probably been Barthes’s 
characterization of Camus’s prose in Le degré zéro de l’écriture (1953).   
174 See Ronald Aronson, Camus and Sartre: The Story of a Friendship and the Quarrel that Ended It 
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2004), 138.  
175 Francis Jeanson, “The Third Man in the Story: Ronald Aronson Discussed the Sartre-Camus 
Conflict with Francis Jeanson,” trans. Basil Kingstone, Sartre Studies International 8.2 (2002), 25.  
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O’Brien, have all registered the impact and political implications of this frictionless tone and absence 
of geographical, political, linguistic, and cultural specificity in his work. Memmi, in a 1957 essay, 
called him a “well-meaning colonizer,” Said wrote that he was “a novelist from whose work the facts 
of imperial actuality, so clearly there to be noted, have dropped away,” while O’Brien judges that in 
considering Camus’s utopian dream of Mediterranean unity, “including the Arabs [but] based on the 
Romance languages, it is not excessive to speak of hallucination.”176 O’Brien also comments on the 
aphoristic quality of the mechanics of justice in L’Étranger, and accuses Camus of trucking not in a 
grand interrogation of responsibility, but rather in the impossible fantasy of a colonialism in which 
all subjects are reduced to equal blankness: “[t]he presentation in this way of a court in Algeria trying 
a crime of this kind involves the novelist in the presentation of a myth: the myth of French 
Algeria…it implicitly denies the colonial reality and sustains the colonial fiction” (23).  
Indeed, the sparseness of La Peste—the empty landscapes, attenuated plots, and the bombed-
out interiorities of its characters—points most obviously to a generalized human condition, a feature 
that earned Camus a reputation as both a hero of post-war humanism and as an embarrassing 
peddler of adolescent pabulum from his less sympathetic readers.177 Other critics have dismissed this 
purportedly naïve humanism as an inaccurate depiction of Camus’s open-work style, suggesting 
instead that the elements of his fictional alchemy are intentionally depleted. To this point, it was 
Camus’s writing in L’Étranger that was one of Barthes’s central models for writing degree zero, 
                                                
176 See Albert Memmi “Camus ou le colonisateur de bonne volonté,” La Nef 12 (December, 1957); 
Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage, 1993), 172; Connor Cruise O’Brien, Camus 
(Glasgow: Fontana, 1970), 14.  
177 Edward Said is critical on this point and its function as a medium for hidden ideology, writing in 
Culture and Imperialism, “[Camus] is a very late imperial figure who not only survived the heyday of 
empire, but survives today as a ‘universalist’ writer with roots in a now-forgotten colonialism” (New 
York: Vintage, 1993), 172.  On the issue of the adolescent appeal of Camus’s philosophical 
positions, see Peter Brooks’s essay, “From Albert Camus to Roland Barthes,” a review of Patrick 
McCarthy’s Camus, in The New York Times, 12 September, 1982.  
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which he calls, in his book of the same name “basically the indicative mood…amodal.” 178 In these 
words, we can hear echoes of Camus’s own description of scientific explanation with which we 
began, an explanation of “what happens”: indicative, observational, amodal. Unlike Said and 
O’Brien, Barthes saw in L’Étranger’s striving for neutrality and flatness   
a style of absence which is almost an ideal absence of style…a sort of negative mood in 
which the social or mythical characters of a language are abolished in favour of a neutral or 
inert state of form…thought remains wholly responsible, without being overlaid by a 
secondary commitment to a form of History not its own (77).  
un style de l’absence qui est presque-une absence idéale du style…une sorte de mode négative dans lequel les 
caractères sociaux ou mythiques d’un langage s’abolissent au profit d’un état neutre et inerte de la forme; la 
pensée garde ainsi toute sa responsabilité sans se recouvrir d’un engagement accessoire de la forme dans une 
Histoire qui ne lui appartient pas.179 
 
Barthes further identifies an “attempt towards disengaging literary language” [effort de 
dégagement du langage littéraire]—a colorless, novel, transparent form of speech that has discarded the 
whiplash of opposites for a “third term…a neutral term, or zero element” [un troisième terme, terme 
neutre ou terme-zéro] (76; 55–56). These praiseworthy features of Camus’s writing are situated within a 
broader project that aims to displace literary expression in the mode of ritualized platitudes, which 
Barthes saw as serving and embodying the “bourgeois myth,” in order to make room instead for 
what he calls the “biological” or “biographical” presence of style in writing that makes itself 
apparent through form, rather than through the impositions of history (11; 12). In this kind of 
writing, this “[l]iterature reduced, so to speak, to being its carcass,” [la Littérature ne serait en quelque 
sorte que le cadavre] (5; 9), Barthes imagines the achievement not only of a writing scrubbed of 
ideology, but also of the vitalist underpinnings of art—an “Orphean dream: a writer without 
literature” [ce rêve orphéen: un écrivain sans littérature] (5; 10). We have already seen some of the ways in 
                                                
178 Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1967), 77. Hereafter cited in text.  
179 Roland Barthes, Le degré zéro de l’écriture (Paris: Seuil, 1953) 56. Hereafter cited in text.  
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which La Peste’s details, perhaps unlike L’Étranger’s, give on to a form of history or histories that are 
not “its own” by intersecting with both medieval and colonial discourses of disease. We may also see 
how the morbid reduction and silence of Camus’s texts—perhaps even their neutrality and 
biologism, the sense that, like Orpheus, they have returned from a place beyond life—may be 
historically bound up with the depleted conditions of living after, through, and in the presence of 
dying in war-time Europe. Notwithstanding the historical implications of La Peste’s atmosphere of 
total negativity, how does the novel’s very engagement with biology, its abstraction and neutralizing, 
even naturalizing of Nazi violence as a plague, render antipathy a problem of nature, rather than of 
action? And how does this transformation sit with what Barthes once praised as Camus’s “wholly 
responsible thought” and his refusal to allow improper forms of history to pollute the “negative 
mood” and “inert state of form” in his writing?  
If Camus’s banishing of myth and figure in favor of biologistic neutrality in L’Étranger was a 
virtue for Barthes in Le degré zéro de l’écriture, it was a related but misplaced objectivity and a 
frustrating lack of historical specificity with regard to what exactly The Plague was allegorizing, and 
what the implications of that allegory were, that made Barthes question the ethics of Camus’s second 
novel on much the same grounds as he offered his admiration of the first. Their conversation on 
this matter proceeds from the question of the historical referent, but involves other factors as well, 
including a consideration of what is possible, historically speaking, when geographical and subjective 
transpositions have taken place. In much the same way that Stoker borrowed the authenticating 
preface of the Gothic novel in order to destablize the notions of documentary authenticity, 
perspective, and interpretation in his brief preface to Dracula, Camus borrows the words of Daniel 
Defoe to set the tone of his novel and present the paradoxes of historical representation in which he 
is interested, and in so doing also presents the tensions implicit in the novel’s allegorical form. The 
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epigraph reads, “It is as reasonable to represent one kind of imprisonment by another, as it is to 
represent anything that really exists by that which exists not” [Il est aussi raissonable de répresenter une 
espèce d’emprisonnement par une autre que de représenter n’importe quelle chose qui existe réellement par quelque chose 
qui n’existe pas].180 This line comes not from the expected place in Defoe’s body of work—A Journal 
of the Plague Year would be the obvious intertext for Camus’s own plague narrative—but rather from 
the third part of Robinson Crusoe, a series of moral and pseudo-anthropological essays called Serious 
Reflections During the Life and Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe. For Camus, representing the sense 
of imprisonment, separation, and isolation occasioned by the arrival of the plague and the 
subsequent quarantining of the city were some of the earliest motivations for the writing of the 
novel, motivations that reflect, as we have seen, a greater interest in the experience of life under the 
pestilence than in the character of the pestilence itself. He wrote in his notebooks of 1942, for 
example, amid notes for La Peste, “Novel. Don’t put ‘the plague’ in the title. But something like ‘The 
Prisoners’” [Roman. Ne pas mettre ‘La Peste’ dans le titre. Mais quelque chose comme ‘Les Prisonniers’”] 
(Notebooks, 28; Carnets v. 2, 41). While the thematic resonance of A Journal of the Plague Year remains 
oblique but unstated in The Plague’s epigraph, the Crusoe citation explicitly highlights the way in which 
The Plague, like Defoe’s text, flirts with, but refuses to name historical referents, and marshals the 
narrative position and literary forms of “reasonable” and “serious” observation and reflection, while 
also claiming status as a multifaceted allegory.  
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By Camus’s own account, given most definitively in an open letter to Barthes published in 
the magazine Club in 1955, the novel was written to chronicle the activities of the Resistance in 
France, which Camus joined in 1943, and whose underground newspaper, Combat, he edited from 
1943 to 1947.181 In response to what Barthes identifies as the novel’s ahistorical ethic Camus writes,  
The Plague, which I wanted to be read on a number of levels, nevertheless has as its obvious 
content the struggle of the European resistance movements against Nazism. The proof of 
this is that although the specific enemy is nowhere named, everyone in every European 
country recognized it. Let me add that a long extract from The Plague appeared during the 
Occupation, in a collection of underground texts, and that this fact alone would justify the 
transposition I made. In a sense, The Plague is more than a chronicle of the Resistance. But 
certainly it is nothing less.182 
[La Peste, don’t j’ai voulu qu’elle se lise sur plusieurs portées, a cependant comme contentu evident la lutte de 
la résistance européenne contre le nazisme. La preuve en est que cet ennemi qui n’est pas nommé, tout le 
monde l’a reconnu, et dans tous les pays d’Europe. Ajoutons qu’un long passage de La Peste a été publié 
sous l’Occupation dans un receuil de combat et que cette circonstance à elle seule justifierait la transposition 
que j’ai opérée. La Peste, dans un sens, est plus qu’une chronique de la résistance. Mais assurément, elle 
n’est pas moins.]183  
 
Although his claim that he “transposed” the chronicle from France to Algeria in order to avoid 
persecution makes sense, there is something slippery about Camus’s defensive position here, 
especially the logic that because “everyone in every European country recognized” that the novel 
was about the Nazi occupations in Europe, their recognition serves as proof that it was. Surely a 
writer as sophisticated, well-read, and well-traveled as Camus was by 1955 would recognize that for 
other readers in other times and places, the plague would reflect their own sense of injustice and 
crisis, thereby undermining his argument about the stable relationship between readerly recognition 
and authorial intention. In fact, he claims to have striven for this very figural excess and 
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extrapolation, commenting that “The Plague is more than a chronicle of the Resistance,” a point he 
re-emphasizes later in the letter when he says explains that “terror has several faces” [quel que soit son 
visage, car la terreur en a plusieurs] (340; 547). It is precisely the broad applicability of his allegory that 
makes him feel as if he is “living by and for a community that nothing in history has so far been able 
to touch” [vivre par et pour un communauté que rien jusqu’ici n’a jamais pu entamer dans l’histoire] rather than 
“feeling installed in a career of solitude” [me sentir installé dans une carrière de solitude] (341; 547). 
Nevertheless, his insistence that the novel depicts the Resistance to Nazi occupation in its most 
simple form has been adopted more or less wholesale as a slogan that places the text squarely in the 
historical canon of European and modernist writing about the Second World War.  
Because of its allegorical parameters—including its setting in Algeria, instead of in France—
it is most often read as a philosophical and ethical, rather than testimonial account of the war, 
although there are notable and important exceptions to this paradigm that take the text’s silence with 
regard to its real-world referents as an important point of departure. The conversation between 
Adorno and an absent Célan about poetry after Auschwitz stands firmly at the base of the mute-
testimony defense of Camus’s novel, which from this perspective becomes a fable about silence and 
the impossibility of witness. The effort to approach the war and the holocaust, even obliquely, as 
early as 1947 is an aspect of Camus’s text that critics have commended. Particularly helpful in 
establishing this reading in the North American scholarly context was Shoshana Felman’s 1989 essay 
“Narrative as Testimony: Camus’s The Plague,” in which she posits a Hegelian definition of history as 
negotiation between events and narrative to argue for the novel’s capacity to bear witness indirectly, 
yet faithfully, to the holocaust: “Camus’s testimony is not simply to the literality of the history but to 
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its unreality, to the historical vanishing point of its unbelievability.”184 Felman elaborates on what she 
identifies as Camus’s construction of an “event without a referent,” a situation partly achieved 
through the anachronism of a plague that had largely receded from the shores of Western Europe. 
“In much the same way as the doctors think the Plague historically impossible…” she suggests, “the 
victims of the plague do not believe in the foreshadowing disaster because it contradicts their 
‘humanism,’ their ideological beliefs and expectations” (257).  
Be that as it may, Camus insisted time and again that the event he described did have a very 
specific referent, and a number of textual details bear this out. Again, the novel’s title is an allusion 
to the odious name given to the occupiers by members of the Resistance. For those who dedicated 
themselves to the preservation of bodily and intellectual freedom in Vichy France, the Nazi soldiers 
were la peste brune, so named because of the flat brown color of their uniforms and the horrific 
destruction they visited on individual lives and the social fabric—destruction so vast it could only be 
equated with the great epidemics of history.185 What’s more, the unspeakable violence of the Nazis 
all over Europe, but particularly in the camps, seemed to exceed any rational understanding of the 
category of the human; indeed the word “inhuman,” became nearly synonymous with the behavior 
of German armed forces and their ancillary branches during the war. The name la peste brune, which 
lends a specific historical force to Camus’s plague allegory, therefore also indexes a sense of deep 
ontological and definitional asymmetry faced by members of the Resistance: to fight an inhuman 
enemy—a brown plague—was both more and less existential than ordinary bilateral warfare.  
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 This is precisely what is wrong, in Barthes’s view, with La Peste, a novel by a writer he deeply 
admired—the writer whose “neutrality,” “responsibility,” “transparency” and attention to form 
inspired him to explore the zero degree of writing as an ethic.186 In “La Peste: Annales d’une 
épidémie ou roman de solitude?” however, Barthes’s first critique of La Peste, which took the form 
of an open letter to Camus, also published in Club, he expresses concern primarily about the fact 
that in dehumanizing the enemy as a natural phenomenon like plague, Camus obstructs a serious 
consideration of responsibility and insulates his story from the grim realities of human evil. He 
suggests that Oran, in the novel, constitutes “a world deprived of History [un monde privé d’Histoire,]” 
and characterizes the plague as an “unknown goddess who fulfills her inhuman role like a destiny as 
immured as an ancient prophecy” [déesse inconnue [qui] accomplit ici son rôle inhumain comme un destin 
presque aussi clos que le Fatum antique].187 In keeping with a traditional anthropomorphic projection of 
epidemic as a terrible goddess—femininity, incontinence and foreignness were ready archetypes for 
epidemic anthropomorphicization in disparate places and times—Barthes continues to challenge 
what he sees as the quietism of Camus’s position by further characterizing the goddess of plague in 
terms of transcendence and sublime unknowability. He remarks,  
One knows nothing of her except that she is; one is ignorant of her origin and her form; 
neither can one assign her any adjective, which would be the first way of taming her; she is 
absolute Evil, and as such, cannot be qualified by that which she overpowers; she is visible, 
evident, and nevertheless unknowable; at the very least, there is no other knowledge possible 
but the recognition of her absoluteness.  
On ne sait rien d’elle sinon qu’elle est; on ignore et son origine et sa forme; on ne peut même la pourvoir 
d’aucun adjectif, ce que serait le premier moyen de l’apprivoiser; elle est le Mal absolu, et à ce titre ne peut être 
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qualifiée par ceux qu’elle accable; elle et visible, évidente, et pourtant inconnaissable; du moins avec elle n’y a-
t-il d’autre connaissance possible que la conscience de son absolu (541–542). 
 
Here, we can see Barthes pointing to what he understands to be an insufficient political and 
historical seriousness in Camus’s allegory, a mystification of evil in the form of a goddess who 
exceeds the rational powers of comprehension, exceeds even description beyond the sheer enormity 
and absoluteness of her presence.  
 
Unknown, Sitala Devi, goddess of poxes.  
Kalighat Painting, c. late 19th century. 
 
 
Such a departure from the realm of the human is also, for Barthes, necessarily a departure from the 
practical difficulties of facing evil in its human form, which can appear to be both ambiguous and 
responsive in a way that natural calamity or absolute evil is not. Moreover, a nameless faceless 
enemy—an enemy without agency—cannot be held accountable or brought to justice for his crimes. 
Barthes insists on this point in both of his letters to Camus on the subject of the novel in 1955, 
concluding the second with the following lines, “[t]o defend oneself against plague…is a matter of 
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conduct more than of choice. But to defend oneself against men, to be their executioner so as not to 
be their victim, this begins when the plague is no longer just the plague, but an image of evil with a 
human face” [Se defender de la peste, et c’est en somme, en dépit des efforts du livre, problème de conduite plus que 
de choix. Mais se defender des hommes, être leur bourreau pour ne pas être leur victime, tout commence là où la Peste 
n’est plus seulement la Peste, mais l’image d’un mal à face humaine] (544). In other words, for Barthes, 
Camus’s scenario of a naturally occurring emergency allows for no exercise of choice. For the 
characters in the novel, Barthes is mostly right: apart from the petty criminal Cottard, who enjoys a 
measure of protection as a result of the town’s new priorities, and Père Paneloux, who represents 
the novel’s connection to a tradition of theodicy, no one in the novel ever contemplates whether the 
plague is sympathetic, or an ally, or anything but an enemy deserving of outright defeat, even if the 
battle will be waged in ordinary, unheroic ways. From this perspective, Camus’s choice of figure 
precludes not only accountability, but also choice; the plague cannot but reduce the respondents’ 
actions to a matter of conduct.  
Barthes redoubles his point by borrowing the terms bourreau and victime from Camus’s own 
renowned series of essays, “Ni victimes ni bourreaux,” published in Combat in November of 1946. 
In these essays, Camus had argued strongly for a strategy of abstention, a refusal to identify either as 
victim or as executioner in the post-war harrowing in which he observed a hysteria for revenge 
against collaborators that sought to legitimate murder under the auspices of justice, which would be 
meted out in the form of capital punishment. An earlier piece in Combat drew attention to the uses 
of sanitary language during this period. In August 1945, a little less than four months after Victory in 
Europe Day and the infamous massacre of Algerians at Sétif would wed the end of the war to the 
beginning of a focused Algerian nationalism, Camus wrote,  
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the word ‘purge’ itself was already distressing…Too many people clamored for the death 
penalty, as if imprisonment was an inconsequential punishment. By contrast, too many 
others screamed ‘terror’ when sentences of a few years were meted out to those guilty of 
denunciations and other dishonorable acts.188 
Le mot d’épuration était déjà assez pénible en lui même…Trop de gens ont crié à la mort comme si les 
travaux forcés, par exemple, étaient une peine qui ne tirait pas à consequence. Mai strop de gens, au 
contraire, ont hurlé à la terreur lorsque quelques années de prison venaient récompenser l’exercice de la 
délation et du déshonneur.189 
 
In an effort to destabilize the crass binary logic that made the choice out to be an either-or 
proposition—you either kill or you die—Camus offered neither-nor: to maintain a rigorously ethical 
stance, one must acknowledge the necessity of choosing, and nevertheless strive to transcend the 
choice by being neither victim nor executioner.  
The first essay in the series carried the subtitle “Le Siècle de la peur,” and detailed what 
Camus understood as the twentieth century’s pervasive “method of fear,” which he described as 
akin to a science. In this context, Camus captures fear within the orbit of the natural sciences by 
placing it at the end of an epochal evolution that begins with mathematics, writing, “[t]he 
seventeenth century was that of mathematics. The eighteenth century that of the physical sciences, 
and the nineteenth century of biology. Our twentieth century is the century of fear” [Le XVIIe siècle 
a été le siècle des mathématiques. Le XVIIIe celui des sciences physiques, et le XIXe celui de la biologie. Notre XXe 
siècle est le siècle de la peur].190 He continues to develop his claim through the related terms of terror and 
remedy which become linked by a fluid use of the idea of a science and its objects: “In order to 
escape from this terror,” he writes, “we need to be able to think and act on the basis of our 
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thoughts. The problem is that terror does not create a climate conducive to thinking. My view, 
however, is that rather than blame our fear, we should regard it as a basic element of the situation, 
and try to remedy it” [Pour sortir de cette terreur, il faudrait pouvoir réfléchir et agir suivant sa réflexion. Mais la 
terreur, justement, n’est pas un climat favorable à la réflexion. Je suis d’avis, cependant, au lieu de blâmer cette peur, 
de la considerer comme un des premiers éléments de la situation et d’essayer d’y remédier (259, 611). If we think 
about the naturalization of Nazi violence through the figure of plague, it becomes possible to see 
how Camus might have been trying to enact exactly this principle by representing fear as “a basic 
element of the situation,” one that importantly can be remedied, precisely because it is constructed 
as a malady, illness, or epidemic. In challenging this decision, Barthes calls Camus back to his 
formulation “neither victims nor executioners,” but insists that in some circumstances, one must 
defend oneself, one must “…be their executioner so as not to be their victim.” 
  A good deal of writing about Camus’s legacy, especially in the broader public forums that set 
the tone for casual readings of his oeuvre, depicts his relationships with his critics in somewhat static 
and oppositional terms: Sartre and Camus were enemies; Camus hated Simone de Beauvoir for her 
transparent caricature in The Mandarins. Most locate a turning point in these relationships on the 
occasion of the publication of L’Homme révolté, which Sartre invited Francis Jeanson to review in Les 
Temps modernes; it was a harsh review that stung all the more for having been written by a strident, 
inexperienced, unknown critic. The flatness of these biographical narratives is in part determined by 
Camus’s untimely death—not only relationships, but also attitudes that may have evolved did not 
play out, even to the end of the Algerian independence struggle, and so the threads of the story end 
rather more sharply than they otherwise might have. In light of these quarrels and the way in which 
they have entered into the history of post-war intellectual life, it is important to note that Barthes’s 
criticism came rather late, nearly a decade after the publication of the novel. By this time, the 
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immediacy of the Occupation and the war had given way to a more analytical distance, and the 
stakes of the conflict in Algeria had become clear—a public intellectual’s position on the conflict 
was as solid a metric of left-engagement as involvement in the Resistance had once been. Given this 
context, what can we see in Barthes’s intervention? Does it suggest the inadequacy of allegory as a 
form for making sense of an increasingly global geo-politics in which archetypes are unreliable and 
evil an illegible or unknowable goddess? Or is it simply a matter of setting the record straight with 
regard to the depiction of enmity during the Second World War? Certainly the latter is how Camus 
seems to have understood it: as a comment that challenged his politics within the limited purview of 
a Vichy–Resistance binary.  
The response from Camus is accordingly personal, wounded, and more than a little scolding. 
He reminds Barthes that he had, in fact, come face to face with the occupiers, and that the question 
of how to confront this kind of evil was, for him, far from a hypothetical one. In Camus’s words,  
the question you ask: ‘What would the fighters against the plague do confronted with the all-
too-human face of the scourge,’ is unjust in this respect: it ought to have been asked in the 
past tense, and then it would have received the answer, a positive one. What these fighters, 
whose experience I have to some extent translated, did do, they did in fact against men, and 
you know at what cost (340). 
La question que vous posez en tout cas “Que feraient les combattants de La Peste devant le visage trop 
humain du fléau” est injuste en ce sens qu’elle doit être écrite au passé et qu’alors elle a déjà reçu sa réponse, 
qui est positive. Ce que ces combattants, dont j’ai traduit un peu de l’expérience, ont fait, ils ont fait 
justement contre les hommes, et à un prix que vous connaissez (547).  
 
In a rhetorical crescendo, Camus promises not to lay down his pen, “[t]hey will do it again, no 
doubt, when any terror confronts them, whatever face it may assume, for terror has several faces” 
[Ils le référont sans doute, devant toute terreur et quel que soit son visage, car la terreur en a plusieurs], a point he 
follows once again with a righteous defense of his decision not to name the plague so as to preserve 
its flexibility as a signifier: “[s]till another justification for my not having named any particular one 
[terror] in order to better strike at them all” [ce qui justifie encore que je n’en aie nommé précisément aucun 
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pour pouvoir mieux les frapper tous] (340, 547). The tone of strident absolutism, its insistence on the 
possibility of an “all” that encompasses terror and injustice (implicit when he says “in order to better 
strike at them all”), is characteristic of the particular way in which Camus extrapolated his politics in 
later years—particularly in reference to the question of Algerian nationalism—from the experience 
of the Resistance and the early journalism that both inspired, and to an extent, constituted this 
involvement.  
With reference to the early journalism in Algeria, prior to Camus’s move to France and 
participation in the Resistance, Alice Kaplan has recently suggested that his 1939 series of articles 
“The Misery of Kabylia,” in which he detailed the abhorrent lack of material support for the 
inhabitants of the Kabylia region—peasants living through a dreadful famine on the spartan land of 
the Algerian plateau—“contributed to the shutting down of Camus’s newspaper [Alger républicain] 
and to his blacklisting by the French government in Algeria. He was unable to find a job,” she 
writes, “and he was forced to leave the country.” She calls this his “first exile,” and remarks aptly, 
“[f]or the rest of his life, he believed he had risked everything for his anticolonial activism.”191 The 
sentiment Kaplan identifies here, that of Camus as an embattled survivor of numerous personal 
ordeals deriving not just from his status as a foreigner in France and his long bouts of illness, but 
also from his political engagements, rooted in what he understood to be a heroic striving against 
oppression, both French colonial and German nationalist, has a great deal of explanatory power for 
readers of Camus who approach his writings with some of the questions Barthes articulates in his 
letter above. Camus’s own response—that the question about how one might face an enemy with a 
face that is all-too-human is moot, and that Barthes need only look at Camus’s own personal record 
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to find his answer—bears Kaplan’s argument out. By 1955, he had been more or less backed into a 
corner, at least by politically engaged artists on the left, and his public comments, on Algeria 
especially, are characterized by a marked defensiveness, frustration, and melancholy.  
Returning to Camus’s response above, in which he seeks to incorporate concentric forms of 
violence into his account of the Occupation, the use of the word terror and his invocation of its 
“several faces” is particularly instructive, especially because his notebooks of 1955, on the occasion 
of his return to Algiers, evince a dedicated and extended attempt to parse the terms terrorism and 
militancy in multiple projects, including Le Premier homme and “L’Hôte,” the much-loved story set in 
the lonely, windswept plateau of Kabylia that would appear in the 1957 collection, L’Exil et le 
royaume.192 In reprising his use of this particular term terreur to refer to the Nazi atrocities in the 
letters to Barthes in 1955, at time when he was also working out, in his notes, the full implications of 
both the terrorist activities of the FLN and as the repressive military response of the French, he is 
eliding the considerable historical and political differences between the two situations and their 
different sides, and, more distantly, linking both to the period of uncurtailed violence after the 
Revolution. The relationship to the post-Revolutionary terror may seem insignificant, but La Peste 
and L’Étranger both exhibit the characteristics of latter-day Gothic—a genre that grew in part out of 
the shock of the Revolution—from the climate of existential emergency to the impenetrable 
motivations of the troubled characters at their centers, to their experiments with the unspeakable.193 
Both novels also play with conventions of noir, horror, and crime fiction informed by surrealism, 
most notably in their depictions of inexplicable graphic violence and harm, and hypersaturated 
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environments of non-descript and unlocatable detail that combine to produce an atmosphere of 
anxiety in which every datum has the potential to be significant.194 In these transformations, we can 
see some of the ways in which the blank tone and the empty center of Camus’s unknown goddess, 
or terror more broadly, participates equally in both a scientistic form of writing that strives to 
explain what happens, as well as more elastic, imaginative forms like Gothic and surrealism. It is 
worth considering, then, whether Camus’s clustering of the different meanings or faces of terror 
may not simply be the retrospective diagnosis of a writer straining to preserve his reputation—
insisting the novel was both about Nazis and about all terror—but rather reflect how the residue of 
a variety of discursive and generic meanings of the term terror are at work in the text.  
Given the range of historical and discursive intertexts that we have seen thus far, there are 
two new ways of thinking about the debates that erupted over the historical referents of The Plague 
that find their genesis in the conversation between Barthes and Camus above, but have also 
continued as we refine and redefine Camus’s writing in a global sphere that has been restructured 
around the threat of terrorism. The first is that there is a more complex historical specificity in 
Camus’s novel that Barthes allows, important strands of which predate the World War II context 
and reach back to the colonial inflection of contagious disease in the nineteenth century, particularly 
through the misprision of cholera in the novel. The second is that in suggesting that in Camus’s 
novel “one knows nothing of [the plague goddess] except that she is; one is ignorant of her origin 
and her form…she is visible, evident, and nevertheless unknowable,” Barthes has hit on the 
powerful way in which Camus’s novel stands as an important moment in the reconfiguration of 
radical antipathy in the space between science and literature. What might have been depicted as a 
frontal event in which the healthy city faces the enemy of plague, like so many soldiers approaching 
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from just beyond the horizon, is instead represented as an emergent event that can only be known 
through its effects, and may not yet be namable, may even, as we have seen, be unthinkable.  
Contrary to what Camus has said about what science tells us, and what his narrator Rieux 
has confessed, Barthes suggests that one knows nothing of this goddess except that she is—its 
name, its origin, its scope, its biology all remain beyond grasp. In order to approach such a problem, 
the novel’s form mimics the experience of the epidemic from an investigative point of view, 
compiling anecdotes and data points from multiple perspectives. Within the scope of the narrative, 
we can only understand the plague by the forms it takes in time (its progress on the body, and its 
transformation from the bubonic to the pneumonic form) and in space (its movement from the 
underground lair of the rats to the surface of the city and its eventual departure). As in the 
comprehensive statistical view of epidemiology, these details constitute the basis of 
phenomenological knowledge and of practice, if not a pathological or microbial understanding of 
the disease. Although Barthes points to this epistemological difficulty as a failing of Camus’s text, 
specifically with reference to its treatment of history, he also unknowingly identifies a crucial 
function of Camus’s novel, namely that The Plague, one of the most widely read literary fictions of 
the twentieth century, yokes a phenomenology of infectious disease to a phenomenology of terror.  
 
—4. Blank Maps and Absent Subjects— 
If The Plague’s extra-textual historical referents are frustratingly suggestive, implicit, and 
multiple, and its epidemic of plague can only be identified under the sign of anachronism, 
uncertainty, and unthinkability, two other details in the novel’s allegorical architecture invite further 
inquiry: the setting in Oran, and the absence of Algerian subjects. The opening pages of the novel 
describe Oran as a “thoroughly negative place” [un lieu neutre pour tout dire] (3; 11) that “turns its back 
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on the bay, with the result that it’s impossible to see the sea, you always have to go look for it” 
[…elle se soit construit en tournant le dos à cette baie et que, partant, il soit impossible d’apercevoir la mer qu’il faut 
toujours aller chercher] (6; 13). The sea on which Oran turns its back is, of course, the Mediterranean, 
whose classical legacy for the young Camus pointed up the possibility of recovering the cultural 
unity of the Romance-language speaking peoples along its shores and adjacent territories—the very 
dream that O’Brien called a “hallucination” for its narrow classicism, which seemed to simply 
imagine away the presence of entirely different, non-Hellenic cultures in the vast and variegated 
Algerian population. For Camus, deeply wounded by his multiple departures and exiles from Algeria, 
and suspicious of the growing violence on both sides of the colonial conflict, the idea of 
Mediterranean humanism amounted to a remedy: a reattachment of the colonial prosthesis in which 
would flourish a confederacy of citizens stretching from France in the North to his beloved Algiers 
and beyond. That the novel begins with Oran “turning its back on the bay” signals that the space we 
are entering is symbolically cut off from this dream—a condition made immediately worse by the 
quarantining of the city. When Alice Kaplan asks pointedly “why does the setting for The Plague look 
more like Marseille than Oran?”195 the answer is challenging: it looks like Marseilles because it is on 
some level about France and the French, and the text seems everywhere blind to its Africanness. 
And nevertheless, it is Oran—an Algerian town without suspicion, perhaps, but one that might 
easily turn its back on Camus’s dream of a lively Mediterranean land above nationalism, “full of 
games and joy.”196  
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Oran is not only depicted as a place cut off from the sea, but also from history, from beauty, 
even from itself. Rieux grudgingly sets the scene for his readers by sketching a “town without 
intimations…in other words, completely modern….its life is not particularly exciting….Treeless, 
glamourless, soulless, the town of Oran ends by seeming restful, and, after a while, you go 
complacently to sleep there” [Oran…est apparemment une ville sans supçons, c’est-à-dire une ville tout à fait 
moderne….la vie n’est pas très passionante….Cette cité sans pittoresque, sans végétation et sans âme finit par sembler 
reposante, on s’y endort enfin] (5-6; 12-13).  Wavering indecisively between descriptions of Oran’s 
situation in a “unique landscape” without equal, [elle s’est grefée sur un paysage sans égal] (6, 13) and its 
quality as a “thoroughly negative place,” [un lieu neutre, pour tout dire] (3, 11), its complete modernity 
and its soulless complacency, Camus’s narrator unfolds a tension between the concreteness of place 
and the cognitive blankness of the quintessentially modern, exemplified in the town’s lack of 
intimation or suspicion. Without glamour, devoid of the “beat of wings or the rustle of leaves” (3), 
The Plague’s Oran, as a completely modern city, is set up to work as a space of open signification and 
interpretation. In keeping with the trope of colonialist descriptions of appropriated territories as 
essentially blank spaces, Camus’s reader is given to believe that although Oran may have longevity, 
at least in the form of its ancient plateaus and the bay on which it “turns its back” [elle se soit construite 
en tournant le dos] (6, 13), it has no history. 197 This judgment is communicated in the first pages by the 
city’s soullessness—its consistent banality and relentlessly commercial orientation, and later by the 
random novelty of its streets, apartment buildings, and residents, who seem to have no memory of 
                                                
197 Gide’s Immoralist (1902) is the most relevant example here, especially insofar as that novel’s 
Algeria is associated with the open spaces of good health. Cf. Edward Said Orientalism (New York: 
Vintage, 1979), and Robert J.C. Young Colonial Desire (London, Routledge, 1995).    
201 
anything that has happened or anyone it has happened to.198 Compared with the setting of Camus’s 
first novel, The Stranger, which takes place mostly in the author’s native Algiers, Oran’s history as a 
modern city, at least since the establishment of Algeria as a French department in 1830, is less 
storied. By the 1940s, Oran was indelibly marked by its status as a capital for French trade; it was 
also the city that Camus’s wife, Francine, called home. The ahistorical character of Oran in Camus’s 
hands, particularly as it intersects with a tradition of writing into the presumed historical emptiness 
of the colony, contributes to the fact that The Plague’s Oran is a difficult place in which to die, even 
to die, as the narrator puzzlingly puts it, a “modern death.” 
Rieux, muses in these opening paragraphs that the only exceptional thing about Oran is, in 
fact, “the difficulty one may experience there in dying” [la difficulté qu’on peut y trouver à mourir]. He 
continues:  
“Difficulty,” perhaps, is not the right word; “discomfort” would come nearer. Being ill is 
never agreeable, but there are towns that stand by you, so to speak, when you are sick; in 
which you can, after a fashion, let yourself go…But at Oran the violent extremes of 
temperature, the exigencies of business, the uninspiring surroundings, the sudden nightfalls, 
and the very nature of its pleasures call for good health….Think what it must be for a dying 
man, trapped behind hundreds of walls all sizzling with heat, while the whole population, 
sitting in cafés of hanging on the telephone, is discussing shipments, bills of lading [sic.], 
discounts! It will then be obvious what discomfort attends death, even modern death, when 
it waylays you under such circumstances in a dry place (5).  
Difficulté, d’ailleurs, n’est pas le bon mot et il serait plus juste de parler d’inconfort. Ce n’est jamais agréable 
d’être malade, mais il y a des villes et des pays qui vous soutiennent dans la maladie, où l’on peut, en quelque 
sorte, se laisser aller…Mais à l’Oran, les excès du climat, l’importance des affaires qu’on y traite, 
l’insignifiance du décor, la rapidité du crépuscule et la qualité des plaisirs, tout demande la bonne 
santé…Qu’on pense alors à celui qui va mourir, pris au piège derrière des centaines de murs crépitants de 
chaleur, pendant qu’à la même minute, toute une population, au téléphone ou dans les cafés, parle de traites, 
de connaissements et d’escompte. On comprendra ce qu’il peut y avoir d’inconfortable dans la mort, même 
moderne, lorsqu’elle survient ainsi dans un lieu sec (13).  
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The peculiar focus here on Oran’s lack of hospitality and its vexed relationship to 
modernity—at once a thoroughly modern city, chattering on the telephone about discounts and 
shipments, but also on the verge of being subject to the most ancient of pestilences, the opposite of 
a modern death—sets up the dual function of the city as both setting and as character, where 
character is constituted in part by the projection of health onto the public body. We can see this 
particularly in the way in which the city’s heat and sizzling walls foreshadow the burning fever that 
will grip the plague’s victims. As we have seen, the novel’s focus is not on the character of the 
plague, but on how it happens, and even then, it is not interested in the tragedy of a particular 
family, or a couple, or even a neighborhood, but rather in the welfare of the collective, the city as an 
imagined, integral whole. Compounding the dispassionate distance of Rieux’s medical perspective is 
that of his friend Tarrou, whose journals he uses to construct his narrative, and of whom, in reading 
the journals, he writes “Tarrou had a habit of observing events and people through the wrong end 
of a telescope”[Tarrou s’’est ingénié à considerer les choses et les êtres par le gros bout de la lorgnette] (24; 29).   
Tarrou’s anti-magnifying perspective highlights the novel’s distant view of protagonism. In 
contrast, say, to the microscope, which invites a view of the microbe into the scale of human 
visibility, the distancing effect of looking through the telescope’s large end reduces the entirety of 
the city—everything that is large and imposing and ugly and multiple—to an equally manageable 
scale. In this way, the city becomes not just a kind of body, but also, as we have seen, a body that is 
vulnerable to suffering and to tragedy. At the time that he was composing The Plague, Camus had 
been involved in theater for more than a decade as a founder and director of the communist Théâtre 
du Travail in Algiers and as a frequent composer and spectator of drama both there and in France. 
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He would see his first play, Caligula, performed in Paris in 1945.199 Though he wrote vigorously for 
newspapers in the early years of the 1940s, he was at the same time tending increasingly toward the 
classical tragedy as a way of accessing what critics would latch onto as his explorations of the 
“absurd,” after his characterization of L’Étranger, Le Mythe de Sisyphe, and Caligula, as the “trilogy of 
the absurd.” In later rejecting that term as a description of his overall writing project, Camus instead 
veered toward the formalism and constraint of tragedy, a form he associated with Algeria as the site 
of a“ solar tragedy,” which embodied the vertiginous contrast between the open blankness of the 
landscape and the inevitability of fate. What is curious about the unsympathetic depiction of Oran in 
the first part of the novel is that it turns out to be the city itself—and the collectivity it embodies—
that is the subject of this tragedy. In the opening lines of part three of a five-part text, for example, 
we can see that Oran itself is in extremis, and that the fate of the city has become the fate of its 
inhabitants:  
…by this time, mid-August, the plague had swallowed up everything and everyone. No 
longer were there individual destinies; only a collective destiny, made of plague and the 
emotions shared by all. Strongest of these emotions was the sense of exile and deprivation, 
with all the crosscurrents of revolt and fear set up by these (167).  
…à ce moment, au mileu du mois d’août, que la peste avait tout recouvert. Il n’y avait plus alors de destins 
individuels, mais une histoire collective qui était la peste et des sentiments partagés par tous. Le plus grand 
était la separation et l’exil, avec ce que cela comportait de peur et de révolte (155).  
 
We are almost exactly at midpoint in the novel here: in a rare moment of dramatic hyperbole, the 
plague is personified as a ravenous all-consumer, “qui a tout recouvert [reclaims everything?]” and 
which “comportait de peur et de révolte [brought with it fear and revolt].” The crisis of contagion has 
become ontologically subsuming, has turned a city of lazy, entitled pleasure-seekers, individualistic 
merchants and businessmen into a single organism whose habits and characteristics are subsumed by 
their collective status as tragic hero and victim alike. In this sense—in its capacity for self 
                                                
199 Cf. Patrick McCarthy, Camus (New York: Random House, 1982) 71-104. 
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reproduction and the way in which it preserves, as an open question, the topic of its character—the 
plague remakes the city in its own image. In other words, Oran itself has fulfilled its fate in 
becoming pathogenic. Unlike in Stoker’s novel, there is no suggestion that the plague has arrived 
from anywhere outside of Oran, it rather emerges from beneath it, or inside of it, and subsequently 
renders itself legible on its surface in the form of rats, and analogously on the surface of the infected 
person’s body in the form of buboes. 
Identifying with the city or with the land, and projecting tragedy onto this place-as-character, 
allows Camus to explore a dramatic climax in the novel without situating spectacular suffering in an 
individual character. Such individual suffering is explored at two other notable moments, but both 
occur after what the novel names as the height of suffering; these include the death of Orpheus at 
the opera house, and the hideous demise of the Magistrate Othon’s young son. For the protagonist, 
Oran, the moment above in which the plague swallows everything and everyone is the decisive 
moment in the city’s fulfillment of its fate. The chronicle makes this structural feature explicit: “the 
narrator thinks this moment, registering the climax [sommet] of the summer heat and the disease, the 
best for describing, on general lines, and by way of illustration, the excesses of the living, burials of 
the dead, and the plight of parted lovers” [le narrateur croit qu’il convient, à ce sommet de la chaleur et de la 
maladie, de décrire la situation générale et, à titre d’exemple, les violences de nos citoyens vivants, les enterrements des 
défunts et la souffrance des amantes séparés] (167, 155). The narrator’s emphasis on plurality highlights the 
general state of crisis as one that belongs to the social whole: “the excesses of the living, burials of 
the dead, and the plight of parted lovers,” are terms that are decisively and deliberately generalized. 
In this way, Oran functions as an abstraction or an archetype—a town without personality, a 
classical tragic protagonist in the mold of Orpheus—but the novel also continually undercuts this 
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abstraction by remaining firmly on Algerian soil, and erupting in an epidemic that has long retreated 
from European shores—in other words, a colonial city that is hot, sick, and ancient.    
In order to take seriously the allegory Camus proposes, in which the plague in Oran 
represents the German occupation, at the same time as we take seriously the mechanics of how he 
constructs this allegory as an infectious outbreak situated in Algeria, it is crucial to think about the 
way in which a colonial representational history of morbidity intersects with that of morbidity and 
extermination in the Second World War. For this, we must look back again to the morphology of 
plague and cholera, and how in each instance the horrors of these epidemics consolidated around 
the threat of racial others as both carrier of illness and, more pointedly, as walking embodiments of 
death. Early nineteenth century descriptions and caricatures of Asiatic cholera borrowed from the 
powerful iconography of the black plague, using the ligature of the chromatic descriptor to the name 
of the disease as a handy way of rendering it foreign; what became known as la mort bleue gained a 
menacing dimension by recalling the medieval terrors of la peste noire. As we have seen in similar 
reflections on the British side, the astonishment with which onlookers encountered the withering of 
the body and the darkening of the skin of white European cholera victims to a bleu violet or an inky 
black—a result of rapid dehydration and sluggish circulation—dovetailed with a growing anxiety 
about a morphological reverse “colonization” of the white body by dark-skinned others, who were 
looked on with suspicion as vectors and threats, as well as caricatured as the very embodiment of the 
disease.200 The darkened bodies and faces, such as that of Heine’s unfortunate harlequin, were 
viewed not just as uncanny replicas of the uncivilized and underdeveloped Orient, but also as 
manifestations of death within life. François Magendie, widely considered the founder of 
                                                
200 Visual culture in the papers and the cholera publications is especially obvious in registering this 
fear—a good deal of this material has been catalogued in Patrice Bourdelais and André Dodin’s 
Visages du choléra (Paris: Belin, 1987).  
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experimental physiology, dubbed cholera’s effect on the body “cadaverization,” to explain the way in 
which  
the cadaver-like appearance…was sometimes more pronounced in living patients than in 
actual cadavers: among the signs were dryness and slackness of the skin due to lack of blood 
in the capillaries; facial changes, especially hollowness in the cheeks; eyes that appeared 
sunken and bluish; and a loss of transparency in the cornea, which appeared to be folded or 
collapsed back on itself and opaline in color (43).   
 
In addition to evoking darker complexions, the effects of cholera also rendered bodies and 
faces shrunken, giving them the appearance of pitiable malnourishment and ill health familiar from 
travel and ethnographic documentation of the colonies. The closed-off and translucent appearance 
of the eyes suggested a corresponding absence of subjecthood that resonated with depictions of 
colonial subjects as intellectually inert and emotionally impassive, characteristics that the city of 
Oran shares, in Camus’s hands. Further underscoring the dehumanization of choleric victims and 
the racial others they resembled, this darkened appearance became inextricably linked with death, 
often serving as its extravagant overture. With particular attention to the specific physiological 
changes wrought on the appearance of cholera sufferers, it becomes possible to understand the 
widespread fear of live burial that so many chroniclers describe in Paris and elsewhere during the 
epidemic waves of the nineteenth century.  
What’s more, sanitation recommendations encouraged rapid burial to reduce the chances 
that corpses might infect the living, so it was entirely possible that, as Delaporte succinctly puts it, “a 
lethargic patient, a person showing no signs of life, could easily be mistaken for a true cadaver” (42). 
The unthinkable calculus of mass death, and the organizational challenges of dealing with potentially 
infectious corpses, pervades nearly all of epidemic literature, which often lingers on the moment of 
transition from ordinary death, mourning, disposal, and last rites procedures to a tipping point after 
which these rituals and considerations must be suspended because there are simply too many bodies. 
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This crisis, as it is represented in the literature of epidemic, often represents the nadir of common 
experience, inasmuch as it approaches the limit of dehumanization in the de-ritualized disposal of 
bodies as waste. The horror of the plague wagons—which play a large part in Defoe’s Journal of the 
Plague Year—and mass graves are particularly poignant in these accounts because in piling dead 
bodies on top of one another, each carries the threat of dedifferentiation: near-death becomes 
indistinguishable from death, the dead body becomes indistinguishable from other dead bodies. A 
long section of The Plague’s third part, the height of the plague which the narrator characterizes as 
the climax of the chronicle, is devoted to this narrative feature of the genre. In contrast to some of 
the more personal scenes of loss that will take center stage in the parts four and five, the corpse 
disposal section contributes to the collective story of the city as itself an infected body, and 
substantiates what Castel calls, early in the epidemic, the “geometrical progression” [suivant une 
proportion géometrique] of the plague (61; 62). Camus adds a few gruesome details from the point of 
view of his narrator who has become, by this point in the plague’s ascendancy, more in demand to 
dispatch the dead than to care for the living. He confesses, somewhat defensively, that at the worst 
point in the epidemic his stock of coffins was  
[The hospital presently made use of five coffins]…at the cemetery they were emptied out, 
and the iron-gray corpses put on stretchers and deposited in a shed reserved for that 
purpose…the empty coffins, after being sprayed with antiseptic fluid, were rushed back to 
the hospital and the process was repeated as often as necessary (175).  
l’hôpital disposait à ce moment de cinq cercueils…Au cimitère, le boîtes étaient vidées, les corps couleur de fer 
étaient chargés sur les brancards et attendaient dans un hangar, aménagé à cet effet. Les bières étaient arrosées 
d’une solution antiseptique, ramenées à l’hôpital, et l’opération recommençait autant de fois qu’il était 
nécessaire (162).   
 
This disgraceful necessity is only the beginning; a few paragraphs later, Rieux describes bodies being 
flung directly out of ambulances into mass graves, one for men and one for women. Soon thereafter, 
there are enough dead clogging up the city and the ambulances that this courtesy, too, must be 
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abandoned, and the bodies are piled altogether in heaps outside the city limits. These scenes, still so 
vivid in their echoes of the horrific mechanics of murder in the German camps, were, at the time of 
the novel’s publication in 1947, irrefutable evidence of Camus’s effort to record something of the 
horror of the war, however successfully he managed to do so.   
As we have seen, Shoshanna Felman has offered a convincing reading of the novel as an act 
of Holocaust testimony, replacing the literality of historical experience with the unthinkable 
abstraction of evil. In her discussion, however, she devotes little attention to Camus’s depiction of 
mass burial and the isolation and quarantine camps outside the city, which, with their strict 
regulations, high walls, and incalculable death, bear further comparison to the horrors of the 
German concentration and extermination camps, and more, to the terrifying reign of a new 
murderous scientism. The camps stand as another inchoate feature of Camus’s allegory in that they 
are not explicitly for death, punishment, labor, and dehumanization, but rather for the preservation 
of life in the still healthy population of the city. This is an argument given by the novel’s reasonable 
people—Rieux, and the gruff but sympathetic magistrate M. Othon who, even after his period of 
quarantine is finished, volunteers to return to the camps, so that he may “feel less separated from 
[his] little boy” (259). On the other hand, the Nazi discourse of sanitation, purification, and bodily 
health, which justified the cleansing of the national body, can be heard in the sanitary agenda that 
supports the existence of the quarantine and isolation camps, which are overseen by 
“commandants” during the plague. While Camus depicts the practice of quarantine as an extension 
of care that necessarily entails the sorrow of isolation, rather than as an expression of the radical evil 
of plague, the two different valences of the camps merge through the figure of the camp-person, a 
shred of a human being reduced to an ambling vector of pathogenicity. These “unfortunates” or 
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“inmates,” the forgotten, have been reduced to a silence so absolute that upon his visit, all Tarrou 
can hear are the flies buzzing about the tents (237).   
Given the prominence of the quarantine camps in The Plague, which support Camus’s 
insistence that the novel allegorized the moral scourge of the Nazis in France, we can also think of 
about the state of cadaverization or death-within-life evoked by the cultural history of cholera (and 
its coextensiveness with an Orientalized pathogenic threat) as a symmetry or reflection of the 
condition of the most dehumanized prisoners in the extermination camps, who Primo Levi 
identifies by the then-common name of the Muselmänner, or Muslims in The Drowned and the Saved. 
Although other critics have suggested that the term’s genesis was in the bodily incapacity of these 
prisoners, which rendered them unable to stand, and thus in a physical state of prostration or 
genuflection resembling Islamic prayer, Levi gives little by way of background or reflection on the 
term. Giorgio Agamben takes up this appellation extensively in Remnants of Auschwitz, providing a 
fuller context for its adaptation and a terminological history—some notable synonyms are 
“staggering corpse,” “mummy-men,” “donkeys,” “swimmers,” “cripples,” “camels,” “tired sheikhs” 
and “Muselweiber” or female Muslims—which in his view reflects a general European view of Muslim 
fatalism and Oriental submission.201 In addition to his identification of the term’s “deprecatory” and 
dehumanizing view of Muslims, which he calls a “ferocious irony,” Agamben’s meditations on the 
condition reflect precisely the medical and anthropological vectors along which the state of 
suspension between life and death were expressed during the epidemics, which, once again, were 
believed to have originated in the Orient. In the chapter entitled “The Muselmann,” he writes,  
                                                
201 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and The Archive, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(New York: Zone Books, 2002), 44-45. Agamben draws on a large archive, in which Levi, 
Bettelheim, and Ryn and Klodzinski’s monograph on the Muselmann play a large role.  
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At times a medical figure or an ethical category, at times a political limit or an 
anthropological concept, the Muselmann is an indefinite being in whom not only humanity 
and non-humanity, but also vegetative existence and relation, physiology and ethics, 
medicine and politics, and life and death continually pass through each other.202 
 
There is a great deal to say about Agamben’s juxtapositions here, and the ways in which they index 
the complexities of a discourse that organized itself to represent the horrors of life in the camps, but 
I want to focus here on one particular juxtaposition, which is the vegetative and the relational. At 
the vegetative end of the spectrum, we can begin to see how specific forms of dehumanization 
consolidate or collapse the distance between the symptom and the cause, or the outward sign and 
that which it manifests, such that the person is reduced to nothing more than the carrier of his 
suffering. On the other side, his capacity for the relational is both diminished and magnified; in the 
case of the former, the eviscerated being of the Muselmann negates all possibility of intersubjective 
understanding, while in the latter instance, he embodies the threat and potential—the infectiousness 
or possibility of transfer—of this very condition to others. For a reading of Camus, it is instructive 
to draw out two implicit intermediate terms between these two states, namely the pathogenic and 
the animal, each of which can be seen lurking in the series of other names given to the prisoners 
reduced to the status of the drowned: cripples, donkeys, and camels. Agamben describes this 
condition as a “third realm,” which serves as “a perfect cipher of the camp, the non-place in which 
all disciplinary barriers are destroyed and all embankments flooded” (48). He defines this “third 
realm” of the Muselmann, suspended between life and death, as constitutive of the very definition of 
life, a logic that mirrors the way in which the state of exception determines the “normal legal order” 
(48). Although Agamben is here talking specifically about the conditions of humanity in the 
concentration camps, his comments raise an important question with regard to Camus’s absent 
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subjects in La Peste; not those who we see in quarantine, or even in mass graves, but those who we 
don’t see at all, namely the Arabs.  
To return to Kaplan’s query about the blank geography of La Peste, in which Oran may just 
as well be Marseilles, we can see how a postcolonially-inflected critique might regard his writing as 
naïvely universalist and strangely devoid of any convincing meditation on, or depiction of, Algeria’s 
Arab inhabitants as any more than features of the landscape or potential recipients of the 
benevolence of the French state. From this perspective, we might see how the novel’s rendering of 
Oran as flat, modern, without supçons, pas trés passionant, and ultimately complacent reflects a striving 
for a kind of epidemiological internationalism, upheld by what was called during the height of the 
colonial period vital or sanitary statistics and sanitary surveillance, and what was coming to be 
known as public health and world health during the period in which he was drafting the novel. The 
statistical approach to medicine and its purported objectivity recast, in Camus’s work, questions of 
politics in the hues of a generalized state of crisis or emergency in which agency and decision take a 
paradoxically indecisive role. From this perspective, we may recover something of a supranational 
agenda in what is often depicted as a nationalist conservatism or cultural chauvinism in Camus’s 
work, underscored by the double negation of both women and non-Europeans.   
If we are to understand how the absence of Arabs functions in the novel, it is instructive to 
consider the role of women, who stand as an intermediate class of subjects somewhere between la 
déesse inconnu and her mute victims. In some ways, the absence of women in The Plague is no more 
remarkable than the absence of any other class of subjects in Camus’s fictions: women tend to be 
mute, passive, and mostly self-effacing mother figures who manifest shades of Camus’s own mother, 
a deaf and illiterate charwoman of Spanish heritage, who worked constantly to support Camus and 
his brother. That Camus’s father died when he was one year old has further entrenched the role of 
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his self-sacrificing mother in the hagiography of the writer, as has the posthumous publication of Le 
Premier homme in 1995, which opens with a courageous and slightly worn figure with “the wavy hair 
of a Spanish woman” and “a look of sweet distraction, such as you always see on simpletons,”203 
who survives childbirth on the isolated Algerian plateau near the Tunisian border. Catherine Camus, 
the writer’s daughter, refers to the manuscript as an “autobiographical account” in her Editor’s Note 
to the 1995 publication.204 Janine, the heroine of Camus’s late story “La femme adultère,” published 
alongside “L’hôte” in L’Exil et le royaume, is a partial exception here; it is her story of alienation and 
awakening he tells by way of a journey into the cold and desolate plateaus of inland Algeria where 
she, the childless wife of an Algiers cloth merchant, succumbs to the fierce sensuality of the desert 
night in a vibratory, ecstatic consummation of colonial eros. As the title suggests, however, her mere 
being in relation to the world around her which happens to be a world in contested Algeria 
punctuated with the presence of soldiers and natives of the plateau, constitutes an act of adultery, 
although there is no literalization of her infidelity in sexual terms.205 Although Janine is adulterous, 
her desire and its fulfillment are saturated in the kind of feminized passivity that often stands in 
Camus’s work for non-engagement, irresponsibility, and as such, adjacent to collaboration.  
If they appear at all, women in Camus’s writing are flat and simple: the longed-for Eurydice, 
the long-gone Jeanne, the impossible young lady on the glossy sorrel mare, the ill wife of Rieux, 
Rambert’s distant lover, all fit this pattern. The parameters of The Plague in particular, which seeks to 
                                                
203 English citations from Albert Camus, The First Man, trans. David Hapgood (New York: Penguin, 
1996), 4. Le Premier homme (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1994).  
204 Catherine Camus, “Editor’s Note,” in Albert Camus, The First Man, vi.  
205 Emily Apter locates Janine’s desire in the “obscure center of her being” where the “natives are 
registered as a barely tangible presence…an enemy within that doubles…as the object of her 
longing,” “Out of Character: Camus’s French Algerian Subjects” Modern Language Notes 112.4 
(September, 1997), 499–516; 504. See also Emily Apter, Continental Drift: From National Characters to 
Virtual Subjects (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 63.  
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represent the visible social experience under conditions of violent extremity, make the relative 
absence of women especially notable. As if to underscore the impossibility of feminine life under 
such circumstances, Camus offers a comedic trope in The Plague by way of the sympathetic buffoon 
Grand, who spends the better part of the novel writing and rewriting the first sentence of his novel. 
When he is nearing death by plague, he asks his friend and caretaker Rieux to read him the much 
labored-over pages, “[g]lancing through them, Rieux saw that the bulk of the writing consisted of 
the same sentence written again and again with small variants, simplifications, or elaborations” (263). 
The sentence, starring a woman who presumably represents Grand’s departed wife, Jeanne, reads, 
One fine morning in May, a slim young horsewoman might have been seen riding a glossy 
sorrel mare along the avenues of the Bois, among the flowers… (263).  
Par une belle matinee de mai, une svelte amazone, monté sur une somptueuse jument alezane, parcourait, 
aumileu des fleurs, les allées du Bois…(237).  
 
Gilbert’s translation captures the overblown poetic ambition into which Grand pours his heart and 
soul to somewhat meager results. From Rieux’s perspective, the pages represent a particularly 
depressing form of melancholy, a static time of non-teleological openness, before Grand had 
become disillusioned with love, and in which it is “persistently the month of May,” with “the lady on 
horseback, the avenues of the Bois recur[ing], regrouped in different patterns” (263). What the 
translation leaves out, however, is some of the surprising beauty that Grand’s contrived language 
yeilds in spite of itself; particularly the strenuous pairing of svelte amazone for lady-rider, and jument 
alezane for a copper colored mare. These choices, absurd as they may be in the context of the novel’s 
studiously amodal tone, invite us to consider the lady in two distinct ways: one as the archetypal 
purpose for the defense of civilization in the face of all that would seek to destroy it—war, plague, 
injustice—a role women have long played in narratives of crisis; and two, as the very threat itself, 
riding in on a horse from somewhere unknown, seemingly innocuous but, if she is indeed like an 
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Amazon, a mercenary and martial third-term of violent capacity whose efforts may attach 
themselves indiscriminately to one side or another. That we do not find out more about her from 
Grand or anyone else in the novel only further preserves the open duality of her significance, and 
she, like other absent presences in the novel, attaches her lack of agency and interiority to the 
broadest characteristics of the plague, which also acts without reason or motive.  
As many critics have noted, the most glaring category of potential victims and witnesses of 
the plague that is also conspicuously absent or otherwise muted in Camus’s writing is the Arab 
inhabitants of Algeria. Conor Cruise O’Brien and Edward Said are the first and best known of these 
critics in the North American and Anglo-Irish tradition of Camus scholarship. More recently, Emily 
Apter has revisited this question in her chapter on Camus in Continental Drift, which weaves a deft 
critique of contemporary homogenizing cosmopolitanism with a pointed appraisal of Camus’s 
insistence on the muteness and invisibility of Algerian subjects—and the depiction of an Algeria 
“Made in France”—in La femme adultère and Le premier homme from the perspective of postcolonial 
criticism. Apter is circumspect about the impulse to locate a colonial “subject,” in Camus’s work as a 
potentially “western obsession,” but situates this inquiry in a genealogy of postcolonial theory and 
philosophy—especially Memmi, Fanon, and Césaire—in which the ontological work and social and 
political recognition of subjecthood is a central, if not the central, concern. For Apter, in spite of the 
distasteful implications of Camus’s mute Algerian subjects, an encounter with a Kabylian scholar in 
the late 1990s occasions a reconsideration of the role Camus might play as “part of a larger reaction 
formation against the [then] current climate of anti-westernization and religious censorship” in 
Algeria (502), and an appreciation of how Algerian intellectuals might “lay claim to Camus as part of 
their own symbolic capital—a star in the firmament of an Algerian literary heritage inclusive of pied-
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noir writers” (502). Such a recovery speaks to the multiplicity of ways in which these silences may be 
read.  
For Alice Kaplan, who traveled in Algeria in the summer of 2012 in preparation for writing 
the introductory essay to the Algerian Chronicles, it was also an encounter with an Algerian scholar 
that gave her pause in her thinking about Camus’s legacy in a postcolonial context. Of her 
conversation with this professor, she writes,  
what she said may have been familiar to everyone in the room, but it was completely new to 
me: ‘It’s true that Camus was banished for a long time, by critics, readers, etc. I don’t think 
it’s The First Man that brought him back. It was the situation, the terrorism we experienced in 
the period we call our civil war (1990s). A lot of Algerians realized then that there might be a 
parallel, that they were in face a little like those French Algerians from before, from the 
1950s and 60s—Algerians whose stature in Algeria wasn’t being recognized. Those Algerians 
in the 1990s recognized themselves in Camus…the constant vacillation, the hesitation, the 
not being able to figure out what is going on or take a clear position. Since we were 
experiencing those same hesitations, we read him again in a new way.’206 
 
The unnamed professor (Kaplan chooses not to identify her in light of the waves of retributive 
violence that have been visited on intellectuals in Algeria in the last decades; she notes that the 
woman’s husband had been murdered in the dirty wars) expresses precisely the opposite of the kind 
of politically unilateral postcolonialism that comes under fire by staunch defenders of Camus, 
especially David Carroll in his recent work, who are impatient with what they understand to be 
anachronistic and revisionist rejections of his work. The professor’s claim, and that of Alawa Toumi, 
                                                
206 Alice Kaplan, “Reading Camus in Algeria Today,” blog The Best America Poetry (July 5, 2012) 
http://blog.bestamericanpoetry.com/the_best_american_poetry/2012/07/reading-camus-in-
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“New Perspectives on Camus’s Algerian Chronicles,” the introduction to the new translation of 
Algerian Chronicles, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
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Apter’s student, evince a curiosity and a puzzlement with regard to the relationship between what is 
present in Camus’s political writing and what is absent in his fiction that is differently inflected by a 
desire to explore these gaps, rather than condemn them, in light of certain specific failures of the 
nationalism and democracy in Algeria and the increasingly untenable situation for those who resist 
the oppressive Islamism of the state. Camus’s work seems to be undergoing an important critical re-
evaluation, as the professor suggests, not because, or not solely because of the posthumous 
publication of the last novel, but because the climate of terrorism in Algeria in the 1990s shed new 
light on Camus’s refusal to support the forms of violence that subtended the Algerian nationalism 
he perceived to be taking shape in the 1950s—forms which already involved the use of extreme and 
irregular forms of violence that, by the 1990s, appeared to have become “epidemic” in independent 
Algeria.207 Since 2001, this concern has become a pointedly American one as well, as Kaplan 
demonstrates in her preface to the Algerian Chronicles, which after more than fifty years has become 
available to an English readership.208 Here we can observe a similar interest in reevaluating what 
have long been understood as the reactionary lacunae in Camus’s work in light of the rise of global 
                                                
207 Epidemic is the word that Apter uses in the introduction to Continental Drift. She writes, “The 
epidemic of assassinations of Algerian intellectuals (morbidly dubbed ‘intellocide’) in 1993…by 
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208 The essays in The Algerian Chronicles that appeared in Combat had been translated previously, also 
by Arthur Goldhammer, in a volume introduced by David Carroll, Camus at ‘Combat’: Writing 1944–
1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). Goldhammer is also the translator of Delaporte 
and Canguilhem into English.   
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Islamist violence and terrorism not just in postcolonial Africa but also in South Asia and the Middle 
East, and more and more in Western Europe and North America.  
 
—5. Rats— 
In the midst of the disagreements over how to understand the absence of non-European 
Algerian subjects in Camus’s writing, what is clear is that scholars of Camus have been increasingly 
interested in recent decades with looking very carefully at those absences across his body of work. 
O’Brien deals with this issue throughout his monograph Albert Camus: Of Europe and Africa, but also 
specifically writes about the dynamic of absence in The Plague. Regarding the characterization and 
lack thereof of this majority population in La Peste’s Oran, O’Brien writes, “up to a point, the 
strategy of the fable requires the disappearance of the Arabs….In the story of occupation and 
resistance there was not any factor, directly involved, corresponding to the Arab population of 
Algeria…”209 O’Brien allows that “myths and fables require a certain simplification,” but he names 
this as a “very serious flaw in the book,” in part because it misapprehends and misrepresents one of 
the “central characters” in the novel, the city of Oran, which carries a distinct and intriguingly 
opaque personality from the opening pages. More than simply misrepresenting demography of the 
city in which his novel is set, however, O’Brien argues that “the difficulty derives…from the whole 
nature of Camus’s relation to the German occupiers, on the one hand, and to the Arabs of Algeria 
on the other,” namely that it was unimaginable for Camus to understand how there might have been 
some  
Arabs for whom ‘French Algeria’ was a fiction quite as repugnant as the fiction of Hitler’s 
new European order was Camus and his friends. For such Arabs, the French were in Algeria 
by virtue of the same right by which the Germans were in France: the right of 
                                                
209 Conor Cruise O’Brien, Albert Camus Of Europe and Africa (New York: Viking, 1970) 53-54.   
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conquest….From this point of view, Rieux, Tarrou, and Grand were not devoted fighters 
against the plague: the were the plague itself (54-55). 
 
O’Brien’s point is crucial for any postcolonial reading of the novel; his simple transposition 
of Rieux and company not as victims, but as executioners, even if unconscious executioners, raises a 
great many questions about the incoherent algebra of Camus’s allegory, the most obvious being how 
the layers of representation break down when one symbolic term stands not for a referent outside 
the text but for another of the text’s symbolic terms. In other words, if, as O’Brien suggests, the 
Doctor and his sanitation squads represent the plague, then what does the plague represent? 
Alternatively, on whom are they inflicting their unaccountable violence? It’s clear that O’Brien 
proposes his transformative iteration of the novel’s representational arithmetic precisely to remedy 
the fact that, as above, “In the story of occupation and resistance there was not any factor, directly 
involved, corresponding to the Arab population of Algeria…” (54). His reading, then, locates the 
Arab population somewhere between the dead, the dying, and the city itself, all of which are shown 
to disintegrate and disappear over the course of the novel. O’Brien’s transpositional operation is 
particularly important when we attend to how the novel’s strategies of representing illness intersect 
with discourses of epidemic and the comprehension and prevention thereof, not least because of the 
colonial history of epidemic management in the nineteenth century, but also because of the role of 
medicine in two other contemporary loci of force during the period: the uses of sanitation, health, 
eugenics, and biopower under the Nazi regime; and the medical surveillance, provision of care, and 
stockpiling of pharmaceutical and surgical resources as tactics of the French colonial government 
against the Algerian nationalists.210 Approaching the problem from this perspective, we might 
                                                
210 Enormously important work has been done to reconstruct this history during the Algerian war by 
Jennifer Johnson Onyedum in an unpublished dissertation, “Humanizing Warfare: The Politics of 
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consider a further iteration of the allegory in which the plague metonymizes the very problem of 
Algerians in colonial Algeria for Camus—the incommensurability of Algerian prosperity and self-
determination with the survival of the pied noir population—as the plague itself. It is easy to imagine 
the morphology of such a figuration, since the bodies of Camus’s Arab Algerians are already 
expunged from the text—already, as it were, shipped off to the camps where they stand both as 
death and as the vectors of the threat of death’s slow and steady growth. 
In this way, the absent natives align with another class of disappeared life in the novel: the 
rats of Oran who teem from the city’s underbelly in the opening pages as a portent of a swarming 
social incontinence to come, and then vanish—bringing the plague, and also, extravagantly, dying of 
it in plain sight. Camus draws on a deep historical repulsion to rats in establishing a tone of 
biological menace in the early part of the narrative. Along with the more recent history of cholera 
hailing from Asia, the plague of Marseilles in 1720—the last of its kind in Europe, which killed more 
than 100,000 people—is an important antecedent here, as it was sourced to a ship that had arrived 
from Lebanon, by way of Libya, Anatolia, and Cyprus. As we now know well, the rats that carried 
yersinia pestis, the plague bacillus, as well as the flea vectors that passed it on to humans, were a 
species native to India, the Black Rat known as rattus rattus that had almost entirely replaced 
European species after the return of the Crusaders from the East.211 In both cases, plague and 
cholera, popular lore as well as more scientific data linked epidemic spread to the rapidly accelerating 
intercourse with barbarous, uncivilized places, even if commentators didn’t know exactly how. It is 
in fact the same patient, a Spaniard with poor lungs, who asks Rieux about cholera and also tells him 
                                                
Medicine, Health Care, and International Humanitarian Intervention in Algeria, 1954-62 (Princeton 
University, 2010). 
211 Natural History of Infectious Disease (4th edition) Sir MacFarlane Burnet and David O. White 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 226.  
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about the rats, “They’re coming out!” he exclaims while receiving an injection, “you can see them in 
all the trash cans. It’s hunger!” [Ils sortent, on en voit dans toutes les poubelles, c’est la faim!] (9; 17).  Rieux is 
doubtful; in the next scene, as he says goodbye to his wife, who is leaving Oran to seek treatment in 
a sanatorium, he meets M. Othon, the magistrate who will become an important figure for the 
humanity of governmentality in the novel. Othon inquires about the rats, hoping for some wisdom 
from the man of science, but Rieux balks, “It’s nothing,” he says, and then he sees “the railroad man 
with a box full of dead rats under his arm” [ce n’est rien…un homme d’équipe…portait sous le bras une caisse 
pleine de rats morts] (11; 18). Soon, however, the city is lousy with them, and by the time the young 
journalist, Rambert, asks Rieux about the “sanitary conditions”[état sanitaire] and “living conditions 
prevailing among the Arab population” [les conditions de vie des Arabes] (12; 18), Rieux feels Rambert 
should forget about the Arabs, “if he was out for curious stories for his paper, he might say 
something about the extraordinary number of dead rats that were being found in the town just now. 
‘Ah!’ Rambert exclaim[s]. ‘That certainly interests me’” [qu’il y a aurait un curieux reportage à faire sur la 
quantité de rats morts qu’on trouvait dans la ville en ce moment. —Ah! S’exclama Rambert, cela m’intéresse] (13; 
19).  
In the pages that follow, the rats, rather than the Arabs, take center stage, littering the 
hallways of the doctor’s building, interrupting the ordinary operations of domestic life. Their 
emergence from the city’s underbelly and death “out in the open” constitute the beginning of the 
plague, whose progress is carefully tracked and measured in the chronicle by seasons, dates, and 
numbers—details that provide a partial clue about the identity of the narrator. He documents the 
early days of the plague thus:  
From April 18 onwards, quantities of dead or dying rats were found in factories and 
warehouses…From the outer suburbs to the center of the town, in all the byways where the 
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doctor’s duties took him, in every thoroughfare, rats were piled up in garbage cans or lying in 
long lines in the gutters (15).   
À partir du 18, les usines et les entrepôts dégorgèrent, en effet, des centaines de cadavres de rats…depuis les 
quartiers extérieurs jusqu’au centre de la ville, partout où le docteur Rieux venait à passer, partout où nos 
concitoyens se rassemblaient, les rats attendaient en tas, dans les poubelles, ou en longues files, dans les 
ruisseaux (21).    
 
Part of what is horrific for these early witnesses—Rieux, his mother, his porter, the patient, 
Tarrou—is the flagrancy of the rats’ public death; again and again the language of the text registers 
the shock and horror or seeing the rats “coming out of their holes” and dying “all over the place,” “a 
particularly disgusting nuisance” [invasion répugnante] (13, 14, 15), rather than remaining hidden from 
the view of the townspeople, which in any case would render the crisis a non-event, as such.212 
Camus lingers on two particularly graphic rat-death scenes in the opening chapter to underscore the 
perversity, even shamelessness of the displaced rats, who, “from basements, cellars, and 
sewers…emerged in long wavering files into the light of day, swayed helplessly, then did a sort of 
pirouette and fell dead at the feet of horrified onlookers” [Des réduits, des sous-sols, des caves, des égouts, 
ils montaient en longues files titubantes pour venir vaciller à la lumière, tourner sur eux mêmes et mourir près des 
humains] (15; 22). What becomes remarkable for the observers of these deaths is not just that they 
are uncommon (and not even that uncommon, perhaps: Rieux’s mother  “took it quite calmly. ‘It’s 
like that sometimes,’” [apprit la nouvelle sans s’étonner —ce sont des choses qui arrivent]  (14; 20)), but rather 
that they seem to be audaciously performative. The pirouetting rat partly disturbs because it 
transgresses propriety, seems to evince suffering, and in so doing, enters the uncanny space between 
human and animal, person and silent “mummer,” or histrion in much the same way that Orpheus’s 
death on stage does. What’s more, like the rats, Orpheus, too, will have emerged from a dank and 
                                                
212 This last seems to be Gilbert’s addition. The phrase constructed in the negative in French, making 
it even more sympathetic to being read as evidence of the novel’s desire that the Arabs would just 
disappear [Ces rats lui avaient donné un coup et tout irait beaucoup mieux quand ils auraient disparu] (20).  
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circuitous journey in the underworld from which he was not supposed—in a strict sense—to be able 
to escape. Perhaps even more disturbing in the quiet, humid atmosphere of the novel’s Oran, the 
rats in their death-throes are not only horrifically visible, but are also audible: “at night, in the 
passages and alleys, their shrill little death-cries could be clearly heard” [La nuit, dans les couloirs ou les 
ruelles, on entendait distinctement leurs petits cris d’agonie] (15; 22).  
As the infection accelerates and rodent bodies accumulate, the problem of disposal and 
hygiene compounds their aesthetic inconveniences,  
[i]n the mornings the bodies were found lining the gutters, each with a gout of blood, like a 
red flower, on its tapering muzzle; some were bloated and already beginning to rot, others 
rigid, with their whiskers still erect….People out at night would often feel underfoot the 
squelchy roundness of a still-warm body (15–16). 
Le matin, dans les faubourgs, on les trouvait étalés à meme le ruisseau, une petite fleur de sang sur le museau 
pointu, les uns gonflés et putrides, les autres raidis et les moustaches encore dressées…il arrivait aussi à plus 
d’un promeneur nocturne de sentir sous son pied la masse élastique d’un cadaver encore frais (22).  
 
Even in the absence of positive knowledge about what exactly is transpiring, it is clear to the citizens 
of Oran that rotting rat corpses will pose a public health threat. Rieux “couldn’t give a definite 
opinion, but he thought the sanitary service should take action of some kind,” [ne pouvait pas en 
décider, mais il pensait que le service de dératisation devait intervenir] (14; 21), but while the “evening papers 
that day took up the matter and inquired whether or not the city fathers were going to take steps, 
and what emergency measures were contemplated, to abate this particularly disgusting nuisance. 
Actually, the municipality had not contemplated doing anything at all” [la presse du soir s’empara de 
l’affaire, dès ce jour-là, et demanda si la municipalité, oui ou non, se proposait d’agir et quelles mesures d’urgence elle 
avait envisagées pour garantir ses administrés de cette invasion répugnante. La municipalité ne s’était rien proposé] 
(15; 21). As the number of dying rats mounts, however, and the daily figures are released on the 
radio, the city develops a solution to collect the dead rats daily at dawn and truck them to the city’s 
incinerator—a prefiguring of how human corpses will later be dealt with at the height of the plague. 
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The phase of the rats ends as quickly as it began however, which the text signals by way of a 
generalizing metaphor that anthropomorphizes the city, with its dying rats, as a sick body—a sick 
man, more pointedly—before turning to the depiction of the first human plague victim. This 
moment is the text is significant in the way it establishes the parameters of plague as metaphor of 
purgation and expression or suppuration, in the surgical sense, of some deeper malady.  
It was as if the earth on which our houses stood was being purged of its secret humors; 
thrusting up to the surface the abscesses and pus-clots that had been forming in its entrails. 
You must picture the consternation of our little town, hitherto so tranquil, and now, out of 
the blue, shaken to its core, like a quite healthy man who all of a sudden feels his 
temperature shoot up and the blood seething like wildfire in his veins (16).  
On eût dit que la terre meme où étaient plantées nos maisons se purgeait de son chargement d’humeurs, 
qu’elle laissait monter à la surface des furoncles et des sanies qui, jusqu’ici, la travaillaient intérieurement. 
Qu’on envisage seulement la stupefaction de notre petite ville, si tranquille jusque-là, et bouleversée en 
quelques jours, comme un homme bien portant dont le sang épais se mettrait tout d’un coup en révolution! 
(22).   
 
The dilatory movement of this passage is typical of how bidirectional figuration works in the 
novel—it starts at one level by representing the surface of the city as the skin of a man: the rats, 
whose dead bodies squelch underfoot, become the buboes and pus-filled boils that signify an 
infection within—and then it shifts to the man representing the experience of the city: his healthy 
tranquility pierced by a sudden elevation of temperature, which Gilbert translates as “wildfire in his 
veins,” but which in the original is rendered as the more politically evocative, if less poetic, révolution. 
The sanitary service, or service dératisation, a name that in French doubles down on the specific 
eradication of rats over general sanitation, as well as the homophony of the practice of ratissage or 
ratonnage—a raking or sweeping operation that would later come to describe the “pacifying 
operations” of the French against Muslim villages and revolutionaries in Algeria213—seems to quell 
the révolution de sang épais, at least as it is expressed in the regurgitation of rats from the bowels of the 
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city. Almost immediately, however, Rieux’s concierge falls prey to the same distemper, for all intents 
and purposes mimicking the pirouetting, incontinent rats, and foretelling the death of Orpheus by  
“dragging himself along, his head bent, arms and legs curiously splayed out with the jerky 
movements of a clockwork doll” (17) [[il] avançait péniblement, la tête penchée, bras et jambes écartés, dans 
une attitude de pantin] (23).  
In this thickly described opening sequence—flat in affect, and striving for documentary 
clarity, we can see how Camus uses the rat crisis as an overture to human infection that comprises 
both the inconvenient and later horrific spectacle of epidemic demise in public space, and also the 
public health threat posed by the necessity of disposing of plague-infected corpses, which quickly 
overwhelm standard sanitation procedures. There is more at stake in this opening exposition, 
however, which we can see strikingly clearly if we put pressure on the moment at which Rieux and 
Rambert’s conversation turns from the sanitation conditions in the Arab quarter—the subject of the 
journalist’s inquiry—to the phenomenon of the rats. What’s more, returning to this moment with 
the question of how Camus expunges Arab subjects from his texts allows us to gain purchase on 
how Camus’s allegory begins to undo itself right at the start. The reason the Doctor gives Rambert 
for his silence and uncooperativeness on the question of Arab living conditions in Oran speaks to 
the very muteness and silence that seem to be always at play in Camus’s writing on the subject; 
Rieux asks Rambert if the paper would be willing to “publish an unqualified condemnation of the 
present state of things,” whether “the journalist would be allowed to tell the truth” about the Arab 
living conditions [si le journaliste pouvait dire la vérité…pouvez-vous porter condamnation totale?] (12, 18–19). 
Rambert replies honestly, “Unqualified? Well no, I couldn’t go that far [Totale, non, il faut bien le dire]” 
and Rieux falls quiet, refusing to speak, even when goaded by Rambert “You talk the language of 
Saint Just” [C’est le langage de Saint-Just]. Rieux’s feelings on the matter read very much like Camus’s 
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own jottings and essays of the exhaustions of injustice: “the language he used was that of a man who 
was sick and tired of the world he lived in—though he had much liking for his fellow men—and had 
resolved, for his part, to have no truck with injustice and compromises with the truth” [c’était le 
langage d’un homme lassé du monde où il vivait, ayant pourtant le goût de ses semblables et décidé à refuser, pour sa 
part, l’injustice et les concessions] (12; 19).  
This moment reveals a great deal about the way absence works in Camus’s writing by 
establishing the question of Arab Algeria as one that is massively important, and yet of necessity, at 
least as Rieux understands moral necessity, unapproachable through the approximate, compromising 
media of both speech and writing. He refuses to speak to the question because of the impossibility 
of transmitting condamnation totale to his Parisian audience. Much has been made of Camus’s own 
silence on the Algerian question beginning in 1956, after which he entered a “29 month silence” 
that, Kaplan has suggested, “became a metonymy for cowardice” (5). During this period, the 
perception of his cowardice and hypocrisy was compounded by the 1957 mess over the Nobel 
interview in which Le Monde reported him to have said “I believe in justice but I will defend my 
mother over justice.”214 To set the record straight, as many critics have suggested in recent years, 
Camus released Actuelles III: Chronique Algérienne the following year, with a new essay “Algérie 1958,” 
that closed with the haunting final line “[t]his is the last warning that can be given by a writer who 
for the past 20 years has been dedicated to the Algerian cause, before he lapses once again into 
                                                
214 Kaplan “Reading Camus,” 18. Kaplan suggests that he wrote to Le Monde immediately to correct 
what he understood to be a misrepresentation (apparently the original statement in the Stockholm 
press conference was En ce moment on lance des bombes dans les tramways d’Alger. Ma mère peut se trouver 
dans un de ces tranways. Si c’est cela le justice, je préfère ma mère (Kaplan, 18 n.19). 
226 
silence” (184) [C’est le dernier avertissement que puisse formuler, avant de se taire à nouveau, un écrivan voué, 
depuis vignt ans, au service d’Algérie].215  
Viewed in light of Camus’s own silence and commentary thereon, Rieux’s refusal to talk 
about the living conditions of Arab Algerians to Rambert is a critical gesture in the context of 
Camus’s oeuvre as a whole; in his very silence, Rieux is in an important way speaking to the issue. If 
we approach the scene from this perspective, the rapid change of topic from Arab sanitation to the 
influx of rats is unmistakable. If the text can’t speak directly to the shameful and abysmally neglected 
lives of Oran’s Arab inhabitants—worthy, in a Doctor’s opinion, of total condemnation—it can 
displace the conversation to a different population that marks time in corners of the city between 
the visible and invisible, silence and the wail of suffering. In other words, the peste brune nickname 
that referred to the brown Nazi uniforms in the argot of the Resistance becomes differently 
literalized through Rieux’s transposition as a plague of dehumanized brownness, a hazy, dirty, 
“murky” or “shadowy” atmospheric threat that lurks outside the fortifications of the city; a plague 
not of brown cloth, but of brown skin. There is enough evidence to argue that, in leaving open this 
possible reading, indeed, in setting it up so clearly in the beginning of the book, Camus is, at least on 
one level, calling Arab Algerians a plague by equating them with rats. If we pursue this line of 
thinking, it follows that the novel mistakes its uneasiness about the discontentment of an oppressed 
population and the possibility of its eruption into violence, with a far clearer and more ferocious 
sense of the injustices of Nazi violence.  
Given the state of affairs between the French colonial government and the growing Algerian 
resistance after the massacres at Sétif and Guelma in 1945, during which time Camus was both 
drafting the novel and writing about the colonial situation, this would not be unthinkable. In fact, 
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this is roughly the position O’Brien takes in his seminal reading of the novel. He closes his chapter 
on La Peste, in which he concludes that it is both a “masterpiece” and an “allegorical sermon,” with 
the claim that  
Eight years after the publication of La Peste, the rats came up to die again in the cities of 
Algeria. To apply another of Camus’s metaphors, the Algerian insurrection was ‘the eruption 
of boils and pus which had been working inwardly in the society,’ And this eruption came 
from precisely the quarter in which the narrator had refused to look: from the houses with 
Dr. Rieux never visited and from the conditions about which the reporter Rambert never 
carried out his inquiry (59).  
 
The first line of this passage is accompanied by a citation from Quilliot, who had written of “the rats 
of colonialism, an old sickness that was dragging on in Algeria” (59, n. 14). O’Brien plainly disagrees 
with Quilliot’s reading, writing “Quilliot seems…like Camus himself, to think that ‘colonialism’ 
could in some way be eradicated without France’s having to leave Algeria” (59 n. 14). In O’Brien’s 
view, Camus may have objected to some of the more oppressive and unjust measures meted out by 
the colonial government, but was far more traumatized by what he understood to be the threat of 
expulsion for the million Algerian-born pieds noirs. By way of conclusion, O’Brien suggests that “the 
source of the plague is what we pretend is not there…” (59), in other words, the brown plague of 
the Arab Algerians, and the problematic relationship between two publics, colonizing and colonized, 
that the novel assiduously avoids commenting on.  
 
—6. Dirty Ink— 
In his essay of 1966, “Depth and Complexity,” Pierre Macherey discusses the fallacy of 
depth in interpretation, suggesting that it is “easy to find [the text] deep, like an enigma or mask 
behind which lurks some haunting presence; this is but one more way of representing the text as a 
228 
smooth and decorative surface, deceptive in its perfection.”216 Instead, he suggests that the text is 
present, “entirely readable, visible, entrusted,” whereas “interpretation simply offers a reductive 
explanation by identifying just one of [the writer’s] choices” (112–113). The sole example Macherey 
offers in this brief essay of such a fallacy of depth is that of Sartre’s interpretation of Camus’s first 
novel, L’Étranger—he calls the explication a “simple procedure” that Sartre “applied” to the novel 
(113). Macherey wants readers to receive the text, to attend to the simultaneity of its activities. 
Thinking with Camus, we might understand Macherey’s intervention as one that insists that we 
attend, almost scientifically, to what happens in the text, “examin[ing] the work in its real complexity,” 
rather than reducing our understanding to an argument about what is by way of what he calls its 
“mythical depth” (112). If Camus’s fictions invite such readings, and La Peste in particular does so, as 
we have seen in the quarrel with Barthes, perhaps it is precisely because the writing attempts to 
negotiate the space between a phenomenology of epidemic and a metaphysics of evil, and in so 
doing, remains silent on so many of the points that might pin it to a particular history, or a particular 
interpretation, even a particular villain, as obvious as the Nazi answer may seem. Macherey offers a 
theory of such absences in the conclusion of his essay, exhorting readers to move toward an 
awareness of “the reason of [the text’s] process” (113). He writes,  
It is not a question of perceiving a latent structure of which the manifest work is an index, 
but of establishing that absence around which a real complexity is knit. Then, perhaps, can 
be exorcised the fallacies which have bound literary criticism to ideology: the fallacy of the 
secret, the fallacy of depth, the fallacy of rules, the fallacy of harmony. Decentered, 
displaced, determinate, complex: recognized as such, the work runs the risk of receiving its 
theory (113). 
 
If La Peste is ready to “receive its theory” once again, as Judt, Kaplan, and others have suggested in 
resituating the novel and its ancillary texts in the era of millennial terrorism, then perhaps, as 
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Macherey writes, it is in the very absences, complexities, deformations, decenterings—the extent to 
which “the book is always the site of exchange,” as Macherey puts it—that its substance lies. Like 
Dracula, La Peste knits complexity around the absent presence of epidemic; it also knits complexity 
around the absent presence of Algeria.  
O’Brien argues that the native Algerians appear indirectly in The Plague only four times: once 
when Cottard makes an oblique reference to The Stranger by mentioning a rumor about “a young 
commercial employee [who] had killed an Algerian on a beach” (The Plague, 54), once when Rieux 
and Rambert walk “down through the alleys of the native quarter [quartier nègre]” (53),217 and twice 
when Rambert inquires about the impact of the plague in the Arab quarter, the living conditions of 
which he had been sent to chronicle for a Paris paper. In response to Rambert’s inquiry about life in 
the Arab quarter, which has now gained a luridly news-worthy dimension owing to the plague, Dr. 
Rieux replies “Ah yes, of course. Well, now you’ve the makings of a good story for your paper” [Ah! 
Oui, dit Rieux. Eh bien, vous avez maintenant un beau sujet de reportage] (83; 81). Rieux’s comment 
expresses a strange irony and cynicism toward the project of documentation in which Rambert is 
engaged, particularly if we think about the centrality of Camus’s own role in sparking and sustaining 
the conversation in France with reference to the Algerian struggles in the post-war period in his own 
journalistic writings. Both prior to and during the time Camus was drafting The Plague, he was also 
producing multiple series of articles on living conditions and political movements among the non-
European inhabitants of Algeria for the radical socialist paper Alger républicain and Combat, the 
French resistance paper he edited for a time. In 1939, when Camus was just 25, he published the 
series of articles called “The Misery of Kabylia” [La Misère de la Kabylie] on the woeful economic 
conditions afflicting the inhabitants of the Kabylia region. A later series for Combat entitled “Crisis in 
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Algeria” [Crise en Algérie] appeared between May 13 and June 14 in 1945, just days after the end of 
the war was marked by Victory in Europe Day on May 8. In keeping with the metaphorical 
landscape of La Peste, Camus’s use of the word “crisis” in the title carries with it connotations of ill 
health, its Greek root krisis describing the turning point in the progression of a disease or malady.218  
This series, Camus announces in the first essay, was to be an objective account of the 
conditions in Algeria that made possible the uprisings in Sétif and Guelma just days earlier, which 
ended with the massacre, according to modest estimates, of at least 6000 Algerians by the French 
Military and the Foreign Legion in the raking-over of Muslim villages known as ratissage.219 As for the 
“political dimension” [le plan politique] of the series of essays, Camus writes, “I want to remind people 
in France of the fact that Algeria exists…I want to point out that the Arab people also exist…that 
hundreds of thousands of Arabs have spent the past two years fighting for the liberation of France” 
[il convient…de rappeler aux Français que l’Algérie existe…je voudrais rappeler aussi que le people arabe 
existe…des centaines de milliers d’Arabes viennent de se batter, durant deux ans pour la libération de notre territoire] 
(Algerian Chronicles, 90–91; Essais, 942–943). In some ways these statements are simple and 
unheroic—it is, after all, no great accomplishment to point out to French readers the mere existence 
of millions of people who are not only inhabitants of France but directly suffering for the 
enrichment of the metropole. These lines from the May 1945 essays are crucial for two reasons, 
however: first because the timing of their publication suggests that for Camus, the end of the war 
only increased France’s already formidable debt and responsibility to Algeria, and second because 
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they serve to destablize some of the critical weight that has been placed on the absence of Arab 
Algerian subjects in Camus’s writing.  
In interpreting the absence of Arabs in La Peste in particular, O’Brien’s thought experiment 
asks us first to consider whether it isn’t the band of European men who stand for the plague, and 
later to think about how the Algerian insurrection might eclipse this identification, replacing the 
referent of Europeans with the referent of insurgent Algerians. In this way, O’Brien’s argument 
strongly condemns Camus’s blindness to the plight of Arab Algerians, and suggests that the 
allegorical slipperiness of the novel may well include an ungenerous pathologization of the native 
population in the form of plague. For establishing a critical agenda that brought Camus and 
postcolonialism together in a rigorous and considered way, O’Brien’s work in this book is much 
admired. Still, recent critics have faulted him for painting a one-dimensional picture of Camus’s 
politics by training his piercing critical gaze on the fictions at the expense of the voluminous 
journalism, where Camus addresses the situation in Algeria more explicitly. This is John Foley’s 
view, for example, worked out in a recent article that turns O’Brien’s own accusations of Camusian 
hypocrisy and “hallucination” against him, and aligns O’Brien’s late-career “swerve to the right” in 
favor of a Unionist Northern Ireland with Camus’s ill-fated attempts at a civilian truce between 
European and Arab Algerians in 1956. In his essay “A Postcolonial Fiction: Conor Cruise O’Brien’s 
Camus,” Foley contends that “there is a fatal weakness at the heart of Cruise O’Brien’s argument, in 
that he pays scant attention to Camus’s journalism, specifically the journalism devoted to Algeria.”220 
Foley works through what he calls a “counternarrative” of O’Brien’s own politics, in which he 
situates O’Brien’s impact on the understanding of Camus among a number of leftist academics, 
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mostly in Ireland. The existence of an Irish Camus is particularly interesting in light of a topological 
history of global anticolonial discourse, which, as we saw in the first chapter, plays an ambiguous but 
central role in Stoker’s fiction at the turn of the twentieth century. Foley’s rebuttal, with regard to 
O’Brien’s reading is that “the absence of Arabs from Camus’s La Peste is neither malicious nor 
miraculous, it is meticulous…the political and social questions which would be raised by their 
appearance…would likely overwhelm the more abstract moral questions” (2). Foley’s claim, like 
those of many before him, seems to suggest that the minutiae of particular politics would get in the 
way of, rather than constituting, more lofty moral and philosophical considerations. 
Notwithstanding this blunt reduction, his comment invites us to think about what a meticulous 
expunging might mean, as opposed to a malicious or miraculous one, especially if we think back to 
Camus’s own differentiation between what science—and perhaps by extension other more 
putatively objective forms of writing—explains, namely that which happens, and does not explain, 
namely that which is.  
While O’Brien’s reading may be against the grain of Camus’s own understanding of the 
work, I do not think that it requires, as Foley suggests, that we blind ourselves to what Camus did 
say about Algeria, and about colonial dynamics more broadly, in his articles of the 1930s and 40s. As 
we can see above, Camus believed he was performing a critical service as a liaison between a French 
public at home, and a forgotten population in the colony. The content of these articles sheds a 
complex historical light on the figural universe of La Peste, evincing an abiding concern and sense of 
responsibility on Camus’s part for the living conditions of Arab Algerians, even, as Alice Kaplan 
points out, at the risk of alienating the colonial government. The 1939 series of articles, La misère de 
la Kabylie illuminates what Camus sees as the French government’s responsibility in prolonging and 
failing to take realistic measures to remedy massive famine and destitution in the overpopulated 
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Kabylian region of Algeria. These essays advocate for the political empowerment of the Kabyle 
people, for “greater independence and self-rule” [une vie plus indépendante et plus consciente] for a people 
from whom Camus believed his readers “could humbly take lessons in dignity and justice” [pourrons 
sans fausse honte prendre des leçons de grandeur et de justice]. 221 But they also establish what will prove to be 
an enduring obstacle for Camus in years to come. Even as he disavows the French colonists, who he 
believes may never act to improve the conditions of their co-habitants in Algeria, he calls on 
metropolitan France to “step in,” arguing in the penultimate article in the series that “a system that 
divorces Algeria from France is bad for France…when the interests of Algeria and France coincide, 
you can be sure that hearts and minds will soon follow” [un régime qui sépare l’Algérie de la France fait le 
malheur de notre pays. Et le jour où les intérêts seront confondus, on peut être sûr que les coeurs et les esprits ne 
tarderont pas à l’être] (80; 935). Whether Camus’s privileging of what is good for France here is simply 
an expeditious attempt to write to his audience or whether it reflects where his sympathies truly 
reside remains ambiguous. In a melancholic turn, he names the “meaning of [his] investigation” in 
the series’ conclusion: “If there is any conceivable excuse for the colonial conquest, it has to lie in 
helping peoples to retain their distinctive personality. And if we French have any duty here, it is to 
allow one of the proudest and most human peoples in this world to keep faith with itself and with its 
destiny” [si la conquête coloniale pouvait jamais trouver une excuse, c’est dans la mesure où elle aide les peuples 
conquis à garder leur personnalité. Et si nous avons un devoir en ce pays, il est de permettre à l’une des populations les 
plus fières et les plus humaines en ce monde de rester fidèle à elle-même et à son destin] (83; 938). Certainly there is 
no absence of humanity in the essays on the conditions of Algerian peasants that comprise “The 
Misery of the Kabylia.” On the other hand, these essays are shot through with both a romanticizing 
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depoliticization of these people as noble and simple, and a firmly entrenched belief that their best 
hope for survival, even happiness, was fuller incorporation into the French legal system rather than 
independence. Another way of putting this is that Camus believed there was one road to the full 
realization of the Arab Algerians’ humanity, and it was through the patrimony of the French nation 
state. If the rhetoric does not exactly replicate the sloganized version of Kipling’s “White Man’s 
Burden,” as a civilizing, soul-saving mission, it does come surprisingly close to the more ambiguous 
articulation in the couplet that follows that famous line, where the speaker exhorts the powerful to 
“Fill full the mouth of famine,/ And bid the sickness cease.”222  
On May 10, 1947, Camus circled back to the confluence of crisis and sickness in an essay for 
Combat called “La Contagion.” It was not, as one might imagine, given the close proximity of La 
Peste’s publication that summer, about either Algeria or the war, at least explicitly. The essay is about 
the “stupid and criminal malady” [maladie stupide et criminelle] of racism in France, which Camus 
locates in the biased press coverage of an attack on Joseph Raseta, a deputy from Madagascar who 
was assaulted in the Palais Bourbon, but who was nevertheless called by the papers “Raseta the 
murderer,” for his ostensible role in the anti-colonial riots in Madagascar beginning in April of that 
year.223 Of the uprisings, Camus writes that he feels nothing but “equal repugnance for the methods 
of both sides” [égale répugnance envers les deux méthodes…], namely the French and the Malgache, but 
that, since no allegations have been proven, and no reliable account of the atrocities in Madagascar 
have been given, the French press calling Raseta a murderer expresses a blatant disregard for balance 
and objectivity in favor of hate-mongering and sensationalism: “no journalist” he writes, “would 
have dared to use such a headline if the alleged murderer had been named Dupont or Durand” 
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(Camus at Combat, 290) [Aucun journaliste n’aurait osé un pareil titre si l’assassin supposé s’appelait Dupont ou 
Durand] (Essais, 321).  
Camus situates this example of the malady of French racism in a broader context, 
illuminating the conflation of colonial immigrants and criminality by way of a lurid anecdote that 
recalls Mersault’s shocking absence of humanity in L’Étranger. Alluding to a recent police inquiry 
into a murder in Essonne, he writes,  
[n]o one is surprised to learn that the unfortunate student who killed his fiancée used the 
presence of “sidis” as they say, in the forest of Sénart to divert suspicion from himself. If 
Arabs go for a walk in the woods, it cannot be simply because spring has arrived. It can only 
be to murder their contemporaries (290).  
On trouve normal que le malheureux étudiant qui a tué sa fiancée utilise, pour détourner les soupçons, la 
présence de «sidis», comme ils disent, dans la forêt de Sénart. Si des Arabes se promènent dans une forêt, le 
printemps n’a rien à y voir. Ce ne peut être que pour assassiner leurs contemporains] (Essais, 321).  
 
“Sidi,” is an honorific in Arabic and related languages, but here is used to indicate the homogenizing 
nomenclature, used in this context as a slur, for brown Muslim immigrants, most of them from 
North Africa. Their presence as criminal scapegoats in France’s cities, however, is not enough, in 
Camus’s view, to remind their French cohabitants either of the Arabs’ humanity, or of France’s own 
recent traumatic history under occupation—an analogue, in this particular moment in Camus’s 
writing, for an oppressive colonialism. He draws a stark comparison between the events in Sétif, 
which he had sought to explain in the 1945 series “Crise en Algérie,” and their aftermath in the 
uprisings and subsequent inhumane treatment and torture of Algerian prisoners on the one hand, 
and the terror tactics visited on the citizens of Europe by the Germans on the other.  
One year ago in Algeria, methods of collective oppression were used. And Combat recently 
revealed the existence of the ‘spontaneous confession chamber’ in Fianarantsoa…Three 
years after being subjected to a policy of terror themselves, Frenchmen are reacting to this 
latest news with the indifference of people who have seen too much. Yet the facts are there: 
the clear and hideous truth: we are doing what we reproached the Germans for doing (291).  
[On a utilisé en Algérie, il y a un an, les méthodes de la répression collective. Combat a révélé l’existence de 
la chambre d’aveux «spontanés» de Fianarantsoa…Trois ans après avoir éprouvé les effets d’une politique de 
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terreur, des Français enregistrent ces nouvelles avec l’indifférance des gens qui en ont trop vu. Pourtant, le fait 
est là, clair et hideux comme la vérité: nous faisons, dans ces cas-là, ce que nous avons reproché aux 
Allemands de faire.] (Essais, 322).  
 
Here we can see Camus clearly aligning the terror of the Nazi occupation with the colonial situation 
in both Algeria and Madagascar. Although he does not go so far here as to bring Algerian anti-
colonialism and nationalism into this comparative constellation, both French and German terror 
tactics are coded as “contagious,” while the violence on the Malgache side inspires “equal 
repugnance,” suggesting that the Malagasy, too, have caught this contagion. Following the 
comparison to the Germans, Camus writes, “I am well aware that we have been offered an 
explanation, namely, that the Malagasy rebels have tortured Frenchmen” (290)  
[Je sais bien qu’on nous en a donné l’explication. C’est que les rebelles malgaches, eux aussi, ont torturé des Français  
(322)]. This statement clarifies further what he means by the contagious logic of both action and 
discourse in the use of asymmetrical violence on the part of the colonists, who inspire violent 
retaliation, and so on, in a cycle of mutually reinforcing contagion. By extension, we must imagine 
that the same victims who were tortured by the French in Fianarantsoa are equally susceptible to this 
contagion, and may soon, if they haven’t already, join the Malgache and the French in being 
repugnant carriers, if not the most egregious dispensers, of this terror.  
 In the essay’s penultimate paragraph, Camus draws Algeria into this cycle of contagion, 
working explicitly through the logic of racial hierarchy and processes of dehumanization that makes 
such violence and racism possible. This moment serves as one of the clearest articulations in 
Camus’s writing of how he understands the pathologies of both nationalism and colonialism as 
transmissible phenomena:  
 “If the Hitlerians applied their shameful laws to Europe, the reason was that they believed 
their race to be superior, hence the law for Germans could not be the same as the law for 
enslaved peoples. If we French revolted against their terror, it was because we believed that 
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all Europeans were equal in rights and dignity. But if Frenchmen can now hear of the 
methods used by other Frenchmen against Algerians and Malagasies and not react, it is 
because they are unconsciously certain that we are in some way superior to those people and 
that it makes little difference what means we choose to demonstrate that superiority” (291). 
[Si les hitlérians ont appliqué à l’Europe les lois abjectes qui étaient les leurs, c’est qu’ils considéraient que 
leur race était supérieure et que la loi ne pouvait être la même pour les Allemands et pour les peuples esclaves. 
Si nous, Français, nous révoltions contre cette terreur, c’est que nous estimions que tous les Européens étaient 
égaux en droit et en dignité. Mais si, aujourd’hui, des Français apprennent sans révolte les méthodes que 
d’autres Français utilisent parfois envers des Algériens ou des Malgaches, c’est qu’ils vivent, de manière 
inconsciente, sur la certitude que nous sommes supérieurs en quelque manière à ces peuples et que le coix des 
moyens propres à illustrer cette supériorité importe peu]  (Essais, 322).  
 
Here, Camus brings together the prismatic historical referents that inform the depiction of plague in 
the novel as both a particular occurrence wedded to a particular state of crisis under the occupation, 
but also as a messy, flexible signifier that reflects the potential contagiousness of this crisis into other 
spaces, and through other means. As such, this moment in the essay “Contagion” lends itself readily 
to a broader interpretive apparatus that might help us make sense of the way in which Algerian 
absence functions in La Peste as a space of open anxiety, of potential infection or corporeal 
vulnerability, and of dread for the horrors that may return unbidden through the touch and 
exchange of colonial contact and the virulent nationalisms he fears it will engender. This essay, it is 
important to note, was published just three months before Pakistan and India would achieve 
independence from Britain in one of the bloodiest mass migrations in modern history.  
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Map of Cholera Incidents in India, 1956 
 
 
As we have seen, Camus’s position on Algeria—which never really entertained the possibility 
of an independent state—became entrenched in the years leading up to and following the official 
start of the Algerian War in 1954. Even as he continued to defend the dignity and humanity of the 
Arab Algerian people, his writing expressed an increasing anxiety about the status of other native 
Algerians; Algerians like his mother, whose life of toil and poverty, he insisted, was equally deserving 
of dignity and humanity. There is the now-famous utterance that Camus made during a discussion 
with students after accepting the Nobel in 1957 that still rings discordantly for many readers; the last 
line especially is often cited as a reason to dismiss an inveterately colonialist Camus. Dominique 
Birmann reported Camus’s statement for Le Monde as follows:  
I have always supported a just Algeria, where the two populations must live in peace and 
equality, I have said and repeated that we have to bring justice to the Algerian people and 
grant them a fully democratic regime…I have always condemned terror. I must also 
condemn a terrorism that is practiced blindly, in the streets of Algiers, for example, and 
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which one day could strike my mother or my family. I believe in justice, but I will defend my 
mother before justice.224 
[J’ai été et suis toujours partisan d’une Algérie juste, où les deux populations doivent vivre en paix et dans 
l’égalité. J’ai dit et répété qu’il fallait faire justice au people algérien et lui accorder un régime pleinement 
démocratique…J’ai toujours condamné la terreur. Je dois condamné aussi un terrorisme qui s’exerce 
aveuglément, dans les rues d’Alger par exemple, et qui un jour peut frapper ma mère et ma famille. Je crois à 
la justice, mais je défenderai ma mère avant la justice.]225 
 
Although the statement was a paraphrase, Camus defends it in a letter he sent subsequently to the 
paper, writing “I was willing to state publicly to that young Algerian…personal explanations that I 
had previously kept to myself and that your correspondent reported accurately” (Algerian Chronicles, 
216). In this letter, he remarks further that the young Algerian who had asked him the question that 
prompted this response was someone to whom he “[felt] closer…than to many French people who 
speak about Algeria without knowing it.” He continues, “his face reflected not hatred but despair 
and unhappiness. I share that unhappiness. His face is the face of my country” (216).  
 Earlier, in a 1948 essay, “The Exile of Helen” [L’Exil d’Hélène] Camus gives shape to this 
sense of shared unhappiness and tragedy, drawing together the feeling of loss that had come to mark 
his experience of both Algeria and France with the story of another plague in another time that 
ended with the death another beautiful city of the East. Drawing on the Homeric song of Ilium, he 
speaks of the exile  of beauty in the Mediterranean as the exile of Helen. This tragedy is not hidden 
or obscured, but plainly visible in the bright light of heroic antiquity. He writes, “[t]he Mediterranean 
has a solar tragedy which has nothing to do with mists…In this golden sadness, tragedy reaches its 
highest point (Lyrical and Critical Essays, 148) [La Méditerranée a son tragique solaire qui n’est pas celui des 
brumes…Dans ce malheur doré la tragédie culmine] (Essais, 853). In marked contrast to this idealized past, a 
past in which the face of the young Algerian, like the face of Helen, might stand plainly for the 
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beauty of homeland that cannot be shared and a sorrow that must, a face unclouded by the mists or 
miasmas of pathology, Camus writes of his own time: “the despair of our world—quite the 
opposite—has fed on ugliness and upheavals” (148) Notre temps, au contraire, a nourri son désepoir dans la 
laideur et dans les convulsions] (853). The language of filth and contagion are pervasive in this period of 
Camus’s writing—it is not just la peste brune that emerges in the post war fiction, but also the crisis, 
contagion, and malady of colonial violence and terror tactics on both sides that we see surging out in 
the journalism and essays. This period also marks the beginning of what will come to be seen as 
Camus’s unsightly phase by committed leftists and anti-colonialists in both Algeria and France, a 
moment in which the ugly parochialism of his politics would sully a shining record of political 
engagement. Camus seems aware of this disappointment lurking on the horizon in the essay on 
Helen, remarking obliquely on the inadequacy of writing to strike at the heart of the present 
“despair,” “ugliness,” and “convulsions.” He laments, “[o]ur miserable tragedies have the smell of an 
office, and their blood is the color of dirty ink” (150) [Nos misérables tragedies traînent une odeur de bureau 
et le sang dont elles ruissellent a couleur d’encre grasse] (854). For the contemporary reader of Camus, these 
lines are an uncanny reflection of the way in which the journalism, essays, and comments on Algeria 
have come to be read, as so much dirty ink spilled in defense of a colonial power of which Camus 
was a privileged member.  
The indelibility of these words, and their connection to the blood and suffering of the 
people, are reflected in the permanent threat of plague articulated in La Peste’s final moments. Here, 
the novel finally tells us something of what the plague is: it arrives not from a geographical afar but 
from a temporal afar. It is a slow and patient dread that, in the words of Dr. Rieux, who has by the 
end of the novel revealed that he is its chronicler, “bides its time in bedrooms, cellars, trunks, and 
bookshelves” [attend patiement dans les chambres les caves, les malles, les mouchoirs et les paperasses] (308; 279).  
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Unknown, “Cholera Tramples the Victor and the Vanquish’d Both” 
 
 
In the early conversations between Rieux and Castel, Castel has tried to remind his younger 
colleague that there is nothing novel or shocking in the arrival of the epidemic, just as there is 
nothing novel or shocking in the perpetual outbreaks of war that count out the time of human 
history. He remarks, “Everybody knows that pestilences have a way of recurring in the world yet 
somehow we find it hard to believe in ones that crash down on our heads from a blue sky. There 
have been as many plagues as wars in history; yet always plagues and wars take people equally by 
surprise.” [Les fléaux, en effet, sont une chose commune, mais on croit difficilement aux fléaux lorsqu’ils vous 
tombent sur la tête. Il y a eu dans le monde autant de pestes que de guerres. Et pourtant pestes et guerres trouvent les 
gens toujours aussi dépourvus.] (37; 41). The final sentence of the novel reprises the older doctor’s 
warnings, this time in the voice of Rieux, who has learned that the ending of this chronicle is no 
ending at all, at best, it is only a pause:  
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…the plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good… it can lie dormant for years and 
years…perhaps the day would come when, for the bane and the enlightening of men, it 
would rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city. […le bacille de la peste 
ne meurt ni ne disparaît jamais…peut-être, le jour viendrait où, pour le malheur et l’enseignement des 
hommes, la peste réveillerait ses rats et les enverrait mourir dans une cité heureuse.] (308, 279).  
 
I want to return for a moment to the essay “Contagion,” published the same summer as the novel, 
because the final lines of that text illuminate the confounding absence of Algeria in the chronicle 
that Camus claimed was an allegory, at least, for the inhumanity of Nazi violence and the struggle 
staged against it. That piece begins by diagnosing an epidemic of racism in France, but it ends on a 
very different note that suggests that colonialism, too, breeds pathology. Camus writes,  
If it is accurate to say that the colonial problem is the most complex of all the problems we 
face, and if it is going to shape the history of the next fifty years, it is no less true to say that 
we will never be able to solve it if we allow the most pernicious of prejudices to influence 
our judgment (Camus at Combat, 291).   
[S’il est vrai que le problème colonial est le plus complexe de ceux qui se posent à nous, s’il est vrai qu’il 
commande l’histoire des cinquante années à venir, il est non moins vrai que nous ne pourrons jamais le 
résordre si nous y introduisons les plus funestes préjugés] (Essais, 323).  
 
These lines reveal the extent to which, in spite of the absence at its heart, La Peste, an immediately 
proximate text of contagion, speaks not only to what happened in the Second World War, but also 
to the epidemics of colonialism, which, if we read this pair of closing lines together, we can see as 
continuous with the pathological nationalism of the Third Reich. Like the plague bacillus, which 
Rieux predicts will rise again from beneath the happy city, the “colonial problem” will shape the 
history of the next fifty years, reemerging in moments of intensity as various forms of terror in 
Algeria, in France, and beyond. We will see one of the ways in which this analogy shapes 
postcolonial writing by looking at the works of Salman Rushdie in the next chapter. Particularly in 
his novel Shalimar the Clown, Rushdie borrows from Camus not only the figure of plague to describe 
political violence, but also its genesis in the contagious, pathological German nationalism. At the risk 
of oversimplifying a vast number of contributing factors, the problem of colonialism is also at the 
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heart of the problem of global terrorism. Outside of fiction, we may recall Tony Judt’s resituating of 
La Peste in 2001, in light of the overwhelming preoccupation with the events of September 11. 
There, he suggests that “[Camus’s] controversial use of a biological epidemic to illustrate the 
dilemmas of moral contagion succeeds in ways the writer could not have imagined. Here in New 
York, in November, 2001, we are better placed than we could ever have wished to feel the lash of 
the novel’s premonitory final sentence.”226  
These displacements are as central to a reading of the novel as any search for a single 
historical referent may be. The logic and structure of contagion, of epidemic, and of plague is 
forceful precisely because it deconstructs and dismantles the artificial separation and quarantining of 
places and times, rendering all space equally vulnerable to its ravages. If Camus did not write a novel 
that deals ethically with history, as Barthes suggests, and if his text naturalizes human violence as 
both subhuman in the form of a microbe, and superhuman in the form of an unknown goddess, he 
nevertheless offers a figure of epidemic violence that has remained central to an understanding of 
terror for more than half a century.    
                                                







Terrorism is a pathological copy of the organism it attacks, a retrovirus created from 
the latter’s cells. It is thus deceptive to think that the enemy comes from without, for 
there is no location outside of our network of global relationships from which any 
impulse, human or inhuman, could come. The threat of terrorism is omnipresent—
like the telephone… 
          —Hans Magnus Enzensberger, “The Resurgence of Human Sacrifice” 
 
 
We share the belief that terrorism is a cancer on the human condition and we intend to 
oppose it wherever it is. 
  —Donald Rumsfeld, “Briefing on Enduring Freedom” 
 
 
In the preceding chapters, I have identified some of the ways in which narratives of violence 
that fall outside the framework of classical warfare, particularly in the aftermath of the Indian 
Mutiny and the post-war uprisings in Algeria, begin to consolidate the language of insurgency, anti-
colonialism, terror and terrorism around the figure of epidemic. I have argued that the cultures of 
neo-Imperialism, especially European and American—including armed intervention, the expansion 
of humanitarianism and forced care, and economic and cultural exploitation—begin, in the wake of 
the September 11th attacks, to adopt the figure of epidemic as an epistemological key to thinking 
global terror, and the most productive entry point for representing and understanding a 
phenomenon that is virulent, shapeless, evasive, and nevertheless remains the object of war. While 
the culture at large reflects discernable patterns of representation and figuration with reference to 
terrorism, the authorship of such representation can also be linked to specific writers—in particular, 
makers of fiction whose representational work is far more nuanced and self-conscious than that of 
demagogues and policymakers, though not immune to the sway of the metaphors it mobilizes. We 
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have seen how stories of epidemicity and terror simultaneously shore up and challenge 
commitments to home, to proto-national collectivities, and to nation itself in Dracula, The Plague, and 
their various intertexts and contexts. In this chapter, I turn to a third scene in which we can clearly 
observe the resurgence of this paradigm: the contested geopolitical landscape of postpartition South 
Asia.  
In the work of Salman Rushdie in particular, whose influence on contemporary global 
literature, and by extension global liberalism’s view of Islam, is unparalleled, these questions take on 
new dimension, new force, and new urgency. Rushdie’s vast corpus of fiction and nonfiction has 
familiarized readers the world over with the beauties, dangers, and contradictions of South Asian 
and South Asian diasporic history and culture, especially its Islamic inheritance. Although his work 
spans geographies and times far beyond the contemporary, his most focused texts deal with the 
currents of politics and history that course through and flow out of the postpartition subcontinent. 
Rushdie’s oeuvre is accordingly deeply imprinted with questions of nation, and the ways in which its 
artifices and limits are expressed through a variety of ruptures including emigration, dislocation, 
linguistic displacement, violence, and epidemic. If we turn our focus to the novels in particular, we 
can see a marked shift in Rushdie’s representation of such violence, and more specifically in his 
representation of terrorism through the lens of epidemic, over the course of his career thus far. In 
this chapter, I argue that the progression from The Satanic Verses to Shalimar the Clown to the memoir 
Joseph Anton expresses Rushdie’s growing pessimism with regard to global Islam and its multiply 
refracted politics, and that all three books advance, in different ways and to different ends, the 
figural, epistemological, and practical relationship between terror and epidemic through narrative.  
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Where The Satanic Verses, published in 1988, resists the association of epidemic with Islamist 
violence, and provides instead the tools for a critique of the figure of terror-as-disease, Shalimar the 
Clown, which appeared in 2005, retreats into the metaphor of epidemic for terror, even as the novel 
reassesses the utility of this figure in the wake of the fatwa calling for the author’s death as well as the 
2001 World Trade Center attacks. In this way, Shalimar the Clown participates in the naturalization of 
terrorism as a category of being, rather than of action, that exists outside of and as an enemy of 
humanity, like a plague, in ways that build on the combination of Gothic and Orientalist 
conventions and rational scientism—both formal and epistemological—that we have seen in the 
earlier colonial works of Stoker and Camus. By juxtaposing the murderous history of German 
nationalism against contemporary Islamist terrorism, and representing both as plague, Shalimar the 
Clown builds on the transpositional practice of allegorizing history that we saw in Camus’s work. 
Rushdie’s novel even calls on the same historical moment of toxic German nationalism that stands a 
the base of Camus’s allegory, and reinscribes the figural relationship between epidemic and terror as 
a mechanism for sense-making in a world radically reorganized by the war. This reorganization, as 
Rushdie makes clear in his novel, included the beginning of the dismantling of the British Empire: 
the liberation of India and Pakistan and the de facto partitioning of Kashmir. Even as Shalimar the 
Clown offers many productive avenues for thinking the legacies of violence in the so-called failed 
states of postcolonialism, and resists an easy ideological stance on acts of Muslim violence and 
extremism, it nevertheless sustains and further elaborates the naturalizing figure of terror as plague 
in ways that exceed the purview of the writer’s fiction. 
Along with Camus’s and Stoker’s novels, Rushdie’s work—as a matter of effect rather than 
intention—participates in the construction of post-9/11 mythology by exceeding itself and 
becoming subject to ideological reassortment in the conversation about global Islam, as well as in 
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conversations about securitization, border control, the curtailing of civil rights, surveillance 
techniques, and their further normalization under the mantle of national and international security.227 
One of the most evident expressions of the figure of epidemic exceeding Rushdie’s fictional horizon  
is in its appearance in the recent memoir of his years in hiding, Joseph Anton, which, among other 
deployments of the metaphor, posits, “the fanatical cancer spreading through Muslim communities 
would, in the end, explode into the wider world.”228 Here, we can observe an opening of the 
taxonomy of epidemic figuration to include not just contagious illness, but also metastatic 
autoimmunity. This shift indicates not only the perennial slipperiness of the epidemic figure, but also 
an evolving set of assumptions about the imagined parameters of the collective body, and the 
measures that should be taken to protect it. I argue that by becoming a kind of belated confessor 
through his self-writing in the memoir, Rushdie lends the use of his imaginative representations of 
the Subcontinent and the South Asian diaspora to the reconfigurations of security discourse.229  
By contrast, The Satanic Verses stands as a counter-paradigm, functioning to overturn the 
ubiquitous figure of terrorism-as-epidemic by narratively isolating the terrorist hijackers of flight AI-
420; by ironizing the Gothic monstrosity of Salauddin Chamcha as a diabolical, outsized, Orientalist 
projection of otherness; and by tracking the salutary social effects of two different diseases, one 
                                                
227 The famous 2003 Pentagon screening of Gillo Pontecorvo’s documentary-style narrative film The 
Battle of Algiers as a piece of intelligence data and training information on the eve of the invasion of 
Iraq makes clear the discrepancy between the intentions of authors (Pontecorvo’s film is widely read 
as sympathetic to the Algerian independence movement he portrays) and the uses to which their 
texts can be put.  
228 Salman Rushdie, Joseph Anton (New York: Random House, 2012), 346.  
229 It is possible to trace the intersections between a fictional projection of terror as epidemic and the 
practicalities of security throughout Joseph Anton, but the points of greatest importance cluster 
around high level meetings with diplomats and politicians, most notably Bill Clinton and Margaret 
Thatcher, but also including a gathering of Senators during the Bush administration, attended by 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Patrick Leahy, Simon, Lugar, Cranston, Wofford, and Pell. As Rushdie 
describes it, the conversation was organized by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, in 
order to discuss the possibility of passing a resolution of support (Joseph Anton, 330).  
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literal within the fiction’s purview, and the other figurative, on contemporary communities in India 
and London. What Rushdie offers in place of the pathologization of Islam in The Satanic Verses is an 
alternative historical pastoral that decenters the monotheistic and patrilineal origins of the religion 
and borrows the notions of contagion, errancy, and mutation to show how a more plural, less 
dogmatic Islam may have been, indeed, may still be, possible. Although this radical, impossible 
future of Islam is a troubled one in the novel, replete with episodes of errancy and uncertainty, it 
offers a hopeful alternative in which telos of Islamist terrorism and or jihad, what Rushdie will later 
refer to as “actually existing Islam,”230 might well have been written out. Mapping these three works 
onto the crucial events of the 1989 fatwa, Rushdie’s years in hiding, and the September 11th attacks 
sheds light on how his body of work registers a growing dismay with what the author apparently 
perceives as the lost radical politics and solidarity of Muslim people, if not Islam. Such a 
contextualization also illuminates a growing propensity for avowing the epidemic metaphor for 
Islamist terrorism and authorizing its dehumanizing effects, and by extension authorizing the forms 
of security this dehumanization invites under the aegis of quarantine and care.  
 
—1. Both the Houses— 
The novelist and journalist Amitava Kumar has suggested that Rushdie is an “academic 
writer,” more concerned with breathless games of literary allusion, intertextuality, and historical 
                                                
230 Salman Rushdie, Joseph Anton (New York: Random House, 2012), 356. Rushdie analogizes his 
distinction between Islam and “actually existing Islam” with the great chasm between Marxist 
thinking and what he called “actually existing socialism” during the “worst excesses of Soviet 
Communism” (356-357). We can hear resonances here with the ontological problem expressed by 
Camus’s distinction between the epistemological mode of science, which explains what “happens” 
and other forms of thinking that investigate what “is.”  
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synchronicity than with the development of subtle political positions or deep characterization.231 
There are reasons to agree with Kumar’s claims; like Stoker’s and Camus’s, Rushdie’s protagonists 
often hover between archetype and person, wearing their many nicknames and pseudonyms as a suit 
of mirrors, behaving superheroically or supervillainously, toying with their fictional exemplarity but 
rarely transcending it.232 His novels invite a hermeneutics of the surface in part because their surfaces 
are so allusive, metafictional, heteroglossic, and hypermobile that they seem not only to obviate, but 
even to mock the quaint notion of depth, of a referent outside of textuality, as if in a virtuosic 
performance of the Derridian maxim il n’y a pas de hors–texte, there is no outside–text.233   
The “academic” intertextuality of Rushdie’s work is most perhaps most evident in the 
epigraphic material he uses to situate the novels. Like Camus, Rushdie looks to Daniel Defoe in the 
beginning of The Satanic Verses, a passage from The Political History of the Devil, which reads, “Satan, 
being thus confined to a vagabond, wandering, unsettled condition, is without any certain abode; for 
though he has, in consequence of his angelic nature, a kind of empire in the liquid waste or air, yet 
this is certainly part of his punishment that he is…without any fixed place, or space, allowed his to 
rest the sole of his foot upon.” 234 Defoe’s Devil, imperial master of “the liquid waste or air,” not 
only prefigures the smelly, migrant third-world subjects, those presumptive “devils” in the eyes of 
their unwelcoming hosts that are embodied in the Verses by the half-devil Saladin Chamcha, but also 
                                                
231 Amitava Kumar, “Who Will Break the Sad News to Salman Rushdie,” Tehelka (August 6, 2005), 
http://archive.tehelka.com/story_main13.asp?filename=hub080605who_will.asp. 
232 With particular reference to Shalimar the Clown, Natasha Walter has written that “the characters in 
Shalimar the Clown…are almost crushed by the freight of nations that they carry around on their 
shoulders.” Natasha Walter, “The Children of Paradise,” review of Salman Rushdie, Shalimar the 
Clown, Guardian (2 September, 2005), 
http://www.theguardian.com/books/2005/sep/03/fiction.salmanrushdie 
233 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976), 158–159.  
234 Daniel Defoe, The Political History of the Devil (Boston: Dow and Jackson, 1845), 64.  
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recalls the monstrous depictions of cholera’s communicative networks, the perverse self-translation 
of violence and evil from one place to another, one body to another, that stood at the base of early 
epidemiological discourse. Defoe’s title, which is amended in Rushdie’s text to The History of the Devil, 
further suggests that fictional and metaphysical forms, too, may have not just a history, but a 
political history; in this instance, a political history that ties sublime monstrosity to unsanitary flow. 
If Satan works in the epigraph from Defoe to represent the bodily dangers of liquid waste and evil 
air, of an uninhibited migration and the sufferings of perpetual homelessness, The Satanic Verses turns 
this blighted condition on its head, deconstructing the binaries of God and Devil, sacred and 
profane, and exploring the potential of the curse to turn itself inside out, to mutate and spread as the 
agent of transcultural solidarity and political change.  
The epigraphs of Shalimar the Clown are equally instructive in establishing the tone and literary 
parameters of the novel. The first epigraph is drawn from Agha Shahid Ali’s beautiful book of 
poems about Kashmir, The Country Without a Post Office. The lines echo the sorrowful condition of 
Satan and his accursed wanderings that preface The Satanic Verses, but here they paint a Kashmir 
beyond life, the poet as its Orpheus.  
I am being rowed through Paradise on a river of Hell;  
Exquisite ghost, it is night. 
The paddle is a heart; it breaks the porcelain waves.235  
 
The second epigraph is from Romeo and Juliet: Mercutio’s famous curse “A plague on both your 
houses.” This is an odd choice, not only for the connection it forges to the well-loved tale of 
adolescent romance, but also because, during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the phrase 
had become a trope of a hard-line American policy of avoiding involvement in the skirmishes of the 
                                                
235 Agha Shahid Ali, “Farewell,” The Country Without a Post Office (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 
1998), 22–23.  
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former colonies, notably the ongoing border dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.236 
Romeo and Juliet’s Mercutio repeats this curse three times as he dies. The first delivery is plaintive, 
without a direct addressee. Reaching out to an unnamed “he” that merges the self with the assailant, 
Mercutio keens, “I am hurt. A plague a’ both the houses! I am sped. Is he gone and hath 
nothing?”237 The second instance is a famous moment of gallows humor in which irony joins a 
mounting bitterness, “…ask for me tomorrow and you shall find me a grave man. I am peppered I 
warrant, for this world. A plague a’ both your houses” (3.1.90-91). Mercutio’s third pronouncement 
completes the hex; in fury and resignation he intones his dying wish, “a plague a’ both your houses! 
They have made worms’ meat of me. I have it, and soundly too. Your houses!” (3.1.96-98).  
What work does this phrase do, isolated from both the body of Rushdie’s novel and from its 
native Shakespearean surroundings, and what kind of stage does it set for the tale Rushdie tells of a 
political assassination bred in the terrorist training grounds of the India-Pakistan border through its 
invocation of plague? In the First Quarto, Mercutio’s “plague” is set down as “pox,” and he invokes 
it four times with no discernable escalation, lending the words a lesser sense of finality in both the 
specificity of the distemper called down, and in terms of its monotone deployment in his dying 
speeches. Quarto 1 was called The Most Excellent Tragedy of Romeo and Juliet, while Quarto 2 went by 
the name The Most Lamentable Tragedy of Romeo and Juliet; we might say, by extension, that a pox may 
be contagious and disfiguring, even life threatening, but a plague is epidemic, existential, 
eschatological. To put it differently, one is an excellent tragedy—a category under which we might 
consider the first of these two novels, The Satanic Verses—while the other is a lamentable one. 
                                                
236 Cf. Howard B. Schaffer, The Limits of Influence: America’s Role in Kashmir (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 2009), Chapter 5 “A Plague on Both Their Houses,” 97-118.   
237 William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet (The New Cambridge Shakespeare), ed. G. Blakemore 
Evans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3.1.82-84. Hereafter cited in text.  
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Rushdie sets loose the strongest of these iterations in Shalimar, and indeed the novel seems to take 
place under a curse of global proportions, commencing in the aftermath of some hazy and ancient 
animosity, and looking forward to a tragic and perhaps accidental mutual destruction.  
By many accounts, Mercutio is a voice of reason in Shakespeare’s beloved tragedy; he serves 
as a kind of diplomat or prophetic third party between the warring Capulets and Montagues, and, as 
the first victim of the rising conflict, is the first to foresee the senseless losses that will accrue to 
both sides. 238 But, in terms of the play’s mechanisms of language, indirection, and misprision by 
which the young lovers come to their demise, he is also the cause of the curse. His words make 
themselves material and fated through their repeated articulation—in the play’s tragic structure and 
the generic obligations of the tragedy, “a plague on both your houses” carries with it the force of 
law. As an apostrophe or invocation that embodies the turn toward the tragic in the third act of the 
play, it becomes a threat that, by virtue of being spoken, cannot but come true. This phrase is 
remarkably incantatory;  it changes shapes, recombines, becomes more virulent, beginning in a 
plaintive mode and amplifying in its urgency and specification of its targets, even as it speaks about 
plague.  
For an author with a live and very recently renewed bounty on his head in the form of the 
fatwa calling for his death,239 the status of such a curse—especially if we understand it in the language 
                                                
238 In his essay, “Mercutio’s Brother,” Joseph A. Porter argues that Mercutio may even be read as a 
figure for the author himself. This connection is particularly important in a reading of Shalimar the 
Clown, in which the major characters’ deaths are foreshadowed by the death of an author at knife 
point. Joseph A. Porter, “Mercutio’s Brother,” South Atlantic Review 49.4 (1984), 33.  
239 This recent development remains shifting terrain for study, but the “causes” of this renewal, such 
as they are, can be summarized thusly: the publication of Joseph Anton, Rushdie’s new memoir of his 
years in hiding, occurred close on the heels of a series of violent protests around the world over a 
14-minute video trailer for an anti-Islamic film called “Innocence of Muslims,” which was posted on 
the web a shared around the Muslim world very quickly (Al Jazeera, 14th September, 2012). In 
response to both of these events, a religious foundation in Iran has increased the price on Rushdie’s 
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of judgment as a verdict or a decree240—cannot be overemphasized. In his study of the cross cultural 
meanings of Islamic practice and law, Tariq Ramadan defines fatwa as “literally, ‘legal decision,’ 
‘verdict,’ or, following the definition of al-Shatibi, ‘A reply to a legal question given by an expert 
(mufti) in the form of words, action, or approval.’”241 The sense of verdict as both a legal judgment 
and a true word (ver-dict) forms a hinge over the peculiar temporal duality of Mercutio’s curse, which 
can be understood both as describing a plague that only he, like a doomed latter-day Cassandra can 
see and at the same time calling such a curse into being.  The fatwa, an exemplary speech act, calling 
for Rushdie’s murder that was issued by the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 on the occasion of the 
publication of The Satanic Verses was, in a very narrow, literal sense, “a plague on both [his] 
houses”—in both East and West, Rushdie would become a hunted man, and to a lesser degree, a 
homeless man. The novel and its writer both present a profusion of possibilities for thinking the 
status of the “houses” on which the plague has been called down; cities, villages, dwellings, and 
interior spaces reinforce and explode by turns the conventions of Gothic fiction as well as Jameson’s 
notion of third world national allegory by offering not only nation but also lineage, territory, home, 
and even mind as spaces of vulnerability.   
                                                
head to 3.3 million dollars. The New York Daily News reports that in spite of the fact that Rushdie 
has no involvement in the creation of the film, an Iranian religious foundation maintains that if 
Rushdie “had already been killed, the anti-Islam film would not have gained such popularity and 
would have never even been made” (Jenny Che, “Salman Rushdie is a wanted man…again: ‘Satanic 
Verses’ fatwa renewed,” New York Daily News, Page Views Book Blog, 18 September, 2012  
<http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/pageviews/2012/09/salman-rushdie-is-a-wanted-managain-
satanic-verses-fatwa-renewed>).  
240 A secondary point about the frequent translation of fatwa as verdict and decree: decree derives from 
the Greek krisis, which was used by Hippocrates and Galen to describe the turning point in a disease 
(“Crisis,” Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, ed. C.T. Onions (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1966), 229). To decree is, in this sense, to set right or heal. Even in the strictest 
definition that Tariq Ramadan offers from al-Shatibi, the sense of a “reply” given to a legal question 
connotes a rift, separation, or disagreement that may be set right by the fatwa.  
241 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, (New York & Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 48.   
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A famously cosmopolitan writer, Rushdie venerates and honors this condition as much as he 
mourns it. From the title essay of his 1991 collection Imaginary Homelands to the epigraph of The 
Satanic Verses, taken from Defoe’s description of the Devil’s accursed wanderings, home is an 
affliction and a fantasy, a faded monochrome past and a queasy Technicolor future. Musing on a 
faded old black and white photograph of his home in Bombay, and speaking of his fellow Indian 
expatriates in the spirit of what has now become a ubiquitous ethics of departure elaborated in the 
work of Glissant, Said, Appiah, and Spivak, among others, he writes  
If we do look back, we must also do so in the knowledge—which gives rise to profound 
uncertainties—that our physical alienation from India almost inevitably means that we will 
not be capable of reclaiming precisely the thing that was lost; that we will, in short, create 
fictions, not actual cities or villages, but invisible ones, imaginary homelands, Indias of the 
mind.242 
 
To what homes or houses does Mercutio’s curse apply in Shalimar the Clown? Given the status of 
Rushdie’s first two major novels, Midnight’s Children and Shame, as satirical allegories of India and 
Pakistan, respectively, we may consider the possibility of these “houses” as both territorial and 
deterritorialized or diasporic spaces of national belonging. Such a reading might follow from 
Frederic Jameson’s well-known suggestion in “Third World Literature in the Era of Multinational 
Capitalism” that  
[a]ll third world texts are necessarily…allegorical, and in a very specific way: they are to be 
read as what I call national allegories, even when, or perhaps I should say particularly when 
their forms develop out of predominantly western machineries of representation, such as the 
novel.243  
 
I won’t rehearse here the very thorough critiques of Jameson’s much-derided position, but the novel 
                                                
242 Salman Rushdie, Imaginary Homelands (New York: Vintage, 1991), 10.  
243 Frederic Jameson, “Third World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism,” Social Text 15 
(Autumn 1986), 69. Emphasis in the original. See also Aijaz Ahmad’s counterposition in the first 
chapter of In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures, “Literary Theory and ‘Third World Literature:’ Some 
Contexts,” (London: Verso, 1992), 43-72.  
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does offer an opening for this kind of reading.244 In line with Jameson’s preferred mode of reading 
and interpretation, the book’s first part is titled simply “India.” We learn almost immediately, 
however, that Shalimar’s is not an allegory of Indian bildung or national formation, but is rather yet 
another India of the mind. The India after which the novel’s first section is named is not an 
imaginary place, but a woman unhappily saddled with a name that represents her father’s romantic 
attachment to the land in which he served as an American ambassador, and from which he departed 
in disgrace once the news of her arrival had reached the ears of authority. If this woman stands for 
India in some way, it is not in a straightforward relationship like the one suggested by Jameson’s 
self-confessed “sweeping hypothesis.” In Rushdie’s novel, set partially in Los Angeles and written in 
New York, the tragic players come not from two rival ancestral houses, nor from rival nations, but 
from many intersecting lines and many exploded territories, few of which are in any meaningful 
sense national. Instead, the lines of flight that occasion their constitution and begetting of one 
another originate in the intimate spaces of the house, which work in what Deleuze and Guattari 
describe as a “connective fashion,” in spite of the spatio-temporal distances that separate them.245 
Each of these houses, at different moments in history, becomes a site of contagion for the unfolding 
of a violent, multigenerational epidemic of terror.  
                                                
244 Stephen Morton explores Shalimar’s presentation of the impossibility of Kashmiri national 
allegory in his article “‘There were collisions and explosions. The world was no longer calm.’ Terror 
and precarious life in Salman Rushdie’s Shalimar the Clown,” Textual Practice 22.2 (June 2008), 337-355. 
Here, he suggests that in the diasporic inheritors of kashmiriyat, we can observe “an answer to a 
narrow ethnic or national chauvinism…an unresolved tension which disfigures the national 
allegorical structure of Shalimar the Clown” (339).  
245 This description of the connectivity of intimate spaces draws on Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari’s conception of the “house-machine” and the “organ-machine,” from Adolf Wölfli’s 
drawings, which participate in the construction of the “body-without organs.” Anti-Oedipus (London: 
Continuum, 2004), 16-17 (on Wölfli) and following.  
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In some ways, this novel, through Shalimar, tells the story of the possible motives and 
operations of Islamism, communalism, nationalism, global network development, and terrorism 
more completely than any other book of its stature in the Anglophone world written since the 
September 11th attacks. At the same time, it bisects the representation of terrorism into the 
traditionally literary realm of psychology and the more social scientific orientation toward effects of 
operations outside of good and evil, or even desire and its objects. The novel also flirts with 
connecting the thoughtless chauvinism and myopic selfishness of American foreign policy as a 
legacy of the world-organizational moment following the Second World War to the contemporary 
epidemic of terrorism. What it does not do is illustrate, or in any significant way critique the 
symmetrical and subsequent motives and operations of counterterrorism and international security 
either as intelligence gathering or as a practice of soft warfare. 
Unlike Rushdie’s other terrorism novel, The Satanic Verses, which opens in the 
deterritorialized space of the sky, Shalimar begins and ends in a house. More precisely, it begins with 
India, standing on a balcony, Juliet-like, watching as her father approaches the front door of her Los 
Angeles apartment building, having just stepped out of a futuristic DeLorean sports car. By the 
book’s close, our heroine has further upended the status of the nation as an allegorical key to the 
novel by rechristening herself Kashmira after the contested border region of Kashmir, the paradisal 
valley of her mother’s birth and her father’s great indiscretion. Readers of the earlier novels will be 
reminded here of the idyllic scenes of filial history in Midnight’s Children, set in Rushdie’s family’s 
homeland of then-colonial Kashmir, which fades into nostalgic mists to make room for that book’s 
brash new nation.246 Kashmira, we learn later, is also the name India’s birth mother gave her, and the 
name her adoptive English mother forcefully erased. In the novel’s final scene, India-now-Kashmira 
                                                
246 Salman Rushdie, Midnight’s Children (New York: Penguin Books, 1991).  
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lays in wait, entombed in a closet in her dead father’s mansion on Mulholland Drive, Rushdie’s nod 
to David Lynch’s California Gothic, waiting under cover of night to assassinate his assassin, 
Shalimar, who has come to kill her in her sleep.247 Further emphasizing the interior architectonics of 
the novel are India’s descriptions of the bedtime stories her father told her, in which she, the 
protagonist, would be expected to chop her way through “the palace of power, a labyrinth of 
interconnecting rooms…windowless…” in which “[t]here is no visible door,” until she penetrates 
“the room of power” in its center.248 These stories with their labyrinthine, sightless corridors leading 
to undefined houses of power—a Gothic space in the image of Sedgwick’s architectonics—would 
become the blueprints of her dreams.  
Brightly drawn as they are, the names of these palaces, the houses to be plagued, the 
dominions over which they presided, and the nature of the power they contained—the power from 
which India would draw and toward which she is told she must struggle—remain indeterminate. 
India’s mother, Boonyi Noman, is long dead, she “had died giving her birth” (4), just as her own 
mother had died delivering Boonyi. Both are present in the novel only metonymically as mother-
shaped absences and in the flowing bodies of water that express longing for place: the snow-melt 
Muskadoon in the Kashmiri village of Pachigam, and the fresh water spring, Santa Monica, named 
for the tears of Saint Augustine’s mother Monica who wept for him when he turned away from the 
church. Kashmira wonders, “[w]ould her dead mother, hearing of her godlessness, have wept for 
her, like a saint?” (18). As mother stand-ins, the novel gives us two witches, the ancient 
                                                
247 Triangulating the Lynchian undertones of this scene is another Hollywood horror reference; a 
number of critics identified India’s use of night-vision goggles in the final scene as an homage to 
Jonathan Demme’s 1991 film, The Silence of the Lambs. See Theo Tait, “The Flame-Broiled Whopper,” 
London Review of Books 27.19 (6 October, 2005), http://www.lrb.co.uk/v27/n19/theo-tait/flame-
broiled-whopper and Amitava Kumar, prev. in fn 233.  
248 Salman Rushdie, Shalimar the Clown (New York: Random House, 2005), 16. Hereafter cited in text. 
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Nazarébadoor, a Kashmiri priestess of the dark arts from ancient Georgian stock, and Olga “Volga” 
Simenovna, the potato sorceress from the Volga delta, which shares the Caspian Sea with the blood-
rich soil of the Caucasus. Even without the occult old-world immigrants and the biographical 
connection to Mary Shelley, whose own mother’s death during childbirth would later bear fruit in 
Shelley’s fiction as the gruesome motherless siring of the Frankenstein monster, it would be difficult 
to imagine a more Gothic frame that didn’t also take us out of the present. Spatial enclosure, sleep 
states, interpretive deferral, and Oedipal or incestuous plots are all features of the Gothic imaginary 
according to Eve Sedgwick’s taxonomy in The Coherence of Gothic Conventions.249 In this novel, which 
begins with an assassination and ends with a murder that closes the loop of a multigenerational 
family romance, we are invited to consider power not only as a historical force, but also, as in the 
Gothic novel, as a locus of violence, plague, haunting, and death. Given the centrality of the struggle 
between Pakistan and India over Kashmir in the novel, we must also ask whether the house of 
power is built according to the malignantly engineered plans of the nation.  
For all the claustrophobic, overdetermined symbolism of these settings, however, the novel’s 
first and last intimate spaces of interiority are enfolded in the homogenous non-evental space of Los 
Angeles, which, as the city of angels, stands in for the infinite revelation of the timeless afterlife. 
India describes it in the opening pages as a place with “[n]o mysteries…or depths; only surfaces and 
revelations” (5). In the context of the political significance of the veil in the lives of Rushdie’s 
recalcitrant Kashmiri women, who defy orders by invading marauders to mark (and potentially 
preserve) themselves as Muslims or Hindus by covering their hair, revelation can be understood here 
                                                
249 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, The Coherence of Gothic Convention (New York: Arno Press, 1980). See also 
Anne Williams, Art of Darkness, Fred Botting, Gothic, and David Punter, The Literature of Terror for 
further cataloguing and elucidation of the generic and aesthetic concerns of Gothic literature.  
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both in its metaphysical sense and in its literal sense of removing a cover, or unveiling.250 As in 
Camus’s tensely observed opening of The Plague, this landscape of revelation offers up, in India’s 
narrative retrospection, three “portents” of her father’s death. We will see this figure reappear as 
well in the memoir, Joseph Anton, in which they are depicted in the more classical medium of the 
blackbird, whose first arrival gives the prologue its title: “The First Blackbird.” Thinking in terms of 
the portents of the end-times, then, we must also note the ways in which Rushdie allows the 
invocations of Hell and the plague in the epigraph to do multiple kinds of work. As in Mercutio’s 
trinity of curses, the Biblical apocalypse text, Revelation, describes the three vials of wrath poured out 
over the world, the first of which is plague. The second vial of wrath transforms the sea into “the 
blood of a dead man,” while the third is poured “upon the rivers and fountains of water; and they 
became blood,” too.251 These scenes of punishment—part of a pattern of hypotyposis in Revelation 
that makes invisible crimes against faith spectacular—anatomize the sea, the rivers, and the land in 
between as a bleeding corpse. We can see this graphic anthropomorphism at work throughout 
Rushdie’s novel, but particularly in his early descriptions of the sinful city of Los Angeles: “[a]s India 
navigated the hollow freeways, her father lauded the city’s bizarre anatomy, which was fed and 
nourished by many such congealed and flowing arteries but needed no heart to drive its mighty flux” 
(21). Here, Los Angeles is not only a house-machine, it is also a body without organs in a nation 
without a heart.  
The tendency of apocalyptic narrative toward the anthropomorphic spectacular builds on the 
imaginative habit of projecting space as body-like, and inscribes the relationship between the specific 
                                                
250 Jacques Derrida, “Of A Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy,” trans. John Leavey Jr., in 
Raising the Tone of Philosophy ed. Peter Fenves (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 
120-122. 
251 The Bible: Authorized King James Version (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), introduction and 
notes Robert Carroll and Stephen Prickett, “Revelation” (16: 2-4), 312.  
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and the general through the flexible, scalar depiction of anatomy. Mercutio’s triple apostrophe, “a 
plague on both your houses,” conditions our reading of Rushdie’s novel, and in so doing foretells a 
private set of losses that simultaneously occasion and index a crisis that is far more public. The 
multiple narratives of crisis, in the world of the novel, take on the capacity to crush all narrative time 
into a single moment: each death, by natural and unnatural causes, seems plucked out of time to 
indicate a collective end in the special, dilatory instantaneity of eschatology. With the forceful 
memory of the heaven-hell binary whose deconstruction motors The Satanic Verses, we might further 
ask if Los Angeles functions as something of a Babylon in Shalimar’s post-moral universe. The 
ambassador’s impressions bear this connection out: he describes the city somewhat admiringly as a 
“decentered promiscuous sprawl….a naked whore, lying on its back and turning every trick” (21-22). 
Such an open city, in a story in which time is rendered smooth and homogenous, would seem to 
foreclose the geometry of allegory, reducing the space between what is seen and what is signified to 
a single, continuous revealed present. But this surface of revelation is not the whole story of the city. 
The ambassador’s monologue continues, “this veiled and difficult place, this erotic capital of the 
obscure strategem, knew precisely how to arouse and heighten our metropolitan desires” (22). One 
of these desires, at least for the ambassador, seems to be for answers. In the flattened world the 
novel observes, we might extend this desire as an expression of longing for a recognizable 
relationship between surface and depth, text and subtext, effects and causes, events and subjects. 
India thinks of her father’s recent obsession with the purported “lizard people” living underground 
and siphoning the resources of their wealthier Angeleno neighbors and concludes, too, that L.A. 
remains “guarded and secret in spite of all its apparent nakedness. In such places,” she continues, 
“even the forces of destruction no longer needed the shelter of the dark” (5). How can the city be 
both open and diffuse, a decentered biomorphic body and also secret, veiled, and vertical? What 
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might this tension teach us about the relationship between the house and the world? Between 
history and the present?  
Personal intimacies, associated in this novel, as in many of Rushdie’s texts, with “the forces 
of destruction,” persistently explode into the public and beyond, into the world-historical. The 
private desires of the American ambassador to India, focused particularly on defending the 
autonomy of the beautiful Kashmir Valley, first determine the course of Indo-American diplomacy 
while he is serving in his post, and later bring his public career to a halt. That he hails from an 
Alsatian Jewish family, and is a survivor of the holocaust, further inflects his struggle with the 
double movement of intimate concerns and modern history. The private wounds of Shalimar, 
rightful husband of the ambassador’s beloved Kashmiri girl, determine a course of events that 
carries him from terrorist training camps in the Himalayas to the driver’s seat of the ambassador’s 
Bentley, to the doorstep where he will slit the ambassador’s throat, and later to a cell block in San 
Quentin prison. Peggy Rhodes, India’s adoptive mother and the ambassador’s one-time wife, 
facilitates escape after escape from Nazi occupied territories to Allied zones on the strength of her 
affection for the not-yet-then ambassador. These characters, the protagonist’s parents’ generation, 
understand themselves as moderns, and as agents of history: changeable, ambitious, but essentially 
themselves, and unshakably committed to post-war and post-colonial senses of right and wrong, 
respectively. Consequently, they have ambitions in line with the size of the world as they know it.  
Only India, named for two places, but linked by her own account to none, remains without 
intimacies, and therefore, according to the novel’s framework, in a position of receptivity and 
reaction, rather than action. At twenty-four years old, she has plans to become a documentary 
filmmaker. A recorder of truth, her father notes, who “wanted to inhabit facts, not dreams” (12). 
Before Shalimar, now a nameless Kashmiri driver in L.A., murders her father, India indulges in a 
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lustful fantasy about the man who the novel describes as “the most beautiful boy in the world” (54).   
She sees Shalimar the Clown, in fact, as the Kashmir valley. “His hair was a mountain stream. There 
were narcissi from the banks of rushing rivers and peonies from the high meadows growing on his 
chest, poking out through his open collar. Around him there raucously echoed the sound of the 
swarnai”(11), a stringed instrument played by Kashmiri bards. The reader doesn’t yet know that 
Shalimar is India’s dead mother’s husband and executioner, and as such, her surrogate father and 
personal reaper, as well as an embodiment of her eventual namesake valley, the intraterritory of 
Kashmir.  
In the salacious sequence in which India and Shalimar first meet, India repeatedly describes 
herself, with echoes of Dracula’s exemplary female medium Mina Harker, as a “conduit,” a “crystal 
ball,” “an abstraction,” “the channel the medium” (13), and later eroticizes her own image in the 
mirror with the conclusion, “she was her father’s ghost” (15). Although she refers explicitly here to 
the ambassador whose body she claims she has inherited, her words also reflect the skewed paternity 
of Shalimar, her biological mother’s husband with whom she shares the light eyes and high color of 
Kashmir. “She was her father’s ghost,” India thinks, and unknowingly also the ghost of Shalimar, 
who also will repeatedly disappear without a trace. To further undermine his heroine’s 
autochthonous character traits that mark her as the ambassador’s Californian daughter, Rushdie 
splices together the young woman’s angry, frustrated training montages—the archery, martial arts, 
boxing, and shooting into which she vengefully flings herself after the killing—with Shalimar’s own 
training in the border mountains under the so-called Iron Mullahs. In the end of the novel, back in 
Los Angeles, India anxiously realizes that, again, like Mina Harker, she has become a medium for her 
enemy, the man who killed her father. Shalimar has slipped away into the sky during a bizarre 
transmigratory prison break and is now making contact psychically: 
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…she had begun to hear his voice inside her head. Or not exactly a voice but a disembodied, 
nonverbal transmission, like a wild screech full of static and internal dissension, hatred and 
shame, repentance and threat, curses and tears; like a werewolf howling at the moon….She 
was made greatly afraid by this auditory manifestation, by her transformation into a medium 
for the living (340). 252  
 
India’s capacity to hear Shalimar’s transmissions turn out to be a legacy from her mother, whose 
love and guilt over her ambition-driven affair with the ambassador enabled her, once she had been 
effectively imprisoned for her infidelity, to continue to communicate with her estranged husband, 
and to anticipate and even long for the moment at which he would kill her. These conflicting 
accounts of the vastness of the world (global transmission systems reprised, to be sure, from 
Midnight’s Children) and the miniscule goings-on of the territory and the mind, the interconnectedness 
of people, place, ethnicities, languages, and the lovingly-rendered details of the hybrid particulars are 
perhaps Rushdie’s most well-known trait as a novelist. James Wood, in a critique of what he called 
“hysterical realism,” published in The New Republic in September of 2001, identifies in the 
contemporary global Anglophone novel the risk of a “Rushdie-like orthodoxy about the worship of 
hybridity.”253 The subject of his essay is Zadie Smith’s novel White Teeth, another book in which 
terrorism features prominently, but he identifies this tendency even more strongly in Rushdie’s 
writing. In Wood’s characterization of this technique of representing global interconnectedness and 
métissage as “hysterical” we can see another kind of pathologization of the narratives of globalization, 
                                                
252 The representation of the young woman as conduit, medium, vessel, and so forth is a readily 
available trope in the English-language novel. Here it is worth noting the particular similarities to 
Stoker’s representation of Mina Harker. In the scenes of her most acute illness following the bite she 
receives from Dracula, Mina Harker must be transfused with the actual blood of a series of men, 
and later becomes an occult medium through whom the group of heroes can perceive Dracula’s 
movements. Both of these conditions are coded as forms of infection in the novel.  
253 James Wood, “Human, All Too Inhuman,” The New Republic, 30 August, 2001. 
<http://www.powells.com/review/2001_08_30.html.> This essay reviews Zadie Smith’s first 
novel, White Teeth, which is also a baroque work of global Anglophone literature that deals 
extensively with the crises of immigration and terrorism in London.  
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beyond the merely allegorical, although in this instance it’s not the unclean, disease-ridden writers of 
subaltern history but rather the weak, feminized Other, the postcolonial writer whose presumptive 
womb is wreaking havoc on his or her sense of the real. In much the same way that Stoker uses the 
belching fissures of the Carpathians in Dracula to prefigure the horrific bodily incontinence he will 
visit on his victims, Rushdie’s critics describe his writerly tendencies as incontinent, undisciplined, 
perverse. Citing Wood’s critique of Rushdie’s histrionics, for example, Joy Press, in a review of 
Shalimar, bemoans the novel’s lack of the “usual glorious torrents of slanguage and gouts of 
Rabelaisian humor,” identifying in the writer’s habits a kind of gushing liquidity that evokes the 
tropical contamination of the novel form.254 The upshot, for Wood, is an evisceration of what he 
calls the “humanity” of character, which I would suggest, following Derrida, expresses a nostalgia 
for the stable, organic, singular ontologies associated with a metaphysics of presence.255 For Wood, 
this literature’s primary sin is a headlong—we might even say eschatological—drive to describe 
everything as everything.  
Or, in terms Rushdie gives to his heroine India, “[e]verywhere was now a part of everywhere 
else…Our lives, our stories, flowed into one another’s, were no longer our own, individual, 
discrete.” She continues, “[t]his unsettled people. There were collisions and explosions. She thought 
of Housman in Shropshire. That is the land of lost content” (37). Thinking in the mode of the person as 
medium, E.A. Housman’s words from The Shropshire Lad, a collection of poems about death and 
                                                
254 Joy Press, “Tragic Realism,” The Village Voice (August 2, 2005) 
http://www.villagevoice.com/2005-08-02/books/tragic-realism/full/ 
255 This particular incorporation of organicism in an account of Derridian “matter” is indebted to 
Pheng Cheah’s “Nondialectical Materialism,” diacritics 38:1-2 (Spring-Summer 2008), 143-157, but 
the disruption of dialectical foundations of ontology in Derrida is here particularly marked by his 
work in Rogues, trans. Pascale-Anne Bruault and Michael Naas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2005). Cf. chapter 6, “The Rogue that I am,” 63-70 and chapter 8, “The Last of the Rogue 
Sates: The ‘Democracy to Come,’ Opening in Two Turns,” 78-94.  
265 
loss, work doubly for India to point to a lost contentment, or happiness, as well as to the loss of 
content, substance, or personhood. In a novel filled with name changing, transnational characters—
all of them forgers, passeurs, posers, performers, or spies—India’s citation of Housman draws 
attention to the negative consequences of the loss of the subject and the loss of place, as the loss of 
content. Echoing the reductions of people to carriers, mediums, and later, disease vectors, the 
unauthorized melding of India’s brain with Shalimar’s in the novel’s final section, which India 
eventually turns to her advantage by torturing the prisoner with a barrage of violent thoughts, begs 
us to consider whether a brain has any content or autonomy at all if it can be inhabited or brought 
into confluence with another. In light of the novel’s self conscious identification with tragedy, 
questions of agency, personal sovereignty, and history abound: by what movement does the self act 
or does history unfold if the dialectic collapses into a monolect? Can there remain a distinction 
between effects and causes? If we pull back from the personal to the scale of the geographic, the 
questions transform: are these spaces, these plagued houses, simply indistinguishable extensions of 
one another—as in the claim that everywhere was now a part of everywhere else—or are there 
historical and geographical specifics worthy of consideration in the constellation of Los Angeles and 
Kashmir? One the one hand Shalimar presents us with ideas of territory, nation, city, dynasty, 
sovereignty, and identity that might be understood through the binary—the both—set forth by 
Mercutio. Kashmir is dying by the selfish headlong double-suicide of Pakistan and India. On the 
other hand, the novel continuously escapes the binary structure of antagonism and the dialectical 
unfolding of history, and suggests a series of third terms to the coextensive questions of ontology 
and sovereignty not through the mechanisms of classical conflict, which imply a bilateral structure, 
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but through the mechanisms of infection, circulation, and spread.256 India sits in her upper chamber, 
musing on what will be her father’s legacy as ambassador. She thinks of how her father  
tried to believe that the global structures he had helped to build, the pathways of influence, 
money, and power, the multinational associations, the treaty organizations, the frameworks 
of cooperation and law whose purpose had been to deal with a hot war turned cold, would 
still function in the future that lay beyond what he could foresee. She saw in him a desperate 
need to believe that the ending of his age would be happy, and that the new world which 
would come after would be better than the one that would die with him….a world without 
walls, a frontierless newfound land of infinite possibility (20).  
 
The man who holds these beliefs is dubbed by Rushdie Max Ophuls, after the German filmmaker 
who hailed from the German side of the Alsatian border with France. Rushdie’s penchant for name 
puns finds no exception here in the ambassador’s outsized chivalry and tragic foolishness. He 
stands, in this way, as something of a foil for the Clown, his rival Shalimar. The fictional Max, who 
we later find out did not leave public service after his ill-advised affair but rather went underground 
to serve as U.S. Counterterrorism chief, hails from the Alsatian city of Strasbourg in France, 75 miles 
from the real Max Ophuls’s home of Saarbrücken. Rushdie situates the ambassador as a native of 
the culturally distinct, and often disputed territory between Germany and France, which invites 
comparison to Kashmir; the ambassador will later muse on the likeness between the two regions, 
“[h]e had come a long way but perhaps not so very far. Could any two places have been more 
different, he asked himself; could any two places have been more the same?” (180). The ambassador 
finds his footing in American diplomacy after becoming a hero in the Second World War as a 
member of the French resistance. In this sense, he stands as an oblique fictionalized composite that 
includes shades of Camus, a midcentury humanist, a man of conviction who turns out to have 
                                                
256 This concern is simultaneously localizing, in the sense that it is associated with what Foucault 
called “the problem of the town” in the eighteenth century, writing that in addition to allowing for 
surveillance, “it was a matter of organizing circulation, eliminating its dangerous elements, making a 
division between good and bad circulation, and maximizing the good circulation by diminishing the 
bad” (Security, Territory, Population, 18).  
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aligned himself on the wrong side of an unambiguous colonial conflict which appeared to him, 
nevertheless, to be the rightful inheritor of post-war justice. For Max Ophuls, America’s power is no 
less categorically dismissable than the extension of French rule in Algeria was for Camus. In an 
interview with the Paris Review following the publication of Shalimar the Clown, Rushdie explained this 
compositional choice in the terms of juxtaposition,  
The resistance, which we think of as heroic, was what we would now call an insurgency in a 
time of occupation. Now we live in a time when there are other insurgencies that we don’t 
call heroic—that we call terrorist. I didn’t want to make moral judgments. I wanted to say: 
That happened then, this is happening now, this story includes both those things, just look 
how they sit together.257  
 
The way Rushdie describes the historical juxtaposition of occupied France and occupied 
Kashmir recalls Walter Benjamin’s modes of reading, most evidently constellation and its 
relationship to historical materialism, which interrupts the linear unfolding of history by attending to 
the ways in which history leaps out of itself to haunt or interrupt the present. Rushdie works with a 
similar theory of history in his fiction through the use of metonymy, a form of figuration that 
instantiates its own materialism by rendering various places and moments in history vulnerable to a 
variety of interrelated plagues. The reassorting of this plague happens in disjointed narrative time. 
Shalimar’s Max pilots his way out of Nazi occupied Strasbourg in a one-of-a-kind Bugatti plane and 
into a career as an architect of the post-war international order not in his native Europe, but rather 
in the land of promise and novelty, the new Imperial superpower, America. At the historic Bretton 
Woods conference, he masterminds the open market postwar global economic “restructuring,” 
which included the creation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the 
International Monetary Fund. Finally, Max decamps to New York where he begins his ascent to an 
                                                
257 Salman Rushdie, “The Art of Fiction No. 186,” interviewed by Jack Livings, The Paris Review, 
2005.  
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embassy position. It is such “pathways,” “global structures,” “treaty organizations,” and 
“frameworks of cooperation and law,” that India invokes as her father’s unfortunate objects of 
nostalgia and his limited vision for the future. Inasmuch as they carry with them the germs of Max’s 
own history, they are also the pathways of transmission of a life-threatening scourge in the form of a 
post-war politics of nationhood. Such an infectious world order, even imagined by a man for whom 
not one but two formerly autonomous valley regions—Alsace and Kashmir—function as imaginary 
homelands, would depend on the stability of the nation to uphold a right and just internationalism. 
If his daughter is his dream, and that of his wife Peggy Rhodes, whose fevered nightmares showed 
her a baby girl that would grow up to be her estranged adopted daughter, India’s given name 
confirms its shape as the dream of the cooperative, multi-ethnic nation—Nehru’s secular India, the 
multi-lingual France of the resistance, the America of summit meetings, surfaces, and revelation. 
This is a humanist vision of the nation, an “India Shining,” in the ubiquitous lexicon of the then-
ascendant BJP government, that would bestow its light on all creeds. 
India’s prophetic diagnosis of her father’s dimming worldview, limited by his own particular 
history and the world he helped create as a result, begins with more skepticism than hope, however. 
Even as he admired and believed in the “elegiac presidencies of the writers, of Václav Havel and 
Arpad Goncz,” India worries that “[h]e closed his mind to other, less palatable possibilities…” (20). 
In this invocation of Hável and Goncz, the former of whom will play a prominent role in the 
memoir, Rushdie expresses a fervent hope that history may, indeed, be made at least in part by 
fabulists. If these men of the pen could inhabit offices at the highest levels of government, what 
history would they write? What blessings or curses would they bestow, and on whose houses or 
homelands would they bestow them? 
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—2. The Plague of Nations— 
In Rushdie’s own historical fictions, the past is often couched in the pluperfect or the 
epithetical, even within the more vivid form of the flashback. The pasts of characters and places are 
described as if by accident in nested subordinate clauses, which are often nestled next to low-voiced, 
parenthetical announcements of large-scale world historical events. The form is especially prevalent 
when many characters—who are the ancestors of other characters—appear in a scene. This one 
describes Shalimar’s parents:   
The Alexandrian fantasy of Firdaus Noman, which caused her to insist that her fair hair and 
blue eyes were a royal Macedonian legacy, had provoked her most vehement quarrels with 
her husband, who opined that conquering foreign monarchs were pestilences as undesirable 
as malaria, while simultaneously, and without conceding that his behavior was in any way 
contradictory, reveling in his own portrayals of the arriviste pre-Mughal and Mughal rulers of 
Kashmir (73).  
 
In this single sentence, Rushdie catalogues three historical epochs of Northern Indian conquest 
(Macedonian, pre-Mughal, Mughal) and connects them to the intimate history of a marriage and its 
patterns (not one but many quarrels over the dynastic inheritance), which expresses two distinct 
personalities (the prideful Firdaus, and her hypocritical but enthusiastic husband Abdullah), as well 
as a generalizable amnesia indicative of the impending communal conflict between Hindus and 
Muslims in Kashmir (Abdullah, a Muslim man, seems to have no trouble thinking of the Mughals as 
rightful inhabitants, while he disparages “foreign monarchs” as “pestilences”). Drawing all these 
histories together in a continuity of public and private, epoch and counter-epoch, rather than a 
discontinuous series of ruptures or events, creates a sense of organicism, and renders the history of 
place apprehensible through the laws and dynamics of biotic life.258 Pheng Cheah has suggested that 
                                                
258 Pheng Cheah frames the problem of the “putatively antithetical” stances of nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism usefully in the introduction to his book Spectral Nationality. He writes, “the putative 
antithesis between cosmopolitan universalism and nationalist particularism misleadingly obscures the 
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the inheritance of an organismic concept of nationalism from German idealism complicates the 
status of the nation as a revolutionary, life-bearing vehicle to freedom in the postcolonial period, and 
that postcolonial nationalism “performs the undoing of organismic vitalism” (12–13). While Cheah’s 
claim that “the most apposite metaphor for freedom today is not the organism but the haunted 
nation” (12) might be brought into productive conversation with the major texts of postcolonial 
Gothic and horror, including both Shame and Shalimar, the concept of “organism” he works with 
seems to exclude the micro-organic dominions of the virus and the microbe, suggesting instead the 
visible bodies of the animal and the human. In Rushdie’s novel, the micro-organism is precisely that 
which haunts the nation: the pestilences of foreign conquest that Abdullah Noman describes are 
consequently naturalized as a part of history, and history, in turn, is rendered by this figure as a kind 
of body, vulnerable to the infections and imprecations of other bodies and other histories.  
At the same time as it registers a universal vulnerability in the organic unfolding of history, 
this subordinated pluperfect historical narrative technique also lends the past a sense of mythic 
inevitability in which events are described as effects, rather than as causes. With regard to the 
question of “lost content,” then, and the extension of this lost content into the loss of agency, 
history in this narrative mode moves along homogenously on a single plane, a chatterbox parataxis 
of effects without causes.259 It would be easy to read the World War II setting of Shalimar’s flashback 
middle section in this way, as an embedded epithetical past that gives Max his charisma and force 
but fails to produce any political or historical outcome within the parameters of the novel’s 
                                                
fact that both philosophical nationalism and cosmopolitanism articulate universal institutional 
models for the actualization of freedom and are underwritten by the same organismic ontology.” 
Pheng Cheah, Spectral Nationality: Passages of Freedom from Kant to Postcolonial Literatures of Liberation 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 2.   
259 This formulation draws on Faisal Devji’s description of the significatory surplus of acts of terror 
in the first chapter of his book Landscapes of the Jihad, “Effects without Causes.”  
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imaginary. The victories of reason, humanitarianism, cooperation, heroism, and justice that Rushdie 
presents as at least the partial the legacy of the Resistance in the Second World War fail to install 
peaceable governance and stable national boundaries in the divided Subcontinent. The 
juxtapositional mode Rushdie describes in the interview above would seem to bear this thesis out: 
there is no judgment here, and no causality: just see how they sit together. But the novel offers us a 
third way of thinking about history through this juxtaposition, and that is as mimetic, multilateral 
emergence; in other words, historical influence and sequence can be understood not through the 
categories of cause and effect, but rather as cyclical, resurgent pestilential spread, even, as we will see 
in The Satanic Verses, as metasticization. Thus far, I have presented a range of possibilities and 
complications for thinking the status of the “house” and the ways in which Shalimar’s intimate 
spaces participate in and disrupt the conventions of the Gothic novel as well as what Jameson has 
called the third world national allegory by offering dynasty, territory, imaginary homeland and 
home—as much as nation—as alternative answers to the question raised by the novel’s 
Shakespearean epigraph: “a plague on both your houses.” I now turn to the other major term in 
Mercutio’s curse, plague, which, as we have seen, is a persistent figure Imperial and neo-Imperial 
narratives of violence, and a grounding metaphor for political violence in Rushdie’s writing.  
In the months leading up to the fall of his native Strasbourg, where his now-threatened 
Jewish family runs one of the oldest and most revered printing businesses in France, the young Max 
opines, “history stopped being theoretical and musty and became personal and malodorous instead” 
(138). Through a series of accidents, Max Ophuls answers the alarming call of this stench by 
converting his parents’ printing shop into a factory for forged identity papers. In so doing, he 
becomes a manufacturer of mutated, mimetic identities that escape their native environments to 
spread out around the globe at a moment in which the “world” of the Wars was about to revise its 
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recent anatomy as a League of Nations, formed in 1919, into the even more universalist United 
Nations in 1945. The use of the print shop here underscores the long-standing dyad that we have 
seen in both Stoker and Camus of blood and ink as both diametrical opposites—one disseminatory, 
the other self-proper—and also as continuous media of transmission. If Max participates in the tacit 
creation of citizens of the world under conditions of emergency, the world order that was born of 
this emergency retained, even further inscribed, by dismantling imperial superpowers, the primacy of 
the nation as a category of identity and a conferrer of rights. The League and the United Nations, 
each seeking to remedy the catastrophic outcomes of their period’s respective wars, established 
national sovereignty as the exclusive inheritor of political legitimacy in the wake of the dismantling 
of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires, which would feed directly into the 
struggle for national independence that would in turn dismantle the French and British Empires.260 
In addition to the reiteration of the category of the nation as the sole form of political legitimacy 
after the world wars, both the League and the United Nations recognized epidemic and global public 
health alongside war as one of the most basic threats to freedom and lived existence in an 
increasingly globalized world, and included in each of their charters a provision for the 
establishment of international health governance.261 
                                                
260 In a chapter that historicizes the geography of the “Arab world” in his book Landscapes of the Jihad, 
Faisal Devji suggests a not mutually exclusive but disruptive effect of this shift toward nationhood 
by seeing the end of the war as the moment of genesis for our modern concept of the “Middle 
East.” He explains that before the end of the First World War, “…the Arab world enjoyed neither 
unity nor autonomy, being, for the most part, an Ottoman possession. As a portion of the Ottoman 
Empire the Middle East formed part of the same political order as Southern Europe…It is only 
after the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire that both the Middle East and its autonomous 
status as the Holy Land of monotheism came into being” (70). Faisal Devji, Landscapes of the Jihad: 
Militancy, Morality, Modernity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).  
261 Eleven International Sanitary Conferences were convened, beginning in 1851, prior to the 
establishment of the first permanent international cooperation mechanisms, the Pan American 
Sanitation Bureau and the Paris-based Office International d’Hygiène Publique, established in 1902 
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Shalimar repeatedly represents a series of identificatory politics, including nationalism, but 
also communalism, dynasty, religious ideology, and even professional affiliation, as plague. In the 
lush, dreamy past of the Kashmiri villages of Pachigam and Shirmal, the portents of the coming 
plague take the form of incursions from outside, each of which demands that the residents of these 
villages, happy in their Kashmiriyat, or Kashmiriness, and marked by a deep history of syncretism and 
cooperation, state their identity and pick a side. The political history of Kashmir in the period 
between Indian and Pakistani independence in 1947 and the Indo-Pakistani war in 1965 is described 
in simplified terms in the novel, but the basics follow a well documented account: Hari Singh, the 
maharaja of Kashmir, then a majority Muslim state, fails to declare accession into India or Pakistan 
at the time of partition. Muslim militias believed to be armed by the Pakistani military enter the 
valley to try to force incorporation into the new Muslim nation. On the request of the maharaja, 
with an understanding that nationality would subsequently be determined by a popular referendum, 
the Indian army pushes the Islamist militants into the mountainous areas of Gilgit, Hunza, and 
Baltistan, thereby establishing a de facto line of control and militarizing the region.262 This context is 
important to the characters in Rushdie’s novel as well as to the development of his structural  
metaphor of plague. Each ratcheting up of communalism serves to sicken the valley and its 
inhabitants further: people who had never before called themselves Hindus and Muslims turn on 
                                                
and 1907 respectively. The League of Nations Council, however, deemed these inefficient and 
limited in their scope particularly after the ravages of the 1919 influenza pandemic. As a supplement, 
the Council established the League Health Organization in 1920, which would then make repeated 
efforts to incorporate the OIHP to no avail. The United Nations would install the World Health 
Organization as its replacement in 1948. Javed Siddiqi, in his history of the period beginning in 1851 
characterizes the phenomenon thus: “world health and world politics seemed inseparable” (Javed 
Siddiqi, World Health and World Politics: The World Health Organization and the UN System (Columbus, 
SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), 19.  
262 Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan, and the Unfinished War (London: I.B. Taurus 
& Co., 2000), chapters 2 and 3.   
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each other; lands, trees, and bees turn on their keepers; and bodies turn themselves inside out with 
desire and hatred, exploding to the surface in painful pustules.   
The series of crises leading up to a series of breaking points in Shalimar is complex and 
retreating, each offering itself up, at the moment of narration, as the crisis point. 263 The birth of two 
children, a boy and a girl, in a snow-covered makeshift tent in the Shalimar Bagh, the garden of 
paradise, presents the romantic axis of crisis, which will come to a head with Boonyi’s affair with the 
ambassador.264 The two babies are Shalimar, whose given name is Noman Sher Noman, and Boonyi 
Kaul, whose birth causes her mother’s death. The two mothers, Firdaus and Pamposh, have 
accompanied their husbands, Abdullah Noman and Pyarelal Kaul to Srinagar for a massive 
performance and feast, which is doubly interrupted by Pamposh’s death and the non-arrival of the 
banquet’s audience. It is at first unclear why no one has turned up for the highly-anticipated super 
wazwaan, the elaborate Darbar feast scheduled just months after partition, an episode Rushdie draws 
from history. But rumor precedes the event, warning of some great calamity, and then the lights go 
out: an effect of the bombing of a power station by Pakistani “irregulars” in a neighboring town. 
The power station explosion serves to inaugurate the political axis of the scourge that will befall 
Kashmir.   
                                                
263I am using crisis, here, once again, to denote both a split and the turning point in a disease. (Cf. fn 
10, Onions).  
264 The significance of the tent here, as opposed to a permanent structure, is deepened when we 
contextualize it within Rushdie’s larger oeuvre. As Gauri Viswanathan has noted in an interview with 
Rushdie, the tent of Akbar in The Enchantress of Florence serves as a space of “intellectual and religious 
pluralism,” an ephemeral, negotiated site of conversation underscored by its impermanence. In 
reply, Rushdie notes that “the Mughals were incredible tent-makers.” The name of the language of 
Urdu bears these resonances of Mughal encampment as well, deriving from the Turkish word for a 
makeshift army camp. See Gauri Viswanathan, “Religion and the Imagination,” interview with 
Salman Rushdie, The Hindu (July 4, 2010), http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-features/tp-
literaryreview/religion-and-the-imagination/article499139.ece?css=print 
275 
Along with the cancelled super wazwaan and the double birth followed by Pamposh’s death, 
this moment in the novel simply stands as the first confluence of crises in a series of others, political, 
criminal, tragic, and otherwise, all of which seem to come out of nowhere at all, or the snow-
softened sky itself, or on the insubstantial winds of rumor. For Rushdie, rumor sits alongside not 
only the modes of transmission associated with the insurgent “illegitimate writing…of law,” as 
Gayatri Spivak has described it, but also alongside the transmissability and reproduction of the 
rapidly evolving, novel organism.265 On the heels of this first explosion, the novel describes rumor in 
terms both social and biological:  
In the absence of the great majority of guests, all manner of rumors came into the Shalimar 
Bagh, hooded and cloaked to shield themselves against the elements, and filled the empty 
places around the dastarkhan: cheap rumors from the gutter as well as fancy rumors claiming 
aristocratic parentage—an entire social hierarchy of rumor lounged against the bolsters, 
created by the mystery that enveloped everything like the blizzard. The rumors were veiled, 
shadowy, unclear, argumentative, often malicious. They seemed like a new species of living 
thing, and evolved according to the laws laid down by Darwin, mutating randomly and being 
subjected to the amoral winnowing processes of natural selection. The fittest rumors 
survived, and began to make themselves heard above the general hubbub; and in the hissed 
or murmured noises emanating from these survivors, the loudest, most persistent, most 
puissant rumor, the single word kabailis was heard, over and over again (85).  
 
The meditation on rumor acts as a mirror for the novel’s representation of infectious disease—one 
of the most obvious categories of rapidly evolving and novel organisms that poses a threat to 
                                                
265 Gayatri Spivak, “Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography,” In Other Worlds (New York: 
Routledge, 1998), 213. The connection between Shalimar and Spivak’s writing on rumor is slightly 
differently developed by Stephen Morton in his article “There were collisions and explosions,” 
Textual Practice 22.1 (June, 2008) 337-355, in which he explains “For Spivak, rumors are a radical 
medium of communication for political insurgents because they operate as a form of writing that 
can be passed on without leaving a trace of the insurgent who started the rumor” (346). He does 
not, however, touch on the evolutionary or organismic aspects of the concept’s development, nor 
on the relationship between what the novel identifies as “the laws laid down by Darwin” and 
Spivak’s notion of “illegitimate” law.  
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populations—together with, and in some ways indistinguishable from Islamist terror.266 The kabailis, 
most “malicious,” “persistent,” “puissant” of rumors, seems to knock the others out in its struggle 
to survive, and although Rushdie doesn’t translate the word directly, it is a crucial one: the kabailis or 
militant Islamic tribals from Northern Pakistan (including Afridis and Mehsuds) are identified once 
again as the source of this novel new organism, which the book calls, in no uncertain terms, a 
plague.  
In the months that follow the eventful night in the Shalimar Bagh, Firdaus Noman, the 
surviving mother, prophesies a snake curse, and the Indian army sets up a permanent camp that 
grows so alarmingly it is dubbed Elasticnagar, later amended Broken Elasticnagar to convey its 
infinitely expanding waistline.  
                                                
266 Evolutionary epidemiology, the subfield of epidemiology that studies behavioral, environmental, 
and other factors in the evolution of infectious disease and virology, has grown massively since the 
publication of Paul Ewald’s book Evolution of Infectious Disease in 1994 (Oxford & New York: Oxford 
University Press), and now forms part of common-sense thinking about epidemic. We have heard a 
great deal about the especially rapid evolution of strains of avian, or bird flu over the last seven to 
eight years, but other diseases, notably HIV, have been extensively studied in this way as well. That 
ideas of “mutation” and Darwinian paradigms of thinking natural selection have become 
increasingly de rigeur in talking about terrorism doesn’t reflect an especially rigorous engagement with 
evolutionary epidemiological research, but it does suggest the ways in which the discipline’s insights 
have trickled down into figurative and pseudo-figurative discourse.  
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Lou Beech, illustration for Shalimar the Clown review, 2005 
 
Cordon-and-search operations grow careless and people die. Sons of the villages slip away into the 
night to join terrorist organizations. Nearly two decades after the thwarted feast, after the massive 
decline in feasting in general, after Boonyi and Shalimar have made their unholy Hindu-Muslim 
union, the Iron Mullah, Bulbul Fakh, descends on Shirmal, seemingly out of nowhere, and begins 
pronouncing the duties of the faithful from his scrap metal pulpit. Some months later, as the 
“rumble of convoys was heard, and the overhead roar of jets,” that signify the Indo-Pakistani war of 
1965, it becomes clear that “[f]ear was the year’s biggest crop” (119). As if in response to the 
historical suffering unfolding in the shadow of the ancient Himalayas, the land grows sick, too:  
In the paddies, fear grew thickly beneath the surface of the shallow water, and in the saffron 
fields, fear like bindweed strangled the delicate plants. Fear clogged the rivers like water 
hyacinth, and sheep and goats in the high pasture died for no apparent reason….Terror was 
killing livestock, like a plague (119).  
 
The effect of this recurrent deepening split is like that of a wound that will not heal, the mark of a 
deadly disease, the “poisonous boil,” that surfaces on the chest of Sultan Zain-ul-abidin, the king 
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most beloved as a dramatic subject by Abdullah Noman and whose life he had planned to portray 
on the night of the darkened feast.  
If Max Ophuls’s story of resistance and escape from religious persecution gives shape to the 
humanist underpinnings of the mid-century moment, the religious zealotry and communalist 
violence he fought so hard to defeat seems to have migrated East to the newly independent nations. 
And if Max’s answer to the “malodorous history” in which he was living was to forge and forger a 
new identity, Shalimar responds similarly to the stench of plague that descends over his paradisic 
valley. Pandit Pyarelal, patriarch of the Hindu family from which India’s mother, Boonyi, hails, calls 
his daughter close to him after a series of violent attacks on Hindu places of worship. The terror 
killing the livestock, it seems, was only the beginning, and the plague had now moved on, in other 
forms, to other victims. Pyarelal is old, his orchards are failing and his bees grow weaker as his 
Muslim neighbors’ grow stronger. He buries his face in his hands and weeps, “Our story is 
finished….It is no longer the story of our lives, but the story of a plague year in which we have the 
misfortune to be around to grow buboes in our armpits and die unclean and stenchy deaths” (295). 
Pyarelal describes a malodorous history, plaguey and personal like Max’s before him. “We are no 
longer protagonists, only agonists,” he continues. As Pyarelal describes it, to suffer this plague is to 
involuntarily cede one’s status as actor to the infection itself, and to be demoted to mere agonist, a 
word whose most obvious available meanings calls to mind a kind of pointless aggression, 
competition for sport, an a priori condition of violent oppositionality, or “ceremonial combat,” 
“programmed contentiousness,”267 but the term also has even more instrumentalized meanings in 
                                                
267 Walter J. Ong, Fighting for life: Contest, sexuality, and consciousness (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1981) cited in Deborah Tannen, “Agonism in Academic Discourse,” Journal of Pragmatics 34 
(2002) 1651-1669, 1652.  
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physiology and chemistry as a proxy or enabler, rather that the thing itself.268 This representation of 
history populated with agonists again presents us with a tension between the heroic and the 
inevitably natural or organic, a characterization that resonates, too with the novel’s ideas about terror 
and rumor as being “subjected to the amoral winnowing processes of natural selection” (85). Rumor 
and kabailis descend from the mountains, snakes emerge from their hibernaculum, lizards inhabit the 
steaming underbelly of Los Angeles, and so too, do terrorists. What Pyarelal describes as the new 
agonistic status of the villagers presumes both their passivity and their absolute consequentiality as 
participants in a contest of the highest stakes and the vaguest clarity. Life, in this scheme, is reduced 
to a collection of symptoms, while history can only borrow the shape of the ghost map, a 
cartography of infection accessorized with the black pearls of plague.  
In the new generation, there are no protagonists, and consequently, according to Rushdie’s 
novel, there is no art. After Boonyi, there is no young girl to perform the devastating Anarkali dance, 
after Shalimar there is no death-defying tightrope walker dancing on gathered air, no heart-crushing 
hip swivel or worthy acrobat’s love-full heart to crush. In a scene that recalls the operatic death of 
Orpheus in Camus’s novel, Abdullah Noman drags his new and talentless young troupe to Srinagar 
to perform for the non-existent tour groups on the request of his old friend, the Sikh mayor Sardar 
Harbans Singh. In a final gesture of frustration and defiance, Abdullah Noman takes the legendary 
sultan Zain-ul-abidin’s sword and spear in his arthritic, barely functional hands, and gives the 
                                                
268 “Agonist” OED Online. March 2013. Oxford University Press 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/4096?redirectedFrom=agonist (accessed April 22, 2013). In 
musculature, the “agonist” muscle engages to allow a movement to take place in conjunction with 
the “antagonist,” while its pharmacological meaning denotes a drug that acts in combination with a 
receptor to produce an outcome. The theme of protagonism-at-risk returns in the memoir, as 
Rushdie reflects on the increasingly sympathetic turn in the media about a year after the fatwa, and 
the way in which it made him feel pitied. He writes, “[h]e did not want to be merely a victim. There 
were important intellectual, political and moral issues at stake here. He wanted to be part of the 
argument: to be a protagonist” (JA, 235).  
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performance of a lifetime. His young players, generally apathetic and, he thinks, worthless, rise to the 
occasion, are possessed by the syncretic history they are playing. The audience dwindles to a quarter, 
then a few, then none, while outside a rising protest mounts as a side show for the ritual funeral of 
Kashmir. In the novel, this scene is the swan song of performance as art: we will see no more plays, 
entertainment, drama, dance. Performance, from this point forward, is indistinguishable from 
politics. Even as they arrive in Srinagar, prior to beginning the evening’s minor entertainment, there 
are already 400,000 people “clogging up the roads” (281) and shouting Azadi! Freedom! Abdullah 
Noman asks his bus driver what is going on, and he answers with an elliptical “It’s a funeral….They 
have come to mourn the death of our Kashmir” (281). Politics is taking place outside the empty 
theater as a spectacle of regional anthropomorphic imagination—it is a ritual mourning of the land 
of Kashmir, recast as a dead person. 
The character of these political and religious developments is presented repeatedly as 
catastrophically contagious, as in the analogy “terror was killing livestock, like a plague,” but the 
question of the contagion’s source, the index case, or the infectious site remains in these sections an 
open one. In this later moment, the dormant plague has to have reemerged from somewhere, and 
the novel asks us once again to consider whether perhaps it was coming from Islam, a new, even 
more militant form of which could be heard echoing though the valley with the clanks of the scrap 
metal Iron Mullahs. Under the influence of the Indian occupation, the distant narrator explains, 
[t]he character of the political echelon had changed. Its new belief system was supported by 
prominent members of the intellectual tier and the economic stratum and held that the 
introduction of Islam in the classical period had been uniformly deleterious, a cultural 
calamity, and that centuries of overdue corrections needed to be made (290).  
 
Whether these beliefs about Islam as the source of fear, terror, and plague are those of a retrenched 
and ideologically motivated Indian occupying force, the Hindu villagers, the narrator, or the author 
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himself is left ambiguous. What is not ambiguous is that they stand in for a form of post-Soviet 
decay of the human in the gray spaces and proxy zones of the Cold War, with their rusted collection 
of scrap metal parts, and that their actions have become a plague on the region: one that desperately 
needs to be quarantined and cured. It is at this point that Shalimar reintroduces its Euro-American 
protagonists, Max and Peggy Ophuls—in the novel’s discontinuous time sequencing, they are back 
in the 1940s here—who continue to understand themselves as the makers of their own destinies, 
and of history. Indeed, they make themselves the parents of “India" by a baptismal sleight of hand: 
they give their brand new daughter the name of a brand new nation, both of them ill conceived. 
Peggy’s implicit hypothesis in this transition is that “corrections” or cures will come from the 
embassy, and at a further remove, from the gleaming shores of America.  
In practical matters, like the unexpected bastard pregnancy of Boonyi Noman, such 
corrections do arrive from the house of the ambassador. Having learned of her husband’s kept 
woman, and the kept-woman’s compromised state, Peggy Ophuls offers poisoned help to her 
marooned nemesis, and installs her in a center for wayward girls and women for her lying-in. The 
infertile Peggy, known in the resistance as the Grey Rat, has been dreaming of a ratling child—
Ratetta, an infant symbol of the very bubonic plague Pyarelal bemoans—that would come to her in 
India. She seizes the opportunity of Boonyi’s misfortune and longing for home and imposes a trade: 
Peggy will have the cursed child, and Boonyi will have a plane to take her home to her cuckolded 
husband, her beloved Pachigam, and the snow-melt Muskadoon of her dreams. Boonyi names the 
baby Kashmira Noman, and Peggy renames her India Ophuls, a triple insult that erases her identity, 
rewrites the future in the script of the nation, and characterizes her homeland as a nation-o-fools. 
Boonyi goes home. Shalimar, as he promises the night of their first liaison, will kill her for her 
infidelity. Once again, the village rallies around their most godlike inhabitants: Boonyi, now fat and 
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ruined, will live in exile, and Shalimar will swear not to kill her while her father is alive, a promise 
that leads him to exile himself. In a near-exact facsimile of Max’s own entry into an underground 
network of violent resistance, Shalimar forges his way out of Kashmir and onto the stage of world 
history. For years, he disappears into the training camps of the militants in the mountains, 
maintaining contact only by involuntary mind reading by his immured wife. After slitting Boonyi’s 
throat, as he has done to the ambassador years later, in the novel’s opening pages, Shalimar begins 
his last escape across the line of control, the de facto but impermanent border that severed bloody 
slices of Kashmir into the eager laps of India and Pakistan. Wandering the freezing mountains, he 
pulls his satellite phone out of his bag. The connection to Max’s own escape is subtle, forged by a 
single word, “[h]e needed what would once, in another war, in another time, have been called a 
passeur” (318). Born Noman Sher Noman, a pallindromic Urdu name meaning blessed lion of 
blessings, but which, written in English, cannot but evoke the Odyssean scene of escape from the 
cave of the Cyclops, Shalimar leaves his tangled recursive name behind, and his home. The assassin 
enters “the phantom world of the run” (319) where he becomes, like his creator, a persona non 
grata, a literal no-man with no nation and no home but himself.   
During Shalimar’s intermediate years working for global terror networks, he finds himself in 
North Africa, where an agent of the FIS (Front Islamic du Salut), a latter-day Algerian militant 
organization that would become widely feared during the civil war of the 1990s, arranges his first 
assassination. Shalimar is given an injection of an “off-white liquid,” a tranquilizer, to fortify him and 
then handed a gun with a silencer. Contrary to orders, and in a split-second decision that almost 
ends his career as a murderer-for-hire before it has begun, Shalimar, clean shaven, leaves the gun in 
its swaddling and pulls a knife out of his Western clothes. Instead of the clean, efficient single shot, 
“he wanted to know what it would feel like when he placed the blade of his knife against the man’s 
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skin, when he pushed the sharp and glistening horizon of the knife against the frontier of the skin, 
violating the sovereignty of another human soul, moving beyond taboo, toward the blood” (274). 
The use of geopolitical metaphors in this description, the “horizon of the knife,” the “frontier of the 
skin,” “the sovereignty of another human soul,” that is violated by Shalimar’s incision, underscores 
the novel’s insistence on the continuity between body and land, self and self-governance. It is not 
just India/Kashmira, and Shalimar himself, but other characters as well who are persistently blended 
with their surroundings in florid orchestrations of pathetic fallacy, as in the episode of Boonyi’s 
father Pyarelal’s death. The widower wonders if he will “live to see the blossom on his apple trees, 
and felt an answering pop inside himself.” He dresses in his wedding finery, and “as a bridegroom 
he went outdoors” into the valley whose plague and death he has foretold, but who remains, 
nevertheless, his bride. As he dies, “the snowflakes carress[ ] his grizzled cheeks” (306).  
In key instances, these continuities are further developed as political allegory. When Boonyi 
Noman begins to break under the weight of her own deception, her lingering love for her clown of a 
husband and her disgust with the failing charade of loving and serving the ambassador, she  
decide[s] that the term “Indian armed forces” would secretly refer to the ambassador 
himself, she would use the Indian presence in the valley as a surrogate for the American 
occupation of her body, so, ‘Yes, that’s it,’ she cried, ‘he ‘Indian armed forces,’ raping and 
pillaging. How can you not know it? How can you not comprehend the humiliation of it, the 
shame of having your boots march all over my private fields?’ (197).  
 
Shalimar’s choice of the knife as sovereignty-violating phallus, responds specifically, then, to 
his emasculation at the hands of his unfaithful wife and her Euro-American consort, and we are 
invited to think of this murder as a stage in his long-plotted revenge against them both. In his 
history of the Algerian War of Independence, Alistair Horne describes the early turn of the FLN 
(Front de Libération Nationale) against what they called “softer” targets, many of whom were 
Algerian peasants seen to be collaborating with or otherwise economically supporting the pied noir 
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farmers and producers that the nationalist movement wanted to evict. An edict issued by the FLN 
banned smoking and drinking as economic sanctions to push the colonial growers of tobacco and 
grapes out of Algeria. Violations of these bans would result in horrific mutilations: for the first 
offense, the severing of the violator’s lips and nose. For the second, the hideously named “le sourire 
de Kabyle,” the Kabyle smile, a deep slashing of the throat. Horne writes, “Most nations have their 
favourite unpleasant way of death; to the Algerians, throat slitting is associated with the killing of 
sheep, and therefore the most humiliating fate an enemy can be made to suffer.”269 This method, 
also called égorgement, would later become a trademark in the Algerian terror campaigns during the 
war of Independence that would last for nearly a decade. The égorgés were marked out as particularly 
deserving candidates with an intimate sentence that set them apart from the random café and car 
bombs. Horne describes this practice of égorgement in a section of his history called the “smallpox 
chart,” in which he describes how the French armed forces tracked and mapped the violent activities 
of the FLN, which they were surprised to find had “survived” the first winter of 1953-54, as if it 
were an epidemic, and had even enjoyed an “inflow” of new recruits. As Horne describes it, the 
“smallpox chart” was the colloquial name given to a map “marking up the occurrence of fresh 
outbreaks of violence…the blotches were beginning to spread rapidly. First they appeared in the 
hitherto unblemished region of North Constantine…then, in March, at the Bône in the north-
eastern extremity of the country…” (111). Like Shalimar’s pox of communalist violence, the 
insurgency in Algeria was mapped and described in its own time in the terms of epidemic.  
The other name of throat slitting or égorgement, the Kabyle smile, adds laughing insult to the 
clown’s injury. Shalimar’s first victim in North Africa binds together his two later ones—the 
                                                
269 Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York: New York Review of Books, 
2006), 112.  
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ambassador in the figure of their creator (in Urdu poetry, the author’s signature, embedded in the 
verse and sometimes an imagistic or linguistic trick, is called a takhallus): his first kill is a writer, “a 
godless man, a writer against god, who spoke French and sold his soul to the West” (274), a figure, 
undoubtedly, for Rushdie himself. The kill, in its violence and intimacy, is an unexpected act, a 
rupture that produces a mess in the form of an outflowing of effluvium. Stepping beyond taboo, and 
into blood, Shalimar thinks of “what it would feel like when he slashed the bastard’s throat in half so 
that his head lolled back and sideways off his neck and the blood gushed upwards like a tree. What 
would it feel like when the blood poured over him…” (275). The reaction of his superiors to this 
unplanned form of murder describes precisely the nature of mimetic violence as plague—a random 
mutation of terroristic reproductions that function both like rumor, and also as rumor, as Shalimar’s 
gains notoriety in terrorist training networks. This violence is not quarantined, contained, or 
neutralized, but rather set loose as a weapon. Shalimar is not sidelined for his disobedience, but 
celebrated: “[f]or a man like you, a complete fucking crazy asshole,” his youthful handler tells him, 
“there will always be work” (275). By the time we read this scene, we already know that égorgement is 
Shalimar’s trademark assassination technique, as we learn in the opening pages of the book. When 
India arrives at her apartment building’s front door, having descended from her upstairs flat in a 
panic over the gurgling, inhuman noises coming through her intercom, she finds her father dead in 
the midst of an extravagant incarnadine lake. “His throat had been slashed so violently that the 
weapon, one of his own Sabatier kitchen knives, which had dropped beside his corpse, had all but 
severed his head” (40).  
Later, as Shalimar stands trial for the assassination of Max Ophuls, his lawyers wager on 
what they call a “Manchurian defense,” implying that the bereft Shalimar had fallen into a kind of 
hypnosis by terrorist masterminds, and was, without consciousness or will, carrying out orders. The 
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lawyers played to “the terrifying possibility that mind-controlled human automata were walking 
amongst us, ready to commit murder whenever a voice on the phone said banana or solitaire…it all 
made the new, senseless kind of sense” (384). Again the novel toys with lack of agency—and here 
we must think both of the broken robots of Islam, the Iron Mullahs who stand as both rusted 
cyborgs and naturalized conduits of an evil ideology, as well as the “amorality” of Darwinian law, the 
natural process of malignant mutation—as the only possible cause of the untrammeled, irrational 
effects of terrorism. This layered depiction of posthumanity places Shalimar and his global cohort of 
mujahideen and assassins even more firmly within the interpretive paradigm of the inhuman, 
unconscious, naturalized, organic epidemic. In a customary strategy that seeks to humanize the 
defendant and clarify the stakes of what are presumed to be political vengeances and vice versa, his 
defenders suggest that his mind broke with grief when the Indian Army invaded Kashmir and razed 
his village to the ground, killing his family and his beautiful, beloved wife Boonyi Noman. They are 
wrong, and the narrator seems to laugh at their naïve bid for sympathy.  
The intimate overtures of the novel, including the epigraph from Romeo and Juliet, require a 
more personal, more painful psychologizing root cause, and India, half rational West, half mystical, 
ruined, raped Kashmir acts as the conduit for this story. She sits quietly through the trial and waits 
until the case has been fully laid out to show her hand. “In a single, brief statement, made with an 
executioner’s calm, she unmade the defense’s case. ‘That wasn’t how my mother died,’ she said. ‘My 
mother died because that man, who also killed my father, cut off her beautiful head’” (386). India’s 
revelation depoliticizes Shalimar’s actions and invalidates his defense by identifying a personal 
grievance against Boonyi and her lover Max as the source of his bloodlust, rather than nationalist 
zeal, or terrorist mind-control. By identifying a broken heart as the source of Shalimar’s killing spree, 
Rushdie seems to write out the geopolitical dimensions of the story, leaving little room for a logic or 
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motive beyond the secular novel’s favorite tropes of love, loss, and a thwarted bildung.270  The scene 
of Boonyi’s death is intimate, scrubbed of politics in comparison to the heavy use of metaphors of 
sovereignty, invasion, and plunder that color her relationship with Max. Upon her return to the 
village following the affair, Boonyi is banished to the woods to suffer alone, a compromise reached 
by the village to prevent Shalimar from killing her, as he promised he would if she were unfaithful, 
until she decides she is ready to die. She listens for her cuckolded husband by way of a distant, extra-
sensory transmission, and readies herself for his arrival by bathing and braiding flowers in her hair.  
He came on foot, holding a knife. There was a horse’s whinny somewhere, but he did not ride. There was no 
moon. She stepped out of her hut to greet him…He said nothing. He was reading the story of her skin. 
Everyone is dead, she said, my father’s dead, and yours, and I think maybe you’re dead too, so why should I 
want to live…Now, she commanded him. Now (318, italics original).  
  
For all its intimacy, this scene’s reductive implications of serial, terrorist violence rooted in wounded 
masculine pride and the vengeance of a humiliated Muslim man against his Hindu wife and Jewish 
rival are immediately destabilized by bringing the Shalimar–Boonyi relationship into the context of 
the militarization of the valley, of Pachigam and Shirmal, and the sudden appearance of suicide 
bombing tactics. The murder is followed by Shalimar’s escape: “He was on his way down the pine-
forested hill with tears in his eyes when he heard the explosion in Shirmal and guessed the rest” 
(318). In this way, Boonyi’s death stands as the end not only of her mother’s painful love story, but 
also the end of the multi-ethnic, pluralistic, paradisal love story of Kashmir.  
                                                
270 To this point, Faisal Devji explains “it is because the jihad is concerned neither with the 
undifferentiated unity of the world’s oppressed, nor even with the particular struggles of Muslims, 
that it has the audacity to engage in a global war” (75). He goes onto suggest that terrorism or 
“crude forms of traditional freedom struggles” are hugely inadequate paradigms for thinking jihad. 
“…modern politics cannot comprehend religion in any terms but its own, which is to say as a kind 
of emotional front for supposedly real issues like freedom or justice, wealth or power” (76). In 
Rushdie’s fictionalization, we can see a concurrent attempt to render terror legible as a matter of 
love, which functions in the novel as a kind of personal freedom.   
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Boonyi’s death also mirrors Max Ophuls’s. As we have seen, images of throat slitting and 
decapitation carry with them the particular history of violence in Independence-era Algeria—this is 
one of the ways in which Rushdie’s novel draws on the same inaugural moment of twentieth-century 
Islamist terror that Camus was thinking through in his later work—but they can also be taken as 
figures for the territorial isolation and political uncertainty of Kashmir: the land, as the novel has it, 
of lost content from which the headwaters of the Chenab, Jhelum, and Indus rivers flow, and which 
sits atop the two nations of Pakistan and India like a promise, the paradigmatic imaginary homeland. 
In the early months of the Indian army’s encampment in the valley described in Shalimar, a 
beleaguered and lovelorn Indian army general considers the nascent Kashmiri liberation movement, 
calling Kashmir for the Kashmiris is “a moronic idea” (101). “Why stop there?” he wonders, “Why 
not demand freedom for ones bedroom, or call one’s toilet a republic? Why not stand still and draw 
a circle around your feet and name that Selfistan?” (102). Here, Rushdie tells a melancholy joke 
about the dismembering, the decapitation, of a natural land-mass, the peninsular subcontinent 
whose splashy tectonic entrance to the Eurasian party threw the highest mountains in the world up 
into the sky, and enclosed the silky limpid valleys of paradise between them. To rip apart and 
balkanize that land with the swords and guns of communalism can only, in an organismic horizon of 
nationhood, be called a most lamentable tragedy. And yet the novel ends with a stranger, less 
melancholic prophecy, which is perhaps also a curse. Shalimar, the exemplary no-man, remains a 
citizen of Selfistan to the last, a refugee and also a clown, a figure whose interlacing of tragedy and 
comedy renders each punctured and permeable at its borders. As India stalks her stalker from a 
California closet under cover of night, tracks his movements with her night-vision goggles, and lets 
fly her expert arrow toward its target, the novel closes: “There was no India. There was only 
Kashmira, and Shalimar the clown.” Whether we understand the survival of Kashmira-not-India as a 
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plague of Selfistani isolation or a benediction of liberty for the valley’s inhabitants will depend on 
what kind of sovereign polity she now describes, and what measures will be taken to defend it. 
These questions remain unresolved at the end of the novel.  
Through Shalimar’s juxtapositional historical tactics, we are invited to think of Max Ophuls as 
a foil for Shalimar, a different kind of carrier, not of terrorism, but of its antidote. Nevertheless, Max 
as an archetype of midcentury political restructuring does carry with him a different form of 
violence. Following his early years in the Resistance, the ambassador goes back underground—like 
Camus’s plague, which “never dies or disappears for good…can lie dormant for years”271—to study 
and interrupt the operations of his own insurgency’s unintended, monstrous stepchildren who have 
taken shape as new rabid nationalisms, new violent rebellions, new minority religious struggles, and a 
new and horrific imagined world order that understands itself in some small way as an embodiment 
of that no-longer Franco-American concept: azadi, or freedom.  
In spite of the implicit fun-house symmetry of Shalimar’s violence and Max’s—which takes 
the form of policy and intelligence, rather than knives and bombs—we never get the full story, nor a 
wholly realized depiction, of how the novel understands counter-terrorism. Is it simply an 
inoculation, antidote, or remedy? Or are these very forms of care, control, and surveillance as 
insidious as the plague itself? By failing to address the implications of the naturalization of terror as 
an epidemic, the novel leaves its readers with an incomplete understanding of what current 
counterterror methods and measures might look like in such an epistemological horizon. In the 
absence of such considerations, the novel seems to suggest that if terror is a plague—horrible, 
inhuman, amoral, cyclical, and nonagental—counterterror is equally non-agental, procedural and 
prophylactic, like quarantine. If body bombs, throat slashing, and blazing temple fires are like 
                                                
271 Albert Camus, The Plague, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York: Vintage, 1991), 308.  
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buboes on the beautiful skin of the earth, then the novel paints a sunny picture of security as a salve 
and a hope, a half-effective treatment, a waiting and watching and researching in the interest of 
being better prepared the next time the rats or the snakes are called out of their hiding places, or 
decide to descend on their own. If we reach even a little beyond the fictional world of this novel, we 
can see how this oversight supports a problematic naturalization of counter-insurgency and the War 
on Terror, which in this scheme evade characterization as aggression or neo-Imperial conduct by 
becoming an unquestionable necessity in the protection of the health of the globe. Counterterror 
measures have taken a variety of non-innocuous forms over the last decade, including disputably 
“legal” warfare in multiple nations and regions in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, 
international security interventions in accordance with the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, the 
U.S.’s so-called signature strikes and other targeted assassination, domestic surveillance, the 
suspension of civil liberties, including the Miranda rights, under Department of Justice safety 
exemptions, the rise of unmanned drones and the calculation of drone casualties categorizing all 
military aged men as enemy combatants, and so on. And this list excludes the recent revelations 
about NSA phone and computer surveillance, about which a great deal remains unknown at present. 
By looking at Rushdie’s recent memoir of his years in hiding, Joseph Anton, we can begin to piece 
together a more complete picture of how the figure of epidemic operates in Rushdie’s writing not 
just as an analogy for terrorism, but also, and perhaps more importantly, as the crystallization of an 
epidemiological episteme that relies on assumptions about the unquestioned priority of health 
security and suggests certain forms of control that, as we have seen in the first chapter, derive from 




—3. Imaginary Homeland Security— 
Rushdie’s elaboration of the figure of terrorism as epidemic in Shalimar the Clown finds its 
reflection outside of fiction in some of the most subtle, non-bellicose forms of aggression, coercion, 
and social control that have, particularly since September 11th, fallen under the rubrics of 
counterterrorism and especially security, a term that forms an important point of intersection 
between militarization and care in Rushdie’s later works. One of the most important ways in which 
discourses of health and insurgency have come together in recent years is in the conflation of and 
data sharing between apparatuses of health security, both national and international, and 
counterterrorism intelligence. The United States Department of Homeland Security has articulated 
among its goals not only the prevention bioterrorism, but also, in naming the Rutgers-based Center 
for Dynamic Data Analysis as a center of excellence in 2009, brought the study of epidemics under 
its purview.272 This decade’s swine and avian influenza outbreaks are paradigmatic of the ways in 
which the work of both national and international health monitoring apparatuses—most 
prominently the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the United Nations-
backed Global Influenza Surveillance Network—have collaborated with security organizations and 
branches of national governments to secure borders that are equally permeable to viruses and terror 
networks.273 That these concerns around public health are shared by the Department of Homeland 
Security and the CDC will come as no surprise. Indeed the epidemiology of mortality and injury 
sustained during terrorist attacks is its own, well-established branch of contemporary 
                                                
272 This center is now operating under the title The Homeland Security Center for Dynamic Data 
Analysis, http://www.dydan.rutgers.edu/index.html.  
273 See, for example, Secretary Napolitano and John Brennan’s joint “Press Briefing on Swine 
Influenza with Department of Homeland Security, Centers for Disease Control, and Prevention, and 
White House,” April 16, 2009, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/04/26/press-briefing-swine-
influenza. Here, Secretary Napolitano outlines the role of TSA and other immigration agents in 
assessing health factors at the borders.  
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epidemiological research, and is not limited to the modes of Islamist violence that most often make 
waves in North American and European news outlets.274 What is perhaps more surprising in this 
conflation is the banality of how these two classes of threat sit together, sharing in common the vast 
likelihood of innocuousness—represented in the unimaginable collation of normal data—and yet are 
animated by the tiny but spectacular statistical chance of malignancy. This overwhelming balance 
toward the ordinary—and all the sacrifices “necessary” to maintain it—is one of the most important 
features of security states as they are critiqued and theorized in contemporary rights discourses.275 
In addition to representing and theorizing the conceptualization and practical enactment of 
security in Shalimar the Clown and The Satanic Verses, Rushdie has recently described his own security 
in narrative terms: “[s]ecurity was the art of making nothing happen….Boredom was good. You 
didn’t want things to get interesting. Interesting was dangerous. The whole point was to keep 
everything dull.”276 In some important ways, this observation marks the difference between the way 
Shalimar the Clown approaches and historicizes Islamist violence by telling a big story in which, as in 
                                                
274 See, for example, Limor Aharonson-Daniel et al. “Epidemiology of Terror-Related Versus Non-
Terror Related Traumatic Injury in Children,” Pediatrics 112.4 (October 1, 2003); Nick Wilson and 
George Thomson, “The Epidemiology of international terrorism involving fatal outcomes in 
developed countries,” European Journal of Epidemiology 20 (2005): 375–381; and Barry S. Levy and 
Victor W. Sidel, Terrorism and Public Health: A balanced approach to strengthening systems and protecting people 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).  
275 In time, an analysis of the lock-down of Boston, MA and its environs in April 2013 during the 
extraordinary search for the remaining Boston Marathon bombing suspect, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, will 
become possible. Now, it seems important to note the incredible spectacle of the “manhunt” which 
has, to all appearances, broken the pattern of narrative horizontality and tedium. There are many 
angles from which to surmise on this exception, but perhaps the most salient here is to note that the 
Tsarnaev brothers seem to have acted in communication with, but not on the orders of any massive, 
bureaucratized network of terrorists and terror organizations. Their story, therefore, has not yet 
become possible to piece together by a blueprinting of diffuse motivations and movements, but 
rather in the tight space of guesswork with reference to biography, psychology, and relationality.   
See David Remnick, “The Brothers Tsarnaev/The Culprits,” New Yorker, April 29, 2013, 
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/2013/04/29/130429ta_talk_remnick.  
276 Salman Rushdie, Joseph Anton (New York: Random House, 2012), 207-208. Hereafter cited in text.  
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Rushdie’s most well-regarded novels, a great deal happens, and the way his nonfictional writings 
have veered further into seamless, flat polemic characterized by a lack of movement and an 
abundance of argument and philosophizing, by turns petty and thoughtful.   
In October of 2012, Rushdie published a long and long-awaited memoir recounting his years 
in hiding following the Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1989 fatwa decreeing his death for the allegedly 
blasphemous portrayal of the prophet Muhammad and Islam more broadly in The Satanic Verses. The 
state of Iran, first under Khomeini and later under others, upheld this decree and continually 
threatened to carry it out on British soil or wherever else they might find the offending writer. Other 
groups joined in the creation and elaboration of a bounty on the writer’s head, and in 1993, the 
Norwegian publisher of the novel was shot three times in an assassination attempt, which he 
survived; earlier, in 1991, the Japanese translator of The Satanic Verses was stabbed to death in the 
face and neck. Taken with these ancillary acts and threats, the fatwa was understood broadly, though 
to varying degrees by differently motivated actors, as an act of terrorism, galvanized through and 
arguably further galvanizing radical forms of political Islam around the globe. The trope of terrorism 
as disease does not appear in the memoir with anything like the robustness or frequency that it does 
in Shalimar the Clown, or even in The Satanic Verses, where, as we will see, the treatment is lighter and 
more oblique. In key moments of the memoir, however, the figure does some rhetorical heavy 
lifting, most often when Rushdie is reckoning with his growing disgust and anger with the religion in 
which he was, at least nominally, raised. Following the issuing of the fatwa, he considers his 
predicament and its implications in the broader currents of world history, writing:  
He knew, as surely as he knew anything, that the fanatical cancer spreading through Muslim 
communities would, in the end, explode into the wider world beyond Islam. If the 
intellectual battle was lost—if this new Islam established its right to be ‘respected’ and to 
have its opponents excoriated, placed beyond the pale, and, why not, even killed—then 
political defeat would follow (JA, 346).  
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The suggestion here, following the “amoral winnowing process of natural selection” Rushdie 
described in Shalimar the Clown, is that some kind of mutation or cellular errancy has taken place, a 
site of malignancy has arisen, and that after spreading within the Islamic world, it will threaten to lay 
waste indiscriminately to persons and publics around the world. Others have used this metaphor as 
well—Donald Rumsfeld, most notoriously, called terrorism a “cancer on the human condition,”277 
while the editor of Critical Inquiry, W.J.T. Mitchell connected the figure to the specter of interrupted 
communication, writing in 2002 that “the invisible figure of terror spread like a virus…as surely as 
the powdered toxin of anthrax circulates through the U.S. Postal system,”278 and the German critic 
Hans Magnus Ensenzberger, placed it alongside an HIV metaphor describing terrorism as a 
retrovirus.279 As early as 1989, the Egyptian novelist Nawal Al Saadawi was referring to the Rushdie 
case in similar terms: “this bloody terrorism which we’re fighting against but which has started to 
spread its cancer from the arena of politics into the arena of arts and creativity.”280 Apart from its 
imaginative potential for projecting a variety of forms of communication and communicability in a 
compact and multivalent way that we have seen at work in Shalimar the Clown, the epidemic metaphor 
                                                
277 US Department of Defense, Former Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld, “Rumsfeld and Myers 
Briefing on Enduring Freedom,” News Transcript, 7 October, 2001, 2:45 PM 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2011 
278 W.J.T. Mitchell, “911: Criticism and Crisis,” Critical Inquiry 28.2 (Winter, 2002), 567-572, 568. We 
will likely see an uptick again in this kind of language following the Ricin incidents of April, 2013, in 
which the poisonous substance was sent through the U.S. mail to President Obama and a 
Mississippi Senator (Mark Landler and Ashley Parker, “Mississippi Man is Arrested in Sending of 
Suspicious Letters,” New York Times (17 April, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/18/us/politics/officials-intercept-suspicious-letter-sent-to-
obama.html).  
279 Hans Magnus Enzensberger, “The Resurgence of Human Sacrifice,” Society 39.3 (March/April 
2002), 75-77, 75.  
280 Nawal al Saadawi, “extracts from an interview with a Swedish journalist” in Albert Memmi, “For 
Secularism”, Index on Censorship 18.6 (May 1, 1989) 16-19. 
http://ioc.sagepub.com/content/18/5/16.citation. 
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is a convenient way of imagining and representing terror if the goal is to divorce murderous 
militancy from what are imagined to be the core values of Islam, as all of these writers seem to want 
to do. In other words, they seem to suggest that Islam, in a way, is fine, but in places, it has mutated 
into a metastasizing and life-threatening form. Alternatively, the rhetoric of these critics and others 
somewhat indiscriminately offers alongside cancer the virus or bacterial infection as a paradigm for 
thinking terrorism. It is crucial to note that in these formulations, as well as in the three Rushdie 
texts I read in this chapter, epidemic is a multivalent term that embraces an enormous taxonomy of 
disease, both contagious and auto-immune. Technically speaking, epidemic does, indeed, encompass 
all of these forms of morbidity and mortality, although its birth as a discipline was occasioned first 
by communicable disease. Rushdie’s phrasing above is characteristic of the slipperiness of this kind 
of language. Almost immediately, the metaphor shifts into the much more visually evocative imagery 
of the terrorist bomb: “…the fanatical cancer spreading through Muslim communities would, in the 
end, explode into the wider world” (346, emphasis mine). This sentence’s imagistic compression suggests 
that cells have the potential to turn into bombs, that the memory of public history can invoke the 
painful intimacy of private sickness.281  
What can be the logical outcome of this mode of thinking? If global space can be 
anthropomorphized according to the logic of terrorism-as-cancer, what would it mean to try and 
                                                
281 I will return to the particular tropology of breast cancer in Rushdie’s work in the next section, but 
it bears mention here that during the time in which Rushdie was in hiding, his second wife, Clarissa 
Luard, mother of his elder son Zafar, was diagnosed with breast cancer, from which she would die 
in 1999. His first wife, Marianne Wiggins was also diagnosed with Burkitt’s Lymphoma after 
noticing a lump in her breast, and the memoir focuses a good deal of attention on the death of 
Thomasina, the television chef Nigella Lawson’s sister, from breast cancer. The Satanic Verses 
registers a particular attention to breast cancer, but before some of these personal events took place; 
the character of Zeenat Vakil’s mother has died of breast cancer, and she won’t allow her breasts to 
be touched (SV, 53), and Mishal Akhtar, one of the women who leads the famous Ayesha 
pilgrimage, does so as she dies of it.  
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keep that global body healthy, to remedy its ills, or perform what are now called surgical strikes? 
How can we understand human actors through the naturalizing and dehumanizing figures of cellular 
mutation, bacterial infection, or virality? And what is the relationship between the image of the 
world as single body—a projection that subtends the cancer metaphor—and the image of the world 
as a collection of innumerable discrete bodies that occupy the space of the infectious and viral 
imaginaries? The discrepancy between the single-body imaginary of the globe, supported by the 
cancer metaphor, versus the imaginary of the collective that undergirds the contagion figure may  
not indicate a fundamental difference in ideology, but rather a difference in visions of 
anthropomorphized world space. As such, each bears distinct features with regard to how they 
project conflict. In a very crude schematic, we might begin by thinking this way: where the metaphor 
of contagion assumes multiple persons, or in a geopolitical sense, sovereignties, each of which has 
the capacity to be threatened by ideological microbes and their carriers, it gives onto an idea about 
internationality that aligns with the possibility of legal modern warfare. This vision’s multiple states 
have the capacity to participate in classical conflict as codified in international laws of war. On the 
other side, the cancer metaphor presumes the unity of a single vulnerable body of the globe, and in 
so doing gives rise to a further militarization of all space, including the enactment of prophylactic 
strategies on the population as a single whole which we might, following Foucault and others, also 
call security.282 This last is in some ways more in keeping with how terrorism has been approached 
                                                
282 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977-1978, ed. Michel 
Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador/Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 11. The 
distinction here, for Foucault, associates sovereign power with older models of governmentality that 
are focused on the defense of territory and the discipline of subjects. Security, on the other hand, is 
aligned with biopower, and the increasing shift in the state’s attention toward the population and its 
management. A key paradigm of the latter for Foucault is quarantine, undertaken as a responsibility 
of the state in the face of eighteenth and nineteenth century epidemics and the increasing circulation 
of goods and people (55-79).  
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from the point of view of the international community, which has, especially over the last ten years, 
stressed intelligence and epidemiological approaches, whereas the former, with its shades of ordinary 
antagonism, quarantine, and war, better represents the most publicly avowed approaches of the 
United States government, with particular reference to Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as increased 
border control and surveillance at and within national boundaries. These visions of world space are 
not mutually exclusive, however, and both of these tropes and their imaginative landscapes of health 
are at play in Rushdie’s works, as well as those of many of his contemporaries.  
The conflicts and discontinuities between these two existing visions of global space 
represent perhaps the most crucial challenges in defining, investigating, and systematizing the 
prevention of Islamist terrorism. A key component of these challenges has been negotiating the 
ways in which the acts, communications, and self-confessed motivations of predominantly Muslim 
perpetrators of terrorism both intersect with and also run roughshod over a global order that relies 
equally on a vision of unified world space and on the concepts of internationalism and just war, 
which are buttressed by a commitment to the nation as the basis of sovereignty.283 For writers like 
Rushdie, disease has become a useful metaphor for thinking terrorism because, like acts of violence 
committed by non-state actors against civilians within sovereign polities, disease respects no borders 
within the body or between bodies; because it lies outside of any jurisdiction or ideas about right, 
thereby making a mockery of the fictions that uphold various social orders; and because in so doing, 
                                                
283 In a 2009 article, Talal Asad remarks that “[i]t is common knowledge that the concept of ‘just 
war’ has its roots in medieval Christian theory; today the terms is used to persuade those who might 
be sceptical [sic.] about the use of international violence that it is both necessary and moral,” a point 
that ought not be elided, I think, when characterizing related constructs such as religion, and more 
importantly here, nation” (Talal Asad, “Thinking about Terrorism and Just War,” Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, 23: 1, 3-24 (18 December, 2009). See also Thomas Keenan “‘Where are Human 
Rights…?’: Reading a Communiqué from Iraq” in Nongovernmental Politics, ed. Michael Feher (New 
York: Zone Books, 2007).  
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it seems to defy what the leaders of wealthy secular democracies identify as “human” logic.284 
Recognizing, and in our recognition, ratifying the existence of the global as well as the space of the 
international and the ideas of international security and justice, requires that we operate in agreement 
with multiple conflicting premises and assumptions, namely that we belong doubly to the nation and 
to the world. It is a convenient double bind for permanent residents and citizens of North American 
and European countries, whose sovereignty is rarely, if ever in the last half century, under threat. 
And this belonging, in some crucial ways, mirrors the utopian undercurrents of postmodern, 
postcolonial, and postnational conditions of hybridity, diaspora, and cosmopolitanism whose 
celebration occupies the wheelhouse of the global English literary market.285  
Such conditions, especially cosmopolitanism, form a sturdy spine through more than thirty 
years of Rushdie’s writing, though they have gone under various names and guises. Perhaps the most 
forceful and theoretically-oriented articulation comes in the title and title essay of his 1991 collection 
of non-fiction, Imaginary Homelands, a phrase that had so much traction with other writers that it has 
become something of a cliché. Here, Rushdie explores the particular fondness, pain, and guilt of 
having been severed from his native India, and nevertheless building his fiction through his 
memories of the place:  
                                                
284 Cf. Yaseen Noorani, “The Rhetoric of Security,” The New Centennial Review 5.1 (Spring, 2005) 13-
41. Noorani suggests a symmetry between the way in which terrorism and the U.S. government both 
function external to “world order,” and that this externality “lies at the foundation of the rhetoric of 
security by which the U.S. government justifies its hegemonic actions and policies” (14).  
285 Gayatri Spivak takes Rushdie to task for uncritically celebrating the universalist aspirations of the 
migrant in her 1989 reading of The Satanic Verses: “We must acknowledge that, writing as a migrant, 
Rushdie still militates against privileging the migrant or the exilic voice narrowly conceived, even as 
he fails in that very effort….the message and the medium of his book are marked by this conflict” 
(82). My contention is that the balance of his texts has shifted, since this essay was written, toward 
the failing side. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Reading The Satanic Verses,” Public Culture 2.1 (Fall, 
1989) 79-99.  
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It may be that writers in my position, exiles or emigrants or expatriates, are haunted by some 
sense of loss, some urge to reclaim, to look back, even at the risk of being mutated into 
pillars of salt.  But if we do look back, we must also do so in the knowledge—which gives 
rise to profound uncertainties—that our physical alienation from India almost inevitably 
means that we will not be capable of reclaiming precisely that thing that was lost; that we 
will, in short, create fictions, not actual cities or villages, but invisible ones, imaginary 
homelands, Indias of the mind.286  
 
If the imaginary homelands of fiction are the creations of diasporic and migratory writers who are 
tethered in some way to their “homes,” but also freed of their possible attendant ethno-national 
myopias through their participation in the civic life of wealthy nations, these imaginary homelands 
are also populated by writers and artists who have moved away from the demands of telling the 
“truth,” in a literal sense, by virtue of what Rushdie calls the inability to “reclaim precisely that thing 
that was lost.” The emigrant’s nostalgia—freed from the practical disruptions of life in the Global 
South—thus becomes the precondition for the extrapolation of a certain kind of cosmopolitan 
space, whose most important characteristic is that it gives free, uncensored reign to the imagination. 
This same material substrate of cosmopolitanism has become a feature of numerous other kinds of 
networks of sociality and politics, especially ones with access to capital, including those of the Bin-
Laden-imprinted global jihad of which the fatwa against Rushdie was an early premonition. In his 
critical geography of Al-Qaeda, Landscapes of the Jihad, Faisal Devji has named the phenomenon of 
supranational affiliation and deterritorialization in Islamism “cosmopolitan militancy.” In his 
discussion, he cites Jacques Derrida’s remarks on the way in which, following the September 11th 
attacks, Middle Eastern oil wells “remain among the rare territories left, among the last 
nonvirtualizable terrestrial places” (71). In other words, in spite of the transformation of oil into 
capital, the well remains the trace of the real, the punctum in the image of a global jihadist that pins 
supra-regional politics to place. In spite of this link to the actual geological resources of place, 
                                                
286 Salman Rushdie, Imaginary Homelands (New York: Vintage, 1991), 10. Hereafter cited in text.  
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“nation,” a category that has been as problematic as “religion” or “secularism” in the modern 
Middle East, begins to evaporate. Devji elaborates that the legal status of massive numbers of non-
citizens in the oil rich countries of the Middle East has effectively rendered the category of 
citizenship, and by extension, nation, obsolete, at least inasmuch as they fail to describe a vast 
portion of daily interactions, explaining that  
[t]his curious world, which may function in various forms within immigrant and other 
cosmopolitan enclaves elsewhere, seems to mirror rather closely the world of the jihad itself. 
It is, after all, the world of the global marketplace, and includes within its ambit not only 
multinational corporations, or transnational trading networks, but also the international 
students, economic migrants, illegal aliens and political refugees who form part and parcel of 
these commercial enterprises. And we know that the global transactions of the jihad, along 
with its incredibly mobile operators, use and indeed emerge from such networks and 
enclaves, in which an old-fashioned politics of intentionality and collective mobilization 
based on some common need, interest or idea has been ruled out….maybe this explains why 
the jihad re-constitutes the Middle East or Arab world by narratives other than those of the 
nation or the region as distinct demographic and geographical entities characterized by 
collective political or economic cultures (73-74).    
 
If the rest of the world is, indeed, becoming more and more smooth, homogenous, abstract, and, 
consequently, more imaginary, then how are we to imagine securing this shared homeland of the 
imagination? What is to be done to protect its creators and citizens from the “cancer” of censorious 
fanaticism, particularly when citizenship means less and less in terms of protection?287 And who is 
                                                
287 Elsewhere in the book, Rushdie refers to cultural relativism as yet another cancer: “As ‘respect for 
Islam,’ which was fear of Islamist violence cloaked in Tartuffe-like hypocrisy, gained legitimacy in 
the West, the cancer of cultural relativism had begun to eat away at the rich multi-cultures of the 
modern world, and down that slippery slope they all might slide” (357). There’s an asymmetry here 
that seems worth lingering on, which is that in Rushdie’s view the inhabitants of another imaginary 
landscape—the people Devji calls “cosmopolitan militants”—are not people, but mutated cells. The 
logic at play in this shift encourages us to think about the actions of terrorists, therefore, not as 
motivated decisions, but as “natural” and unavoidable, radical evil, and without cause or causes. This 
is in part what Devji is referring to in an earlier chapter of the book, which he calls “Effects Without 
Causes” (1-33). A different way of accessing this purported abyss between incompatible systems of 
logics is through the plaintive cliché “Why do they hate our freedom?” 
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responsible for protecting this homeland, for its security, if it overlaps in space and time with the 
new cosmopolitan militancy?  
 Rushdie called the memoir of his years in hiding Joseph Anton. The name of the book is also 
the alias he used during the period in which his life was under the protection of the British 
government; he was known then, facetiously, and perhaps with a measure of jovial condescension, 
as “Joe” to his personal security detail, the so-called “A-squad” of rotating protection officers who 
collectively serve as a kind of sympathetic antagonist in the book. The alias honors two of his 
favorite writers—writers who Rushdie identifies as exiles in their own right: Joseph Conrad and 
Anton Chekov. Of the latter, he writes, “…Chekov, the master of loneliness and melancholy, of the 
beauty of an old world destroyed, like the trees in a cherry orchard, by the brutality of the new; 
Chekov, whose Three Sisters believed that real life was elsewhere…” (165), registering again the 
importance the imaginative place of offshore authenticity, that real life which is elsewhere. Other 
men of literary distinction with whom Rushdie aligns himself and his predicament over the course of 
the book include Milton who wrote was is perhaps the best-known anti-censorship tract in English, 
Aeropagitica (342); Ovid, exiled by Julius Caesar to the Black Sea; Federico García Lorca, killed by 
Franco’s “thugs”; and Osip Mandelstam, who wrote essays and poetry against Stalin’s regime (628). 
In moments of understandable panic over his safety and that of his family, Rushdie finds comfort in 
the classical Bardic dream of immortality upheld by their stories: poetry would live on long after its 
poets were dead. “Art,” he writes near the end of the book, “could perhaps take care of itself…[but] 
artists needed defenders” (628). In other words, while the place of art is something approaching the 
eternal of a secular transcendental signifier, artists, no matter how exalted, need security.  
This performative juxtaposition of an eternal life of the mind and the grim practicalities of 
airlines, low-level politicians, back entrances, and death threats drives the memoir, which critics 
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lambasted for its arrogance, misogyny, and self-aggrandizement.288 In it, Rushdie expands on his 
earlier formulation of the imaginary homeland by frequently invoking something like a Republic of 
Letters, a notion elaborated by Pascale Casanova in her 1999 book of the same name, in which the 
scene or place of the literary triumphantly transcends national, communal, and otherwise laughably 
parochial borders, at least from the point of view of Rushdie’s humor.289 These poets—Ovid, 
Milton, Mandelstam, Lorca, and Rushdie, as he represents himself—are its honored citizens. 
Beneath Rushdie’s utopian vision of what he calls “an unfettered republic of the tongue,” is a partial 
admission of its status as a fantasy; grammatically speaking, at least, Rushdie distances himself from 
the voice of his wounded narrator by employing the third person pronoun in reference to himself. 
For six hundred and thirty three pages, Rushdie, in his own memoir, is not “I,” but “he.” So, with 
what sometimes appear to be Borgesian ambitions, Rushdie claims that it is “he” who dreamed this 
utopia, a “he” who is not exactly I. “He” is that person who had security and death on the brain, 
                                                
288 See especially Daisy Rockwell, “All Hail Salman Rushdie, All Hail Joseph Anton,” review of Joseph 
Anton by Salman Rushdie, Bookslut, November, 2012, 
http://www.bookslut.com/white_chick_with_a_hindi_phd/2012_11_019575.php and Zoe Heller, 
“The Salman Rushdie Case,” review of Joseph Anton by Salman Rushdie, New York Review of Books,  
December, 20 2012, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/dec/20/salman-rushdie-
case/.  
289 Pascale Casanova, World Republic of Letters, trans. M.B. DeBevoise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004). Casanova speaks of her world literature project in reparative terms, 
suggesting in the preface to the English language edition that we “restore a point of view that has 
been obscured for the most part by the ‘nationalization’ of literatures and literary histories, to 
rediscover a lost transnational dimension of literature that for two hundred years has been reduced 
to the political and linguistic boundaries of nations” (xi). She also specifies that she intends to 
borrow from the historical and political approaches of postcolonial criticism (xiii), and suggests that 
literary legitimacy in postcolonial space came about only after nationhood: “Finally, with 
decolonization, countries in Africa, the Indian subcontinent, and Asia demanded access to literary 
legitimacy and existence as well” (11). While it is unclear the extent to which Rushdie has explicitly 
leaned on this and related versions of World or Global literature’s Romanticizations of a supra-
political polis of the mind, it is obvious how much he benefits from the installation of such critical 
paradigms, which, by identifying themselves with postcolonial criticism, seek to evade charges of 
cultural neo-Imperialism.  
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which insisted on taking up space alongside the loftier concerns of creation, voice, and story. “He,” 
is the man who spends the first half of the book trying to arrange for better police protection, and 
the second trying to “free himself of the shackles of security, even if that did make him easier to 
assassinate” (551).  
These shackles, as he describes them, are partly represented by the police themselves, whose 
rules are supposed to maintain his cover, but often seem arbitrary and controlling, and also, perhaps 
more interestingly, partly represented by the security mindset in which he and his security proxies 
lived. He describes the necessity of security in response to a specific terrorist threat, but also as the 
period in hiding progresses, as a kind of ethos: “[t]he security worldview,” he writes, “was 
impressive, and often persuasive, but it was just one version of the truth. It was one of the 
characteristics of security forces everywhere in the world to try and have it both ways” (601). The 
“both ways,” he is referring to here have to do with how the possibility of real harm, ranked and 
scored on a double scale of risk and threat, intersects with his own public presence as an author 
during these years. Whether he would be “allowed” (a word he writes either in scare quotes or italics 
in the book) to do an event—a reading, say, or a speech—became increasingly dependent on how 
the British government, and the governments of the places he traveled to, which included Norway, 
Spain, France, Sweden, and America, viewed the necessary security expenses in relationship to the 
public good associated with his visit. Indeed, the security schemes he describes range from the 
installation of multi-person teams in his house around the clock to private planes with full escorts to 
the shutting down of the Place de la concorde in Paris. At one point, while visiting Denmark, he recalls 
looking out the grand glass windows of the museum in which he was being honored and seeing a 
battleship cruising by: “‘is that for me?’ he asked meaning it as joke; but it was indeed for him: his 
personal battleship to guard him against a naval attack, and to keep a lookout for Islamic frogmen 
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swimming up toward the museum with cutlasses between their teeth. Yes, everything had been 
thought of,” he remarks, “they were a thorough people, the Danes” (349). In other words, when 
Rushdie says security forces “try and have it both ways,” he means that they are simultaneously 
resource-shy, risk-averse, and over-prepared. The tone of this passage is undeniably self-
congratulatory, but it also borrows from specific racist imagery that identified brown immigrants in 
Britain as “wogs, ” a derogatory term for Indian dock and maritime workers, sometimes believed to 
be an acronym for “Wily Oriental Gentleman,” of which these imaginary swimming terrorists are a 
vivid example. The cutlasses in their teeth are not just a reference to their needing their hands to 
swim, but also to the iconic images of the Gurkha warriors who fought the British periodically 
during the nineteenth century, and whose deadly kukri knives were often carried between the teeth 
as they advanced low to the ground.290  
A pattern emerges in the narrative in which the police discourage the writer from making 
public appearances, capitulate after one of his trademark temper tantrums, provide outsized security, 
observe no disruptions, and then claim the lack of disruptions was a direct consequence of the 
outsized security (and the expense of said security). In his telling, Rushdie takes their risk-averseness 
as an affront to his personal freedom, as well as to the literary world more broadly. A main thread of 
the narrative is Rushdie’s complaint that the British government maintained an attitude toward him 
of irritation rather than responsibility, which more or less played out in a long-term effort to restrict 
his movements and decisions as much as possible. Reflecting on an invitation to speak at a literary 
festival in Wales, he writes, with evident sympathy for himself, “[h]e could imagine the senior 
policemen rolling their eyes, here he goes, making demands again, but he was determined not to succumb 
                                                
290 This knife, carrying this British Colonial history with it, is also the knife used by Jonathan Harker 
against in one of his many escape attempts. See Stephen D. Arata, “The Occidental Tourist: 
‘Dracula’ and the Anxiety of Reverse Colonization,” Victorian Studies 33.4 (Summer, 1990), 621-645.  
305 
to their desire that he lie low and say nothing” (347). When he is finally allowed to return to his 
native India, more than ten years after The Satanic Verses, and, effectively, himself, had been banned 
there, he describes the experience as a physical one, analogous with healing—he observes his heart 
overflowing, unaccustomed to happiness and freedom because of the way in which he had been 
“infected by the fears of the police” (602).  
 In response to inhabiting and being infected by a grimly political and artistically 
impoverished world of armored guards, private aircraft, and embassy accommodations, the Rushdie 
character begins to take refuge in his fictional landscapes. In the fifth year after the fatwa, as if to 
perform and ratify the materiality of this new Republic, this “united states of the mind, the celestial 
and infernal nations of desire,” (419) the International Parliament of Writers in Strasbourg “elected 
him president and asked him to write a sort of declaration of intent” (419). A new imaginary 
homeland, cancer-free and uninfected, was becoming manifest. It was in the speech he gave, his 
declaration of intent, that he named the “republic of unfettered tongues,” as the land of writers: “a 
territory far greater than that governed by any worldly power” (419). But for the book’s repeated 
insistence on its author’s secularism—Rushdie recounts, for example, being asked to be Christopher 
Hitchens’s child’s “ungodparent”—this polity of imagination, greater than any worldly power, 
sounds a great deal like the kingdom of God, or at least a place above the rules and rule of existing 
sovereign nations.  
In an earlier speech, delivered a year prior in the Chapel of King’s College, Cambridge, 
Rushdie’s alma mater, the narrator equates his work, in a deft dialectical schematic, with the work of 
the church, writing, “Just as King’s Chapel may be taken as a symbol of what is best about 
religion…so the fatwa has become a symbol of what is worst. The fatwa itself may be seen as a set of 
modern satanic verses. In the fatwa, once again, evil takes on the guise of virtue and the faithful are 
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deceived” (373).291 If the fatwa becomes a symbol of all that is worst in religion, whereas the Chapel 
is the symbol of all that is best, the question arises as to where Rushdie himself fits. Given that he 
delivers the speech from the Chapel’s pulpit, and stands as the object of this death threat, it is clear 
that we are to imagine him as a kind of secular priest. It’s not an outlandish analogy for those who 
minister, in new and different ways, to the spiritual needs of a post-religious or otherwise non-
believing segment of cosmopolitan culture, but the practicalities of governing this ungodly kingdom 
come into conflict with other sorts of territorial sovereignties in increasingly uncomfortable ways in 
this memoir, and in more pointed ways than in Shalimar the Clown.  
 Taking as a point of departure a somewhat mechanical characterization of the priest as a 
liaison or ambassador between the kingdom of God and the kingdoms of men, we can re-engage, 
through Rushdie’s self representation as a secular man of the cloth—a man endeavoring through his 
public pronouncements to heal the ills of violence and its resultant censorious isolation—the 
question of the geopolitical, and through this reengagement look more precisely at the nature of the 
security he describes with reference to the cancer of political Islam. At an earlier moment in the 
memoir, the beleaguered man describes his feelings of abandonment by the British government, and 
observes himself veering toward the self-promotional monadic: “[h]e became, having no alternative, 
in part an ambassador for himself” (355). This is the only time in the book that he uses this 
ambassadorial formulation explicitly, but it bears examination for a number of reasons. First, the 
“self” he alights on here, and the question of its sovereignty, resonates strongly with the moment in 
Shalimar the Clown in which the question of Kashmiri independence is lampooned by an officer of the 
Indian Army as a “moronic idea,” an overture to the creation of infinite Selfistans (Shalimar, 102). 
                                                
291 The text here is broken up by em-dashes to effect the pauses of speech necessary in the acoustic 
space of the stone Gothic. These have been removed in this citation.  
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What was, in the novel a wistful joke applies, too, to Rushdie’s feelings about becoming ambassador 
for his own Selfistan—it’s not a desirable outcome. But Shalimar the Clown is, as we have seen, deeply 
interested in the security of a particular ambassador, Max Ophuls, who, I would suggest, is one of a 
very few, if not the only, Rushdie surrogate in the novel. This brings us to the second reason that his 
assertion that he had become “an ambassador for himself” bears scrutiny: the fictional 
ambassador—who has also served secretly as United States counter-terrorism chief—is killed by 
Shalimar, the vengeful Muslim assassin in the opening pages of the book, his life under threat in 
much the same way Rushdie’s has been during the years he describes in hiding. The ambassador’s 
daughter, India, watches from her upper window as he approaches her Los Angeles apartment 
building. Her thoughts at this moment point us back to the imaginary Republic of lost Homelands, 
those nations of the mind, as yet uninfiltrated by the cancer of terrorism, that Rushdie had been 
generating with the fervor of an exile for, at the time of writing, nearly two decades. Even as her 
father approaches her door, she muses on his imminent departure: “[m]oment by moment he was 
leaving her, becoming an ambassador to such unthinkably distant elsewheres” (Shalimar, 7). This 
phrase mimics a much earlier locution in Imaginary Homelands, in which Rushdie writes of being far 
from home, as a writer “out of country,” “[loss] is made more concrete for him by the physical fact 
of discontinuity, of his present being in a different place from his past, of his being ‘elsewhere’” (IH, 
12).  
India is right—like her mother, she is having prophetic visions—this time foretelling her 
father’s death, but prior to his assassination, the novel pauses on a peculiar exposition of the details 
of the ambassador’s security arrangement:  
The sidewalk was broad. India’s building had an entry-phone system. All this slowed things 
down, increased his window of vulnerability. There were procedures Max Ophuls knew 
intimately from his days in the secret job, the job whose name could not be spoken, the job 
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that didn’t exist except that it did, but the ambassador was not thinking about those 
procedures. He was thinking about his daughter….The procedures required advance men to 
precede him, to block off a parking space right in front of the venue, to pre-enter the 
address and secure it, to hold the doors open. Any professional in this area knew that the so-
called principal was easiest to attack in the space between the door of his vehicle and the 
door of the location he planned to enter. But the threat assessment against Max Ophuls was 
not high nowadays and the risk assessment was lower. Threat and risk were not the same. 
Threat was a general level of presumed danger, while the level of risk was particular to any 
given activity. It was possible for the threat level to be high while at the same time the risk 
attached to a given decision, for example, a last-minute whim to go see you daughter, could 
be negligibly low (39). 
 
The crucial thing here is to bring this moment into contact with two remarkably similar passages 
from the much more recent memoir. In the first of these passages, security is described specifically 
in epidemic terms as “sanitation.” The following descriptions come from the early chapters of Joseph 
Anton, where the author recounts the very earliest days after the issuing of the fatwa:  
1. The most dangerous zone, the zone that could never be sanitized 100 percent, was the 
space between the exit door of a building and the door of a car…when he walked from the 
door of a car to the door of a building or back again, he consciously slowed down. He would 
not scuttle. He would try to walk with his head held high (JA, 176).  
 
2. The man from the [police] branch would be accompanied by an intelligence officer and 
they would tell him what security decisions had been made concerning the threat. Threat was 
a technical term, and it was not the same as risk. The threat level was general, but risk levels 
were specific. The level of threat against an individual might be high—and it was for the 
intelligence services to determine this—but the level of risk attached to a particular action by 
that individual might be much lower, for example if nobody knew what he was planning to 
do, or when” (96). 
 
 The unmistakable correspondences between the lead up to the assassination scene in the 
novel and the musings in the memoir may, for some readers, indicate nothing more than the deep 
imprint of a massive biographical fact on Rushdie’s writing. Like all writers, he was, during this time, 
drawing on the peculiarities, lexicons, and conditions that surrounded him. But I think there is more 
at stake here as security and its attendant worldview become naturalized as mechanisms within and 
between the imaginary homelands he invents and inhabits. If we return to the disease metaphor that 
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carries across these two books and points us back to the imaginary homelands of the essay, the 
implications of a securitized world-view that reaches down into territorial, sovereign space as well as 
up into the space of the “unthinkably distant elsewhere,” become clearer: just as the figures of 
cancer, viruses, and infectious diseases index our fear of those unavoidable, ineradicable threats that 
defy the logic of law, war, nation, and territory, so too do terrorists. Against both, intermediate 
spaces requires sanitation. To make the point more sharply, Rushdie makes his fictional terrorist 
succeed, where those who threaten his actual life have not—as we have seen, Shalimar slices the 
ambassador’s head nearly off on the threshold of his own daughter’s apartment building—a 
technique he learned as an assassin in Algeria. Eventually, he is imprisoned for his crimes, but he 
escapes—literally walks off a prison yard wall onto the gathered air of the night and up into the 
heavens, “as if he were running up a hill” (Shalimar, 395).  
This scene of escape is the culmination of a relatively inert plot and characterization detail: 
Shalimar is a clown, trained to perform in the circus as a high-wire artist. His father teaches him how 
to do this by harnessing his innate sense of balance—certainly an invitation to the reader to consider 
his growing emotional imbalance—by imagining the tightrope as itself made of and surrounded by 
“gathered air.” What this gathered air represents or renders visible is perhaps one of the most 
challenging questions of the book. At once, the gathered air suggests the discontinuous continuity of 
historical epochs suggested by Rushdie’s juxtapositional strategy of putting Second World War 
liberation movements alongside Kashmiri unrest; the alternating condensation and dilation—the 
sense of concrete abstraction that characterizes the space of the sky in the era of air-power and air-
travel; the pathways of regional and international networks that sometimes trace bodily itineraries 
and sometimes just ideological ones; and the invisible vectors of contagion that carry the ancient 
plagues of violence, of certain forms of politics, and of the sickness of the body itself from time to 
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time and place to place. In short, it is a figure for the transformation of the abstract, or what appears 
to be abstract, into the manifest and back again, with or sometimes without a trace. What is 
important about all of these possibilities, and is even more noticeable if you put them side by side, is 
that they all shuttle in the space of the system or the network that, once again, falls outside of 
available rubrics of good or evil and instead constitutes the neutrality of relationality and network as 
such. They have simply come to be; the gathered air that holds things aloft, deterritorializes them, is 
as neutral, as hijackable, as an airplane.  
As it is rendered in the novel, there is a great beauty and sweetness in Shalimar’s escape off 
the boundary wall, even if it achieves for him only a temporary freedom. It reflects some of 
Rushdie’s most ethical moments of thinking in the memoir, as when he writes, “‘[i]f you succumb to 
the security disposition of the world…then you will be its creature forever, its prisoner.’… This was 
a thing he would have to remember. There were only varying degrees of insecurity” (JA, 176. Italics in the 
original). Shalimar’s moment of departure—which literalizes the escape from prison—is both an 
acknowledgement of the existence and persistence of varying degrees of uncertainty and insecurity, 
and also as a release of something resembling the spirit of the terrorist’s character into moral 
indeterminacy—an escape, in other words from an outright condemnation that would imprison a 
reading of this character as simply vengeful. For all the archetypal flattening of Shalimar’s 
characterization Rushdie is not an inhumane writer, is not content to dole out capital punishment on 
his characters, even when those characters are foils for those who have threatened his life. So 
something of Shalimar is released here in this moment, even as the plot trundles forward to its 
conclusion, which will see him die at India/Kashmira’s hands, surely an expression of the author’s 
anger over the threat under which he has been living.  
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The representation of terror as plague, in the schema of Shalimar, may in this way appear to 
be frustratingly or inactionably neutral. When describing a similar conundrum of limited agency and 
significatory excess as a feature of global jihad, Faisal Devji suggests that his claim may be 
“anodyne,” a different way of talking about how neutrality colors the bodily metaphors of politics. 
The idea of action and responsibility in the spread of both ideology and infectious disease is 
necessarily bisected in the novel, which sketches out both a dispersed social agency of disease and 
terror, in which human vectors behave with limited agency as individuals and as communities, and 
also act unconsciously as media, occasioning the natural, blameless movements of disease. There are 
indeed many other large-scale systems, including finance capital, agriculture and food systems, debt, 
the illegal drug trade, and so forth, in which the conundrum of agency might be described similarly. 
These systems cannot be separated from the movements of disease and other epidemics any less 
than they can be extracted from an understanding of terrorist networks. Less obvious, however, may 
be the way in which the textual field and the production of discourse stand on a very similar dual 
sense of agency with reference to authorship. According to this logic, practices of epidemic 
interpretation have to allow equally for the seemingly natural, non-agental surpluses of effects, in 
other words the ways in which objects of mimetic contagion, be they microbes, terror organizations, 
or textual and discursive effects “take on a life of their own,” to borrow a phrase again from Devji. 
There may be no more iconic instance in the last three decades of the capacity of the text to take on 
a life of its own, to exceed and nearly obliterate the author, than the fatwa against Rushdie in 





—4. The Falling Sickness— 
In the preceding pages I have suggested some of the ways in which the prominent and 
insistent figuring of terrorism as epidemic in Rushdie’s work has important consequences for the 
conception, interpretation, and prevention of terror, particularly from the point of view of agency 
and responsibility—what Rushdie distinguished in Shalimar the Clown as the difference between 
protagonism and mere agonism. Some of these consequences are very direct; the years Rushdie 
spent under government protection in Britain and the United States made his personal opinions 
about censorship, global Islamist violence, and later the religion of Islam more broadly, fall on the 
ears of some of the most powerful officials in the world, including the much-reviled Margaret 
Thatcher (whom he had immortalized in The Satanic Verses as “Maggie the Bitch”), Bill Clinton, then-
Secretary of State James Baker, and a dizzying cadre of other high level diplomats and security 
officials, many of whom expressed their genuine admiration for the contested book (and some of 
whom even toted their copies around for him to sign).292 Apart from this extremely unique 
confluence of law-making, international negotiating, and fiction reading, the stakes of this 
overlapping figural tradition are also, to some extent, more constitutive and less occasional; 
embedded in the term’s etymology and constituent parts is a question around personhood and the 
relationship between subject and object: epi means upon or about, and demos means the people, a 
root the term shares with democracy. Brought together in epidemic, they indicate “that which is 
upon the people,” articulating a distinction between the people, as victims, from that which has 
befallen them. At the same time, the term begs the question of who counts as the people, and 
                                                
292 These anecdotes are scattered throughout Joseph Anton, alongside a nearly endless parade of 
celebrity friends (Bono, Nigella Lawson, Brian Eno), who doubtless helped to publicize the affair 
and sway public opinion, unquestionably rightly, in favor of not killing Rushdie and maintaining his 
protection.   
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registers an anxiety with regard to the demos as a category that requires protection, but that can also 
turn on itself through the circulation of contagion, or even through what Derrida, in a number of 
different places in his later work, has called autoimmunity.293 Although Derridian autoimmunity aims 
to illuminate the specific mechanisms by which democracies turn on themselves, and instantiate 
“cruelty itself, the autoinfection of autoaffection,”294 Derrida is concerned mostly with extreme 
forms of ipseic risk, culminating in the suicide or other forms of the self annihilation of the 
democratic state at its own hands, as in the case of the 1992 elections in Algeria. What he speaks less 
about are forms of autoimmunity that are even more survivable, forms that don’t threaten the very 
being of the state, but nevertheless instantiate chronic suffering, as in allergies, arthritis, even 
cancers. As I have mentioned, the epidemic metaphor comprises a vast taxonomy not only of 
disease, but also of accident, environmental effects, and psychological events. We have begun to see 
how the epidemic metaphor operates flexibly within this breadth by looking at how Rushdie deploys 
the figures of plague and cancer in tandem to describe Islamist terrorism.  
Irrespective of the specific form of illness or adverse event such figures entail, in Derrida, as 
in Rushdie, the figuring of terrorism as epidemic—whether infectious or autoimmune—once again 
suggests the naturalization of acts of violence as something organic, rather than as political 
articulations or deliberate acts of faith, however anathema such ideas may be. In other words, when 
                                                
293 Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason trans. Pascale Anne Bruault and Michael Naas 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), and “Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of 
‘Religion’ at the Limits of Reason Alone,” Acts of Religion, ed. Gil Anidjar (New York: Routledge, 
2002), 40-101. See also J. Hillis Miller, “Derrida’s Politics of Autoimmunity,” Discourse 30.1&2 
(Winter & Spring, 2008), 208-225, and Martin Hägglund, Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).  
294 This passage from Rogues is highlighted as the culmination point of J.Hillis Miller’s “Derrida’s 
Politics of Autoimmunity,” though it is left unexplained in that context. The passage appears near 
the beginning of the section called “Sending,” which works through in some detail the intersection 
of sovereignty-in-crisis and Heidegger’s thinking on death, good and bad (Rogues, 109-116).   
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we ascribe the logic of infection and sickness to acts committed by human agents, we risk 
obfuscating the possibility of a politics, irrespective of what we might think about the content of 
that politics, and also risk rendering the problem of terrorism one that is isomorphic with inhuman 
logic, unreadable through theoretical prisms such as political agency, internationalism, just war, 
sovereignty, and right, and yet only manageable through precisely these mechanisms. We have seen 
how the figure is accommodating and promiscuous; it advances cultural and political agendas at 
extreme odds with one another, but as it works in the two books I have thus far discussed, its 
elaboration also upholds fantasies of rational puzzle-solving through data collection and analysis; 
projective modeling and historical transposition; the eradication of pathogenic microbes, viruses, 
and human beings; and the installation and justification of a broad, international security apparatus 
to defend those privileged citizens of the cosmos, the writers and migrants born of imaginary 
homelands. Querying the epidemiological trope as it appears in and structures these works thus gives 
us access to this politics and its multiple refractions. 
In Shalimar the Clown and Joseph Anton, Rushdie retreats into the figural apparatus of epidemic 
to describe outbreaks of specifically Islamist violence, and sources them to Islamic militants who 
invade the valley of Kashmir and Iranian fundamentalism in the wake of the Revolution, 
respectively. I end this chapter by demonstrating through a very circumscribed close-reading how 
The Satanic Verses, published in 1988, can be read productively as a counter-paradigm for the 
articulation of epidemic terrorism as it appears in Shalimar and the memoir. Contrary to the strongly 
negative correlation between plague and communalism, or cancer and Islamism, in the later books, 
disease in The Satanic Verses performs an ambiguous but largely positive political function. The figure 
appears in a number of forms, as a swirl of communicable tropical diseases—a punishment Gibreel 
Farishta calls down on a cold, unfeeling London—and as the non-communicable conditions of 
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epilepsy and breast cancer, which become transmissible affectively, through acts of prophecy. Even 
while it is coded as classically tragic, it is also constantly linked to the ideas of recognition, 
reproduction, and rebirth. Disease, in other words, can lead to suffering, but it is also de-
differentiating and affiliative. This generative counter-paradigm of epidemic and disease (which are 
to some extent differentiated in this book by virtue of the latter’s non-communicability) takes place 
in two of the novel’s major subplots: first, the “tropicalization” of London at the hands of its dark-
skinned warm-climate derived immigrants, and second, from what is widely referred to as the 
Ayesha hajj or Ayesha pilgrimage. While I will touch briefly on tropicalization as an extension and 
reappropriation of the late-nineteenth century epidemic imaginary, I will focus my attention here on 
the latter of the two episodes in order to show how the non-infectious paradigm of epidemic illness 
functions in Rushdie’s work as a path not taken.295  
An exquisite tertiary narrative arises about a third of the way through The Satanic Verses: two 
women, Mishal and Ayesha, suffer side by side from non-contagious afflictions, one from breast 
cancer, and the other from epilepsy, which is also called by Rushdie “the falling sickness.” This 
nomenclature reflects one of the novel’s most evident thematic concerns, which is the synchronicity 
of physical and metaphysical falling—devils and angels are, from the start, in collision with one 
another, even as they fall together through the upper atmosphere, while a secular historical 
interpretation has long held that the prophet Muhammad’s visions of revelation were actually 
epileptic fits.296 Because these two women’s ailments, the falling sickness and breast cancer, are non-
infectious however, this novel resists the strict association of disease with contagion or 
                                                
295 A third section of explicitly medical interest in the novel is what Gayatri Spivak has written about 
as the “hospital section of the book” called Ellowen Deeowen in her essay “Reading the Satanic 
Verses,” Public Culture 2.1 (1989) 79-99.   
296 See Christopher Hitchens in God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (London: Atlantic 
Books, 2008).   
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transmissibility. Instead, it stages a translation from illness to prophecy, such that language and idea 
become capable of viral spread, and their infectiousness occasions not the untrammeled 
dissemination of communalism and ideological violence as in the later books, but rather the 
formation of new communities. Rushdie’s inquiry into the birth of novel forms in The Satanic 
Verses—both physical and conceptual—allows for a politically supple critique of religion, belief, and 
secularism that transcends the category of the polemic, which the novel is so often accused of falling 
into.  
The political suppleness of this metaphor, and its potential to serve as a force of affiliation, 
does not appear as fully or convincingly in Shalimar or the memoir, which largely take the view that 
“human beings” have a natural enemy in disease, and so too, in terror. It is important to remark, 
once again, that two major events separate the writing of The Satanic Verses from these other books: 
the first is the Rushdie affair, the attack on Rushdie himself for apostasy, staged in nations around 
the world, and crystallized in the fatwa of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who decreed Rushdie’s death on 
February 14, 1989.  
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Protest against The Satanic Verses, Bangkok, 1989 
 
The second is the attack on the World Trade center in 2001, which indelibly yoked the imagery of 
hijacked aircraft with Muslim terrorists. The configuration of violence and disease in The Satanic 
Verses holds open the potential of a deracinated, supranational politics of affiliation, understood, 
following Edward Said, as distinct from the biological lineages of filiation, which have historically 
structured national and territorial imaginaries of belonging.297 In contrast to some of the other 
                                                
297 Edward Said, “Secular Criticism,” The World, The Text, and the Critic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1983). This is a contrast he makes especially in reference to his case study in this 
introduction, Eric Auerbach’s Mimesis, 16-17. The sharpest distinction he draws takes place in a 
realms of intellectual labor and life, and favors the disciplinary or learned over the inherited, but also 
runs the risk of simply relocating the old values into new categories: “…if a filial relationship was 
held together by natural bonds and natural forms of authority—involving obedience, fear, love, 
respect, and instinctual conflict—the new affiliative relationship changes these bonds into what 
seem to be transpersonal forms—such as guild consciousness, consensus, collegiality, professional 
respect, class, and the hegemony of a dominant culture. The filiative scheme belongs to the realms 
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looser, less politically sconsequential narratives of migrancy, friendship, and provisional community 
construction that run through Rushdie’s work, the version of affiliation that is at play in The Satanic 
Verses literalizes an interesting an underattended aspect of Said’s description of affiliation in secular 
criticism, which is that is presumes the worldliness of texts (4). In the case of Rushdie’s novel, which 
both banalizes the Qur’an by calling its status as sacred transmission into question by way of 
transcription errors and also makes texts function and contagious vectors of communication, we can 
observe an interest in the worldliness of the text, indeed, its embodiment as non-biological seed or 
germ. The politics this affiliation instantiates, as it unfolds in the migratory, transnational space of 
the novel’s Arabia, India, and London is a politics of postcolonial representation and reading, and its 
affiliation works, in this text, through the mechanisms of contagion.  
So ideas, even good ideas, are shown to spread through vectors of contact, and disease itself 
becomes the occasion for the creation of new, transreligious, transhistorical, and transnational 
communities. To state the contrast more simply: what Shalimar the Clown and Joseph Anton later ossify 
as the coterminous inevitability of infection, death, and annihilation, The Satanic Verses holds open as 
the potential fecundity of illness, contact, and affiliation. For reasons that have to do with its own 
polyvalent expression and the almost inconceivable real politics to which it gave rise, The Satanic 
Verses renders the intersection of postcoloniality and global Islam in ambiguous, but partially 
optimistic terms in a way that later becomes opaque behind the dense shroud of the novel’s own 
relationship, and that of its author, with terrorism. A shift, then, can be observed in the interim from 
the positive relationship between postcoloniality and Islam as radical forces for affiliation, for the 
displacement of hegemonic neo-Imperialisms, and against the massive economic inequality in Britain 
                                                
of nature and of ‘life,’ whereas affiliation belongs exclusively to culture and society” (20). I would 
add to this that the completion of this matrix would necessitate placing death, and possibly (though 
more tendentiously) sickness, therefore on the side of affiliation.  
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during the Thatcher era in which The Satanic Verses was written, and Shalimar and Joseph Anton’s later 
staging of the impossibility of Islam as a vehicle or medium of affiliative postcolonial politics on the 
global stage. A series of pointed questions about the narrative intersection of health and politics 
follows: what good can come of disease in the fictional horizon of a prophet’s contagious words as 
they move through and infect the discontinuous history and cartography of The Satanic Verses? How 
do these words go viral, so to speak? What kinds of naturalization are they therefore subject to? To 
what extent does illness contain the seeds of a cure or give onto the idea of healability? By what 
mechanisms of reproduction do revelations begin to transform, mutate, metastasize, and give rise to 
affiliations? And finally, what can the epidemic imaginary lend to the depiction of prophecy and how 
can epidemiological technologies teach us how to read prophetic speech?  
To answer these questions, we can look to one resonance or attenuated representation of 
disease, violence, and the reproducibility of an idea, which The Satanic Verses flirts with calling Islam, 
but whose content remains an open question throughout. Islam works flexibly in Rushdie’s fiction, 
as religion, but also as a word of reproduction and of unorthodox labor, in the sense of work and in 
the sense of birth. The word means submission, the work of submitting, or subjecting oneself to the 
authority—or authorship—of another. Rushdie makes this meaning clear in the novel, using the two 
words interchangeably. He also names the transformation of Saladin Chamcha— of one of the 
novel’s two protagonists—into a modern day devil a “submission.” Chamcha, bereft, recognizes this 
new form as himself, submits to it: “I am, he accepted, that I am. Submission.”298 Rushdie also 
associates Islam with disenfranchisement and exile, explaining, “the followers of the new faith of 
Submission found themselves landless, and therefore poor” (375). The early followers of the 
                                                
298 Salman Rushdie, The Satanic Verses (New York: Picador, Henry Holt & Co., 1997), 298. Hereafter 
cited in text.  
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fictional prophet are depicted as radicals, aiming to overturn the economic structure that oppresses 
them as a result of their exile: “they financed themselves,” he writes, “by acts of brigandage, 
attacking the rich camel trains on their way to and from Jahilia” (375). The brigand, a word that first 
denoted an irregular foot soldier who would ambush travelers, calls to mind the ethics of economic 
redistribution, but also the forms of “irregular warfare” that have already been the cause of action in 
the book, especially in the hijacking of the Air India flight 420’s aircraft, Bostan, modeled after the 
real-world hijacking and explosion of Air India flight 182, Kanishka, in 1985.  
This double sense of submission and its reproduction, submission’s ability to be hijacked as 
an idea, to instantiate an insurgent politics, is embodied in The Satanic Verses in the character of 
Osman, born an untouchable, and converted to Islam for the somewhat unspiritual purpose of 
gaining access to a well, which he had been forbidden to touch under Hindu law. Rushdie’s use of 
the well and its potential pollution at the hands of this spiritually unclean boy references the 
originary scene of epidemiological science: the investigation by John Snow into the pollution of the 
Broad Street Pump in London’s Soho district.299 Rushdie’s well, however, in becoming accessible, 
rather than quarantined, also displaces the notion that public space, or spaces of confluence, contain 
the germ of infection and death. The word for well in Rushdie’s native Urdu, a language that is 
threaded throughout his body of work, also means navel: kooan denotes both the site of umbilical 
nourishment, and also the source of water, the traditional gathering place of the village. Extending 
the metaphor of reproduction and renewal, water, in the tradition of Islamic ablutions, works in the 
novel to purify, and to melt away. When Islam takes hold of Osman for mercenary reasons that 
include the potential for incorporation in a new community, what kind of “spreading” of the religion 
                                                
299 Cf. Tom Koch, Cartographies of Disease: Maps, Mapping, and Medicine (New York: ESRI Inc., 2005) 
and Disease Maps: Epidemics on the Ground (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011).  
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of submission is the novel depicting? In the historico-religious imaginary of The Satanic Verses, we 
might consider Osman’s mercenary conversion a departure from the realm of the religious and a 
migration into a narrative of collectivity, of the political, of giving birth to and being borne by 
history.  
The novel opens with an iconic free-fall-from-heaven—two men, one named Gibreel, after 
the angel Gabriel, tumble through the sky in an embrace of intimate necessity. Falling with them are 
derailed airline pseudo-recliners, tray tables in their outright, unlocked positions, high-flying 
businesspersons so costumed, and fellow immigrants on the up and up hurtling down fast to their 
terrestrial demise. The flight is headed from Bombay to London. Their aircraft has been exploded by 
a young female terrorist over the English Channel—a fact which the reader learns nearly a hundred 
pages later. Here, the novel identifies terrorism as a cause of this fall, inflecting the falling with both 
political and theological meanings, meanings that will later reappear in Ayesha’s “falling sickness” 
(227). Before she pulls the wire attached to an undergarment of explosives—“all those fatal breasts,” 
as the author describes them (89)—concealed beneath her djellabah, or robe, Tavleen, the sole female 
member of the quartet of Sikh separatists who have hijacked the airplane intones gently the 
prophecy the text will proceed to fulfill over the course of its more than five hundred pages. She 
says, softly in a voice that is described as “oceanic”: “Martyrdom is a privilege…We shall be like 
stars, like the sun” (88).   
This Sikh woman is camouflaged behind her djellabah, a traditionally Berber garment that 
invokes the iconography of Algerian women terrorists. The image of Tavleen lifting her clothing to 
reveal an arsenal of deadly breasts indexes the novel’s interest in figures of reproduction and 
maternity adjacent to the violence of communal belief. The airplane that explodes is figured as a 
reproductive hybrid: in one instance it’s described as an exploding “seed pod,” scattering its germ 
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and “an egg yielding its mystery” (4), while in another moment it becomes a hyperfertile metal 
womb aloft, carrying its hostages in a “second gestation” (85), after which they will pass through the 
birth canal of the freezing, limpid sky to be reborn on the shores of England. One of the falling men 
foretells this monstrous dissemination and wonders before the explosion “how do you call it when 
fifty kids come out of the same mother?” (85). Rushdie gives us a more eloquent pair of follow-up 
questions for our consideration: as they fall from the shattered egg womb in the sky, Gibreel 
Farishta, whose second name is a Persianate word for angel, asks “how does newness come into the 
world? How is it born?” Versions of these questions, which have become refrains in postcolonial 
studies to investigate the circulation and transmission of literary and other cultural forms, is here 
particularly inflected by Rushdie’s inquiry into the origins of Islam in 6th century Arabia. These 
questions, in this exact form, also filter through the novel’s fragmented consciousness and come 
tripping off of the tongues of each of its main characters, who are separated by great distances in 
space and time.  
Much later in the novel, a different man in a different time and place looks with longing and 
befuddlement at an accidental prophetess and asks her “what kind of idea are you?” Long before he 
asks her this, the orphan girl called Ayesha sits naked in his garden chomping on butterflies—in 
Urdu they are called titli, and their abundance in this village gives it its name, Titlipur—Rushdie’s 
Urdu/English pun, the city of butterflies as the city of tits, draws our attention to the ways in which 
the breast is disembodied in the nourishing cloud of insects. Ayesha, in the moment she appears, is 
thus parented, in a sense, by the atmosphere of the village, drawing nourishment from the gossamer 
insects as they funnel down into her mouth. A seizure interrupts her lepidopteric feast, and we soon 
learn that Ayesha, in a long tradition of sufferers touched by God, has been afflicted with epilepsy or 
the falling sickness since she was a child. These swoons, indistinguishable from lucid dreams, give 
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her access to revelation, even as they contain in repetitious miniature the Miltonic fall from heaven 
with which the novel begins, a fall, we must remember, in which Gibreel plummets into rebirth 
following the terrorist attack in mid-air. Ayesha, the beautiful young mystic, forges a friendship with 
the man’s wife, Mishal, from the ore of absent maternity: Ayesha is an orphan, Mishal is unhappily 
childless. These conditions are further underscored by the difference in their social status; as Gayatri 
Spivak has noted, while Ayesha occupies the social stratum of the converted untouchable Osman, 
the Mirza Akhtar and his wife Mishal are the progeny of the zamindars, land-controllers who 
collected taxes on behalf of the Colonial overlords during the Colonial era, and they live in a house 
whose fading grandeur perfectly illustrates their condition (81). These gaps in station and belonging 
are stitched tenuously together through their friendship, and that friendship through suffering.  
Mishal is about to learn that she has fatal cancer that has metastasized in both of her breasts, 
a fact which Ayesha reveals to her alongside other messages she claims to be receiving from the 
Angel Gabriel, even as the character, Gibreel, dreams the prophetess into existence. These breasts, 
riddled with disease, cannot but call to mind the fatal grenade breasts of the suicide bomber, 
Tavleen, and these women taken together constitute the novel’s attenuated representation of disease, 
violence, and the reproducibility of ideas through multiple characters who are reborn in each other 
through the metonymy of their deadly organs of maternal nourishment.  
The man, the Mirza Saeed Akhtar, enters his bedroom to find Mishal and Ayesha “facing 
each other, grey eyes staring into grey, and Mishal’s face…cradled between Ayesha’s outstretched 
palms” (239). Ayesha’s embrace of Mishal, whose name means beacon, and who indeed will perform 
this function for her village, even in her sickness, prefigures the catastrophic end of the pilgrimage 
they will undertake together: the folding of the sea onto the two women and their cohort, an image 
of melding, of grey eyes staring into the grey of other eyes, and beyond them, the grey of the sea. 
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Given the way in which characters in the novel share names with each other, as well as allegorize, 
embody, and reproduce other characters, in addition to more broadly available symbols and icons, it 
is important to remember here the Freudian association of the oceanic with the maternal, because 
this ocean, like Freud’s, like the oceanic voice of Tavleen, serves a dedifferentiating function, 
rendering the border between bodies permeable, and meltingly unified. Also at stake in Freud’s 
consideration of the oceanic feeling, as he receives it from his friend Romain Rolland, is how it 
describes a dramatic fall into religious sensation, the notion that one belongs to, and indeed is 
protected by, a vast receiving body into which one can dive or plunge. Freud refuses the religious 
aspect of Rolland’s experience, but identifies in it a tragic hero’s recognition of the inconclusiveness 
of his fate as he contemplates suicide: the sense that even when we face a “self-inflicted death,” “we 
shall not fall out of this world. We are in it once and for all.”300 Freud’s oceanic feeling is dramatized 
in the tragic hero’s recognition that he cannot fall out of the world, even if he should choose to end 
his life, and this a-teleological or incomplete structure depicting the immanence of falling is mirrored 
in Ayesha’s co-pilgrims, who walk into the water, but cannot, within the parameters of the novel’s 
logic, fall out of life, or as it were, the story.   
Mishal and Ayesha’s friendship, the linking of their fates and their increasing 
indistinguishability from each other, as well as Mishal’s belief that her breast cancer will be healed if 
she heeds Ayesha’s prophecy, prove disastrous both for their village, and for Mishal herself. 
Atmospheric changes are taking place—fog, like the ocean mists displaced, has come to rest over 
the village and swarms of colour-changing butterflies cling to the trees and grasses and people like 
low, sticky clouds. Increasingly agitated by her visions and revelations, and with butterflies swirling 
                                                
300 […aus die Welt werden wir nicht fallen. Wir sind einmal darin]. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its 
Discontents ed. and trans. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1961) 11, fn. 3. 
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after her, Ayesha insists that the entire village of Titlipur will have to walk to the Arabian Sea, at 
which point the sea will part, and they will be able to walk across its floor to Mecca. Ayesha 
proposes her plan to the panchayat, or ruling council of the village, and, Rushdie writes, it was as if 
“her silence infected everyone” (242). Here the novel gives us a crystallization of the polysemic 
nature of prophetic speech, which, as with Muhammad’s contested revelations, can also go awry, or 
be infected by a pre-semantic silence, untethered from explication, elaboration, and even these 
words’ original source. Ayesha’s infectious silence is a part of her prophecy, and here Rushdie draws 
our attention once again to the status of the apocryphal Satanic Verses, which give the novel its 
name. What became known in the first two centuries of Islam as the pagan, or Satanic Verses, 
purported to record Muhammad’s revelations, but were later be deemed false and excluded from the 
Qur’an—the words of Satan rather that the word of God delivered through the lips of Gibreel, the 
Angel of Recitation.301 That the novel’s Gibreel falls, like Lucifer, in the opening pages of the text 
further underscores the capacity of revelatory or prophetic speech to come become detached from 
its source, to mutate and to fall or err. Recalling the epigraph from Defoe, the novel already 
associates Satan’s falling with the imperium of air and liquid waste, a connection that points up the 
potential of the divine to turn virulent.  
The villagers, naïve to these transformations, agree to Ayesha’s plan, rapt in her prophetic 
quiet, and anxious for a chance to perform the hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, in the wake of this 
enchantress. Mirza Saeed protests, later hollering, “The devil alone knows what germ this whore has 
infected the villagers with!” (245). In Saeed’s frustrated vociferation, we can see an additional register 
added to the promiscuity of prophetic language through its alignment with the promiscuous woman; 
                                                
301 Rushdie revisits this story in a passage from Joseph Anton quoted above, in which he delivers a 
speech at the King’s College Chapel. Joseph Anton, 372.   
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both, we are reminded, are unreliable media, and suspicious proxies or carriers of the divine seed of 
language. Saeed’s invocation of infection also serves as a premonition of the illness and suffering 
that will occur as a result of their arduous walk. Nevertheless, they do this: Muslims, Hindus, 
untouchables with their favored bullocks, the young, the old, resisting chaperones, zealous toy-
peddlers, even a titan of industry. They all catch the Ayesha pathogen—Mirza Akhtar describes it as 
“an eczema of the spirit that maddened him because there was no way of scratching it” (238), adding 
a slightly comic dimension to Derrida’s politics of autoimmunity, and they all walk behind her to the 
edge of Ma-Bharat, Mother India, and enter the waters.  
Mirza Saeed, still full of longing and befuddlement, and having followed his resolute wife 
and her personal saint on the pilgrimage (though he does so in a black Mercedes station wagon), 
asks Ayesha another version of the question Gibreel poses: “how does newness enter the world?” It 
is this he asks her, as the hostages on the hijacked plane have silently asked Tavleen, the grenade-
breasted terrorist, in exactly the same words: “what kind of idea are you?” Each of these women—in 
lines delivered hundreds of pages apart—replies with a constellation of the same words: “unbending, 
uncompromising, absolute, pure.” In Urdu, the word for this is Pak, as in Pakistan, the land of the 
pure. The pilgrimage is an episode Rushdie adapts from contemporary Pakistani history. In 1983 a 
young woman by the name of Naseem Fatima lead 38 Shi’ia Muslims to their demise on the Hawkes 
Bay beach in Karachi with promises of an ocean that would open like a book, and convey them, like 
lines of prayer, to the holy city of Mecca.302  
                                                
302 For a more fully situated discussion of the translation, or “dislocation” of the Hawke’s Bay 
incident in Pakistan into an Indian context, see Sara Suleri, “Contraband Histories: Salman Rushdie 
and the Embodiment of Blasphemy,” Reading Rushdie: Perspectives on the Fiction of Salman Rushdie 
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As in the novel, the survivors were charged by the police with attempting to emigrate 
without visas, as though people could be undetectable as germs, migratory as thoughts, viral as 
tropical epidemics ready to inflict themselves on the great cities of the North. Rushdie’s text insists 
that we elaborate on the question “what kind of idea are you?” by asking how does an idea begin to 
take hold? How does it begin to transform, reproduce itself, hybridize, recombine? And how, 
subsequent to its coming into being, does an idea become embodied? How does it spread within a 
body or leap outside and  between them? And does the falling sickness instantiate the radical 
potentiality of submission, as an affiliative politics? In the Ayesha episodes of The Satanic Verses, 
Rushdie offers us an idea, hailing from the land of the pure, plucked from the news, and remodeled 
and hybridized, “dislocated” as Sara Suleri has put it, and abstracted by changing the identity of the 
Shi’ia Muslims in Pakistan to a more generalized populace in India, as a parable for the tragic fate of 
a community that is seen as a metastasizing force on the maternal body of the Subcontinent, namely 
Muslims. At the base of his inquiry into novel forms is the birth of Islam itself.  
The clearest figure Rushdie gives us for thinking about the relationship between these 
questions in The Satanic Verses, and, I would argue, in his entire body of work, is the padyatra, or foot 
pilgrimage, from the village of Titlipur to the Arabian Sea. The padyatra represents the 
externalization, socialization, and even healing of the intimate and grave condition Mishal suffers, 
metastatic cancer of the breast. As the metastasizing journey progresses, so too does her disease, and 
those around her suffer in concert, even as they are galvanized in their journey by her suffering, and 
the promise of a cure should they undertake the test of the faithful. The group or corporate body of 
the pilgrims begins to disintegrate, starting with the old woman, Khadija, the sarpanch’s wife who 
shares a name with the prophet Muhammad’s first wife, the wealthy widow. After her death, five 
others follow suit—and resultant episodes of violence and mutiny, like malignant clusters, sully the 
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beatific atmosphere that surrounds the mobile village like its titular butterflies. The land, too, suffers, 
and the region experiences a devastating drought. As they walk, “the land browned under rainless 
skies. The corpses of buses and ancient monuments rott[ed] in the fields beside the crops…trees 
st[ood] on roots exposed by soil erosion…looking like huge wooden claws scrabbling for water in 
the earth” (493). This is the condition of the land as the village of Titlipur walks and dies, slouching 
toward a promised salve, the healing ocean, the miraculous pilgrimage. Those who remain are, by 
the time they reach the water, a “lame, tottering, rheumy, feverish, red-eyed bunch,” Saeed wonders 
“how many of them would manage the final few yards to the water’s edge” (515). Mishal has 
become completely grey, already embodying the sea that will take her.  
In spite of all of this, in spite of Rushdie’s insistence on the disease metaphor, in spite of his 
repetition of the figure of the fatal breast, which invites us to consider these women as sources of a 
poisoned maternity, malign mothers of terror and of mass suicide, the pilgrimage challenges the 
notion that these deaths, this suffering is simply an inhuman event befalling the people, a terror 
outside of politics, a suicidal filiation. First, it draws on the powerful historical iconography of 
Gandhi’s 1930 Salt March, which stands as a key moment in the independence struggle in which the 
Mahatma incited his followers to walk from Ahmedabad to Dandi in order to protest the British 
monopoly on salt and the heavy taxes levied on its trade.303 In so doing, the Ayesha pilgrimage 
strongly associates itself with the activities of a liberatory politics whose horizon was the birth of a 
democratic nation, but which also contained the seeds of the partition of the subcontinent into the 
flightless bird of India, flanked by the wings of East and West Pakistan, as well as the seeds of a 
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transnational anticolonialism that had begun to take hold after the First World War. It is important 
to remember, too, that foot pilgrimages were some of the first scenes of Imperial epidemic 
intervention in the nineteenth century.304 Efforts to control masses of people as they moved together 
from the far-flung reaches of India and beyond, bringing with them the pathogens of their regions, 
and passing them along to a vast, variegated population who would then, in turn, carry pathogens 
back with them to their points of origin, were at the forefront of British tactics for controlling the 
spread of cholera, plague, malaria, and other infectious diseases. The program of containment, and 
of forbidding religious pilgrimages of Muslim, Hindu, Jain, and hybrid publics, had the salutary 
effect of curbing the exchange of dangerous ideas, which were slowly curdling in the end of the 
nineteenth century into anti-Imperial and nationalist ones.  
Second, the word Rushdie uses for the pilgrimage is a specifically Sanskrit-derived one: 
padyatra is a foot pilgrimage from a linguistically Sanskrit, and implicitly Hindu standpoint, as 
opposed to hajj, which is an Arabic word usually denoting the pilgrimage to Mecca. The padyatra thus 
represents an instance of the hybrid religious practices Rushdie so often celebrates in his work, 
although it also becomes an inflammatory point as the villagers move through largely Hindu areas of 
India. Hindu nationalists and communalists object to the “hijacking” of a long-standing Indian 
practice: “Padyatra, or foot pilgrimage, is an ancient pre-Islamic tradition of national culture,” 
onlookers object, “not imported property of Mughal immigrants.” This Muslim girl, they argue, 
ought not coopt a Hindu practice, it’s “a flagrant and deliberate inflammation of already sensitive 
situation” (502). Pad, they insist, is for Hindu feet, yatra is for Hindu pilgrimage. They shout from 
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the roadside “NO ISLAMIC PADYATRA! BUTTERFLY WITCH, GO HOME” (503). Still, the 
prophetess, an oblique figure for Gandhi’s slow march toward democracy, welcomes everyone, and 
an impediment thrown up by Hindu nationalists is washed away by an apocalyptic flood, which has 
come too late to save the crops, but just in time to save the pilgrims. In the moments before the 
healing waters arrive, Mirza Saeed muses, “we have suffered from a kind of disease: one of 
detachment, of being unable to connect ourselves to things, events, feelings” (504), his thoughts 
themselves a citation of his cohort Srinivas, who wails “I should have stayed with wife and kiddies 
and cut out this adventure disease that has made me land up in such a place” (504).  
Srinivas is an especially important minor character in the Ayesha plot; it is he who produces 
at this moment of despair the novel’s icon of draconian control over reproductive health: the family 
planning doll. The story of this doll illustrates one particularly tragic facet of the capillary dispersal of 
biopower in post-independence India—the doll does not come handed down directly from the 
government, but is rather the ingenious invention of Srinivas, the toy-maker as “a socially 
responsible variant of the old Russian-doll notion. Inside, a suited-and-booted Abba-doll was a 
demure, sari-clad Amma, and inside her, a daughter containing a son. Two children are plenty: that 
was the message of the dolls” (231). Knowing that Ayesha has fallen on hard times, Srinivas 
encourages her to make a few of these “FP dolls” for him to sell, since they have a high turnover, 
and even offers to pay her double for her work. She refuses, and in so doing stages an oblique and 
subtle form of protest against the distant coercion of the Indian government’s forced sterilization 
campaign mostly spearheaded by Sanjay Gandhi along with the slum clearance policy, both of which 
became the occasion for massive outrage and protest during the 1975-77 Emergency and 
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following.305 The financial bribes, unauthorized tube ligations and vasectomies, and deceptive 
administration of sterilization drugs are some of the more terrifying manifestations of the 
government’s effort to control population growth. Rushdie’s novel doesn’t linger on these events in 
particular, but draws them into the ambit of a broader conversation among Non-Resident Indians at 
the Shaandaar Café in London, where, in trying to parse what has happened to the fallen Saladin 
Chamcha who has become a cloven-hoofed devil, Jumpy Joshi outlines the following crimes on the 
part of the Metropolitan Police force: “Wrongful arrest, intimidation, violence….Illegal detention, 
unknown medical experimentation in hospital…” the listeners respond with  
murmurs of assent here, as memories of intra-vaginal inspections, Depo-Provera scandals, 
unauthorized post-partum sterilizations, and, further back, knowledge of Third World drug 
dumping arose in every person present to give substance to the speaker’s insinuations (261).  
 
While the curbing of reproductive rights as such, and the economic and other collateral forms of 
disenfranchisement that came with it, do not form a center of gravity in the book, the allusions to 
the history of forced sterilization in India under the auspices of economic growth adds another 
important historical layer to the depiction of malfunctioning maternity in the shared undertaking of 
Mishal and Ayesha, who have, by the time Srinivas produces his incongruous and tactlessly-timed 
doll as a gift for Mishal’s mother, come very near to reaching the maternal ocean that promises their 
rebirth. First, however, the obstacles of protest must be cleared by the miraculous flood, whose 
implications of fecundity are further underscored by the dual nature of fertility during the 
Emergency, the declaration of which was directly linked to fluctuating agricultural yields; under the 
Emergency, the government’s suspension of civil liberties included the concerted and abusive efforts 
to curb family size.  
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This flood, then—drawing on Deluvian narratives from Judeo-Christian sacred texts and 
before—sets the scene for the entering of the maternal ocean; “it was as if God had been saving up 
the water for just this purpose, letting it build up in the sky until it was as endless as the sea” (505). 
What follows after the flood is a two-fold rebirth. Instead of struggling or dying, the pilgrims walk 
calmly into the water. Witnesses attest to diving deeper and deeper to rescue them, only to find the 
waters parted, like hair, beneath their own surface, and the pilgrims continuing their ambulatory 
journey, as Osman puts it, “going along the ocean floor, among the dying fish” (518). A police 
officer, who has arrived at the beach to keep order, runs breathlessly to the protesting family 
members and survivors, a group that includes Mirza Saeed Akhtar, who is still pleading with his wife 
to remove herself from the thrall of the witch Ayesha and go to America for cancer treatment, 
everything state of the art. The police officer, confused by the hullaballoo, greets a wet Saeed with a 
simple question: “what is befalling?” he asks (517), seemingly an address not just to the frantic man, 
but to the novel as a whole, in which, as we have seen, the falling sickness seems to have taken hold 
of them all. Later, Mishal’s mother, another witness to the parting waters, confirms the status of her 
witnessing as recitation: “Believe, don’t believe,” she finishes emphatically, “but what my eyes have 
seen, my tongue repeats” (518).  
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Daisy Rockwell, “Oscar, Wow! III,” 2010 
Like Ayesha’s prophetic speech, a symmetrical foil for the errancy of revelation at the hands of 
Mahound’s untrustworthy Persian scribe (380), this act of witness stages the birth of mythic content 
not as the transmission of a theological signified, but rather as an originary, profane interpenetration 
of eye and tongue, of sense and language, or of saying and seeing—an originary act of transmission, 
in which witness cannot simply be believed or enacted, but must first be received and interpreted, 
with or without belief. The reproduction of ideas is thus revealed as that which always carries with it 
the risk of errancy, promiscuity, contagious reproduction, and the notion of rebirth accordingly 
migrates away from the orthodoxies of both religion and the nation.   
The second rebirth occasioned by the Ayesha pilgrimage is Mirza Saeed’s, though it arrives 
much later in the novel, after his return to Titlipur, where he finds the village has rotted away, has 
crumbled in his absence. As he sits on his dusty verandah, overlooking his land, he remembers his 
wife, and begins to slip away into death. As slips, falling out of life, he sees Ayesha under the water, 
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glorious with “tentacles” of light streaming out of her navel. He struggles, begins to chop wildly at 
the radiant umbilical cords, and they both begin to drown. The gates of paradise, the heavy water, he 
thinks, are slamming in his face. At this moment, Saeed “made a different choice,” and “his body 
split apart from his adam’s apple to his groin, so that she could reach deep within him, and now she 
was open, they all were, and at the moment of their opening the waters parted” (520-521). In 
reentering each other’s bodies through the outflow of umbilical light in an act of poetic, impossible 
reproduction, the pilgrims are drawn out of the depths, are thrown back up into the firmament from 
which they fell. In their luminous ascendancy, they have become, as Tavleen with her arsenal of 
deadly breasts prophesied, “like stars, like the sun” (88). They survive themselves, in a precarious 
reassortment of Derridian autoimmunity, are transmitted, not as prophets, but as profane figures of 
prophetic dissemination. 
The horizon of the pilgrimage, then, and the prophecy of Ayesha, is that of non-filiative 
reproduction, and of healability: for Mishal, for the village, for the desiccated land, for the non-
believers even in their non-belief, for the wounds of partition. Ayesha’s words—“everything will be 
required of us, and everything will be given” (232, 239, 240, 242, 245) contain within them an 
ambivalence, and a potential for that which befalls the people—indeed for their falling itself, for the 
falling sickness—to occasion such a rebirth. In entering the grey waters pointed toward, but without 
arriving at Mecca, the pilgrims demonstrate the ambiguous status of an idea that can be hijacked, 
perhaps away from religion, an idea that can spread and metastasize, can be borne, like an illness, but 
can also be born like new life, can gather and affiliate, and can perhaps also bear them along. In 
comparison to the rest of the novel, the Ayesha hajj has the virtue of satisfying readers’ thirst—in 
what is admittedly a drier, more academic climate than many of Rushdie’s other books—for the 
satisfaction of pain and fatality transubstantiated, made divine. In this way, the book is far more 
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imprinted by religious—specifically Abrahamic—iconography than a reader who came late to 
Rushdie would be given to expect, although it is unclear where one might draw the line between the 
aesthetic and secular appropriations of religious themes on the one hand, and a genuine experiment 
with eschatology, passion, and infinite love embodied in this profane and erotic encounter between 
the girl-prophet and the godless, ageing land owner.  
If the question of singular revelation, epiphany, or of spiritual transformation is possible in 
the horizon of the Ayesha narrative as a traveling vector at odds with the non-contagiousness of 
epilepsy and breast cancer—in other words, an affective condition that travels from and between 
two unique women (Ayesha and Mishal) to a collective (their followers) and then has the capacity to 
survive the dissolution of the collective only to reemerge later in an outbreak of individual 
symptoms (for Mirza Saeed)—then the novel also presents a more explicit political affiliation 
through the figure of a conglomeration of contagious diseases and other afflictions from the third 
world. This is the novel’s depiction of what Janice Ho has called “tropicalization,” the concrescence 
of a variety of radical politics through which minority groups in Britain challenged the dominant 
agendas of Thatcher-era political liberalism.306 The term indexes a backward glance to the discourses 
of tropical disease and epidemic in the nineteenth century. When Gibreel Farishta finds himself once 
again disappeared in London, self-spirited away from a crowd thronging with sinister tones, he is in 
flight, aloft now in different, more urban air. Hovering over the vast and sprawling city in a rage, he 
determines that the problem with England is that “they were English: damn cold fish!” (363). In 
response to this problem, and its many violent consequences for the struggling and marginalized 
migrants of England of whom his friend Chamcha is only the most outsized and abused example, 
Gibreel styles himself the “great Transformer,” and, like an unseen pandemic, prepares to bring the 
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city to its knees. He apostrophizes Fanon, and with him, refuses to acquire the “stony calm” of the 
colonized (364). Instead, he decides that “truth is extreme, it is so and not thus, it is him and not her, a 
partisan matter, not a spectator sport. It is in brief heated” (365). Having discovered the necessity of 
putting the flame to the failed proverbial melting pot, he bellows “City…I am going to tropicalize 
you” (365). Among other narrative results, including the famous melting of political effigies in the 
Hot Wax nightclub, and the coalition of West Indian, African, and South Asian migrants this event 
gives rise to, Gibreel’s threat of tropicalization is immediately broken down into its constituent parts: 
what will come of this reverse colonization includes better friendships, “religious fervour, political 
ferment, renewal of interest in the intelligentsia” (365), but also “cholera, typhoid, legionnaire’s 
disease, cockroaches, dust, noise, and a culture of excess” (366). The very notion of tropicalization, 
drawing on the history of tropical medicine as a subfield of both epidemiology and colonialism, is an 
infectious one. This is clear not just in the specification of disease as a collateral import with the 
tropical, but also in the way the novel plays with the dangers and potentials of radical affiliation in a 
variety of epidemic forms in which infectiousness travels from body to word and back again.  
In coding tropicalization as the touchstone of the novel’s politics of extremity, Rushdie 
offers yet another possibility for the political projection of epidemic as isomorphic with forms of 
insurgent violence, even intersecting in some cases with minor forms of domestic terrorism. To 
balance the hot optimism of this London boiling, the novel has already given us the monstrous, 
failed scenes of the Iranian Revolution in images of a throbbing, self-consuming swarm, scenes that 
certainly played into the Ayatollah’s objections to the book. Perhaps one of the novel’s greatest 
achievements, particularly when read in light of the later works’ intractable pessimism with regard to 
the potential of political Islam, or third world politics more broadly, is that these representations of 
affiliation and disease don’t fall easily into favorable or unfavorable categories. As Ho puts it, “the 
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novel’s imagination remains conflicted about the implicit violence that such a politics of extremity 
entails” (208). Ho suggests that the novel “attempts to resolve” this conflict by turning to magical 
realism, a mode that allows the author to “efface the material consequences of violence” (208). Ho is 
right to point out the necessity of shifting into a different kind of interpretive space beyond the 
control of discourses of morality, legitimacy, or even efficacy.  
I want to suggest, however, a different mechanism than magical realism for holding apart the 
question of real violence from fictional experiments with a fatal politics of extremity first in The 
Satanic Verses, and  progressively less so in Shalimar the Clown and Joseph Anton. That mechanism is the 
form of historical juxtaposition—what I have called in the introduction to this dissertation 
epidemiological historiography, a variation on Benjamin’s historical materialism and Serres’s 
topological relations—that brings Max Ophuls together with Kashmiri communalism, and that 
draws on the alarming imaginary of subterranean epidemics’ reemergence.307 The historical 
correspondences and resurgences that connect a vast range of insurgent narratives in Rushdie’s 
work—from the faintly outlined memory of the 1857 Mutiny to the Iranian Revolution to the plague 
of Islamist violence in Kashmir to the cancer of radical Islam—serve to connect a politically and 
morally ambiguous assemblage of events by way of the metonymic deployment and interpretive 
demands of epidemic figuration. These interpretive demands require us to think agency differently, 
to reflect on communicability as a horizon of commensurability, but without the flattening 
reductiveness of sameness. The distance that separates the historical and political events of The 
Satanic Verses, like so many seemingly unconnected outbreaks, is vast enough that it requires 
interpretive reconstruction, mapping of multiple social factors, and a resistance to mining the data 
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for easy abstract similarities that tend to be classified as causes. In other words, the practice of 
writing fiction through the lens of epidemic history invites a perpetual reading of fictional space as a 
dynamic interpenetration of surfaces and revelations, agential action and natural affliction. In this 
way, Rushdie’s earlier fiction obstructs the habits of simple moralization or psychological root-cause 
goose chases into which so many narratives of both monstrosity and terrorism fall. The same can be 
said, though I think to a lesser extent, of Shalimar the Clown, and still less so of Joseph Anton.  
In closing, it is instructive to return to Shalimar, and consider how the threatened 
ambassador understands, and in fact brings about these resonances, since I have argued that he 
stands as a proxy for Rushdie himself. It is possible to read the novel’s historical correspondences as 
instances of the histrionic overinvestment of detail that James Wood scoldingly identifies in 
Rushdie’s writing—the apocalypse time of “surfaces and revelations” in which everything is 
everything, or “everywhere is a mirror of everywhere else.” This is the sort of amplified humanism 
that the novel ironizes by burying it in the swoony tones of the romantic middle sections and 
mourning it in beginning and end as the outmoded optimism of a bygone era, an optimism that Max 
expresses when he looks down on the valley of Kashmir for the first time. He stands on the cease-
fire line and thinks of Alsace, of “the history of his hometown, and the whiplash movements of the 
Franco-German frontier across its people’s lives” (180). Comparing the frozen land below to his 
own, he thinks, “[h]e had come a long way but perhaps not so very far. Could any two places have 
been more different, he asked himself; could any two places have been more the same?” In a voice 
that rings of Camus in its capacious humanism and nostalgia, a declaration big enough to be right, 
Max waxes philosophical: “[h]uman nature, the great constant, surely persisted in spite of all the 
surface differences. One snaking frontier had made him what he was…had he come here, to another 
such unstable twilight zone, in order to be unmade?” (180). The question marks the sense of 
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vulnerability implicit in universality—and we know by this time in the novel that the menaces of the 
ambassador’s own history of religious persecution are looming heavily on the horizon in Kashmir—
if human nature is a great constant, the novel seems to tell us here, it also persists in harboring the 
seeds of its past plagues. Such universalism, then, teaches us nothing, except to expect disaster; that 
disease will reemerge, looking, once again, like disease.  
The particular comparisons Shalimar the Clown draws between the successive conquests of 
Kashmir and the global political legacies of the Second World War suggest that the cyclical dialectics 
of history, as we can see them through the reemergence of plagues political and otherwise, are not 
the same as stasis or historical sameness. There are not only epistemological effects, but also deep, 
ineradicable cultural impacts borne of the specific, embodied, experience of particular diseases, and 
particular forms of violence, even particular narrative and historiographic modes. As he considers the 
mind’s fondness for pattern recognition and its ability to mimic its own experiences in new 
encounters—looks, as it were, through Tarrou’s inverted telescope—Max Ophuls also stands on the 
precipice of his career. He will meet Boonyi Noman in the next paragraph, so he is also standing at 
the doomed edge of his marriage to the Grey Rat. In Max’s mind, the question falters and dies; he 
wonders “did the mind discover likeness in the unlike in order to clarify the world, or to obscure the 
impossibility of such clarification?” (180). The same question might be asked of the likeness we have 
collectively forged and overwhelmingly recognized between terror and plague and the various eras 
and geopolitical contexts in which this figure emerges: does thinking historical violence as mimetic 
contagion clarify our present global political landscape? In some ways, perhaps it does; certainly an 
epidemiology of terror does not fail to illuminate chains of effects—of economic exploitation, 
seemingly infinite debt structures, the stoking of militarization and increasing banality of security 
states, the immanence of nationhood in an international order, to name just a few—for which 
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American imperialism, as an inheritor of Enlightenment-era colonialism, is in many ways 
responsible. At the same time, perhaps the discovery of likeness in the unlike is another unlucky 
attempt at humanist universalism: an arrogant, rationalist proposition mired in the epistemology of 
depth and truth. Gibreel Farishta entertains this thought.  
When you looked through an angel’s eyes you saw essences instead of surfaces, you saw the 
decay of the soul blistering and bubbling on the skins of people in the street….As he 
roamed the metamorphosed city he saw bat-winged imps sitting on the corners of buildings 
made of deceits and glimpsed goblins oozing wormily through the broken tilework of public 
urinals for men (331).  
 
Farishta, armed with his London A-Z, another name, perhaps for the alpha and omega of Shalimar’s 
apocalyptic surface city of Los Angeles, claims to see through London’s surface to what lies beneath, 
an underlayer of gargoyles, devils, parasites, and serpents. He sees the decayed soul of the people 
erupting like buboes on the skin. Perhaps, then, Farishta sees the “essence” of London, but it is also 
the essence and prefiguring of the plague Max both sees and doesn’t see as he gazes on the valley of 
Kashmir, full of monsters and ghouls that are at once familiar and not. This, too, is a tapestry of 
essences so shared and ubiquitous as to be nothing less and nothing more than the eternally 
surfacing revelation of migrancy, urbanity, and the contamination of one history with a host of 
others. Perhaps, then, the indiscriminate appearance of these figures of affiliation and terror as 
epidemic participates in maintaining the problems of global inequality, armed “humanitarian” 
intervention, and the impossibility of a popular politics without economic stability by searching for 
organic causes of cyclical insurgent eruptions, distracting us with graphs, maps, surveillance, and 
narrative, performing a dance of scientific veils to obscure the horror of an impossible knowing, an 








In fiction as in politics, the enemy’s outlines grew vague and vast; he was too big to be tried 
in our courts, too deadly to be fought without torture, too radical to be understood….For 
the most part, the results have been disappointing; awe has outpaced understanding, and few 
writers or filmmakers, with a small number of notable exceptions…have succeeded in 
depicting their zealots as fully human.  




The work in this dissertation was motivated by a desire to see how the figuring of terror as 
epidemic moves through the exemplary scenes of colonial, anticolonial, and postcolonial politics and 
cultural production, and how it changes as it moves away from characterizations of national self-
determination struggles, such as those in India and Algeria, toward more wide-ranging forms of 
violence and resistance, and finally toward depictions of global jihad and other forms of 
contemporary terrorism. I wanted to know how the figure influenced and made itself known 
through genre and literary form. Across the texts and discursive fields that have comprised my 
research, I have observed the figure doing two kinds of work—the first opens up non-state violence 
to the rational hermeneutics of epidemiological science, and in so doing, attempts to domesticate the 
radical alterity that presumably constitutes this form of enmity under the auspices of an infinite 
science of surveillance. The other kind of work the figure does is both contrary to and inextricable 
from the first: the epidemic figuring of terror obscures motive, agency, and legibility behind a gothic 
veil of monstrosity and the dehumanizing organicisation of the pathogenic other. As an extension of 
this epistemic confluence, I have observed the ubiquitous deployment of the figure of terror as 
epidemic in the service of depoliticizing the violent acts of non-state actors, as well as sanitizing the 
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political valances of the prophylactic measures and retaliations of sovereign and governmental actors 
against them. Such representations, therefore, are also frequently attended by both a slippage in the 
conception of the subject, such that human actors become reconfigured as viral vectors or infectious 
agents, as well as a programmatic rhetorical justification of any and all acts against these agents, and 
the places in which they reside, in the interest of defending the unassailable good of global health. 
The epidemic method as it operates in the texts I have interrogated here thus buttresses the 
consolidation and extension of imperial and neo-imperial forms of power and control. 
It is this discursive history that enables the authors of the 9/11 Commission Report, for 
example, to meditate, in the wake of the September 11th attacks, on the way in which globalization 
has “taught us that terrorism against American interests ‘over there’ should be regarded just as we 
regard terrorism against America ‘over here.’ In this same sense,” they conclude, “the American 
homeland is the planet.” 308 Likewise, this discursive history has also enabled the commissioners to 
characterize the “Muslim world” as a monolithic entity within this American planet that “has fallen 
behind the West politically, economically, and militarily for the last three centuries…” Such language 
reproduces the pattern we have seen repeatedly in the coding of non-Western space as out of joint 
with modernity, and presumably also lacking in the benefits of health, longevity, and prosperity that 
come with it. They continue, “because few tolerant or secular Muslim democracies provide 
alternative models for the future, Bin Ladin’s message finds receptive ears” (362). This 
characterization further implies that the lack of secular democratic structures leaves people in the 
“Muslim world,” more susceptible or vulnerable to the kinds of ideology with which “Americans 
cannot bargain or negotiate,” namely radical Islam’s lack of “respect for life,” which the 
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commissioners suggest “can only be destroyed or isolated,” as if by inoculation or quarantine. 
Indeed, the authors suggest, in their final recommendations, that the best way to remedy the 
resentment of America and the West is “tolerance, the rule of law, political and economic openness, 
the extension of greater opportunities for women—these cures,” they write, “must come from 
within Muslim societies themselves (362–363). In this dissertation, I have tried to suggest the 
significant role that this kind of language, and the forms of representation in which it operates, has 
played in the literary, scientific, and political discourse of power beginning in the late nineteenth 
century with the great global epidemic of cholera. I do not think it is a mistake that the language of 
powerful nations and actors has continued to imagine its others as weak, sickly, pathogenic, and in 
need of “cures” whether from afar, or from within a perceived global body.  
In ending this dissertation with Salman Rushdie’s counter-paradigmatic deployment of the 
epidemic figure for a politics of affiliation in the Satanic Verses, however, I am acutely aware of a 
parallel story that can, and indeed, ought to be told about the uses of the epidemic imaginary, not for 
the furtherance of existing structures of biopolitical control, but against them. The “tropicalization” 
of London and the falling sickness of Ayesha show us clearly that discourses of disease can and have 
been appropriated to revolutionary and affiliative ends. The very dispersal that structures the 
epidemic imaginary is thus also its greatest resource—in the capillary nodes of contact, exchange, 
and transmission of contagious or otherwise shared affliction resides a nearly infinite potential for 
attachment, mutual responsibility, and the redistribution of power. In constructing a genealogy of 
the contemporary deployments of epidemic figuration in and around the War on Terror, I have 
focused my attentions on texts that have circulated easily and broadly within the pathways of 
imperialism and neo-imperialism, and in many ways reinforce their ideology. The purview of this 
dissertation is thus limited in three particular ways that I hope to address in the next iteration of the 
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project. The first is that I have worked primarily with a model of epidemiology that remains wedded 
to its origins in colonial science. This is not the only model of the discipline, however, which has 
evolved in significant ways, especially since the outbreak of HIV and AIDS, and has served to 
instantiate practices of research and care that dramatically decenter the locations of biopower and 
destabilize its multiple local and global agendas. The second is that I have structured my inquiry 
around writers and texts whose impact on the evolution of the epidemic figuring of violence is 
determined by their centrality and continued popularity in canonical Anglophone and Francophone 
literature. As I have shown, these texts are riven with political ambiguity, and their representations 
of epidemic are neither stable, nor ideologically consistent. Nevertheless, Stoker, Camus, and 
Rushdie are writers of global reputation whose texts have earned their place in “world” literature in 
part because they were written in the vehicular languages of colonialism and published and 
promoted through the channels of the world literary markets based in London, Paris, and New 
York. That many other colonial and postcolonial texts and writers participate in the conversation 
and transformation of epidemic figuration, discourses of pathogenicity and toxicity, and experiments 
with medical discourse in imaginative writing goes without saying; in a future version of this project, 
I hope to decenter the literary and discursive canons within which I have pursued these forms of 
representation thus far.  
Finally, since September 11th, 2001, political, cultural, and literary criticism in North America 
and Western Europe has been enormously impacted by research fields and projects that, both 
implicitly and explicitly, engage with questions of how things have been “since September 11th, 
2001.” In this way, despite the dramatically smaller number of lives lost in the immediate zones of 
conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United States, the last decade in literary scholarship, 
philosophy, and political theory shares characteristics with the post-war era in Europe, in terms of 
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the urgency with which cosmopolitan subjects—mostly Anglophone and Francophone, though for 
different reasons this time—have addressed themselves to their own moment in history. I think it is 
fair, in closing, to point to this phenomenon of cultural periodization that defines a distinct epoch 
“since September 11th” as a myopic one. Such a periodization makes a great many assumptions 
about what constitutes the first-person plural. These conversations—at the level of the production 
of a public discourse that could be considered in some way global—do not characterize dominant 
political speech anywhere outside of the West/Islam axis, and even there only among a population 
that is both literate and powerful enough to have access to modes of publication and dissemination 
that exceed the local. The fixation on terrorism and the notion that the entire world has been 
redefined by the 2001 attack on American soil is both insular and naïve in ways that range from the 
quantitative to the qualitative to the broadly epistemic. I want to acknowledge that insularity here, 
and begin to think through how I might speak, in subsequent work, to the prevalence of this 
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